



# SALW Survey of Croatia



**SEESAC**

South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse  
for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons





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## **SALW Survey of Croatia, SEESAC 2006**

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## Acronyms

ATT	Arms Trade Treaty
BICC	Bonn International Center for Conversion
CAF	Croatian Armed Forces
CRC	Croatian Red Cross
DMA	Department for Material Affairs
DSC	Delta Shooting Club
EC	European Commission
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
HK	Heckler and Koch
JNA	Yugoslav People's Army
LTDP	Long Term Development Plan
MFAEI	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration
MIA	Ministry of Internal Affairs
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MoE	Ministry of Economy
MoI	Ministry of Interior
MoJ	Ministry of Justice
NISAT	Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PoA	UN Programme of Action on SALW
PSA	Practical Shooting Association
PSC	Private Security Companies
PTSD	Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
RACVIAC	Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SA-XD	Springfield Armory Extreme Duty
SEE	South Eastern Europe
SECI	Southeast European Cooperation Initiative
SEESAC	South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of SALW
UHBDDR	Association of Croatian Homeland War Volunteers
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNTAES	United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Westerns Sirmium
USKOK	Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organized Crime



## Executive Summary

### SALW Distribution

- It is estimated that there are approximately 968,000 weapons in civilian hands, comprising 371,000 registered and 597,000 unregistered weapons. The number of registered firearms, per capita, is 20 percent of the figure in the United States, 40 percent of the figure in Serbia, 50 percent of the figure in BiH, 100 percent of the figure in Bulgaria and Switzerland, and 800 percent of the figure in Hungary. The estimated number of unregistered weapons constitutes a significant threat to public safety as evidenced by a comparatively high number of armed assaults, murders, robberies and suicides, and a challenge to state and regional security through the ongoing activities of serious and organised crime.
- There is also a very significant SALW (weapon and ammunition) surplus stored in an excessive number of storage facilities. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Ministry of Interior (MoI) between them continue to control approximately 250,000 surplus weapons in addition to millions of rounds of SALW related ammunition. As part of the Long Term Development Plan for the Croatian Armed Forces these SALW have been designated as surplus, however, no definitive decision has yet been taken on how to dispose of them. The maintenance of effective security provisions at each of the 40 storage sites (surplus and formation) involves an unnecessary financial burden and assistance should be made available to facilitate destruction.
- The licit production of firearms in Croatia is centred on a single facility in Karlovac. The volume of production has been growing consistently in recent years with the United States market accounting for 90 percent of sales. Security at the facility appears to be satisfactory; however, the management of the business has been plagued by scandal. Increased overall transparency would serve to demonstrate effective management and control. Overall, exports accounted for US\$ 12.3 million in 2004, the last year for which statistics are available.
- The illicit production of firearms in Croatia is thought to continue, though clandestine facilities for producing and refurbishing firearms have been raided and closed during 2006. The continuing fashioning of specialist firearms for solely criminal purposes is a serious threat to public safety and border security across the EU. The law enforcement community, working in partnership with EU states and the US have demonstrated a renewed willingness to end illicit production.
- Croatia remains a transit state for firearms trafficked from east to west and into the EU. The relative saturation of the Croatian market means there is little domestic demand for firearms from abroad with the partial exception of 'boutique' firearms. There is no evidence of high-volume, state-facilitated trafficking with the majority of interceptions classified as 'ant' [low volume] traffic. The vast 'Green' (land) and 'Blue' (river) border with Bosnia and Herzegovina presents serious challenges to border integrity and poses real problems for Croatia's ability to fulfil Schengen acquis requirements. Current international assistance in this field should be intensified and further coordinated.

### SALW and Human Security

- Overall, the level of reported and investigated crime in Croatia has not changed significantly over the course of the previous four years; however, the level of serious and organised armed crimes has increased by more than 50 percent over five years with armed assault, armed robbery and armed murder all rising year on year with one exception. More than 75% of homicide is committed with unlicensed handguns. The increased incidence of armed crime versus other types of crime demonstrates the need to continue supporting initiatives designed to tackle the symbiotic problems of organised crime and illicit firearm (particularly handgun) ownership through more effective law enforcement, a more robust penal code and an enhanced judicial system.
- It is estimated that approximately half a million people remain traumatized by the armed conflict of the 1990s. Traumatic disorders are more prevalent in the male population, especially among war veterans. Auto-aggressive (self-injurious) behaviour and the wide availability of weapons have led to a high number of male

suicides with guns. In general, the rate of suicides per capita is substantively above the EU average. Current support to veterans and sufferers of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) should be intensified, and the Law on Arms should include a robust provision to ensure PTSD sufferers are not able to access firearms.

- There continues to be a high and disturbing level of armed domestic assaults, often involving people suffering from PTSD. No conclusive statistics exist on the exact number of such incidents, however, a sample period in early 2006 revealed an average of 12 incidents per month involving firearms used against family members or neighbours. In contrast to the type of firearm used to commit organised criminal acts, firearms used in domestic assaults and murders are a mixture of both registered and unregistered, with an apparently high number of firearms remnant from the war. This trend demonstrates the continuing need to tackle the linked problems of PTSD, domestic violence and unregistered firearms through enhanced law enforcement, awareness raising, support to victims and a firearms collection.
- Men are overwhelmingly both the victims and the perpetrators of armed crime, representing 70 percent of all reported cases. Men demonstrate a less negative attitude towards firearms than women, and young men (under 26) demonstrate an involved interest in firearms. Very few women are the perpetrators of armed crime; however, they are disproportionately often the victims of armed domestic crime. Such gender distinctions underscore the need for the state social welfare system, international assistance, law enforcement and awareness-raising to sufficiently target policies and outreach.
- The perceived level of overall security in Croatia is generally high by EU standards, however, it is deteriorating in urban areas such as Zagreb and Split where there has been a perceived rise in the level of crime (not documented). Conversely, the perceived level of security in Areas of Special State Concern is increasing from the very low levels experienced in the late 1990s. Unemployment and economic depression continue to be a source of insecurity, particularly in rural areas. Such geographical distinctions underscore the need for law enforcement and the social welfare system to target outreach and enforcement appropriately, along with addressing the root causes of long-term unemployment. Furthermore, communities with deteriorating levels of security should be targeted by community policing initiatives.
- A strong image of the male defender of the country prevails in Croatia with firearm ownership clearly linked to this image. Fifty percent of respondents in the survey consider the protection of their family and property as the main reason for keeping a firearm, despite comparatively high levels of overall security. This apparent contradiction can likely be attributed to a failure of the state to sufficiently outreach to the public through effective, community-based policing and proactive local administration.
- Despite relatively high levels of firearm ownership, the majority of survey respondents – particularly women - displayed a critical or very critical attitude towards guns, stressing that guns remain a major threat to their communities. Such a finding underscores the untapped value and role that women might play in both future firearms collection initiatives and in raising awareness within the family and community.
- Only 10 percent of the public would turn to non-state actors – such as family, friends, private security companies, private investigators - to provide security and deliver justice; the rest view the police as monopoly providers of public safety in most communities. Survey respondents concluded that the police were reasonably effective at providing basic forms of safety but were ineffective at combating and investigating serious crime, so by undermining overall confidence and security. The improvement in law enforcement capacity to tackle organised crime needs to be continued and enhanced and significant achievements need to be better explained to the public.
- The majority of the public support a future weapons collection and amnesty, which is envisioned in the draft of the Weapons Law. The only criticisms were that previous programmes were too short and that, since 2003, there was no longer an option to turn in illegal weapons without fine or punishment resulting in an increased number of 'abandoned' firearms. A collection will never reach all illegal weapons, as those used for criminal purposes will not be surrendered for fear of punishment; only aggressive law enforcement can tackle this problem.



## State Capacity: Legislation and Regulation

- Croatian legislation on production, customs, and private security providers is generally in line with EU and international standards. However, the absence of controls on brokering represents a serious and unaddressed deficiency in the overall legislative architecture. Furthermore, enhanced transparency in export decisions would ensure greater confidence in the overall effectiveness of the export licensing process and is in line with the EU Code of Conduct. The inclusion of brokering controls in legislation along with a redefining of the state-owned broker / wholesaler *Agency Alan* should be addressed immediately.
- Current Croatian legislation on civilian firearm ownership represents a serious threat to public safety because of inadequate provisions to guard against misuse by individuals with mental difficulties, the ability to carry concealed firearms in public, the length of time an individual may own a firearm without re-licensing and the number of firearms a single individual may possess. The envisioned Law on Arms will, if passed in its current form, go some way to address these shortcomings. The government and particularly the National Commission on SALW should be further supported to ensure legislation promotes responsible firearm ownership and facilitates an enforceable legal framework for the police.
- Private security companies play an important role in commercial security and are well regulated with only limited instances of 'abuse of position'.

## Inter-agency co-ordination

- The inter-ministerial National Commission on SALW represents a potentially effective way to coordinate arms control issues across the Ministries of Interior, Defence, Justice, Health and the various constituent control agencies. This is important because arms control is not a single-agency issue. In 2006, the Commission has significantly enhanced its ability to coordinate control and its efforts should continue to be supported.
- The lack of an integrated criminal justice data system accessible for all law enforcement agencies is a major shortcoming to tackling serious and organised crime. There is an awareness of this problem and the MoI, supported by external actors, is attempting to address this.
- The capacity of non-state actors to contribute to the improvement of the security environment is limited; however, the Catholic Church and Veterans Organisations could play an important role in future interventions. To date, the National Commission on SALW lacks adequate participation from important segments of civil society.

## Transparency

- The sale of MoD surplus has long been the preferred option for disposing of surplus SALW, however, increased transparency within the MoD and a nascent appetite for destruction represents a change in policy direction and reflects a growing commitment to UN and EU Agreements and Codes of Conduct.
- In general, there continues to be limited – though improving – transparency surrounding some government activities related to defence and security. The Freedom of Information Act and the State Secrecy Act (introduced in 2003 and early 2006 respectively) have been controversially debated. A coalition of civil society groups maintains that a 'culture of secrecy' still prevails concerning official policy on free access to information. Greater transparency should be promoted wherever it is not directly detrimental to national security or endangers the integrity of the legal and justice systems.
- Although legal regulations are in place and a parliamentary committee already exists for the oversight of defence and security issues, the Croatian Parliament has not yet engaged in efficient oversight. There is a general lack of civilian expertise on military and security matters in the Croatian Parliament. Greater emphasis should be placed on security oversight and administrative capacity should be strengthened for parliamentarians.

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# SALW Survey of Croatia

## 1 Introduction

### 1.1 Scope

This report is a SALW Survey of the Republic of Croatia. It was conducted between January and June 2006 in accordance with a set of guidelines developed by the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of SALW (SEESAC), in co-operation with a non-governmental research organization, the Small Arms Survey. These guidelines determined the scope, method and objectives of the research. The survey addresses SALW issues through four main components:

- **Small Arms Distribution Survey (SADS)**, which investigates the distribution of small arms across Croatia.
- **Small Arms Impact Survey (SAIS)**, which examines the impact of SALW on the human environment, specifically by looking at armed crime and the impact on individuals, communities and the state.
- **Small Arms Perception Survey (SAPS)**, which assesses the views of the public in relation to SALW in their communities.
- **Small Arms Capacity Survey (SACS)**, which examines the capacity of institutions for dealing with small arms problems.

### 1.2 Methodology

A number of methods were used to gather information for this report, including a nationwide household survey, focus group discussions, in-depth interviews with 'key informants', and a review of secondary sources.

- More than 30 key informants were interviewed over a period of three months on the occasion of four field visits by the researchers. These included staff from key national SALW control agencies within the Croatian Government, employees from international organizations, and a number of journalists, NGOs, as well as war veterans' associations, arms producers, and academics.
- The nationwide household survey implemented by the Croatian polling institution PULS captured 1,000 respondents from a representative sample of individuals 15 years of age and older based on data from the 2001 census. Two stratum criteria were applied: region and settlement size. A random selection of sample points was applied (cities and villages) in each stratum cell, and 100 sample points on the whole sample level (an average of 10 respondents per one sample point). The method of random walk<sup>1</sup> achieved a random selection of households in the sample points. Age and gender quotas were also applied in order to have a representative selection of respondents in selected households. The margin of error for the household survey is 3.1 percent.
- A media analysis of four local newspapers, Novi List, Vjesnik, Slobodna Dalmacija, and Glas Slavonije based in Zagreb, Rijeka, Osijek and Split respectively, was also conducted. SALW related articles were identified and analyzed for 10 two-week periods between January 2003 and September 2005.
- Five focus groups were jointly conducted by PULS and the BICC in the cities of Zagreb, Split, Glina, Vukovar and Knin in the second and third week of March 2006. The focus groups lasted two hours each and consisted of 8-12 people representing an accurate sample according to age, sex, and educational background. All focus groups were facilitated in Croatian but videotaped and later translated into English. The focus group method also included a questionnaire similar to the household survey and was distributed to the participants prior

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<sup>1</sup> The basic sample design is a multi-stage random sampling, called 'random walk'. This method, whereby interviewers are given precise guidelines, has the advantage of not requiring a complete poll basis. Interviewers are provided with an itinerary indicating at what stages they should carry out interviews.



to the focus group discussion. A quantitative and qualitative analysis of the focus groups was therefore possible.

A substantive set of SALW-related data was officially requested through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, which was then forwarded to the respective ministries and state agencies for replies.

## 2 Small Arms Distribution Survey (SADS)

### 2.1 Overall distribution

This survey concludes that there are approximately 1,322,695 weapons in the Republic of Croatia of which an estimated 969,160 are in private hands and 353,535 in the hands of state authorities. This number does not include weapons held in industrial stockpiles.

HOLDERS	QUANTITY	SOURCE
Registered civilian possession	371,702	Ministry of Interior
Estimated illegal civilian possession	597,458	Calculation based on household survey questions
Police service weapons	38,700	Estimate based on number of police personnel
Police stored weapons	54,146	Ministry of Interior
Croatian Armed Forces	260,689	Ministry of Defence
<b>Estimated Total</b>	<b>1,322,695</b>	

**Table 1: Estimated total number of firearms in Croatia**

#### 2.1.1 Legal civilian possession

Even before the 1991 - 1995 conflict Croatia had a high level of civilian ownership of guns, particularly for hunting. For example, in 1989, a total of 299,586 weapons were registered in a population of 4.6 million.<sup>2</sup> However, many weapons were bought during the conflict and later legalized and registered by their owners, bringing the total in 2002 to 394,419 legally registered weapons in a population of 4.2 million.<sup>3</sup> It is therefore clear that, after the war, Croatia experienced a significant growth of civilian legal armaments.

Nevertheless, by 2005, the overall number of registered weapons slightly decreased to 371,702.<sup>4</sup> The majority of registered weapons are no longer hunting rifles but pistols and revolvers, amounting to a total of over 140,000 weapons. The remainder of these weapons consist of various other kinds of guns.

Croatia has two different kinds of licences for weapons: possession, and possession and carrying.<sup>5</sup> The majority of weapons (205,971) are licenced for possession and carrying, while 137,222 are registered for possession only and have to be stored safely at home. This is the reverse of findings in other countries in the region, where most of the licences are issued for possession only. For example, in Serbia there are 1.1 million legally registered weapons, but only 1,557 persons are actually allowed to carry their weapons – all other licences are for possession only.<sup>6</sup>

Although civilian registration is already very high in Croatia, requests for new licences also remain high. In 2005, 15,028 requests were made, namely to obtain a license to possess and carry a weapon (12,071). Among these requests, two thirds were made for double-barrel guns (hunting and sports), and only one third for pistols; 3,270 were denied.

In addition, the administration revoked licences for 2,158 weapons in 2005 as a result of medical assessments or other pertinent reasons. Approximately 2,788 weapons were also turned over in 2005 through voluntary cancellations of weapons licences. Unfortunately, the Ministry of Interior could not provide the numbers for the

<sup>2</sup> Small Arms Ownership in the former Yugoslavia, 1989. BICC Conversion Survey 2002, p.127.

<sup>3</sup> *Report on the Implementation of the National Program for the Increase of General Security through Voluntary Submission of Arms, Ammunition and Explosive Ordnance Devices* (in Croatian), Ministry of Interior, 2002, p.16.

<sup>4</sup> All numbers from the *Reply of the Ministry of Interior to the BICC questionnaire on SALW*, May 2006.

<sup>5</sup> See chapter on SALW legislation.

<sup>6</sup> *Living with the Legacy*. SALW Survey of Serbia, UNDP, 2005, p.11.



years before, so it can only be estimated that the overall reduction of about 20,000 registered weapons in the period between 2002 - 2005 may have resulted from revoked licences and voluntary cancellations.

### 2.1.2 Illegal civilian possession

There are no official statistics on the civilian possession of illegal weapons, nor has a single representative of the Mol presented an estimate in interviews conducted for this survey. The same is true for most of the key informants interviewed for this survey.

Nevertheless, almost every interviewee stressed the problem of illegal weapons as one of the biggest threats to Croatian society, and the same sentiment was echoed in all focus group discussions. Given that in 2005, approximately 75% of homicides were committed with illegal weapons, this issue remains a prominent one for the Government of Croatia to address.<sup>7</sup>

Almost 500,000 citizens of Croatia are war veterans, having either served or volunteered in the Croatian Armed Forces during the war. Often, people with minimal or no military training sold their car or other valuables to buy a military gun and defend their country.<sup>8</sup> At the beginning of the war in 1991, parties distributed weapons without registration and ordinary citizens looted military barracks of the JNA and the Territorial Defence Forces, seizing large amounts of SALW.<sup>9</sup> At the end of the war, official soldiers were asked to return what had been issued to them as weapons, but all SALW that were bought privately or seized during the war are likely to have remained in their ownership. So far, there are no official statistics on how many SALW were actually returned to the CAF at the end of the war.<sup>10</sup> The CAF currently holds 260,000 weapons, including surplus stocks. It is likely that no more than 31,000 weapons were destroyed after the war.<sup>11</sup> The high number of veterans and the limited control of their possession of SALW upon early discharge after the war indicate a high number of illegal weapons.<sup>12</sup>

Most of the illegally owned weapons are believed to be arms that are banned under the *Law on Arms*, namely military style weapons such as assault rifles and automatic guns for which civilians cannot obtain a license. Even the current draft of the National Strategy on SALW identifies this as the biggest problem with guns in Croatia. The draft notes that *'during the homeland war a great number of firearms, ammunition, mines and explosives was concentrated on the territory of the Republic of Croatia, and a huge number of those weapons are still illegally possessed by Croatian citizens. It is mostly weapons the procurement, registration and possession of which is banned by the Weapons Act'*.<sup>13</sup>

Although different offers of amnesty allowed people to return illegally owned weapons without punishment, there was no financial compensation offered, with the exception of one period. Considering that many of these weapons were purchased under duress/in the context of conflict, often using a family's only remaining savings, it is likely that most people decided to keep them for insurance and protection, particularly given the perceived widespread fear of the resurgence of war.

The household survey for this study can provide more information on this issue. Although calculations based on public opinion polls have to be treated carefully, they can deliver an estimated guess on the scope of the problem of illegal weapons in Croatia.

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<sup>7</sup> *Nacional*, 'Croats keep weapons for sports and self-defence', 03 April 2005.

<sup>8</sup> BICC interview with Ozren Zunec, Professor of Political Science, University of Zagreb, 22 March 2006.

<sup>9</sup> *Op cit.* Zunec.

<sup>10</sup> *Op cit.* Zunec.

<sup>11</sup> See section on destruction capacity of this survey for detailed numbers on destruction.

<sup>12</sup> See SADS and SACS chapters for detailed numbers.

<sup>13</sup> *Draft National SALW Control Strategy and Action Plan*, 2006.

Two questions were asked to assess the amount of weapons in households:

- a) Does your household own a gun and if so how many?
- b) On average, how many weapons do you think that people have in their household?

As expected, and similar to other surveys conducted in the region, the number of people who replied positively to the first question was relatively low. Using the 2001 census, calculations of this question yield a result of 313,205 weapons.<sup>14</sup> Nevertheless, since the issue of illegally owned weapons is a delicate one, it is unlikely that many people revealed the truth about their ownership, particularly in the case of weapons that are banned for civilian possession. The actual number of weapons in Croatian households is therefore likely to be much higher.

The second question can be used to deliver a more accurate assessment of firearm ownership patterns in Croatia. While 40.2 percent of the respondents did not know and 4.5 percent provided misleading answers, the majority of the remaining 55.3 percent estimated an average of one or more weapons per household. Only 8.5 percent said that there were on average no weapons in Croatian households. The median of all of these responses is 1.1 firearms per household.<sup>15</sup> Given that there are 1,477,377 households in Croatia according to the latest census in 2001, and applying different levels of confidence regarding the accuracy of the reply, the resulting numbers range from 1,255,770 to 1,625,115. The median of the results of both questions is thus used to provide a more realistic picture.

CONFIDENCE LEVEL	WEAPONS PER HOME (ESTIMATE)	TOTAL	MEDIAN
Low	0.85	1,255,770	784,487
Medium	1.10	1,625,115	969,160
High	1.35	1,994,458	1,153,831

**Table 2: Estimates by respondents of household survey on arms per household**

These estimates refer to the total number of weapons in Croatian households. In order to obtain the potential number of illegally owned weapons, the 371,702 registered weapons need to be subtracted. In conclusion, the estimate is:

CONFIDENCE LEVEL	TOTAL NUMBER OF ESTIMATED ILLEGAL WEAPONS FOR CROATIA
Low	412,785
Medium	597,458
High	782,129

**Table 3: Estimate of illegal weapons in Croatian households**

A total of 597,458 illegal weapons would mean that about 12.9 percent of the Croatian population possess an illegal weapon. This is about the same as the estimate for Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the respective SALW Survey assessed that about 13.2 percent of the population have illegal weapons, while the surveys for Serbia and Albania assessed a lower percentage of 8 to 9 percent respectively. These results seem reasonable given the history of the Balkan wars, where more fighting took place on Croatian and Bosnian territories, which likely led to the purchasing of more arms by civilians and the looting of military barracks. In addition, the nature of the conflict decreased the state's control over SALW in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, while the Yugoslav regime maintained a higher level of control over these weapons.

<sup>14</sup> See Annex H for a detailed description of the calculation and methods applied.

<sup>15</sup> A similar assessment of one gun per household, but only based on key informants, was made in the SALW Survey for Montenegro. See 'A House is not a Home without a Gun'. SALW Survey of Montenegro, SEESAC, 2004, p.4.

### 2.1.3 Private security companies' possession

There are currently 180 private security companies (PSCs) registered on the territory of Croatia. According to the Ministry of Interior, PSCs register their firearms for the company. The individual employee who is carrying a weapon must obtain a license as well.<sup>16</sup>

Altogether, the MoI has issued licences to PSCs for approximately 1,800 weapons. So far, PSCs are neither allowed nor have raised the demand for long-barrel guns as service weapons. Consequently, all registered weapons are pistols.

The biggest PSC in Croatia, Sokol Maric, has 740 handguns<sup>17</sup> registered for its 2,000 employees.<sup>18</sup> The number of registered weapons among PSCs is included in the aforementioned total number of registered civilian weapons in Croatia.



Picture 1: Money Transporter of the Croat Private Security Company Sokol Maric in front of a bank, Zagreb (Copyright Tobias Pietz).

## 2.2 Holdings and stockpiles

### 2.2.1 Ministry of Interior (MoI) holdings

The number of service weapons currently held by Croatian police officers is classified as 'Top Secret' by the Ministry of Interior (MoI), and therefore data could not be obtained for this survey.<sup>19</sup>

Nevertheless, it is possible to estimate the numbers of weapons in service at the MoI. According to experts, the number of weapons issued to police officers and other armed personnel at the MoI (pistols, long-barrel guns, others) are likely to vary between 1 - 3 weapons per officer.<sup>20</sup> Similar to the SALW for Serbia, this provides an average of 1.5 weapons per MoI employee.<sup>21</sup> As of 2004, the Croatian police consisted of 19,807 police officers (including border guards), 4,428 civil servants and 1,580 other employees.<sup>22</sup> Accordingly, the total number of weapons in use at the MoI is estimated to be around 38,700.

In addition, the MoI provided total numbers of weapons and ammunition currently in stock. These weapons were either confiscated during police raids, collected through various campaigns, obtained from detected caches, or voluntarily turned in by their owners.

<sup>16</sup> BICC interview with Damir Stolnik, MoI, General Police Directorate, Zagreb, 06 June 2006.

<sup>17</sup> *Sokol Maric. Company Profile and Structure*, April 2006, p.10.

<sup>18</sup> BICC interview with Mario Salaj, Sokol Maric, Zagreb, 19 April 2006.

<sup>19</sup> Incidentally, the total numbers of weapons and ammunition of the Ministry of Defence are not classified as top secret and are therefore available to the public.

<sup>20</sup> BICC interview with Knut Dreyer, Senior Police Advisor, Head of Police Affairs Unit, OSCE Mission to Croatia, Zagreb, 14 February 2006.

<sup>21</sup> See SALW Survey of Serbia, p.18.

<sup>22</sup> *Op cit.* Dreyer.

TYPE	TOTAL / TYPE
Revolver	53
Pistol	10,959
Hunting Rifle	1,392
Semi-automatic Military Rifle	1,659
Automatic Rifle	28,016
Machine Rifle	3,933
Machine Gun	5,606
Heavy Machine Gun	327
Light Anti-Aircraft Artillery	1,395
Mortar	425
Air Rifle	338
Gas (Air) Gun / Rifle	18
Improvised Weapons	25
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>54,146</b>

**Table 4: Total number of stored weapons at the Ministry of Interior<sup>23</sup>**

A total of 54,146 weapons are currently kept in storage, including a high number of military weapons, approximately two-thirds of this stock. The number of ammunition in storage is 2.6 million rounds, the highest share of which is ammunition for guns with a total of 1.6 million rounds.

It is not clear whether these surplus items will be destroyed, donated or sold. Altogether, the number of weapons under the control of the MoI is estimated to be almost 93,000.

## 2.2.2 Military holdings

As described above, the Croatian Armed Forces (CAF) are still undergoing a huge transformation and modernization in order to achieve membership in NATO. Moreover, a lot of military personnel have already been discharged from the CAF and additional reductions are likely in the near future. These reductions have caused a severe problem of surplus SALW at the Croatian Ministry of Defence (MoD).<sup>24</sup>


Accompanying the finalization of the Long Term Development Plan (LTDP) of the CAF, the numbers of SALW currently in possession of the CAF were calculated. The foreseen number of required SALW is still not fixed, as discussions on the LTDP and the number of military personnel continue. In addition, some of the stored SALW are meant for an anticipated increase in the Croatian police force in the years 2006 - 2015. The following numbers are therefore subject to change in the near future.

Nevertheless, the total number of SALW at the MoD suggests that the ministry will be facing some serious challenges on how to deal with surplus weapons and ammunition. The total amount of weapons currently adds up to over 260,000, only 69,000 of which may be needed in the future. A surplus of over 190,000 weapons, most of which are automatic rifles (130,000), is likely to challenge the MoD's capacity to handle alone.<sup>25</sup> For example, the annual destruction rate of the MoD over the past several years has been between 1,000 to 2,000 weapons.

<sup>23</sup> All numbers provided by the MoI in June 2006.

<sup>24</sup> BICC interview with Ivica Nekic, General Manager, Agencija Alan, Zagreb, 21 March 2006.

<sup>25</sup> See section on destruction capacities.



NAME OF PRODUCT	EXISTING WEAPON STOCKS	REQUIRED WEAPONS	SURPLUS WEAPONS
Mortar 82mm	554	270	284
Mortar 60mm	2,353	270	2,083
Pistol	26,726	9,500	12,226
Automatic Pistol	535	300	235
Repeating Rifles	353	0	353
Semi-automatic Rifles	3,622	0	3,622
Machine Gun	7,941	2,452	5,489
Sniper Rifles	2,353	500	1,853
Automatic Rifles	188,321	51,000	137,321
Sub Machine Gun	21,524	1,950	19,574
Machine Gun	1,358	250	1,108
Heavy Machine Gun	1,159	0	1,159
Grenade Launcher	3,890	2,550	1,340
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>260,689</b>	<b>69,042</b>	<b>191,647</b>

**Table 5: Overview of MoD weapons and LTDP anticipated requirements (June 2006)** <sup>26</sup>

The LTDP has not yet identified the amount of ammunition needed by the armed forces in the future. However, the total number of almost 170 million rounds of ammunition<sup>27</sup> currently kept by the MoD indicates, once again, a problem of surplus. This is especially true given that most of the ammunition is not appropriate for sale in contrast to a lot of the surplus weapons.<sup>28</sup>

## 2.3 Production

Although Croatia has a tradition of producing military goods, it has never reached the levels of production of Bosnia and Herzegovina or Serbia during Yugoslav times.<sup>29</sup> At the beginning of the war in 1991, the Republic of Croatia produced about 7 percent of the Yugoslav military output.<sup>30</sup> Because of the high demand and the growing defence budget – approximately 15 percent of the national budget – during the war, Croatian arms production grew to about 62 producers with 10,000 employees in 1993.<sup>31</sup>

After the war, the reduction in defence spending in conjunction with economic transition, and growing competition with other arms producers, led to a wide decrease in the country's arms industry. The military industry is no longer a significant part of Croatia's economy. The number of employees in SALW-related production has shrunk from 1,500 in 2003 to about 400 employees in 2006.<sup>32</sup> The same is true for the number of producers. In 2004, the SALW Monitor listed eight production facilities that are registered for the production of SALW and ammunition in Croatia, yet the official reply of the Alan Agency, lists only three remaining defence companies in 2006.<sup>33</sup> These are HS Produkt in Karlovac, Metallic in Rijeka, and ATIR in Zagreb, the latter two of which produce the grenade launcher RGB-6 and its corresponding grenades.

<sup>26</sup> All numbers from the *Reply of the Ministry of Defence to the BICC questionnaire on SALW*, June 2006.

<sup>27</sup> In a meeting with EUSAC, an official from the MoD estimated that this amount likely equates to 6,500 tones, but that it could even be as high as 8,000 tons.

<sup>28</sup> *Op cit.* Nekic.


<sup>29</sup> *Op cit.* Zunec.

<sup>30</sup> SALW Monitor 2004, p.83.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> SEE SALW Monitor 2004, p.83; SEE SALW Monitor 2005, p.70.

<sup>33</sup> *Reply of the Alan Agency to the BICC questionnaire on SALW*, May 2006.



HS Produkt is the last remaining producer of firearms in Croatia and, as such, has come under the scrutiny of the media for its allegedly dubious deals and transfers. Unfortunately, neither the Alan Agency nor HS Produkt were willing to share details with the survey team on production and economic performance.<sup>34</sup> Only six to seven years ago, the situation for HS Produkt and other local producers was disastrous as a result of a shrunken local market and lack of competitiveness internationally, though this has definitely changed for the company.<sup>35</sup> The company only produces pistols of five different calibres and three different sizes, HS 2000 being the one most produced.<sup>36</sup>

Entry into the all-important American market was accomplished with a contract with the American Intrac Arms Int. for an order of 50,000 pistols in five years.<sup>37</sup> But the most influential decision on the path of the company was undertaken a year later when HS Produkt signed a contract with the American producer and seller, Springfield Armory, for a period of 15 years. Since then, 90 percent of the company's production of the HS 2000 goes to the US and is sold by the company as Springfield Armory Extreme Duty or SA-XD.<sup>38</sup> The SA-XD has been named 'pistol of the year' twice in the US,<sup>39</sup> and over 100,000 weapons have been sold in the country over the last five years.<sup>40</sup> Currently, HS Produkt is competing with other arms producers to provide the new service pistol for the US Army, which would mean the sale of up to 645,000 pistols.<sup>41</sup> Overall, the step into the American market boosted the local production of pistols in Croatia, which is evident in the rise in the value of exported pistols from \$350,000 in 1999 to over \$7million in 2003.<sup>42</sup>

According to the Alan Agency, there are smaller arms producers that are using their services to help market their products. In a catalogue provided by the Agency, all available Croatian military products are advertised for foreign buyers. In addition to the aforementioned HS 2000 and the RPG 6, there are additional weapons listed.<sup>43</sup> These include two types of submachine guns (both 9mm), a 12,7mm sniper rifle, a 20mm cannon, and three different types of mortars (60mm, 82mm, and 120mm). However, the General Manager of the Alan Agency explained that only 30 percent of the advertised items are currently produced in Croatia, though all others can be produced upon request.<sup>44</sup>

Inquiries about the illegal production of arms in Croatia either at official factories or in smaller illegal sites were denied by government officials, HS Produkt, and journalists.<sup>45</sup> Yet, unmarked pistols and submachine guns of Croatian production were detected in the UK in 2002,<sup>46</sup> while in June 2006, the Croatian police discovered an illegal arms factory in Novi Golubovec near the Slovenian border.<sup>47</sup> The factory is suspected to have produced various types of high quality pistols, revolvers, automatic pistols and machine guns for quite some time. At the site, the police confiscated several dozen illegally produced weapons, 2,000 rounds of ammunition, 15 hand grenades, drugs and other items.<sup>48</sup> According to the police, the arms were intended for 'murders, robberies and terrorism'.<sup>49</sup> Ten people were arrested and more than 50 are currently being investigated in connection with the facility.

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<sup>34</sup> The exact numbers were requested officially through the questionnaire sent to the MFAEI, but not provided by the Alan Agency.

<sup>35</sup> BICC interview with Ivica Nekic, General Manager, Alan Agency, Zagreb, 21 March 2006.

<sup>36</sup> *Op cit.* Gvozdanovic.

<sup>37</sup> NACIONAL 'Croatian Pistol for 645,000 US Soldiers', 07 February 2006.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>39</sup> BICC interview with Pavlin Zeljko, Director, HS Produkt, Karlovac, 23 March 2006.

<sup>40</sup> Nacional, 'Croatian Pistol for 645,000 US Soldiers'.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>42</sup> See next chapter on exports.

<sup>43</sup> Catalogue provided by Ivica Nekic, Alan Agency, 21 March 2006. The catalogue is available online under <http://www.aalan.hr/default.asp?ID=26> (accessed on 18 June 2006).

<sup>44</sup> *Op cit.* Nekic.

<sup>45</sup> *Op cit.* Nekic, Zeljko; BICC interview with Marijina Bilus and Mario Duspara, Journalist, Nacional, Zagreb, 21 March 2006.

<sup>46</sup> SEE SALW Monitor 2004, p.91.

<sup>47</sup> BBC Monitoring Service 'Croatian Police Smash International Arms-smuggling Ring' 08 June 2006.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*



While this incident demonstrates the growing competence of the Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organized Crime (USKOK), it nevertheless shows that even in today's Croatia, large scale and high quality illegal production is still possible.

## 2.4 Exports and transfers

Besides the export and sale of weapons and ammunition by Croatian producers, the government has been regularly selling and transferring surplus weapons from the armed forces, the police, and SALW obtained through collection campaigns. Unfortunately, the government did not provide the survey team with official numbers on Croatia's overall exports over the past several years.

EXPORTS PER YEAR (USD)	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Grenade Launchers	-	-	-	3,520	136,682	119,600
Military Rifles, Machine Guns and Others	1,731,479	532,455	1,211,904	42,794	101,654	82,831
Cannon, Mortars and Others	-	-	-	748,585	193,728	-
Ammunition and Explosives	1,937	9,674	182,717	20,994	4,602	-
Pistols / Revolvers	354,306	975,891	1,477,083	4,609,045	7,056,839	425,990
Weapon Parts and Ancillaries	2,510	25,960	17,576	10,951	60,653	166,052
Air Rifle Pellets	7,279	-	1,512	7,820	1,612	-
Sporting and Hunting Shotguns	-	5,076	-	1,343	5,543	55,984
Ammunition	103,360	4,195	3,135,126	934,017	3,096,236	451,697
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,200,871</b>	<b>1,553,251</b>	<b>6,025,918</b>	<b>6,379,069</b>	<b>10,657,549</b>	<b>12,300,154</b>

**Table 6: Value of SALW-related exports in USD (1999 - 2003). (Source: NISAT Database, 16 May 2006)**

Nevertheless, looking at the number provided by the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) in their database, there has been continuous growth in SALW exports from Croatia. The total value of exported weapons and ammunition has increased by almost five times between 1999 and 2003 to a total of over US\$ 10 million. This increase is mainly due to the success of HS Produkt in the American market, as 70 percent of the value of exports are pistols from this producer.

A lot of the transferred SALW are also surplus weapons that are mainly sold, but sometimes also donated by the Croatian Government. Examples of donated weapons include 2 million rounds of ammunition, the 12 SPG-9 Kopye, a Russian tripod-mounted man-portable recoilless gun, together with 10,000 projectiles, as well as 10,000 grenades for the RPG-7 handheld anti-tank grenade launcher. These items were donated to the Afghan National Army by a decision of the Croatian Government in September 2002.<sup>50</sup>

YEAR	VALUE (USD)
1996 - 1998	-
1999	875,000
2000	223,650
2001	915,175
2002	1,650,000
2003 <sup>51</sup>	-
2004	640,000
2005	85,000

**Table 7: Value of sold surplus weapons and ammunition in USD<sup>52</sup>**

<sup>50</sup> Decision of Donating Military Equipment for Training of the Afghan National Army, No.50330109-02-01, Zagreb, 05 September 2002.

<sup>51</sup> The Alan Agency did not reveal why there were no sales in 2003.

<sup>52</sup> Reply of the Alan Agency to the BICC questionnaire on SALW, May 2006.

In addition, the Alan Agency, which is in charge of advertising and selling the designated surplus of weapons and ammunition of the Croatian Armed Forces, has successfully generated profits from sales, reaching US\$ 1.65 million in 2002. The Agency plans to sell and export more surpluses in the upcoming years. Now that the LTDP is ready and the surplus identified, up to 190,000 weapons could be sold and exported. In the interviews conducted for this survey, destruction was not seen as a priority, except for a wide amount of the surplus ammunition that is no longer in good condition for sale.<sup>53</sup> However, the MoD is appearing to change its stance on this issue by recently engaging in discussions with international agencies and donors on funds to help support the destruction of surplus stocks.

The survey was not able to obtain any data on overall SALW transfers and brokering in Croatia. Especially on brokering, the legal provisions are regarded as insufficient.<sup>54</sup>

## 2.5 Illicit small arms transfers

Recently, the international media and also Amnesty International were especially critical about the transfer of weapons from Bosnia and Herzegovina through the territory of Croatia. Almost 300,000 AK47s and 64 million rounds of ammunition were exported from Bosnia and Herzegovina between June 2004 and July 2005 - the biggest arms export in Europe since the Second World War. The majority of these were sent to Iraq, but Amnesty International believes that up to 90,000 were bought by dealers in the UK, Germany and Switzerland through a Croatian broker who also performs business for the US Department of Defence.<sup>55</sup> According to Amnesty International, that broker is the Zagreb-based Scout Company, which steered the arms transfer from Bosnia and Herzegovina to Iraq through the southern Croatian port of Ploče.<sup>56</sup> EUFOR and OSCE sources believe that Scout played a key role in the early phases of the transfer, but Croatian officials did not come across anything illegal with respect to that transfer.<sup>57</sup>

Another incident that displays a continuing lack of control of military transfers was the 'loan' of rockets to Macedonia in 2001.<sup>58</sup> In this case, over 5,000 128mm rockets for a multiple rocket launcher system were exported on a loan to Macedonia, but were never returned. Officially, the rockets were still in the books as being kept in storage in Croatia, though many people at the military knew that they were gone. The situation was revealed when the rockets were claimed 'missing' to the MoD and General Staff by an officer not involved in the secret deal in 2006.<sup>59</sup> The media then discovered that the rockets were actually sold through the Alan Agency to Macedonian companies, and that both the minister and the chief of cabinet had actually signed off on the transfer from different storage sites. The exact amount of money earned by the Alan Agency and others for this transfer are still not known, but are currently being investigated.<sup>60</sup>

Besides this case, smuggled small arms from Croatia have made it into the international news several times in recent years. For example, reports indicate that arms have been smuggled to the Real IRA, the Basque terrorist organization ETA, and to organized crime groups in the UK.<sup>61</sup> While unproven, arms were also allegedly transported to Palestine through Croatian ports.<sup>62</sup> Numerous recently reported cases of arms cache discoveries and arrests of dealers and smugglers by the Croatian police and USKOK suggest that the illegal arms trade continues to be an important problem in the country. Besides the aforementioned discovery of the illegal factory and smuggling

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<sup>53</sup> *Op cit.* Nekić.

<sup>54</sup> See section on SALW legislation.

<sup>55</sup> *Daily Mirror UK* 'AK47 Gun cache is in Britain' 23 May 2006; and also *Guardian Unlimited* 'Small arms shipped from Bosnia to Iraq 'go missing' as Pentagon uses dealers' 12 May 2006.

<sup>56</sup> *BBC Monitoring Service* 'Croatian minister has no information on Zagreb company's Bosnian arms exports' 11 May 2006.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>58</sup> *Glas Slavonije*, 'Missiles are not stolen, they're stored in warehouse in Lički Osik' 24 January 2006.

<sup>59</sup> *Iskon.hr* 'Jozo, where are the rockets?' 21 January 2006.

<sup>60</sup> *Vecernji List* 'Everybody knew about the plunder, nobody about the money' 21 January 2006.

<sup>61</sup> SEE SALW Monitor 2004, p.91.

<sup>62</sup> *Vecernji List* 'Palestinian terrorists buying arms from Croatian mafia' 18 September 2005.



ring, USKOK seized a large amount of weapons and arrested 11 people for smuggling in July 2005, as well as four Montenegrins who tried to smuggle 208 tons of explosives from the port of Rijeka in May 2005.<sup>63</sup>

One of the most disturbing incidents regarding the illegal arms trade in Croatia are the charges against the former owners of HS Produkt, Ivan Zupcic and Marko Vuković, as well as the customs officer Pero Antunovic, for allegedly having exported 3,810 pistols worth 778,410 German Marks in 1998 / 1999.<sup>64</sup> A total of four illegal shipments were revealed: three from the customs office at the airport in Zagreb and one from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Two of the shipments went to the fictitious company Metropolitan Capital Investment in the US, to Liberty Enterprises on the Virgin Islands, and one to a company called G C Ezeth International Ltd. in Nigeria.<sup>65</sup> Weapons from this shipment have been clearly linked to murders in Madrid, Amsterdam, Leeds and London.<sup>66</sup>

Although HS Produkt dismissed the allegations and bad press as the attempts of foreign competitors to harm their business,<sup>67</sup> many interviewees agree there is a lack of transparency and potential for corruption in the whole institutional set-up and oversight of the arms trade, as well as in the companies involved.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> *T-Portal* 'Croatia – illegal arms dealer's paradise' 31 May 2005; and *Vecernji List* 'Zagreb: 11 persons arrested for illegal arms dealing' 05 July 2005.

<sup>64</sup> *Vecernji List* 'Mol in business with suspects for smuggling 3,810 guns' 09 October 2005.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>66</sup> Derek Dunne (Amsterdam, 03 June 2000), Manuel Gimenez Abad (Madrid, 06 May 2001), PC Ian Broadhurst (Leeds, 26 December 2003), Theo Van Gogh (Amsterdam, 02 November 2004).

<sup>67</sup> *Op cit.* Zeljko.


<sup>68</sup> *Op cit.* Zunec; BICC interview with Marijo Kavain, Journalist, Slobodan Dalmacije, Split, 17 March 2006.

### 3 Small Arms Impact Survey (SAIS)

#### 3.1 SALW and crime

According to the Ministry of Interior (Mol), total crime levels have remained more or less the same over the last couple of years with about 110,000 recorded incidents per year, while the overall level of violence and number of crimes involving SALW have increased dramatically.<sup>69</sup>

The accuracy of the number of total incidents reported in Croatia is somewhat questionable, as it is significantly lower than those reported in other countries of the same size.<sup>70</sup> The actual figure could therefore be 30 percent higher mainly due to the population's continuing low reporting mentality.<sup>71</sup>



**Figure 1: Number of crimes committed with SALW<sup>72</sup>**

The Mol has provided the survey with detailed information on crimes committed with SALW. The information shows that the total number of crimes committed with weapons increased by over 50 percent during the period 2001 to 2004 and remained at that level in 2005.<sup>73</sup>

This coincides with and supports information provided by journalists and the Mol regarding the recent and substantial growth of violent crime and casualties due to armed robberies.<sup>74</sup> Armed robberies were also mentioned as the biggest threat of armed violence in all focus groups conducted for this survey, especially in those conducted in the cities of Zagreb and Split. The use of assault rifles and long-barrel guns in these robberies has been another disturbing trend.

Incidentally, most crimes are committed with pistols or revolvers, which are the most widely held and legally registered weapon among the civilian population. Nevertheless, both police and journalists stressed that most crimes are committed with illegally owned weapons, which to some extent also include weapons banned for civilian possession such as rifles and their military counterparts.

<sup>69</sup> BICC interview with Josip Vrbic, Criminal Police Directorate Organized Crime Department, Ministry of Interior, Zagreb, 05 June 2006.


<sup>70</sup> BICC interview with Knut Dreyer, Senior Police Advisor, Head of Police Affairs Unit, OSCE Mission to Croatia, Zagreb, 14 February 2006.

<sup>71</sup> *Op cit.* Dreyer.

<sup>72</sup> Authors' calculation based on the information provided by the Ministry of Interior in a meeting in Zagreb on 05 June 2006.

<sup>73</sup> All data and calculations are based on the information provided by the Ministry of Interior in a meeting in Zagreb on 05 June 2006.

<sup>74</sup> *Op cit.* Vrbic, Kavain, Bilus, Duspara.



**Figure 2: Crimes committed with pistols / revolvers**

Approximately 50 - 60 percent of each weapon-related crime each year falls under the Croatian Chapter 17 of the penal code dealing with robberies and burglaries. Cases of murder or attempted murder with a gun have since dropped from 146 in 1999 to only 77 in 2005. Domestic violence and rape with weapons make up only a few reported cases per year; however, this very much contradicts the anecdotal evidence provided by women's organizations and the media for the past ten years. Again, the actual number of cases of domestic violence is likely to be much higher due to the low reporting mentality on this issue.<sup>75</sup>

The household survey provided additional information on crime and SALW. When asked if they or members of their family had been victims of an armed crime, almost 10 percent replied yes, out of which the majority of respondents had experienced an 'armed threat'. While the results of the survey were broken down by region and war-affected areas, there were no significant differences between these regions with regard to the victims' experiences.

In addition to information on armed crime, the survey also requested data on self-inflicted harm with weapons. Data provided from the Ministry of Health on people who intentionally harmed themselves using SALW or explosives is statistically low, reflecting only those who had been hospitalized after the incident.

INCIDENT CATEGORY	2000		2001		2002		2003		2004	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
X72 Intentional self-harm by handgun discharge	10	1	1	1	13	2	9	0	6	0
X73 Intentional self-harm by rifle, shotgun and larger firearm discharge	4	0	6	1	0	0	2	0	5	1
X74 Intentional self-harm by other and unspecified firearm discharge	2	0	0	0	3	0	1	0	0	0
X75 Intentional self-harm by explosive material	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

**Table 8: Hospitalization of people wounded by firearms (2000 - 2004)<sup>76</sup>**

Another calculation from the National Institute for Public Health shows much higher numbers of suicides using guns.<sup>77</sup> Out of 871 suicides in the year 2004, 17 percent were committed according to the international reporting codes X72-75, meaning that 148 people killed themselves either with a gun or using explosives.<sup>78</sup> Between

<sup>75</sup> See chapter on domestic violence in this survey.

<sup>76</sup> Reply of the Croatian Ministry of Health to BICC Questionnaire on SALW, May 2006.

<sup>77</sup> Magnitude of Mental Disorder Problem in Croatia, Presentation by V Hrabak-Zerjavic and M Silobrcic Radic, Croatian National Institute for Public Health, Cambridge, December 2005.

<sup>78</sup> Magnitude of Mental Disorder Problem in Croatia.

1995 and 2004, the total number of suicides remained stable at around 800 to 900. The total rate of suicides per 100,000 was 19.6 in Croatia in 2004; however, two thirds were committed by men, bringing the male rate to 30.2 and the female rate to a low of 9.8.<sup>79</sup> Compared to other European countries, the Croatian suicide rate is quite high. For example, in 2003 Bulgaria had a rate of 14 per 100,000, the Czech Republic 16.9, while the Netherlands and the UK were at a low of 9.2 and 6.9 respectively.<sup>80</sup>

### 3.2 A case study of SALW and crime from the media

A sample of articles from four Croatian newspapers in Zagreb, Rijeka, Osijek, and Split was selected for ten, two-week periods between January 2003 and September 2005. The articles on incidents involving SALW were analyzed to identify the type of incident, the gender and age of the actors involved, the type of weapon used and the impact of the crime upon the victim. The analysis is only meant to provide a picture of the problem the way it is portrayed in the media and should be seen as complementary to the official crime statistics from the MoI.

DATE	2003	2004	2005	2006
January (01 - 14)	Novi list Vjesnik Slobodna Dalmacija Glas slavonsije	Novi list Vjesnik Slobodna Dalmacija Glas slavonsije	Novi list Vjesnik Slobodna Dalmacija Glas slavonsije	Novi list Vjesnik Slobodna Dalmacija Glas slavonsije
May (01 - 14)	Novi list Vjesnik Slobodna Dalmacija Glas slavonsije	Novi list Vjesnik Slobodna Dalmacija Glas slavonsije	Novi list Vjesnik Slobodna Dalmacija Glas slavonsije	N/A
September (01 - 14)	Novi list Vjesnik Slobodna Dalmacija Glas slavonsije	Novi list Vjesnik Slobodna Dalmacija Glas slavonsije	Novi list Vjesnik Slobodna Dalmacija Glas slavonsije	N/A

Table 9: Time frames and newspapers analysed

Altogether, 83 incidents with weapons were reported in the analysed period. Both victims and perpetrators were predominantly male. Particularly in the case of perpetrators, 66 percent were male versus only 9 percent female.




Figure 3: Age of perpetrators (newspaper analysis)




Figure 4: Age of victims (newspaper analysis)

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> See the official WHO statistics: [www.who.int/mental\\_health/prevention/suicide/country\\_reports/en/index.html](http://www.who.int/mental_health/prevention/suicide/country_reports/en/index.html). Accessed 03 August 2006.



Most actors identified by the media were between 26 to 35 years of age. It is likely that the older individuals in this age group would have had fighting experience in some kind of regular or irregular armed unit or as conscripts during the war. Unsurprisingly, the types of weapons reportedly used in these crimes also include war-type weapons and explosives, including hand grenades. More specifically, 8 percent of the weapons used were identified by the media as machine-guns (half of them AK47s), and 10 percent as explosives. Together with the 16 - 25 age group, the 26 - 35 age group constitutes more than half of all victims and perpetrators of armed crime. While the Serbian Survey shows similar results, it is the youngest age group in Bulgaria that has the highest involvement in armed crime.<sup>81</sup>




Figure 5: Types of weapons in newspaper analysis

The frequency and distribution of the crimes reported does not allow any conclusions to be made on whether or not there is a certain time of year where there are more or less crimes involving weapons. With regard to the impact of the crimes, 29 percent of the reported cases resulted in injuries, 14 percent resulted in homicide, and 8 percent were suicides. Altogether, shooting made up the biggest share of all reported crimes committed, followed closely by assaults and the illegal possession of SALW.




Figure 6: Types of crime in newspaper analysis

<sup>81</sup> See SALW Survey of Serbia, p.33; and *Taming the Arsenal. SALW Survey of Bulgaria*, UNDP, 2005, p.42.

Although the above media analysis can only provide a sample of the information received by the public, and keeping in mind that news coverage is often guided by public demand, it can still be said that media coverage of armed crime increased during the period from 2003 to 2005. In September 2003, the four papers reviewed covered only two incidents, but from September 2004, some 12 - 14 incidents were covered in every two-week time frame assessed.




Figure 7: Number of incidents of armed crime reported in newspaper analysis (2003 - 2006)

### 3.3 SALW and gender

Almost all areas and issues of SALW in Croatia show clear differences between the sexes whether in perceptions, attitudes, impact of crimes, or even employment (in security services). These differences are important to highlight, as they may serve to guide future interventions for SALW control in the country.


Where the perpetrator's sex was identified in the newspaper article, the above media analysis shows an overwhelming dominance of 66 percent male perpetrators in crimes committed with SALW compared to only 9 percent female. The same holds true for the victims who were mainly male (42 male victims to 9 percent female victims). However, some of the violence targeting women is still underreported, as the reporting of crimes in general remains lower in Croatia than in Western Europe.<sup>82</sup>

The household survey also shows different perceptions and attitudes of men and women towards guns. Asked about whether or not there are too many guns in society, over 81 percent of women said yes compared to 73 percent of male respondents.

This distinction is even clearer when asked about why they would not choose to own a gun; here, 71 percent of women replied that they do not like guns compared to only 51 percent of men. Women also see guns as a bigger threat to their community than men do.

<sup>82</sup> BICC interview with Knut Dreyer, Senior Police Advisor, Head of Police Affairs Unit, OSCE Mission to Croatia, Zagreb, 14 February 2006.

**Do you believe that possessing weapons makes you safer or less safe as a community?**



**Figure 8: Perception of gun ownership by gender**

Because of the critical female attitude towards weapons, potential collection programs or SALW Awareness activities could possibly rely on strong support from women and women’s organizations.

### 3.4 Domestic violence and SALW

Domestic violence continues to be a problem in Croatia as in many other post-conflict countries. In 2004, a Croatian newspaper reported a significant increase in reports of domestic violence during the past several years.<sup>83</sup> As early as 1996, researchers revealed a connection between the return of soldiers and an increase in domestic violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.<sup>84</sup> Since many soldiers brought their weapons back home as well, incidents of domestic violence often involve the use of arms.

An analysis of the Ministry of Veterans, Family and Inter-Generation Solidarity summarized alarming levels of family violence in Croatia.<sup>85</sup> According to their analysis, the police received 55,969 requests for intervention in situations of family violence between 01 January 1999 and 31 December 2003. The police filed complaints against a total of 24,518 offenders who committed acts of violence in the family as a misdemeanour offence. Within these cases, a total of 34,550 people were injured, 9,394 of which were minors. With respect to the sex of the victims, 23,489 (68 percent) of them were female. In general, every third woman in Croatia has been a victim of physical aggression by her marital/extramarital partner at least once.<sup>86</sup>

Women’s organizations assess that in the beginning of their work in Croatia in the mid-90s, up to 30 percent of all victims of domestic violence were victimized with a gun.<sup>87</sup> Although this number dropped to 8 percent in 1999 and 7.17 percent in 2001, the actual number is estimated to be much higher due to the number of unreported incidents. For example, anecdotal evidence from women’s shelters and emergency hotlines shows that every second woman reporting a case of domestic violence has been threatened with a gun.<sup>88</sup> Unfortunately, most organizations dealing with domestic violence have only recently introduced a reporting category on the kind of weapon used in an assault or threat, and will edit the resulting data in the future.<sup>89</sup>

Most women’s organizations see as the biggest problem the link between mental health problems and the possession of weapons, although alcoholism, drugs, and unemployment are also major issues that can lead to

<sup>83</sup> Bjelanovic et al., 2004, p.2.

<sup>84</sup> Nikolic-Ristanovic, 1996, p.75.

<sup>85</sup> *National Strategy of Protection against Family Violence, for the Period from the Year 2005 till the Year 2007*, Ministry of Veterans, Family and Inter-Generation Solidarity, 2005

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.3-6.

<sup>87</sup> BICC interview with Dubravka Kprcina Stipicic, MIRTA, Split, 17 March 2006.

<sup>88</sup> BICC interview with Neve Tolle, Autonomous Women’s Organization, Zagreb, 16 February 2006.

<sup>89</sup> BICC interview with Melina Skouroliakou, International Liaison, B.a.B.e. – Women’s Human Rights Group, Zagreb, 17 February 2006.

domestic violence.<sup>90</sup> In the case of mental health problems, criticism has been raised concerning old licences for guns that were issued without a medical check, as well as the long time frame before individuals get checked again.

### Box 1: Man with PTSD shoots his wife and two girlfriends

In 2005, a man who had been diagnosed with PTSD shot his wife and two of her girlfriends. Between 1997 and 1999 he had been treated three times for mental problems. Nevertheless, in 2000, a medical commission responsible for determining the mental and physical fitness of individuals applying for a weapon license declared that he was able to carry a gun. The commission was composed of two psychologists, one medical doctor, and one psychiatrist who knew about his medical history. According to the Croatian newspaper *Jutarnji List*, it is absurd that a person diagnosed with PTSD cannot get a drivers license above a certain category and has to pass a medical test every year, but only needs a medical check-up every 10 years to own a gun – and can actually keep the gun in the meantime!

Source: *Jutarnji List*, 23 and 25 March 2005

In general, the reporting mentality on domestic violence has slightly improved along with the legal provisions. However, for a long time, neither the police nor the courts were very active in prosecuting domestic violence. Unfortunate incidents where the police did not believe the female victim and released the male perpetrator have led to several cases of homicide. These cases were widely covered in the Croatian media and have resulted in more severe prosecution and punishment of perpetrators since late 2005, according to some women's organizations. In addition, the police have started to become more aware of the problem and to take reports of domestic violence more seriously.<sup>91</sup> Women's organizations are now urging victims of domestic violence to immediately reveal whether a weapon was used in the assault or threat of assault, as the police are more likely to act in such cases.

## 3.5 Masculinity and SALW

Although the war and the transition of Croatian society has led to serious changes in gender roles and relations, the dominant masculinity in the country remains the strong man as the protector and breadwinner of the family. This image is often propagated not only by the Catholic Church, but also the Ministry for Family, War Veterans and Inter-Generation Solidarity. In addition, soldiers from the war are often idealized as male warriors or heroes.

In periods of transition and economic uncertainty, as well as a result of trauma caused by war, it is often difficult for men to measure up to and maintain that dominant masculinity. As a result, some men have resorted to alcohol, drugs and often violence, including domestic violence, as discussed above.<sup>92</sup> But in many cases, war veterans in particular resort to auto-aggressive (self-injurious) behaviour. The rate of suicide among veterans is estimated to be very high and almost always involves the use of arms, especially war-type guns.<sup>93</sup> This is clearly linked to the wide availability of SALW in Croatia as a result of the war – before the war, hanging was the most common method for suicide, but today it is the use of a gun.<sup>94</sup> As previously mentioned, men are more likely to commit suicide in Croatia, with a suicide rate of 30.2 per 100,000, compared to the female rate of 9.8.<sup>95</sup> Comparatively speaking, the male rate in Bulgaria in 2003 was 21, while the male rate in the UK for the same year was 10.8. The Croatian rate of male suicides thus represents a major problem for the country.

War veterans make up 80 percent of all currently treated individuals in psychiatric clinics in Croatia.<sup>96</sup> When taken in, veterans have to reveal whether or not they possess a gun. According to the head of Psychiatry of the

<sup>90</sup> *Op cit.* Stipicic.

<sup>91</sup> *Op cit.* Tolle.

<sup>92</sup> BICC interview with Vedrana Zdero, Psychologist, MIRT, Split, 17 March 2006.

<sup>93</sup> *Op cit.* Kavain.

<sup>94</sup> BICC interview with Prof Dragica Kozaric-Kovacic, Head of the Department for Psychiatry, University Hospital Dubrava, Zagreb, 21 March 2006.

<sup>95</sup> *Magnitude of Mental Disorder Problem in Croatia*, Presentation.

<sup>96</sup> *Op cit.* Kozaric-Kovacic.



University Hospital in Zagreb, the number of veterans confirming their possession of a gun has decreased since 2002.<sup>97</sup> But the number of individuals not telling the truth could be high. The availability of guns and the high prevalence of mental problems therefore pose a continuing threat to society. According to a specialist involved in the medical testing process for obtaining a license to carry a weapon, this process involves five different specialists and is quite rigorous. However, cases highlighted by the media have shown that even tested people have committed homicides, leading to a great deal of scepticism concerning the accuracy of such tests. In addition, while medical tests are required to obtain a license to carry a weapon, there is currently no testing process required in order to obtain a license to possess a weapon.<sup>98</sup> The new *Law on Arms*, if adopted by Parliament, aims to rectify this situation by requiring regular medical checks for licences to both carry and possess a gun. A regular medical check-up as part of the overall licensing process would be an important arms control measure, as some psychological problems can surface years after a traumatic experience.

Men were not only mobilized widely into armed units during the war and more likely to possess and use a gun, but they also have different attitudes towards and perceptions of guns, according to the household survey.<sup>99</sup> Men are also much more interested in practical shooting, whether as a sport or to improve their firing skills. Out of the 830 members of the *Croatian Practical Shooting Association (CRO P.S.A.)*, only five are women.<sup>100</sup>

In general, male fascination with guns continues to be high in Croatia. Awareness campaigns should take this factor into account in their outreach and education activities, as well as the strong image of former soldiers as war heroes.<sup>101</sup>

### 3.6 SALW, youth and children

According to the United Nations, 'youth' are individuals anywhere between 15 and 24 years of age. Youth violence and access to weapons can pose a significant threat to societies, especially in times of economic and democratic transition such as in Croatia.

The media analysis undertaken for this survey showed that 23 percent of reported victims were between 16 and 25 years of age, or the third highest share. In addition, 16 percent of the perpetrators were from this age group, again the third highest share. What is more, the household survey shows that about 18-19 percent of 15-24 year olds has a positive attitude towards guns, saying that they would choose to own one if legally allowed.

#### Box 2: Incidents of youth and SALW

'20 - 30 people beat up my brother and me. One put a gun into his mouth. The police didn't do anything. He is traumatized and can't go out alone anymore. I couldn't watch that happening again. Next time I will be prepared and have a gun. If I had one last time I would have used it.'

*Teenage boy, focus group discussion, Knin.*

'A nine year old boy shot another boy with a pistol. He thought it was a toy gun.'

*Young woman, focus group discussion, Glina.*

<sup>97</sup> *Op cit.* Kozaric-Kovacic. Unfortunately, this data has not been systematically collected and edited so far. Moreover, the number of individuals not telling the truth could be high.

<sup>98</sup> *Op cit.* Kozaric-Kovacic. This is going to change with the adoption of the new *Law on Arms*.


<sup>99</sup> See Chapter 5.2.

<sup>100</sup> *Op cit.* Gvozdanovic.

<sup>101</sup> See also Chapter on traditions of SALW use.



**If your household could own a gun legally, would you choose to do so? By age groups**



**Figure 9: Perception of gun ownership by age group**

Croatian youth show a certain fascination for guns. American gangster rap music together with its violent symbols is very popular among teenagers. This alone does not pose a problem for society, but given the wide availability of weapons in post-war Croatia, youth awareness activities and sensitization appear to be necessary.

The survey team could not identify any comprehensive analysis of violence in schools. So far the only weapons found at school are knives, but one interviewee raised the concern that guns could become more widespread in the future.<sup>102</sup> A survey cited in the Croatian newspaper *Vecernji List* in 2004 found that 37 percent of Croatian primary school kids have seen weapons at their schools, such as knives or guns.<sup>103</sup> It also reported that 24 percent of students attending a secondary school in Croatia have seen weapons in their school.<sup>104</sup> The article also quotes an expert who argues that the problem mainly arises from the availability of weapons in their homes.

The Croatian NGO Anti-War Campaign has recently undertaken a nation-wide survey on the perceptions and attitudes of school children towards civil service, the armed forces, and related issues.<sup>105</sup> Asked about whether or not they could agree to the sentence 'I would like to have a gun at home', only about 20 percent of the respondents strongly agreed. However, over 31 percent also strongly agreed with the statement 'I like to shoot with guns.'<sup>106</sup> Broken down by sex, 51 percent of the male school children strongly agreed with this statement compared to only 14 percent of the girls. The same survey also asked respondents to assess their attitude towards the statement 'I would like to throw a hand grenade', out of which 39 percent of the male youth agreed or strongly agreed, whereas only 7 percent of the girls agreed.<sup>107</sup> Moreover, about 47 percent of all youth respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement 'I do not want to be near guns', while 38 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement. Once again, these numbers indicate that there is a strong group within Croatian youth that are interested in guns. While the phrasing and methodology of the survey is debatable, particularly with regard to the above statement on hand grenades, the results can be used to identify some trends that are lacking in the absence of more comprehensive studies. Taking into account the high number of legal and illegal weapons in the country, some active measures are needed. So far, the Croatian school curriculum does not deal with violence or guns, but this could be an important entry point for raising awareness of these issues among youth.<sup>108</sup>

<sup>102</sup> BICC interview with Ivana Batarelo, Center for Educational Research and Development, Zagreb, 22 March 2006.

<sup>103</sup> Unfortunately, the survey team was not able to identify the survey referred to in the article, nor the ways in which it was conducted. Nevertheless, this piece of information stresses the need for a deeper analysis of the issue, which is ultimately beyond the scope of this study.

<sup>104</sup> *Vecernji List*, 'Ucenici u Skole nose nozeve svicarce, ali i pistole' 22 January 2004.

<sup>105</sup> Similar studies had been undertaken already from 2000 - 2005, but only in a couple of big cities. The 2005 study also tackled smaller cities in Croatia. The main focus of the survey was to reveal the factors influencing school kids to decide to join either the Croatian Armed Forces or to choose civilian service. Altogether, the survey asked the respondents to assess 60 different statements of which only three are of direct interest for this SALW Survey. BICC interview with Lea Jurisic, Anti-War Campaign, Zagreb, 22 March 2006.

<sup>106</sup> Lea Jurisic et al., Survey on Youth and Civilian Service in Croatia, 2006 (unpublished document).

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>108</sup> Op cit Batarelo.



### **3.7 Economic impact**

War-affected areas such as Eastern Slavonia or the regions temporarily held by Serb military units during the war have been classified by Croatia as 'Areas of Special State Concern', namely due to their low level of development, destroyed infrastructure, and the problem of internally displaced persons or refugees.

From the outset of this study, the survey team estimated that such war-affected areas would be especially saturated with SALW and therefore experiencing a lot of SALW misuse or crime, hindering any potential economic progress. That assumption proved to be incorrect. The factors influencing human security and economic development in these areas, although rooted in the destructive impact of the war, display no concrete link to SALW issues. However, illegal weapons, mostly war-type weapons, are still likely to be kept by civilians in those areas, as some distrust remains.

The focus groups revealed that the level of crime and personal feelings of insecurity were to be found less in cities in war-affected areas such as Knin or Vukovar. Although weapons were still seen as a threat to their communities, other factors such as high unemployment and low investments were seen as the main reasons for economic insecurity and depression.

## 4 Small Arms Perception Survey (SAPS)<sup>109</sup>

### 4.1 Perceptions of traditions of gun ownership and use

Increasingly, research on SALW has been using the term 'gun culture'.<sup>110</sup> While there is no clear definition of or consensus on the meaning of this term, it continues to be used both in literature and practice to describe attitudes and behaviours toward weapons. However, without a clear conceptual basis, the term is of little to no use in explaining these attitudes and behaviours, as well as in providing entry points for small arms control activities.<sup>111</sup>

Instead, a more valuable approach is simply to record observable attitudes, activities and behaviours relating to the possession and use of guns without joining these into an overarching 'gun culture'. In Croatia, many observations can be made that, together with the results of the household survey, allow us to describe certain patterns and continuing attitudes towards guns.

The 1991-1995 armed conflict continues to be a defining issue for Croatia and is also a very personal issue for many citizens, as a large section of the population was directly affected. In particular, war veterans and their associations continue to be an influential force in the public discourse on the war.<sup>112</sup> Over 10 percent of the current Croatian population are officially registered as war veterans – albeit mostly male – and there are 334 veterans' associations in the country. The public image about the war, however, does not take into account the possibility of war crimes committed by the Croatian Armed Forces (CAF), as evidenced by the fierce debate surrounding the role of General Gotovina during Operation 'Storm'. Rather, the widely dubbed 'Homeland War' is largely regarded as the struggle of an under-equipped army joined by ordinary citizens who sold their cars or spent their savings to buy a gun and fight not only for their state, but also for their home.<sup>113</sup>

Croatians mainly use the term 'branitelj' or 'defender' instead of the term 'war veteran', which is a critical element of glorifying the war, war soldiers, and weapons.<sup>114</sup> Even the government uses this term; in fact, the Ministry of Veterans, Family and Inter-Generation Solidarity would be correctly translated as the Ministry of Defenders. Although critical voices are increasingly arguing for the need for a new and objective discourse, the glorification perspective remains dominant and has a clear impact on how owners of weapons feel about their guns. For example, many interviewees stressed the image of the weapon as a trophy from the war or a memory with strong feelings attached to it, but also, and in a negative sense, an instrument that yields power.<sup>115</sup> Especially in cases of failed social reintegration, trauma and economic depression, the gun often remains the last resort for strength and pride.<sup>116</sup> The rising cases of domestic violence, as well as suicides involving the use of weapons after the war constitute the clearest evidence of this link.

Another reason for the glorification of the war, war soldiers, and the gun might be rooted in the long history of glorification of the Yugoslav partisan war, and the following propaganda and education during the former Socialist Yugoslavia. Yugoslav school children were taught courses on defence of the country and were familiarized, but

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<sup>109</sup> The analysis of the SAPS is based on a household survey conducted by the Croatian polling institution PULS. The margin of error for the sample of 1,000 respondents is 3.1 percent.

<sup>110</sup> See also *Living with the Legacy – SALW Survey of Serbia*, SEESAC, 2005, p.37.

<sup>111</sup> A COST meeting of SALW researchers and practitioners at BICC in November 2005 widely discussed the term 'gun culture' and concluded that 'agreeing on a definition of 'gun culture' was not considered a priority' for SALW control or research (*Summary and Minutes from the COST Meeting on 'Gun Culture'*, Bonn, February 2006).

<sup>112</sup> According to the Ministry of Veterans, Family and Inter-Generation Solidarity, 489,407 persons are officially registered as war veterans in Croatia. *Reply of the Ministry of Veterans, Family and Inter-Generation Solidarity to the BICC Questionnaire on SALW*, June 2006.

<sup>113</sup> *Op cit.* Zunec.

<sup>114</sup> BICC interview with Ranka Radovic, Center for Peace Studies, Zagreb, 15 February 2006.

<sup>115</sup> *Op cit.* Stipicic, Radovic, Zunec.

<sup>116</sup> See also chapter on masculinities in the SAIS section.



not trained, with weapons.<sup>117</sup> At the same time, the concept of 'Total Defence' saw a huge amount of people trained with SALW and listed as reserves in the so-called Territorial Defence Forces.<sup>118</sup>

In the focus groups conducted for this survey, many participants stressed that guns are part of the 'macho' culture in Croatia, and that many men need guns to feel strong and important in situations where they are facing unemployment and lack prospects in their lives. They also highlighted that many people simply keep weapons for hunting, and that hunting is still very popular in rural Croatia, thus forming part of the overall tradition of weapons in civilian possession. In the household survey, the second most popular reason (30.8 percent) for owning a gun was hunting and sports shooting. At the same time, the SALW Distribution Survey (SADS) shows that the overwhelming number of registered civilian weapons are in fact pistols and not hunting rifles, showing a disconnect between stated and unstated goals.

### Box 3: Guns and Parliamentarians

In 2003, the Croat weekly *Globus* published an article about patterns of gun ownership in the Croatian Sabor, the parliament of the country. It revealed that 39 out of 151 parliamentarians from that election period legally owned different types of guns. The total amount of weapons declared was more than 100 weapons. One parliamentarian got hold of a whole arsenal during the military operation 'Storm' in 1995. Another one said that he often carries his pistol in the pocket of his trousers. Some cannot remember how many weapons they actually own and others clearly refused to ever give up their guns. In contrast, female parliamentarians declared not to own any weapons at all.

Source: *Globus*, 01 September 2003

Asked about why they would choose to own a firearm, only 6.4 percent of the respondents selected tradition, while an overwhelming 55.8 percent selected the protection of themselves, their family, or their property as the main reason for choosing to own a weapon. Nevertheless, this result is indicative of a very traditional attitude towards gun ownership, and also one that is likely deeply rooted in the image and experience of the war.

According to many interviewees, the incidence of celebratory fire at weddings or on the occasion of holidays or victories at sports events used to be widespread in Croatia during and even for a long time after the war. This behaviour led to serious injuries: a young man in the focus group in Knin was wounded at the age of 12 on New Year's Eve by a stray bullet, while another focus group participant in Glina lost her husband at their wedding to gunfire from celebratory shooting. Encouragingly, interviewees noted that the number of celebratory shootings has dropped immensely since 2002. Some attributed this decrease to the awareness campaign conducted by the 'Farewell to Arms' campaign of the Ministry of Interior, while others stressed the influence of the Catholic Church through public announcements and sermons.<sup>119</sup>

### Box 4: A recent pattern in firearms and crime – Folk Club Shootings

'My lover has a deadly gun, pulls it out for fun. He fires a bullet or two every Friday night, without much a do.' This song by Croatian singer Vesna Pezo refers to what is now often called 'Folk Club Shootings'. They happen every once in a while on a weekend in Zagreb, Osijek or Split in clubs that play the very popular and macho 'folk music' or so-called 'turbo folk'.

There had been four - five incidents of gunfire in front of these clubs within a period of four months in early 2006, a couple of which even resulted in murder. While some people stress that it is not about the music but just rival criminal gangs, others see the mixture of alcohol and the folk music that is glorifying guns as the main reasons for the shootings. An online questionnaire of *Glas Slavonije* resulted in 27.5 percent of the respondents saying that they take a weapon with them when they go to clubs. Although some might have selected that answer as a joke, there are probably enough individuals who do carry a gun to folk clubs. A popular joke says that 'If you don't have a gun at the entrance of a folk music club, you will be given one inside!'

Source: *Glas Slavonije*, 15 February 2006

<sup>117</sup> *Op cit.* Gvozdanovic.

<sup>118</sup> *Op cit.* Zunec.

<sup>119</sup> *Op cit.* Radovic.

It is still quite common for a man to own a gun in Croatia. Traditional patterns of gun ownership for hunting and self-protection prevail, and even male parliamentarians openly reveal the amount of weapons they possess (see Box 3). Most of the behaviours and attitudes regarding guns are closely linked to the war and its glorification. A more critical public debate on the war would therefore cross-benefit measures to reduce the amount of weapons in society and help change masculine images of war heroes. As the rising incidence of domestic violence in Croatia shows, these images can be dangerous to citizens and be counter-productive to the progress of modern societies.

## 4.2 Perceptions of human security

The general perception of security has been central to various SALW control measures in the past to assess their potential success or effectiveness. In countries or regions where a certain level of insecurity or distrust prevails, collection programs in particular have faced enormous difficulties.<sup>120</sup>

Compared to one year ago, how do you think that the level of your own personal security has changed? Frequencies.




Figure 10: Perceptions of physical security


As the level of violence, especially crimes with firearms, has increased over the past several years, it is not surprising that this development is reflected in the results of the household survey. Compared to one year ago, only 5.5 percent of the respondents thought that their personal security had improved, while 20 percent believed that it had deteriorated and the majority stated that it had stayed the same. Interestingly, when broken down 23 percent of urban respondents believed their personal security had deteriorated, while only 15 percent of respondents in rural areas felt the same way.

In the focus groups, there was a huge rift between perceived security in urban and rural areas and urban and war-affected areas. The questionnaires used before the focus group talks revealed a high level of perceived insecurity – 36 percent – among respondents from all focus groups. At the same time, results from questionnaires in the two urban cities of Split and Zagreb were completely different to rural cities like Glina, or war-affected cities like Vukovar and Knin. More precisely, people from the urban cities feel less secure, while individuals from Knin and Vukovar – two cities that saw some of the worst fighting and forced displacement – have seen a much greater improvement in their security since that time.

<sup>120</sup> Such as the UNDP collection program in Kosovo in 2003.



**How secure do you feel compared to some years ago?**




**Figure 11: Change in perception of physical security**

However, focus group participants differentiated between economic security and security related to crime. While participants from war-affected areas may feel more physically secure than during the war, they now believe that economic insecurity has become their main problem. In Knin and Glina, for example, people complained about the high level of unemployment and poor prospects for the future. In Vukovar, the most devastated city in Croatia during the war, participants saw their economic situation as catastrophic and felt that their survival was under threat. There was no fear of weapons or crime, but rather a fear of a deep economic depression.

In Zagreb and Split, people continually stressed the rising number of armed robberies, which is what they feared most. This assessment was also supported by the household survey, which showed that people generally see robberies and burglaries as the crimes most committed in their neighbourhood. However, broken down by area of residence, only 11.5 percent of respondents from rural areas selected this answer, compared to 42.3 of respondents residing in large urban areas.

**What types of crime occur most often in this area nowadays?  
 Frequencies.**



**Figure 12: Frequency of types of crime committed**


SALW control measures like collection programs could therefore be an option for rural areas. As many interviewees and focus group participants believe that weapons leftover from the war are mainly to be found in rural and war-affected areas, this combined with the high level of perceived security in these regions might be a fruitful place to start a SALW collection in the future.

### 4.3 Perceptions of SALW proliferation

Judging from both the household survey and the focus groups conducted throughout Croatia, the issue of SALW is seen by a majority of respondents as a great concern for security. Two thirds of all respondents either agree or strongly agree that the availability and use of guns is of great concern for their community. In the questionnaire for the participants of the focus groups, even 68 percent replied that weapons are the main threat to their security.

The household survey revealed that there are some differences in perception between rural and urban areas, as well as between people with different levels of education and income. While about 70 percent of the urban population were concerned about the issue of weapons, only about 50 percent of rural respondents concurred. And in the household survey, while about 50 percent of respondents with a primary education agreed to this notion, over 70 percent of respondents with tertiary education were concerned about the proliferation of weapons. The same difference was also observed between respondents with low and high-income levels.

**Do you think the availability or use of SALW is an issue of concern to your community? Frequencies.**



**Figure 13: Perception of small arms threat**


Nevertheless, there is a general rejection of weapons in many parts of Croatian society, which is evident from the replies to the survey question on whether respondents feel there are too many weapons in the country: an overwhelming 78 percent agreed, while only 12 percent disagreed. This result shows that there can be strong public support for any additional means of arms control by the Croatian Government, even though there is a high level of gun ownership.

Broken down, urban respondents are again more critical towards guns than rural respondents, with 80 percent of them agreeing with the above statement versus 70 percent. The same is true for people with tertiary or higher education, where about 85 percent responded that there are too many weapons in Croatia. As previously mentioned, when broken down by gender, 81 percent of women and 73 percent of men agreed with this statement.

When asked about where weapons are most likely to be found, more specifically in which groups of society, most people selected 'criminal groups'.



**In which parts of society? Frequencies.**




**Figure 14: Sources of weapons in society**

However, as evident in the above chart, 50 percent also selected ex-fighters as the second most likely source of weapons. In a country where 10 percent of the population are officially registered as veterans, and perhaps even more were involved in the fighting, this number may reflect a situation that many experts also raised in interviews: many weapons from the war remain illegally in the hands and households of ex-combatants. The potentially high number of guns in civilian possession is also reflected in the response for ‘whole society’ and ‘in households’, which were both picked by more than 20 percent of respondents.

A noteworthy result is the low percentage of respondents – only 6 percent – that believe a lot of weapons are still held by the Serb minority. This percentage rises to about 14 when looking only at the responses from individuals living in war-affected areas. But even among these individuals, more than 80 percent believe that weapons are *not* to be found among the Serb minority. Again, this shows that insecurity and distrust in war-affected areas has been significantly reduced and might therefore be fertile ground for more arms control measures.

The public use and display of weapons, be it for celebratory shooting or for crime, has been reduced according to most of the focus group participants. However, the household survey shows that people still hear shots in their community to some extent, about 28 percent do so less than once a month, but about 8 percent hear them more frequently.

**On average, how often do you hear weapon-shots in your neighbourhood? Frequencies.**




**Figure 15: Frequency of gunshots heard in neighbourhood**

The percentage of people who actually see weapons in their neighbourhood is even lower, though about four to five percent see them frequently.

#### 4.4 Perceptions of possession and ownership

Although the level of legal ownership in Croatia is already very high, the majority of the respondents of the household survey, as well as most focus group participants displayed a critical attitude towards the possession of guns. Almost 40 percent of the respondents in the household survey are of the opinion that people should never handle a gun. In many of the focus groups, participants stressed that nobody should be allowed to own weapons except for the police, or maybe some hunters.



**Figure 16: Perception of appropriate age for gun ownership**

Again, women were even more critical, with almost 50 percent agreeing in the survey that nobody should ever handle a gun.


As mentioned before, most people assessed that weapons in Croatia are held for the protection of personal property and family. However, over 40 percent believe that the weapons are probably left over from the war, which indicates the type of weapon and the possible illegal status of the ownership in many cases. Hunting was chosen by about 30 percent of the respondents – a number that increased to over 40 percent in rural areas – and tradition was chosen by only 7 percent of respondents.

An overwhelming 81 percent declared that they would not choose to own a weapon even if they were legally allowed to do so. Only about 16 percent replied to the contrary and said they would choose to own a weapon. The main reasons provided by the former group were that they do not like guns (63 percent), they do not need them (42 percent), they are dangerous for their families (36 percent), and they are a danger to the community (11 percent). The higher the education or income level of the respondent, the higher the number of people stressing the potential danger of guns to the family (more than 40 and 50 percent respectively). The people who replied to the contrary more or less replicated the results from the general question on the reasons why people keep guns: protection of family and property (over 50 percent), hunting (30 percent), and tradition (6 percent). Only about 2 percent picked work as a reason they would decide to own a gun. The percentage that chose 'for protection of family and property' dropped significantly among respondents with a higher level of income or education. In war-affected areas, the survey observed a slightly higher percentage of people choosing 'to protect the community' as a reason for obtaining a gun (10 percent versus 2 percent in non war-affected areas).

As questions regarding personal ownership of weapons have been always very sensitive in SALW Surveys, the household survey included several more general questions, asking the interviewees first about their assessments of other people's possession patterns before asking them directly whether or not they own a weapon. The




refusal to answer some of these questions rather than responding negatively may indicate that the respective respondents actually do own a weapon.



**Figure 17: Distribution of weapons in the community**

When asked about the number of weapons in their community, only 30 percent replied that there are no weapons or hardly any weapons in their community. On the other hand, 44 percent said that there are weapons in their communities and 26 percent refused to answer this question. Compared to one year ago, 47 percent thought that the overall number of arms has stayed the same, while 11 believed it has decreased and 5 percent have detected an increase.

When asked about the actual number of weapons Croatians keep in their households, the result of the survey shows that, although about 40 percent did not know or refused to answer, 36 percent believed there to be at least one weapon per household. Approximately 12 percent believed there were even more weapons, while only about 8 percent believed that there were no weapons in households.



**Figure 18: Estimation of the number of weapons in Croatian households**

Asked directly whether or not their household owns a gun, a majority of 87 percent replied in the negative. Only 4.6 percent refused to answer, while 8.4 percent admitted that their household owns one gun or more, with 'one

gun' having the highest percentage of 5.3. In war-affected areas, the 'no' reply to the above question was slightly lower than in non-war affected areas (82 compared to 88 percent).

There is a sharp difference between respondents' own admission of having a gun and their overall perception of gun ownership in their communities. In general, respondents think that ownership of guns in their community is much higher than the results from the question on personal ownership indicate.

This was also supported by the views expressed in the focus groups for this survey. While only one person openly admitted to owning a weapon, the overwhelming opinion in the groups was that there are too many weapons in Croatia, and that it is too easy to obtain guns, legally and illegally. Most participants in the focus groups thought that the biggest share of weapons in homes are remnants from the recent war, including illegal ones.

#### Box 5: SALW at the courthouse

At the meeting of the Heads of Croatian Prisons in Glina in May 2006, the Assistant Minister of Justice revealed that huge masses of firearms, ammunition, and explosives are seized at Croatian court entrances. In 2005, 18,015 objects that are not allowed inside the courtroom were detected. Among the objects were 886 pistols, 622 bottles of teargas, six electric cattle prods, 513 scalpels, 1,237 screwdrivers, 15 explosive devices, and 7,508 knives.

Source: Jutarnji List, 17 May 2006

However, a high number of participants in all focus groups stressed that nobody should be allowed to own weapons except for the police. The negative attitude displayed towards gun ownership even in rural areas is likely beneficial for future SALW control interventions.

## 4.5 Perceptions of security providers

The view of the population towards the police can be described as negative. Although over 90 percent of the respondents in the survey said that only the police should be responsible for security, their perceptions of the police are rather negative. The same was true for the focus groups. While all agreed that they would turn towards the police in cases of crime, they nevertheless thought that the police were not efficient and often corrupt. In Zagreb and Split, the people thought that only the right connections could help to get the police active. In Vukovar and Glina, participants distinguished between the capacity of the police to provide physical security, which they thought was well done, and the failure of the police to fight crime, such as smuggling and corruption.

Asked about the general efficiency of the police to solve crime and protect people, over 30 percent believed the police were not efficient. Half of the people though the police's capacity was moderate while only about 12 percent believed them to be efficient. There were significant differences between rural and urban respondents, as well as between respondents with different levels of education. While rural respondents were less critical about the police, 40 percent of urban respondents believe the police are inefficient. People with tertiary education had the highest level of mistrust towards the police, with over 43 percent saying that the police are not efficient (only 27 percent with primary education agreed). Again, these results were mirrored in the replies and discussions in the focus groups. In comparison, only 17 percent of the respondents in the SALW Survey for the Republic of Serbia assessed the police to be inefficient.<sup>121</sup> It is crucial to improve the performance of and perceptions towards the police, not only for future SALW collection programs, but for human security in general.

A positive result from the survey is the low number of respondents who believe that informal actors should be responsible for security. Only about 5 percent of the respondents picked the family or ex-combatants to be suited for this task with no significant differences between war-affected and non war-affected areas. Similar results were obtained in the SALW Survey for Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004 and show that, despite the continuing distrust towards the police, there is a general understanding of their role and responsibilities as the ultimate providers of state security.<sup>122</sup>

<sup>121</sup> SALW Survey of Serbia, p.45.

<sup>122</sup> Sources: CSS/BICC Household Survey; SALW Survey of Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNDP BiH, 2004, p.39f.



Nevertheless, when compared to a recent public opinion poll conducted in 2006 throughout the Balkans, the level of distrust among Croatians towards the police is alarming. In this survey, 51 percent of Croatians respondents said they distrust the police, while only 26 percent replied to the contrary.<sup>123</sup> Approximately 84 percent in this poll thought that bribery is common or widespread in the police, an assessment that was also frequently made in the focus groups, particularly those held in Zagreb and Split.

#### 4.6 Perceptions of SALW control interventions

Most of the people in the focus groups were aware of the collection campaign 'Farewell to Arms'. The ultimate success of that campaign, however, was discussed somewhat controversially. While some claimed that it had been successful, the majority of the participants felt that it had not been successful enough in reducing the number of illegal weapons in Croatia. Some even suspected that people who turned in their weapons did so to distract from the ones they continued to keep. The participants also felt that the campaign was too short, did not have enough publicity, and should have never stopped because there is no longer any legal way to dispose of weapons. In fact, participants admitted that some people have just been throwing their guns away. All participants recognized that this method of disposal, which was highlighted both in Glina and in Knin, poses a great danger for children and teenagers.

In all focus groups, people stressed the need for financial compensation in order to persuade individuals to turn in their guns during collection campaigns. Many assessed that the collection programs were most successful when cash was offered, which is not one of the conclusions from the 'Farewell to Arms' campaign.<sup>124</sup> The majority of respondents in the household survey also claimed that financial means would be the most important incentive for future collection campaigns. At the same time, 20 percent also believed the introduction and application of more severe legal sanctions for possession of weapons to be an important incentive for people to turn in their weapons.

##### Box 6: Song of a band from Eastern Slavonia

The band *Septica* from Eastern Slavonia has been quite successful with a satirical song about people keeping their illegal guns, called 'I didn't bring the guns to the MUP' (Ministry of Interior).

(...)

I didn't bring the guns to the MUP,  
I didn't return them because I'm not stupid.  
I didn't return them because life is precious,  
and I will never give them to the MUP.


Nobody is going to play me for a sucker.  
I don't give up my guns, I don't give them up, no!

Source: <http://septica.blog385.com/mup.htm> (accessed 03 August 2006)

<sup>123</sup> South East Europe Barometer. Public Opinion Compared in 7 Countries. Studies in Public Policy Number 407, Paul Lazarsfeld Society, 2006, p.22.

<sup>124</sup> See Chapter on collection activities.

**Under what conditions, if any, do you think people in your community would be willing to hand in their weapons, during an amnesty? Frequencies.**



**Figure 19: Conditions for participation in weapons collection efforts**

This response coincides with points made in the focus groups, where a majority of people asked for more severe punishment for illegal ownership, carrying of weapons without a license, and for crimes involving the use of weapons. Although many of the requested legal penalties already exist, the reactions in the focus groups indicate that people either do not know about them or that the police and courts are not implementing the legal regulations appropriately. In general, many participants wished that the process of obtaining a license for a weapon would be much more difficult. Complaints were made that the medical tests in particular were not accurate or rigorous enough, as even people diagnosed with PTSD were able to obtain or continue to keep a weapons license.



## 5 Small Arms Capacity Survey (SACS)

### 5.1 Government policy and practice

With Croatia's aspired accession to the EU within the next five years and its eventual goal of NATO membership, the country has aligned its arms control policy with a number of Western European and international arms control regimes. At the international level, these include the UN Programme of Action (PoA), the UN Firearms Protocol (ratified in November 2004), and most recently the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which Croatia joined in 2005.<sup>125</sup> Regional agreements to which the Republic of Croatia has committed itself also include, inter alia, the OSCE Document on SALW, the Stability Pact SALW Regional Implementation Plan (RIP) (Revised May 2006), and the EU Code of Conduct.

ARMS OR SALW CONTROL AGREEMENTS	CROATIA'S COMMITMENTS
EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports	August 2002
OSCE Document on SALW	November 2000
OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition	December 2003
OSCE Decision on MANPADS	2003
OSCE Decision on End User Certificates	2004
OSCE Decision on Brokering	2004
Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan	November 2001
UN Firearms Protocol	November 2004
UN Programme of Action on SALW	July 2001
UN Register of Conventional Arms	Submitted returns since 1992
Wassenaar Arrangement	2005

**Table 10: Croatia's commitments to conventional arms or SALW control agreements<sup>126</sup>**

The national point of contact on matters relating to the implementation of the UN Programme of Action on SALW continues to be the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration. Since 2003, Croatia has submitted an annual report on its implementation of the PoA, and also regularly reports on its adherence to the OSCE Document on SALW.<sup>127</sup>

Croatia is also a State Party to 13 international legal instruments against terrorism and transnational organized crime, including its most recent ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.<sup>128</sup> If properly implemented, these agreements should help further the goal of SALW control at the global level.

At the national level, the Republic of Croatia established a National Commission for Arms and Ammunition on 31 March 2005 that is responsible for coordinating activities related to SALW control. The Commission should provide policy guidance by developing an action plan for addressing the small arms problem, and help monitor the implementation of activities related to that plan. In principle, the Commission is composed of assistant ministers from the MFAEI, MoI, MoD, MoE, MoF/Customs Administration, MoJ, as well as representatives from the National Intelligence Agency, Counterintelligence Agency and the arms production agency, the Alan Agency.<sup>129</sup> However, the survey team was not able to obtain a list of the representatives actually sitting on the Commission, and thus assess the commitment of each agency to the process. National policy is also influenced by the adoption

<sup>125</sup> UN PoA Report 2006, A3 (i).

<sup>126</sup> Source: SEE SALW Monitor 2005, p.69. Amended.

<sup>127</sup> UN PoA Report 2006, B1 (i). The latest report was reportedly submitted to the OSCE in June 2005.

<sup>128</sup> UN PoA Report 2006, C1 (i).

<sup>129</sup> *Op cit.* Nekic.

of new measures on national security and defence, which is intended to bring the country more in line with NATO standards.<sup>130</sup>

Croatia also actively supports SEESAC, established by the Stability Pact countries and UNDP in 2002. Croatia also hosts and supports the Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC) established in 2000 in Zagreb, which brings together military officials from SEE countries to build capacity and promote cooperation on regional security issues. In addition, Croatia has hosted several regional meetings on security issues in an effort to help build capacity for greater SALW control.<sup>131</sup>

## 5.2 Legislation and regulatory frameworks

The production, trade and transit of arms and military equipment in Croatia is regulated by two main provisions, the *Law on Arms* adopted in 1997 and the *Law on the Production, Overhaul and Trade in Arms and Military Equipment* adopted on 25 March 2002. Civilian possession and use of SALW is also governed by the *Law on Arms* and subsequent amendments that were made to the Law in 1999, 2001 and 2002. The import and export of arms and military equipment in Croatia is also regulated by the *Decree on Goods Subject to Import and Export Licensing* adopted in 2003.

On 09 May 2002, the Croatian Government adopted a Decision to abide by the principles established in the EU Code of Conduct for Arms Exports, which was agreed in 1998. The Decision states that Croatia 'shall follow the criteria and principles contained in the Code, which shall guide it in its arms control export policies'.<sup>132</sup> What is more, Croatia aligned itself with the EU statement on transfer controls at the PrepCom for the UN Programme of Action on SALW (PoA) in January 2006, as well as the Review Conference of the PoA in June - July 2006.<sup>133</sup>

While the introduction of a National Commission on SALW in March of 2005 has implications for the coordination of SALW control activities in the country, it is not yet clear how this Commission may impact on the current legislative and regulatory framework in Croatia.

### 5.2.1 Licensing of exports and imports

The *Decree on Goods Subject to Import and Export Licensing* (2003) identifies those goods for whose export or import it is necessary to issue export or import licenses, including weapons, ammunition, explosives, military equipment and their parts.

Croatia regulates state and commercial transfers of weapons differently, effectively operating a dual system for controlling arms transfers. Article 4 of the Decree specifies that import licences for arms and military equipment intended for the Croatian Army and Police shall be issued by the MoD and Mol, while export and import licences covering arms for commercial use shall be issued by the Ministry of Economy, subject to the approval of an inter-ministerial commission.<sup>134</sup> This commission, the Licensing Authority for Import and Export Control of Weapons for Commercial Purposes, is appointed by the Minister of the Economy and regularly meets at least twice a month. The Authority comprises representatives of the MoD, Mol, MFAEI, MoE and Customs (together with other appropriate advisory bodies dependent on need), each with their own advisory role in the decision-making process. The Authority must reach consensus on each decision in order for the Ministry of Economy, Labour

<sup>130</sup> SEE SALW Monitor 2005, p.68. Originally quoted in Grillot S, 'Small Arms Control in Central and Eastern Europe', Eurasia Series No. 1, International Alert, June 2003, p.12.

<sup>131</sup> The most recent workshop took place in Zagreb at the end of March 2006 under the auspices of the OSCE. The workshop focused on the subject of controlling the sale and export (brokering) of SALW in South Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, 'OSCE workshop in Zagreb to focus on better ways to control sale of small arms and light weapons,' [http://www.osce.org/fsc/item\\_1\\_18519.html](http://www.osce.org/fsc/item_1_18519.html), accessed 08 June 2006.

<sup>132</sup> UN PoA Report 2006, Section A3 (i).

<sup>133</sup> SEESAC/Saferworld, *Analysis of national legislation and implementation and enforcement mechanisms for arms transfer controls in the Western Balkans*, forthcoming. The EU statement emphasized that it 'attaches great importance to improved [transfer] controls' and that it 'favours the use of minimum common standards including criteria to determine whether a proposed transfer of SALW will aggravate a conflict, repress human rights, undermine development or constitute a risk of diversion in the recipient country.' <http://www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/pdf/RCEV-Austria.pdf>, accessed 03 August 2006.

<sup>134</sup> UN PoA Report 2006, Section A3 (i).



and Entrepreneurship to issue an Export or Import Licence for the transfer of arms and military equipment. Government-to-government transfers, however, are not subject to the same level of administration or scrutiny.

The Decree also addresses the issue of end-use for transfers of arms and military equipment. Along with an export certificate on arms for commercial purposes from Croatia, it is necessary to enclose an import certificate issued by the national authority of the (export) final destination country, along with an original certificate on the final user, certified by the national authority of the final destination. The end-use certificate must contain appropriate non-re-export or retransfer clauses. However, the Decree does not provide for any post-export follow-up, either through delivery verification or end-use monitoring, which would be necessary to ensure the integrity and effectiveness of Croatia's end-use controls.

By the Decision of the Government in 2002, Croatia committed to apply the criteria and principles of the EU Code of Conduct while authorizing arms transfers, and therefore, on the basis of the Decree on Licensing, Rules of Conduct of the Commission were established, in which it is stated that the Commission should comply with the criteria and principles of the EU Code of Conduct (CoC). However, the degree of adherence to the EU CoC was impossible to establish.<sup>135</sup> Prohibited destinations for arms exports are currently determined on the basis of UNSC arms embargoes and provided to other ministries by the MFAEI on a regular basis.<sup>136</sup> At the same time, the MoE has reported that export license applications were denied on at least two occasions in the past for reasons in line with the EU Code of Conduct.<sup>137</sup> To better consolidate this process, the MoE is currently working on a new draft law on trade in arms and military equipment that would, inter alia, introduce a list of arms and military equipment subject to import and export licensing according to the EU Common Military List.<sup>138</sup> Currently, the list of arms and military equipment to which the law applies does not correspond with the EU military list. The new law would also introduce brokering controls in line with the EU Common Position on Brokering, as Croatia does not yet have in place a law that regulates this issue. According to the Report of Croatia to the UN Program of Action in 2006, a draft law is aimed to enter the intergovernmental process during the year 2006.<sup>139</sup> However, there is still no clear evidence that brokering controls will be introduced any time soon.

The transit of arms and military equipment across the territory of Croatia is regulated by the *Law on the Production, Overhaul and Trade in Arms and Military Equipment*, as well as the *Law on Arms*. Transit licences are the responsibility of the MoI, who issues them in consultation with the MoD, and only for the transit of arms and military equipment across the state border. Authorization of arms transits does not require permission from the Licensing Authority and are consequently subject to fewer controls, rendering the whole process rather weak. Only a valid copy of an import license issued by an authority of the country of destination must be presented in order to issue a transit license. However, any retransfer of arms and military equipment for commercial purposes from Croatia must go through the same processes and scrutiny as all relevant import and exports, which is part of Croatia's end-use control process. More specifically, any company intending to import and retransfer arms from the country must meet the same requirements as for any other import and export and receive approval from the Licensing Authority.<sup>140</sup>

In 2004, the Republic of Croatia adopted a *Law on the Export of Dual-Use Goods*, which entered into force on 01 January 2005. Among other things, the Law specifies the nature of dual-use goods, determines the conditions for the export of dual-use goods, and identifies a list of dual-use goods that can be licenced for export by the MoE.<sup>141</sup> The Ministry of Economy issues or denies licenses based on the recommendation of an inter-agency commission for the Export of Dual-Use Goods License Issuing, which consists of representatives from the MVPEI, MIA, MoD, Customs, MoE and other bodies as appropriate depending on the type of goods; i.e. State Office of Nuclear Safety, Ministry of the Sea, Tourism, Transport and Development, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and

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<sup>135</sup> SEE SALW Monitor 2005, p.73.

<sup>136</sup> Croatia's UN PoA report 2006 notes that the Government has adopted a *Law on International Restrictive Measures* on 24 December 2004 that aims to place the implementation of international sanctions within domestic legislation, Section A4 (ii).

<sup>137</sup> As reported in the SEE SALW Monitor 2005, p.73.

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid.*, p.73.

<sup>139</sup> UN PoA Report 2006, Section A8 (i).

<sup>140</sup> UN PoA Report 2006, A3 (i).

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*

Water Management, Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, and Intelligence and Counterintelligence agencies. According to a SEESAC/Saferworld report, Croatia's legislation of dual-use goods is more in line with EU practice than its controls on arms and military equipment transfers.<sup>142</sup>

Overall, there are a number of weaknesses in Croatian law regulating arms and military equipment transfers. For example, Article 12 of the *Law on Production* allows manufacturers to claim pecuniary compensation for refused export permits if the weapons in question are of 'special importance for the defence of...Croatia.' According to SEESAC/Saferworld, this provision may promote a more lenient approach to export licensing, as the refusal of such licences can be costly for the State.<sup>143</sup> SEESAC/Saferworld also notes that within Croatian law, there are no controls on intangible transfers of arms and military equipment technology, as well as no provisions for revoking import/export licences.<sup>144</sup>

There is also a significant lack of transparency regarding the overall transfer of arms and military equipment in Croatia. For example, Article 24 of the *Law on Production* explicitly states that information about, among other things, the country's production and production capacity, research and development, trade, and cooperation with foreign partners regarding arms and military equipment is classified as 'secret defence information'.<sup>145</sup> Information on the sale of surplus arms and military equipment is further classified as 'military top secret.' There are currently no provisions in Croatia's regulatory system for parliamentary scrutiny of arms transfer licensing or for the publication of reports on this subject by the government.<sup>146</sup> While the government has indicated its willingness to do so, any reporting that is done is either by request or on an ad hoc basis.<sup>147</sup> Without a national report, it is difficult to obtain an accurate picture of Croatia's transfers of arms and military equipment, as well as their overall activities related to defence and security. A coalition of civil society groups closely following the government's policy on access to information has stated that a 'culture of secrecy' still prevails.<sup>148</sup>

## 5.2.2 Licensing of production

Production of arms and military equipment in Croatia is regulated by the *Law on the Production, Overhaul and Trade in Arms and Military Equipment*, along with *Law on amendments and supplements to the law on production, overhaul and trade in armaments and military equipment* (2003). Among other things, the law regulates the planning, production and development of arms and military equipment; safety and protection of methods of producing and refitting arms and military equipment; and the production and refitting of arms and military equipment in time of war or in situations of clear and present danger to the country. Notably, all producers of arms and military equipment must be registered and entered on a list of licenced producers by the Government of Croatia following the supervision and proposal of the Ministry of Defence.<sup>149</sup>

Once licenced, producers of arms and military equipment must abide by the regulations contained in the *Decree on Conditions and Criteria That Must be Fulfilled by Producers of Arms and Military Equipment*. This Decree outlines the conditions and criteria producers of arms and military equipment must fulfil according to Article 6, paragraph 3 of the *Law on Production*. This Decree has not yet been adopted, and the Government of Croatia has for the past several years reported that its final draft version is with relevant government ministries for comments and amendments.<sup>150</sup>

Producers of arms and military equipment are also required to abide by the *Regulation on Special Measures for Securing and Protecting the Production, Overhaul and Trade in Arms and Military Equipment*, in effect since

<sup>142</sup> See SEESAC/Saferworld, *Analysis of national legislation* (forthcoming), p.6, for a more detailed discussion.

<sup>143</sup> SEESAC/Saferworld, *Analysis of national legislation* (forthcoming), p.6.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid*, p.6.

<sup>145</sup> *Law on Arms*, Article 24.

<sup>146</sup> SEE SALW Monitor 2005, p.73.

<sup>147</sup> International Alert, MISAC project, Small Arms Control in Croatia, p.5.

<sup>148</sup> *Transitions Online*, Croatia: Curb your Watchdog, 17 July 2006.

<sup>149</sup> *Law on Production, Overhaul and Trade in Arms and Military Equipment*, 2002, Article 6.

<sup>150</sup> UN PoA Report 2003, 2005, 2006, Section A3 (i).



2003. This document creates a set of rules for the selection of new manufacturers and for the procedures that new developments of arms and military equipment should follow. Also in effect since 2003 is the *Regulation on Special Conditions for Defence Equipment Development*. The work of private contractors or companies developing such equipment can be stopped if it does not abide by the safety and protection measures outlined in the Regulation.<sup>151</sup> To ensure compliance and quality control, Article 12 of the *Law on Production* provides for the MoD, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Standards and Measures Office to engage in on-site inspections of these companies. At the same time, however, information about the company's planned or actual output, manufacturing capacity and research and development, among other things, is considered 'secret defence information' under the same Law.<sup>152</sup>

### 5.2.3 Customs legislation

Customs legislation relating to the control of arms and military equipment is embedded in the *Decree on Goods Subject to Import and Export Licensing*. International border crossing points are used for the transportation of arms. In principle, all consignments that cross the border, regardless of their content, are subject to inspection without exceptions.<sup>153</sup> However, no records on the number of such inspections are kept. With regard to arms transfer licences, Customs officers are mandated to check the data on each import or export license against the actual condition of the cargo during each border crossing.<sup>154</sup> The Customs Directorate also checks for the end-user certificate, though according to the Decree, the exporter is obliged to prove that the goods have been received by the intended party/ies and relay this information to the license issuer.

Croatia's border control is the responsibility of the Border Police and the Customs Directorate. Control activities at the border crossing points are carried out by trained police officers whose numbers range between three to ten depending on the size and location of the crossing point. Arms crossing the state borders of Croatia need to be declared to the Border Police and must be accompanied by valid licences and permits. Border Police are tasked with checking these documents, including the Decision approving the transportation of arms. This Decision is issued by the MoI and must be presented to the Border Police at the international border crossing point. When the arms are transported by freight trains, the MoI provides the relevant police administration with the Decision, who then forwards it on to the border crossing point where the transfer will take place. Customs officials are then responsible for checking the goods against import/export licences and contents of the consignments.<sup>155</sup>

In practice, border control is a challenging process in Croatia due to its difficult geography, long coastline and terrain. While procedures for conducting checks on weapons shipments exist, customs authorities in Croatia suffer from a general lack of capacity to implement them.<sup>156</sup> On this front, Austria and the United States have been active in helping to increase Croatia's technical capacity for tackling cross-border trafficking.<sup>157</sup> Croatian authorities also continue to increase their level of cooperation in exchanging information and educating customs officers through bilateral agreements with a number of Customs Directorates in neighbouring countries, most recently with Bulgaria.<sup>158</sup> Joint patrols have also recently been established between Croatian and Slovenian Border Police to prevent the smuggling of illicit arms.<sup>159</sup> In addition, a Customs Academy opened in 2005 to provide training to Custom officers on a number of relevant issues, including capacity building in SALW control.<sup>160</sup> Finally, the Border Police Task Force is now mandated to combat the trafficking of illegal firearms through random, unannounced inspections of border crossing points.<sup>161</sup>

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<sup>151</sup> UN PoA Report 2006.

<sup>152</sup> *Law on Production*, 2002, Article 12.

<sup>153</sup> Saferworld questionnaire.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>155</sup> Republic of Croatia, EC Western Balkans SALW Action Support Plan.

<sup>156</sup> SEE SALW Monitor 2005, p.78.

<sup>157</sup> SEESAC/Saferworld, *Analysis of national legislation* (forthcoming), p.11.

<sup>158</sup> UN PoA report 2006, Section C2 (i). The Cooperation Agreement between Croatia and Bulgaria toward this end was signed on 27 April 2006.

<sup>159</sup> SEE SALW Monitor 2005, p.77.

<sup>160</sup> UN PoA report 2006, Section C3 (i).

<sup>161</sup> SEESAC/Saferworld, *Analysis of national legislation* (forthcoming), p.11.

The Border Police and the Customs Directorate cooperate at the border crossing points on the basis of the 'Instruction prescribing the single methodology for mutual cooperation and coordinated activities of police officers and authorized customs officers', dated 21 October 2003.

#### 5.2.4 Legislation on domestic trade

The primary legislation on the domestic trade in arms is covered by the *Law on Production, Overhaul and Trade in Arms and Military Equipment*. Article 3 of this Law mandates the creation of an Agency of the Government of the Republic of Croatia to monitor and coordinate the government's arms exports.<sup>162</sup> The state-owned Alan Agency – jointly administered by the Ministers of Defence, Interior, Foreign Affairs, Finance and Economy – is tasked with coordinating transfers of military weapons and equipment for the MoD, MoI and for commercial purposes. The Agency is also responsible for providing initial approval for the production of weapons and military equipment in cooperation with the MoD, MoI and MoE, preparing contracts, maintaining a database of military transfers and production, and marketing surplus arms.<sup>163</sup>

In times of war or in the event of immediate threat to the integrity of the Croatian State, Article 32 empowers the MoD to engage in trade in arms and military equipment in addition to licenced producers and the Agency. Companies or individuals in breach of any of these provisions face a fine between 20,000 and 100,000 Kuna (approximately 13,800 Euro).<sup>164</sup> There is no provision for prosecuting individuals on this front. However, an individual caught for exporting dual-use goods without the necessary license faces a fine between 50,000 Kuna and 250 percent of the export business value, while the 'responsible person' in a company caught for the same infraction faces a fine between 10,000 Kuna and 50 percent of export business value.<sup>165</sup>

With regard to the punishment of individuals, Article 298 of the *Criminal Law Act* (OGs 110/97, 27/98, 50/00, 129/00, 51/01 and 105/04) provides for the offence of 'evasion of customs control', which is punishable with up to eight years' imprisonment. However, it remains unclear as to the circumstances under which the different statutes would apply, as well as how actual sentencing to date has compared to the maximum stipulated.<sup>166</sup>

#### 5.2.5 Licensing of civilian weapons

National legislation regulating the use and possession of weapons include the 1997 *Law on Arms* and the *Law on Amendments on the Law on Arms* (1999, 2001, 2002). These provisions apply to government authorities, companies, organizations, citizens and other legal persons. According to Article 14 of the *Law on Arms*, citizens are allowed to acquire and in some cases carry weapons for self-defence, hunting and target shooting. This process is regulated by the police in two phases: first, a license to possess arms must be obtained from the relevant policy authority and is valid for six months from the date of issue. A firearm can then be acquired and, once it has been, it must be registered with the relevant police authority within eight days of acquisition. An Arms Permit is then issued, authorizing the owner to possess and/or carry their weapon for up to ten years, at which point an extension may be granted following a medical examination of whether the entity in question remains mentally and physically 'fit' to hold and/or carry a weapon.<sup>167</sup>

In order for a citizen or other legal person to obtain an Arms Permit, several conditions must be satisfied: the citizen must be over 18 years of age, must have a justifiable reason for acquiring weapons (hunting, sports, personal protection, work), must have an appropriate health certificate to carry weapons, relevant technical knowledge for operating a weapon, as well as space for the safe storage of weapons. A permit would be denied if these conditions were not met and if the citizen in question has been convicted of a criminal or minor offence, or

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<sup>162</sup> *Law on Production*, Article 3.

<sup>163</sup> SEE SALW Monitor 2005, p.72.

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*, Chapter IX, Article 39(3).

<sup>165</sup> *Act on Export of Dual-use Items*, Article 18.

<sup>166</sup> SEESAC/Saferworld, *Analysis of national legislation* (forthcoming), p.12.

<sup>167</sup> *Law on Arms*.



has a record of questionable behaviour (alcoholism, history of abuse and negative relationships, etc.).<sup>168</sup> Article 29 of the *Law on Arms* also authorizes the Croatian police to deny the issuance of an Arms Permit for those weapons whose origin cannot be traced, or which have no engravings or markings.<sup>169</sup>

According to Croatian officials, there are no limitations on the number of arms that individual owners may have.<sup>170</sup> Citizens in possession of illegal firearms can now face fines of up to Euro 6,500 and compulsory prison sentences from six months to three years, or five years in worst cases.<sup>171</sup> According to several government officials, these penalties are not severe enough and do not provide a strong enough deterrent. Questions about the Arms Permit licensing system have also been raised, particularly the thoroughness of medical examinations, following the misuse of weapons by registered owners.<sup>172</sup> Many key informants for this survey were especially critical that licences are issued for ten years before the next medical examination, and that a license for possession only does not include a medical test at all.<sup>173</sup> Taking into account the high prevalence of traumatic disorders in Croatian society, interviewees also claimed that the missing link of the arms registry to a database on PTSD was a shortcoming of the current licensing procedures.<sup>174</sup>

Both journalists and NGO representatives also stressed that enforcement of sanctions for carrying or possession of illegal weapons is still too weak, and that obtaining a license for only possession of a firearm is too easy.<sup>175</sup>

However, the Ministry of Interior has drafted a new *Law on Arms*, which was adopted by the Croatian Government on 20 June 2006 and is planned for adoption by the Croatian Parliament in 2006. It might be implemented as soon as January 2007. The first reading of the law in parliament indicated a majority in favour of it. However, the first feedback from parliament was the suggestion to the Mol to change the envisaged financial penalties in the new law for those carrying or using illegal weapons into jail sentences before the parliament enters into the second reading of the law.<sup>176</sup>

Some of the changes planned are in direct response to many of the criticisms mentioned above. According to the new law, a medical test would be also obligatory for a license for possession only.<sup>177</sup> The certificate on the status of the individual's health would be valid only for five years and no longer for ten.<sup>178</sup> The new draft also plans to introduce a so-called 'technical book' for each weapon that will include pictures, and a description of the weapon and its condition, as well as any changes made to it. The technical check will be conducted by specialists from a newly established agency of the Mol. The test will allow the tracing of the origins of each weapon, because each owner will have to fire a bullet, which will remain in the hands of the police to form a unique database of firearms in Croatia.<sup>179</sup> The new agency will issue 'testing stamps' for the technical book after having checked any changes or repair measures of the weapon.

In addition, the new law will abolish some regulations such as the possibility of a license for a co-user of a weapon, which has been issued to about 5,000 persons so far. The license for a weapon kept as 'memory from the war' will be abolished, too, persons holding such a license will have a two-month period to either disable,

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<sup>168</sup> These provisions are outlined in *The Weapons Law*, Chapter II, Article 17.

<sup>169</sup> This is despite the fact that the present *Law on Arms* and its amendments has no provisions requiring the marking of weapons by the producer. Nevertheless, a draft of the new Arms Act is being prepared and will, among other things, aim to regulate the examination and marking of firearms. See UN PoA report 2006, Section A9 (i).

<sup>170</sup> As noted in SEE SALW Monitor 2005, p.71.

<sup>171</sup> *Ibid.*, p.71.

<sup>172</sup> *Op cit.* Toelle.

<sup>173</sup> *Op cit.* Radovic. In contrast, a driver's license can only be kept by passing a medical test every five years.

<sup>174</sup> BICC interview with Vedrana Zdero, Psychologist, MIRTA, Split, 17 March 2006.

<sup>175</sup> *Op cit.* Bilus.

<sup>176</sup> HINA/Metro, 'Harsher Penalties for Illegal Weapons', 30 June 2006.

<sup>177</sup> BICC interview with Ksenija Krulic, Head of Internal Affairs, Section for Arms and Legal Rights, Mol, Zagreb, 06 June 2006.

<sup>178</sup> *Law on Arms*, Chapters 6 and 7, June 2006.

<sup>179</sup> *Op cit.* Krulic; *Vecernij List* Croatian Government Adopts Bill Tightening Control over Arms Possession, 21 June 2006.

register in accordance with the regulations for obtaining a regular license, sell, or donate the weapon to the Croatian state.<sup>180</sup>

A last, but crucial measure of the planned new *Law on Arms* will be the introduction of an amnesty and subsequent state collection for the surrender of illegal weapons. This fills a gap that has been highlighted by many of the interviewees but also within the focus groups conducted for this survey, as for the last four years there was no possibility to return illegal weapons without punishment.<sup>181</sup> Experiences with open-ended amnesties have been mixed because they do not pressure holders of illicit guns to surrender these. The last amnesty in Croatia showed a similar pattern as most weapons were returned within two weeks before the end of the amnesty.<sup>182</sup> The Croatian Government might have to reconsider the amnesty approach depending on the successes of the collection program within the next two years. Regarding any SALW that would be turned in under a new amnesty, the administration would check whether or not the gun had been used in any crime, but if not, then there would be no sanctions for the person turning it in.

As some shooting and veterans' associations have raised complaints about the planned changes to the *Law on Arms*, it is not foreseeable if it will be adopted by parliament, although the media and the general public seemed to be in favour of stricter SALW control measures.<sup>183</sup>

### 5.2.6 Licensing and control of private security companies (PSCs)

The market for Private Security Companies (PSC) has been growing in Croatia since its independence in 1991. Currently, there are an estimated 180 PSCs operating in the country.<sup>184</sup> There are an estimated 16,000 licenced security guards.

According to a study on PSCs by International Alert, Saferworld and SEESAC, the following key legal provisions govern the operations of PSCs in Croatia: <sup>185</sup>

- There is a special law regulating the private security sector: *Private Protection Act* of 22 April 2003.
- The previous legislation regulating this sector was the *Protection of Persons and Property Act* of 08 October 1996.
- There are also dozens of bylaws regulating specific aspects of the private security sector and the work of PSCs and related institutions. The most important of these are:

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<sup>180</sup> *Op cit.* Krulic.

<sup>181</sup> *Op cit.* Radovic, Kavain.

<sup>182</sup> See also Chapter on the SALW collection program 'Farewell to Arms'.

<sup>183</sup> *Op cit.* Gvozdanovic.

<sup>184</sup> *Op cit.* Stolnik.

<sup>185</sup> For a more detailed description of PSCs in Croatia see: *SALW and Private Security Companies in South Eastern Europe: A Cause or Effect of Insecurity?* SEESAC, August 2005, pp.39-48



DATE	LEGISLATION
1997	Spatial and Technical Conditions of the Private Security and Private Detective Company's Premises Regulation
17 November 1997	Physical Protection Regulation
1999	Documentation and Evidence of Weapons and Ammunition Regulation
2003	Technical Protection Regulation
31 October 2003 <sup>186</sup>	Minimal Protection Measures in Operations Involving Cash and Valuables Act
December 2003	Private Security Guard and Private Security Agent Identity Card Regulation
24 March 2004	Ways of Establishing General and Specific Health Ability of Guards and Private Security Agents Regulation
26 July 2004	Education, Training and Professional Examination of Private Security Agents and Guards Regulation
18 November 2004	Conditions, Ways of Examination, and Program of the Professional Examinations for Private Security Agents-Technicians Regulation

**Table 11: Croatian legislation applicable to PSC operations**

The study concludes that the private security providers are well regulated in Croatia, an assessment that many interviewees for this survey also shared.<sup>187</sup>

Regarding the use of firearms, employees of PSCs are only allowed to carry small arms, such as pistols or revolvers of a calibre of 9mm or greater.<sup>188</sup> The company must own all of its arms, and has to obtain licences for arms and ammunition from the Mol. In addition, the individual employee has to obtain a license for carrying a weapon from the Mol.<sup>189</sup> In order to obtain such a license for the first time, the person has to undergo three types of checks supervised by the Mol: a technical one on procedures and legal regulations; a health test; and a test on shooting capabilities and weapon safety handling.<sup>190</sup>

All PSCs have to maintain an armoury according to certain security standards. These armouries are checked by the Mol once or twice a year. In the case of the largest PSC, Sokol Maric, there is one central armoury for the whole of Zagreb that is open 24 hours, seven days per week, and has detailed procedures for employees to receive their weapons. Firearms are issued upon the signing of a receipt by each employee at the beginning of his/her shift, and the same is applied at the end when they have to return their service weapon.<sup>191</sup> Employees are not allowed to take their guns home. They are also not allowed to use their own private weapons at work, should they own one. According to Sokol Maric, no theft of firearms has been recorded so far at any of their armouries.

## 5.3 Organizational capacity

### 5.3.1 The National Commission on SALW

On 31 March 2005, Croatia established the National Commission on SALW, a comprehensive inter-agency commission for arms control measures. It is officially composed of representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, Ministry of the Interior; Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Labor and Entrepreneurship, Customs Service, Ministry of Justice, Intelligence Agency, Counterintelligence Agency, and the Alan Agency.<sup>192</sup>

<sup>186</sup> SALW and Private Security Companies in South Eastern Europe, pp.44 - 45.

<sup>187</sup> BICC interview with Ranko Helebrant, Croatian Helsinki Committee, Zagreb, 21 March 2006; *op cit.* Bilus and Duspara.

<sup>188</sup> *Op cit.* Stolnik.

<sup>189</sup> *Op cit.* Salaj.

<sup>190</sup> *Op cit.* Salaj.

<sup>191</sup> *Op cit.* Salaj.

<sup>192</sup> *Description of the National Commission for Arms and Ammunition*, March 2005 (provided by the MFAEI).

The mandate of the Commission comprises the following tasks:

- a) Develop the National Strategy and the Action Plan for combating problems related to arms and ammunition;
- b) Coordinate the activities envisaged by the Action Plan in the following fields:
  - suppressing illegal production, trade, possession and smuggling of arms and ammunition;
  - controlling the acquisition, possession, trade, repair and production of arms and ammunition, and controlling civilian shooting ranges;
  - border control;
  - legislative and normative issues;
  - processing criminal offences (criminal policy);
  - survey and assessment of the issues;
  - strategy for informing the public;
  - collecting, stockpiling and destroying arms and ammunition;
  - stockpile management;
  - ensure the reporting of measures conducted in accordance with international obligations; and
  - import/export of arms and ammunition.
- c) Control the implementation of the Action Plan and the goals of the National Strategy.

During the second half of 2005 the National Commission made little progress in systematising its working practice, defining its participants or in taking on the coordinating role foreseen in its mandate. However, during the first half of 2006, the Commission defined its permanent participation; in accordance with its mandate it began to meet regularly and the MFAEI took on the role of lead coordinator. The National Commission will, in late 2006 and early 2007 be responsible for drafting a National Strategy to further enhance SALW control in Croatia. This Strategy will largely be informed by the SALW Survey findings and some encouraging signs of consensus are apparent within the Commission.

The success and effectiveness of the Commission will depend on the ability to prioritize feasible SALW measures based on the analysis of this present survey and the input of experts from different ministries in the Commission. In addition, only with a clear lead agency and the commitment of nominated personnel can the Commission make a sustainable and important contribution towards the development of a joint and coherent approach for arms control. The developments in 2006 clearly indicate that the Commission is following that strategy now. The new *Law on Arms*, in conjunction with a new collection campaign and the launch of the present SALW Survey might be able to trigger a joint and coherent campaign steered by the Commission. Although the Commission's founding document states that they may invite 'non-governmental organizations and independent experts', this has not happened so far. The exclusion of civil society from this process would omit important actors from a process that relies very much on the public's participation.

## 5.4 Police Service

Although the household survey and other sources revealed that the public image of the Croatian police still needs improvement, the overall assessments of the OSCE and the EU on police performance in Croatia recorded constant progress over recent years. In 2006, the OSCE reviewed the reforms and activities of the Croatian police from 2001 to 2005 and concluded that the security environment in Croatia has substantially improved and that local communities have greater confidence in the work of the police.<sup>193</sup> The European Commission (EC) also highlighted in its report on the progress of Croatia good results on implementing community policing and better

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<sup>193</sup> 2006 Review. Report on Croatia's Progress in Meeting International Commitments since 2001, OSCE Mission to Croatia, Zagreb, June 2006, p.27.



officer training. However, the EC criticized the missing link between the General Police Directorate, the 20 police districts and the 175 police stations in the country.<sup>194</sup>

In addition, the EC detected improvements in the fight against organized crime, especially the work of USKOK, but the lack of an integrated criminal justice data system accessible for all law enforcement agencies was seen as a major shortcoming.<sup>195</sup> Links between organized crime and illegal trafficking of firearms can only be fought successfully if the respective departments at the MoI work in accordance with international standards and have access to the needed equipment. A CARDS program to develop the aforementioned data system is currently being implemented.<sup>196</sup>

Unfortunately, the survey has not been provided with the actual number and type of weaponry in the police service. The information received from the Ministry of Defence regarding the potential use of their surplus weapons for additional police units seem to indicate a shortage of adequate weapons, at least for an expanded police force.<sup>197</sup>

Regarding the issue of SALW, the MoI has gained various experiences in setting up, coordinating, and evaluating the 'Farewell to Arms' collection campaign. These experiences are thought to be especially helpful in guiding the work of a newly established working group at the MoI, which is presently preparing a new collection campaign.

The MoI has also been the driving force in writing the new *Law on Arms*, which will be presented to the Croatian Parliament in 2006.

In addition, the MoI has initiated the creation of an operative body at the national level that will be in charge of the prevention of smuggling and illegal possession of weapons, and for operative tracking, surveillance and coordination on these matters.<sup>198</sup> In 2004, a CARDS project on the Prevention of the Illegal Smuggling of Weapons, Ammunition and Explosives was initiated to improve the capacities and equipment provision of the police.<sup>199</sup>

The MoI also acknowledged the need for the adoption of the *European Convention on Control of the Acquisition and Possession of Firearms by Individuals* (ETS 101), and will proceed accordingly.<sup>200</sup>

## 5.5 Border police and customs

Border management has been a problematic area in Croatia for a very long time. The long coastline and the huge border with Bosnia and Herzegovina constitute major problems for preventing the smuggling of weapons. The various incidents described above show that SALW smuggling happens regularly, and not only on a small scale.

According to information provided by the MoI, the border police confiscated about 58 weapons and 8,100 rounds of ammunition in 41 cases of SALW smuggling in 2004. In 2005, the border police encountered 31 cases of smuggling and seized 62 weapons and 3,200 rounds of ammunition.<sup>201</sup> However, the actual figure of successfully smuggled weapons is likely higher given that the current size and equipment of the border police is still not sufficient.

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<sup>194</sup> European Commission. *Croatia 2005. Progress Report*, Brussels, 09 November 2005.

<sup>195</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>196</sup> Ministry of Interior. *Information on the MoI Achievements in Relation to the EU Accession Process*, Zagreb, January 2006; and BICC interview with Stephan Dahlgren, Task Manager, Justice and Home Affairs, Delegation of the European Commission to Croatia, Zagreb, 13 February 2006.

<sup>197</sup> See SADS on military surplus.

<sup>198</sup> *Information on the MoI Achievements in Relation to the EU Accession Process*, p.8.

<sup>199</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>200</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>201</sup> *Reply of the Ministry of Interior to the BICC questionnaire on SALW*, June 2006.

A total of 189 border crossings exist in Croatia.<sup>202</sup> However, at the state border with Bosnia and Herzegovina there are about 200 local roads where the police or customs can be avoided when crossing into Croatia.<sup>203</sup> In conjunction with the border police's serious staff shortages, this has a negative impact on Croatia's ability to control its borders. Currently, only about 4,000 of the envisaged 8,500 positions are filled.<sup>204</sup> As of March 2006, the Customs Directorate employs 3,126 people, although it is not clear how many are actually deployed at border crossings.<sup>205</sup>

Nevertheless, the border police and customs have implemented a number of activities to improve border management, some in cooperation with or in direct support of the European Union. The steps towards reaching EU standards began within the CARDS 2001 Program on Integrated Border Management Twinning Project, and continued with Twinning Project in 2003 to increase capacity building at the Border Police Directorate, and standards and conditions for safe and cost effective border control.<sup>206</sup> In 2005, the Croatian Government adopted two more strategies under the 2001 CARDS Program: the Border Police Development Strategy and the Integrated Border Management National Strategy.<sup>207</sup> These programs will also include training on combating trafficking of firearms for border police, which will be implemented from 2006 to 2008.<sup>208</sup>

The lack of technical capacities is fought through various measures, including a CARDS 2004 Project on the Modernization of the State Border Protection worth EUR 8 million to be spent for the purchase of technical equipment. The educational level of the border police has been tackled since 2005 through a new Border Police Specialized Training Programme, which trains 100 people per year.<sup>209</sup>

Although all these measures will surely improve the capacities of border control in Croatia, the country's long and inaccessible border regions will continue to provide challenges to prevent the smuggling of SALW in the near future.

## 5.6 The Croatian Armed Forces (CAF)

By contrast to developments in post-socialist countries in the mid-1990s, Croatia, like the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, has retained its traditional force structures, heavy weaponry and territorial defence strategies due to its experience in the Balkan wars. The same holds true for military reform, downsizing and the slow restructuring of the armed forces.

The CAF personnel is an important measure for safeguarding the huge amount of surplus weapons and ammunition currently stored in 40 locations (surplus and formation) across 34 cities and towns. The continuous reductions in military personnel and conscripts may in fact lead to a shortage of guards. The Long Term Development Plan is envisaging a total of 16,000 soldiers and 6,000 active reserve in the future.<sup>210</sup> Although the MoD did not provide an overview of the number of stolen weapons from their barracks, a couple of these incidents have been reported in the media. In 2003 alone, 231 weapons were stolen from military barracks.<sup>211</sup> The actual and unreported figure, however, may be even higher.

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<sup>202</sup> Reply of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration to the Saferworld Questionnaire, May 2006.

<sup>203</sup> Answer of the Republic of Croatia to the Questionnaire of the European Commission, Zagreb, October 2003, p.58.

<sup>204</sup> European Commission. Croatia 2005. Progress Report, Brussels, 09 November 2005, p.91.

<sup>205</sup> Reply to Saferworld Questionnaire.

<sup>206</sup> Information on the MoI Achievements in Relation to the EU Accession Process, p.2.

<sup>207</sup> Ibid.

<sup>208</sup> Op cit. Dahlgren.

<sup>209</sup> Information on the MoI Achievements in Relation to the EU Accession Process, p.3.

<sup>210</sup> BICC interview with Mirko Kukulj, Deputy Head of Directorate, Ministry of Defence, Division for Material Resources, Zagreb, 13 February 2006.

<sup>211</sup> Vecernij List 'Croatian Pistols in the hands of terrorists' 30 November 2004.



The CAF had been actively involved in past collection campaigns where it not only supervised the safe storage of collected weapons, but also conducted special campaigns to persuade soldiers to give up their remaining illegal guns from the war.

With regards to SALW (Weapons) destruction, the CAF has trained and deployed 13 officers to the Remont Institution that is dealing with destruction. According to the MoD, annual destruction of weapons could be up to 160,000 weapons if all of those 13 officers focus solely on this task.<sup>212</sup>

## 5.7 Judicial capacity

Judicial reform efforts in Croatia only began in late 2000 with a series of reform plans and strategies issued in the intervening years, which were accompanied by both new legislation and other measures. Recently in September 2005, the Minister of Justice issued a Judicial Reform Strategy that specifies short, medium, and long-term measures to address identified concerns.<sup>213</sup>

While underway, judicial and administrative reforms have yet to become sufficiently consolidated so that the impact is routinely felt by the public. Extensive judicial delays continue to be the norm. The public continues to perceive corruption as endemic to public services, the judiciary being seen as one of the least responsive institutions. In early April, the parliament adopted a National Anti-Corruption Programme for 2006/8, which includes measures intended to root out corruption in the judiciary. The Ministry of Justice, the Criminal Justice Directorate, state and judicial bodies, those responsible for the National Programme, have provided mini programs for implementation of measures from the Program. These mini programmes form a basis for drawing up action plans, work on which is underway. The action plans will contain the titles of individual tasks, deadlines for their implementation, the body and person responsible for implementation, estimated costs, sources of financing and success indicators.

Nevertheless, the Croatian legislation covering all aspects of SALW has significantly improved since the end of the war. The new *Law on Arms* will, if passed by the parliament, close some of the remaining gaps for the control of civilian ownership of guns.

However, the general public and focus groups participants have raised their concerns that existing laws have not been adequately implemented. This was especially the case regarding fines and punishment for the illegal possession of guns, as well as the carrying of weapons with a license only for possession.<sup>214</sup> The issue of domestic violence and arms has largely been downplayed by the police and the courts – there have been some incidents where, due to poor handling by the police or a lack of legal punishment by the courts, men have returned home and killed their wives or girlfriends.<sup>215</sup> However, several such incidents in 2005 led to a major public outcry followed by a more serious handling of these cases by the police, and also the issuance of more severe punishments to the perpetrators.<sup>216</sup> New amendments to the Criminal Code will enter into force as of 01 October 2006. These amendments are designed to impose more severe punishments for crime in general with minimum tariffs increased across the board. For the time being, there is no harmonized court policy on sentencing for firearm-related crimes.

## 5.8 Parliamentary oversight over security and defence matters

Based on the *Defence Act* and the *Security Services Act*, the Croatian Parliament has the authority to decide upon the main issues of defence, as well as the general supervision of the security forces including the CAF. Its parliamentary committee for interior policy and national security can call in officials from the CAF for hearings, as well as evaluate all financial and material issues of the CAF and other security services. In addition, the establishment of the Council for Oversight of the Security Services (COSS) in 2003, consisting of seven

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<sup>212</sup> Reply of the Ministry of Defence to the BICC questionnaire on SALW, June 2006

<sup>213</sup> 2006 Review. Report on Croatia's Progress in Meeting International Commitments since 2001, p.21.

<sup>214</sup> *Op cit.* Bilus and Duspara.

<sup>215</sup> *Op cit.* Toelle.

<sup>216</sup> *Op cit.* Toelle, Skouroliakou.

independent experts, was highly acclaimed. The COSS members are entitled to access the reports from the security services and its respective personnel whom they can call in for a hearing.

Though the set-up seems to be sufficient and similar to other oversight measures applied in European countries, the reality is very different. There is a general lack of civilian expertise on military and security matters in the Croatian Parliament. Due to the limitation of a four-year mandate, it is difficult for parliamentarians in the committee to build up this capacity adequately enough to perform any serious oversight and control function.

This also holds true for the NGO and research community in Croatia, where there is currently not enough expertise on security issues. Regarding the COSS, not only did the head of this council, a well-known academic expert on defence and security issues, recently resign from his post, but it seems that the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff are still reluctant to provide this forum with the requested documents. A scandal involving the accusation of rape and sexual harassment at the CAF is a recent example of this problem, as the results of the military investigation were neither made public nor given to the respective parliamentary committee or COSS.<sup>217</sup>

In general, these measures, together with the *Freedom of Information Act* need improvement to also enable better democratic control of arms production and trade in Croatia.

## 5.9 International involvement and cooperation for SALW control capacities

### 5.9.1 RACVIAC

The Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC), a project of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SEE), is a multi-national centre based near Zagreb. The project was created in 2000 with a twofold mandate: to act as a forum for regional dialogue and co-operation on different arms control and confidence and security building measures, as well as to provide assistance in all matters of arms control and its implementation. RACVIAC contributes to the aims of the Stability Pact, supports and complements the activities of the OSCE, as well as other organizations working in similar fields in SEE.<sup>218</sup>

RACVIAC also facilitates some training for personnel in arms control and confidence and security building measures. RACVIAC's work covers three main areas:

- Facilitating and encouraging dialogue and co-operation in the region;
- Training personnel from verification agencies to the same standard in all aspects of implementation; and
- Organizing activities on key aspects of defence conversion: resettlement of military personnel, conversion of former military bases and the restructuring of defence industries.

Focusing mainly on activities for confidence building measures, RACVIAC has in recent years also begun to engage in issues related to SALW control. Various seminars, workshops and other training events on SALW control have taken place at RACVIAC since 2000, but always in cooperation with SEESAC or OSCE. Seminars held at RACVIAC were on:

- Regional Dialogue and Cooperation in Combating Illicit Trafficking of SALW, March 2002;
- Best Practice in Communication and Awareness Raising of Specific Arms Control Issues, using SALW as a model, June 2003;
- Training course for NGOs in Monitoring Verification of SALW Collection, March 2004;
- SALW Awareness Support Pack Outreach Workshop, July 2004;
- The 2nd Year of the Implementation of the SALW Stability Pact Plan, November 2004;

<sup>217</sup> Pietz, T, *Defence Reform and Conversion in Albania, Macedonia and Croatia*, Bonn, July 2006 (BICC brief 34), p.38.

<sup>218</sup> See [www.racviac.org](http://www.racviac.org)



- SALW - Regional seminar on renewing the UN Programme of Action on SALW and progress towards EU accession, March 2005;
- SALW Trafficking Seminar, 2006; and
- SALW Brokering Workshop, 2006.

Currently, RACVIAC is also beginning to transform some of its set-up from a pure forum and training site into an analysis centre for defence conversion. A small, 'Defence Conversion Cell' was accordingly initiated in 2006.<sup>219</sup>

### 5.9.2 SECI Center for Combating Transborder Crime

The SECI Center for Combating Transborder Crime, based in Bucharest, is comprised of police and border officials, seconded from twelve regional countries. It seeks, among other things, to 'prevent, detect, trace, investigate and suppress illicit trafficking in SALW by establishing direct, sustainable and rapid channels of information exchange'.<sup>220</sup> Croatia has one liaison officer who represents both the MoI, and the Customs Directorate.<sup>221</sup> It is hard to assess the efficiency and influence of the centre so far, as funding remains inadequate.

Although the centre's report on its activities in 2005 lists five cases of successful interventions, as well as 21 joint cross-border operations of so called 'Task Forces' (including two against SALW trafficking), the impact of the centre on preventing illicit arms transfers is hard to estimate. The Croatian MoI says that the government plays an 'active role in the work' of the centre, but does not indicate what that means in practice.<sup>222</sup>

### 5.9.3 European Union, Stability Pact and UNDP

The South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), a joint initiative of UNDP and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SP) has been mainly engaged in Croatia through training seminars in RACVIAC.<sup>223</sup>

SEESAC has trained, among others, Croatian journalists and NGO representatives in SALW control measures. In 2006, SEESAC appointed a Chief Technical Advisor for European Union Small Arms Control (EUSAC) to provide input and support to the Croatian Government and the National Commission on SALW for future SALW control measures, including the drafting of an Action Plan on SALW.

As Croatia prepares for European Union membership, the government has undertaken to tackle the diverse problems caused by the proliferation of SALW, in line with international best practice and the EU's SALW Strategy. EUSAC supports the government's efforts by affording strategic assistance towards a comprehensive national strategy to eliminate the threat caused by SALW and to enhance its safety and stability.

EUSAC is part of the European Union's involvement in supporting SALW control measures in the country. In addition to the various EU twinning projects on improving integrated border management in Croatia,<sup>224</sup> the EU accession process in itself has provided guidance for Croatia on SALW-related matters.

The Questionnaire of the European Commission, which the Croatian Government replied to in October 2003, facilitated a structured process of the Croatian Government to compile all existing information and activities in areas that are also related to SALW control.<sup>225</sup>

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<sup>219</sup> UN PoA Report 2006, p.9.

<sup>220</sup> See [www.secicenter.org](http://www.secicenter.org).

<sup>221</sup> *Information on the MoI Achievements in Relation to the EU Accession Process*, p.5.

<sup>222</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>223</sup> See Chapter on RACVIAC.

<sup>224</sup> See Chapter on police capacities.

<sup>225</sup> This is particularly true with regard to questions on Justice and Home Affairs in chapter 24 and on Common Foreign and Security Policy in chapter 27. *Reply of the Croatian Government to the Questionnaire of the EC*, October 2003.

The chapters on Justice and Home Affairs, as well as on Common Foreign and Security Policy will continue to inform the progress of Croatia on SALW control measures, especially with regard to improved border management and customs. These areas in particular were still assessed as being under-staffed and under-equipped for effectively combating various kinds of trafficking, including SALW.<sup>226</sup> As mentioned above, numerous CARDS projects have led to increased reform activity in various departments of the Ministry of Interior since 2001.<sup>227</sup> The decision of the European Union on 08 October 2005 to open accession talks with Croatia will spur the process of modernization and the application of the *Acquis Communautaire* of the European Commission. This could also provide a unique opportunity to link further support and activities on SALW control to EU projects and thus contribute to the closing of Chapters 24 and 27 of the *Acquis* in the near future.

## 5.10. Stockpile management

Taking into account the huge amount of surplus weapons currently stored both at the MoD and the Mol, there is a need for effective measures for safe storage of arms and ammunition. While the Ministry of Interior stores its reserves and surplus weapons in four different locations across the country, the Ministry of Defence keeps its weapons in 40 storage sites across 34 locations.<sup>228</sup>

The reduction of active soldiers and conscripts might have a negative impact on the capacities of the MoD to provide enough personnel for safeguarding such a huge number of stockpiles. Similar problems are known in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The MoD might consider reducing the total number of stockpiles in the country that still seem to be connected to an outdated strategy of territorial defence. Thefts from military barracks have happened before and should be prevented in the future. The large surplus of arms from military units, however, is stored at a central location.<sup>229</sup>

Regarding safety measures, the survey relies on official statements. Within the Mol, the Department for Material Affairs (DMA) in cooperation with the Department for Police Technical Issues determines the number of weapons and ammunition to be stored. According to the 2006 report of Croatia on the implementation of the UN PoA, all stockpiles of the Mol and the MoD are kept in accordance with regulations of the General Staff and the Mol, which include a monthly control of the inventory and a detailed inventory every year.<sup>230</sup> A certain percentage of the stored ammunition is inspected each year as well to monitor its condition. The security and counting instruments at military depots also have to be in line with a manual from the General Staff on 'Storing, Keeping and Maintaining of Ammunition and Explosive Ordnance'.<sup>231</sup>

At the Mol, the DMA can issue weapons and ammunition to each unit of the Ministry of Interior only upon a direct allowance provided by the Department for Police Technical Issues. All entries and exits of weapons and ammunition are kept in a central registry at the Mol.<sup>232</sup> The weapons of the Customs Directorate, which used to be stored at producers' warehouses due to the lack of adequate storage space at the Customs Directorate, are now stored appropriately at the Mol.<sup>233</sup>

In 2005, the SEE SALW Monitor raised some doubts about the safety measures and capacities of military depots because of an incident in 2003 where the military identified that 231 pistols had been stolen from a unit near Split, probably many years before.<sup>234</sup> According to journalists interviewed for this survey, there have been several more incidents of thefts from barracks involving up to 10 firearms that were not really publicized by the media.<sup>235</sup>

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<sup>226</sup> European Commission. *Croatia 2005. Progress Report*, pp.91-95.

<sup>227</sup> *Information on the Mol Achievements in Relation to the EU Accession Process*.

<sup>228</sup> *Reply of the Ministry of Defence to the BICC questionnaire on SALW*.

<sup>229</sup> SEE SALW Monitor 2005, p.81.

<sup>230</sup> UN PoA Report 2006, pp.6-7.

<sup>231</sup> SEE SALW Monitor 2005, p.81.

<sup>232</sup> UN PoA Report 2006, pp.6-7.

<sup>233</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>234</sup> SEE SALW Monitor 2005, p.81.

<sup>235</sup> *Op cit.* Bilus and Duspara.



However, according to representatives from the Ministry of Defence, there have been no further incidents of thefts from military storage sites.<sup>236</sup>

## 5.11 Destruction capacity

To date, weapons destruction has not been a priority for the Croatian Government.<sup>237</sup> Although destruction activities have taken place, these measures are not part of an overall systematic program for destruction. MoI and MoD have stored serviceable items collected during the war, from Eastern Slavonia during the UNTAET mission and from the 'Farewell to Arms' campaign at their storage sites.

Whether or not arms are surplus and should be sold or destroyed is decided by the MoD upon suggestions of General Staff of the CAF. The decision of the MoD has to be based on the 'Regulation on Sales of Obsolete Weapons and Defence Equipment'.<sup>238</sup>

Both the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defence maintain their own destruction facilities. The MoI used to melt down collected and confiscated firearms that are not of use by the police in the electric furnace of a steel factory. This was done three to four times a year depending on the amount of weapons designated for disposal.<sup>239</sup> Due to internal reorganizations of the MoI, there have been no destruction activities since the end of 2001, which explains the Ministry's high number of stored weapons from confiscation or collection programs.<sup>240</sup>

The MoD maintains a destruction facility in Zagreb. The so-called Remont Institution is staffed by 13 officers trained for weapons disposal.<sup>241</sup> According to the MoD, these officers can destroy up to 160,000 weapons per year if they focus solely on this task.<sup>242</sup> However, the funds for such a task have not been available lately, as destruction has not been considered a priority of the Croatian Government within the last couple of years. From 2002 to 2005, only 6,389 weapons were destroyed under the auspices of the MoD. In the year 1998, however, the MoD destroyed over 12,000 weapons.

TYPE OF WEAPON / YEAR	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	TOTAL
Pistol	2	2	41	19	8	7	19	16	57	28	0	199
Mortars	124	88	51	296	147	28	75	63	37	17	12	938
Machine Gun	103	33	429	5,149	641	754	1,328	37	205	701	45	9,425
Rifles	949	172	1,720	5,879	2,297	1,636	1,103	954	1,080	1,045	1,974	1,880
Launchers	4	101	81	836	507	3	63	35	1	81	1	1,713
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,182</b>	<b>396</b>	<b>2,322</b>	<b>12,179</b>	<b>3,600</b>	<b>2,428</b>	<b>2,588</b>	<b>1,105</b>	<b>1,380</b>	<b>1,872</b>	<b>2,032</b>	<b>31,084</b>

**Table 12: Decommissioned and destroyed MoD weapons<sup>243</sup>**

In 2005, the German arms producer Heckler and Koch (HK) paid for the destruction of 1,000 AK47 assault rifles from the Ministry of Defence. This occurred within the framework of the initiative 'New for Old' by the German Government, in which arms producers were encouraged to combine arms sales with local destruction of surplus

<sup>236</sup> *Op. cit* Kukolj.

<sup>237</sup> See profits through sales of SALW under the auspices of the Alan Agency in the Section on transfers.

<sup>238</sup> *Official Gazette 95/02*.

<sup>239</sup> SEE SALW Monitor 2005, p.80.

<sup>240</sup> See SADS Chapter on MoI holdings.

<sup>241</sup> *Reply of the Ministry of Defence to the BICC questionnaire on SALW*, June 2006.

<sup>242</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>243</sup> Provided by Col Mirko Kukolj of the MoD, 06 June 2006.

SALW.<sup>244</sup> The MoD expects that HK will sponsor another activity like this in the near future, perhaps jointly with the Mol.<sup>245</sup>

The Mol, as mentioned above, stopped its destruction activities in 2001. This is probably related to the uncertainty about the number of police officers, which is likely to increase up until 2015. However, according to the ministry the preparations to continue the destruction of surplus arms and ammunition are underway and destruction will resume in 2006.<sup>246</sup> So far, the Mol has destroyed 14,316 weapons between 1995 and 2001. Although the Mol provided information to the survey team saying that destruction has not yet started, according to a newspaper article, the destruction facility of the Mol in Sisak destroyed 3,000 weapons between December 2005 and July 2006.<sup>247</sup> These weapons were mainly from the 'Farewell to Arms' collection program. Presently, 8,000 more guns have been selected for destruction and an overall 50,000 are waiting to be examined and classified either for reuse, sale or destruction.

TYPE OF WEAPON / YEAR	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	TOTAL / TYPE
Revolver	31	7	22	23	23	45	18	169
Pistol	280	126	248	287	306	528	933	2,708
Hunting / Sport Rifle	508	173	401	681	605	622	683	3,673
Semi-auto Rifle (Military)	4	12	73	122	133	162	533	1,039
Assault Rifle	16	8	67	67	65	96	1,276	1,595
Sub Machine Gun	23	32	36	33	38	162	86	410
Light Machine Gun	1	2	8	21	27	27	271	357
Heavy Machine Gun	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	5
Light Anti-Tank Weapon	1	0	1	1	6	7	74	90
Mortar	0	0	1	2	0	6	0	9
Air Gun (Pistol / Revolver)	267	91	87	82	114	61	84	786
Gas Pistol / Revolver	199	76	70	81	129	54	83	692
Improvised Firearm	503	164	351	720	360	373	312	2,783
<b>TOTAL / YEAR</b>	<b>1,833</b>	<b>691</b>	<b>1,365</b>	<b>2,120</b>	<b>1,806</b>	<b>2,144</b>	<b>4,357</b>	<b>14,316</b>

**Table 13: Destroyed Mol weapons between 1995 - 2001<sup>248</sup>**

The distribution of the type of weapon destroyed illustrated above reflects the Croatian Government's policy of storing serviceable, surplus arms for future use or sale. Most of the types of weapons are no longer of use to the Mol or the MoD, especially the high number of 'improvised firearms', which are probably not in line with any international standard.

Within the same timeframe (1995 - 2001), the Mol also destroyed 431,816 rounds of ammunition and explosive ordnance, over 330,000 being for rifles.<sup>249</sup>

Altogether, the MoD and the Mol have destroyed 48,400 weapons as of mid-2006, representing around 20 percent of total current surplus holdings.

<sup>244</sup> BICC interview with Col Wolfgang K P Schulz, Defence Attaché, German Embassy, Zagreb, 15 February 2006.

<sup>245</sup> *Op cit.* Kukolj.

<sup>246</sup> *Reply of the Ministry of Interior to the BICC questionnaire on SALW*, June 2006

<sup>247</sup> *Vjesnik*, 'Sisak Factories Swallow Firearms', 07 July 2006.

<sup>248</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>249</sup> *Ibid.*



## 5.12 Amnesty and collection capacity

In the past Croatia has seen different kinds of amnesties, collections and buy-back programs to reduce the number of illegal SALW throughout the country. The two most popular and successful programmes were the UN-facilitated 'buy-back' program in Eastern Slavonia from 1996 to 1997, and the recent collection programme 'Farewell to Arms' which was implemented from 2001 until the end of 2002. Besides these initiatives and other official amnesty programmes, there may have only been very small and locally sponsored initiatives, as well as informal returns of illegal SALW to police stations since this time.<sup>250</sup> Altogether, there have been seven periods of amnesty and collection of weapons and ammunition where citizens could hand over or legalize unregistered weapons without punishment. Those were from:<sup>251</sup>

- 30 October 1992 to 30 April 1993;
- 10 May 1993 to 10 May 1994;
- 05 January 1996 to 05 January 1997 (with financial compensation);
- 19 February 1997 to 19 August 1997;
- 01 January 1999 to 02 August 1999;
- 22 February 2001 to 22 February 2002; and
- 01 March 2002 to 31 December 2002.

According to a government document from 2006,<sup>252</sup> the third period with financial compensation was the most successful. In contrast, the final document of the collection programme 'Farewell to Arms' sees its own programme of voluntary submission as more successful than the one with financial compensation.<sup>253</sup>

Altogether, the number of weapons and ammunition collected over all seven periods is quite high: 33,598 weapons were collected,<sup>254</sup> over 1.6 million items of explosive ordnance, over five million rounds of ammunition, and more than 7.5 kg of explosives.<sup>255</sup>

But in many of the semi-structured interviews conducted for this survey, interviewees expressed a need for a new collection programme, as illegal weapons continue to pose a serious problem.

## 5.13 SALW Collection in Eastern Slavonia

The collection of weapons and ammunition in Eastern Slavonia from 02 October 1996 to 19 August 1997 was a political project for the demilitarization and stabilization of a disputed region of Croatia with a large Serb population. Because of its special political situation and target group, and also due to the fact that it was implemented mainly by the United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), this SALW control measure differs, of course, from all the measures implemented by the Croatian Government.<sup>256</sup>

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<sup>250</sup> *Op cit.* Bilus and Duspara.

<sup>251</sup> According to the draft of the *National SALW Control Strategy and Action Plan*, 2006 (unpublished document).

<sup>252</sup> *Ibid.*, p.2.

<sup>253</sup> *Report on the Implementation of the National Program for the Increase of General Security through Voluntary Submission of Arms, Ammunition and Explosive Ordnance Devices* (in Croatian), Ministry of Interior, 2002.

<sup>254</sup> Although SEESAC's database on SALW collection concludes that the MoI has collected altogether 61,011 weapons, official documents from the MoI and MFAEI cannot confirm this. The *Report on the Implementation of the National Program for the Increase of General Security* from 2003, and the draft of a *National Strategy* from 2006 both report a total of 33,598 collected weapons.

<sup>255</sup> *Report of the Republic of Croatia on Implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects*, First Biennial Meeting of States to consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, 2003, p.9.

<sup>256</sup> For a detailed analysis of the program see BICC brief 12 *The UNTAES Experience: Weapons Buy-back in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (Croatia)*, 1998.

The plan of using Croatian state funds to buy back SALW from the Serb minority encountered a lot of resistance from the Croatian population at the beginning of the talks with UNTAES. This issue, as well as other critical aspects, such as the destruction or transfer of the collected weapons to the Croatian Government, was solved during negotiations between June and early October 1996.

During the buy-back scheme, the Croatian Government paid between 155 and 176 German Marks<sup>257</sup> for each weapon after a Croatian expert had assessed its value. The SALW could be turned in anonymously at one of the four Weapons Buy-back Locations (WBL) at the Battalion Headquarters of the Belgian, Russian, Pakistani and Jordan battalions. Unserviceable weapons and all ammunition were destroyed, while weapons in good conditions were transferred to Zagreb and placed under custody of the UN until the end of the UNTAES' mandate in January 1998, at which point they were handed over to the Croatian Government.<sup>258</sup>

By 19 August 1996, the program had been able to collect 9,146 rifles (including automatic and semi-automatic ones), 6,375 rocket launchers and anti-tank weapons, 14,521 grenades, and over 1.9 million rounds of ammunition.<sup>259</sup> Up until 22 September 1997, although the programme had stopped, people continued to turn in weapons and ammunition on a voluntary basis, in this case, 204 rifles, 11 anti-tank rockets, 238 grenades, and 55,000 rounds of ammunition. With the end of the mandate of UNTAES, the Croatian Government received all weapons that had been stored by the UN near Zagreb; a total of 10,136 weapons.<sup>260</sup>

The overall assessment of the UNTAES buy-back program was positive, although not all illegal weapons were removed from civilian hands. Nevertheless, considering the circumstances and, in particular, the high distrust between the two ethnic groups in the region, the final collection numbers were quite high.<sup>261</sup>

## 5.14 Farewell to Arms

In 2001, the Croatian Mol came to the conclusion that there was still a large number of illegal SALW and ammunition in the hands of the Croatian population, and therefore a new amnesty and collection programme was needed.<sup>262</sup> On 31 May, the Croatian Government decided to implement a programme called 'Zbogom Oruzje' (Farewell to Arms). While the Mol was tasked with overall coordination, the programme was planned and conducted together with other ministries, veterans' associations, shooting clubs, women's organizations, hunting associations, various media, and other partners in Croatian civil society.

The media campaign in particular was seen as key to the success of the programme, as not only did Croatian public media provide free air time, but so did 54 out of 110 private TV and radio stations. In addition, newspapers continuously published the results of the collection activities, as did the website of the Mol. Veterans and Croatian soldiers were especially targeted through the MoD and veterans' associations.

The collections were locally prepared through meetings of local administrations, civil society, veterans, media and the police. These meetings designated coordinators for the municipality. Collection points were mostly in schools and were implemented by the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Defence. The Ministry of Education had complimentary arms awareness activities in schools for children and parents.

The Mol sees 'Farewell to Arms' as the most successful programme in Croatia so far.<sup>263</sup> Between 22 February 2001 and 31 December 2002, 6,574 weapons were collected, 67,333 items of explosive ordnance, 2.3 million rounds of ammunition, and 3,748 kg of explosives. An interesting detail is that one third of the weapons were

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<sup>257</sup> The Croatians would not pay Dinars and the Serbs refused Kunas.

<sup>258</sup> BICC brief 12, p.5.

<sup>259</sup> *Ibid.*, p.22.

<sup>260</sup> *Ibid.*, p.21.

<sup>261</sup> The UNTAES numbers are very impressive if compared, for example, with the collection effort in Kosovo in 2003, which had been implemented in a similar atmosphere of distrust, and resulted in only 155 guns being collected (see SEE SALW Monitor 2005, p.96).

<sup>262</sup> *Report on the Implementation of the National Program for the Increase of General Security, 2002.*

<sup>263</sup> *Ibid.*



collected within the last two weeks.<sup>264</sup> In addition, about 11,064 requests for legal registration of firearms were submitted.

While all explosive materials and the non-functional weapons were destroyed, functional weapons were stored with the Mol, which generated some criticism.<sup>265</sup> A complete destruction could have served the public image of the campaign in a much better way.

The final report on 'Farewell to Arms' came to the conclusion that Croat citizens continue to keep a high amount of illegal weapons and thus the programme and a complementary awareness campaign should be continued. However, there has been no new amnesty or collection programme since the end of 2002.<sup>266</sup>

### 5.15 A new campaign?

Complimentary to the above-mentioned new *Law on Arms*, which is, at the time of writing, has passed the first reading of the parliamentary process, the MUP is now preparing for a possible new collection campaign.<sup>267</sup> In May 2006 the Mol formed a working group at the ministry that is currently discussing an awareness campaign, which is meant to apply similar measures and media networks similar to the successful 'Farewell to Arms' collection programme.

In a meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration in June 2006, the MFAEI, as the coordinating agency for the National Commission on SALW, signalled its interest in supporting this measure and in coordinating a joint approach with the Mol in the future.<sup>268</sup> The Mol stressed that although they are envisaging a campaign at least as intense as the 'Farewell to Arms' collection programme, funds are still limited and need to be raised from international donors in order to be able to implement such a programme.<sup>269</sup>

If the new *Law on Arms* is adopted by the parliament by Autumn 2006, a new campaign could be prepared for 2007 in cooperation with all members of the National Commission on SALW, as well as civil society organizations, media, veterans' associations, the church, and international partners such as the EU and UNDP.

### 5.16 Capacity of civil society and non-governmental organizations

There is no NGO or think tank exclusively dealing with issues related to SALW or ammunition in Croatia. The various measures, individual interests or commitments reviewed over the course of this survey lack an overall link or network to improve the influence and effectiveness of civil society when it comes to SALW control. Instead, arms control or awareness activities are often driven by individuals. Moreover there is a lack of institutionalized measures at the level of the government for SALW Awareness in schools, despite the rising concern of teachers regarding an escalation of violence.<sup>270</sup>

#### 5.16.1 NGOs, Academia and the Church

Between 2003 and 2005, SEESAC trained 12 individuals on various issues related to SALW, mainly journalists and NGO members.<sup>271</sup> But no organization has taken a lead role on the issue thus far. IANSA, the International Action Network on Small Arms, lists the Antiwar Campaign, the Croatian Red Cross, and the Human Rights Centre

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<sup>264</sup> Experience now suggests that during the majority of voluntary weapons collection programmes that 2/3 of the weapons are collected during the last 1/3 of the amnesty period.

<sup>265</sup> SEE SALW Monitor 2004, p.93.

<sup>266</sup> *Report on the Implementation of the National Program for the Increase of General Security*, 2002, p.10.

<sup>267</sup> *Op cit.* Vrbic.

<sup>268</sup> Meeting of MFAEI, MoD and Mol representatives together with EUSAC and a representative of BICC, Zagreb, 06 June 2006.

<sup>269</sup> *Op cit.* Vrbic.

<sup>270</sup> See Chapter on youth and SALW.

<sup>271</sup> BICC interview with Adrian Wilkinson, Head of SEESAC, Belgrade, 23 January 2006.

as organizational members, along with one individual member.<sup>272</sup> Of these organizations, none is currently working on SALW issues.

The Croatian Red Cross is working on the issue of mines. Although the issue of SALW and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are clearly linked, the curriculum on mines that the CRC has designed includes only one sentence on the danger of SALW. The awareness campaigns on mines that the CRC is conducting in schools (about 800 in 2005) do not include SALW in a systematic way, but rather depend on the attitude of the individual trainer and his/her willingness to also talk about SALW.<sup>273</sup>

#### Box 7: Independent community measures in Knin – A school play on weapons

Sub-financed through local development funds provided by the World Bank, a small initiative of parents in Kin has produced an awareness tool and a play on mines and SALW. The awareness tool, a small brochure published in October 2005, tells the illustrated story of three kids who went playing in the forest. They find a weapon and the boy shoots at one girl who is wounded but survives.

The play was produced in Knin and premiered there in March 2006 in the local community college. It is about two siblings playing at home and finding a weapon. They think it is a toy weapon, the boy points it at his sister and shoots at her but she survives. The conclusion of the play tells Kids that they *'should not touch any weapons to make sure that such a tragedy never happens to you because it cannot be made undone. Tell your parents that if they loved you they should not endanger your lives by keeping weapons at home'*.

It is likely that more of such small and independent initiatives exist all over the country but an overall network of people working on these issues in their communities is lacking.

Sources: Interview with Zeljka Lovretic, Knin, 18 March 2006; brochure 'Pazi Mina!' and text of the play 'Opasna Igra'

The Helsinki Committee used to have good cooperation with the Mol and has jointly published a book on the police and human rights. It raised criticism about the early end of the collection and amnesty phase in 2002 and the inability of the program to incite more people to turn in their weapons.<sup>274</sup> The Helsinki Committee hopes to renew the collection of arms by applying an interagency approach with a wider inclusion of civil society, veterans' associations and the churches, similar to the Mol's 'Farewell to Arms' in 2002, and has already raised that issue with international organizations.<sup>275</sup>

The Croatian section of Amnesty International (AI) is actively promoting AI's 'Control Arms' campaign in Croatia. This also includes lobbying the Croatian Government to support the proposed international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).<sup>276</sup> Using its local structures, AI Croatia is promoting the campaign through press conferences, the Internet, and with panel discussions. AI Croatia's 10 local groups are organizing events and display stands where people can sign up for the petition.

As of yet, research institutions have not focussed on the issue of SALW in Croatia.

Nevertheless, there have been some surveys on youth and violence and civil service that included some issues linked to small arms.<sup>277</sup> A more systematic exchange and publicity of research on violence and crime might lead to additional information for future SALW analysis in Croatia.

The Catholic Church in Croatia has been active against celebratory fire through public announcements before Christmas, New Year's Eve and other holidays in Croatia, asking people not to shoot on these occasions. According to some interviewees, these announcements have helped to reduce celebratory gunfire since 2002.<sup>278</sup>

<sup>272</sup> See [http://www.iansa.org/about/members/se\\_europe.htm](http://www.iansa.org/about/members/se_europe.htm), accessed on 01 June 2006.

<sup>273</sup> BICC interview with Vjorka Roseg, Croatian Red Cross, Zagreb, 16 February 2006.

<sup>274</sup> BICC interview with Ranko Helebrant, Helsinki Committee of Croatia, Zagreb, 21 March 2006.

<sup>275</sup> See Chapter of collection activities.

<sup>276</sup> BICC interview with Edin Tuzlak, Amnesty International Croatia, 22 March 2006.

<sup>277</sup> Lea Jurisic et al. 2006; but also UNICEF Croatia in the mid-90s.

<sup>278</sup> *Op cit.* Radovic.



### 5.16.2 Veterans and shooting clubs



Picture 2: Page from the SALW Awareness Booklet for Croat Elementary Schools (Copyright Dubravko Gvozdanovic and the UHBDDR).

The UHBDDR, the Association of Croatian Homeland War Volunteers, has been tasked for the last five years by the Ministry for Veterans (now Family, Veterans and Inter-Generational Solidarity) to implement arms awareness classes in elementary schools in all 21 regions of Croatia.<sup>279</sup> The association receives 150,000 Kuna per year from the Ministry to teach about the dangers of SALW and explosive remnants of war.<sup>280</sup> The main teaching instruments are comic books, painting books, as well as some stickers, hats and other presents for the children.

The teaching takes place at the school and lasts for one hour. Trainers are selected by the association from among its members.<sup>281</sup> The main criteria for trainers are that they do not own a weapon, they do not have a criminal record, and that they have kids of their own. In addition, the association tries to

use the training to benefit both the children and veterans by also choosing unemployed individuals. In the case of the latter, the training is seen as part of their resocialization process.<sup>282</sup> Until now, awareness training has been implemented in approximately 100 schools, reaching about 10,000 children. Evaluation and positive feedback from the Ministry for Education assures that the organization can continue this project.

Moreover, the UHBDDR cooperated with the police in some regions during the implementation of the 'Farewell to Arms' collection program. They suggested that their members give up their guns and also informed the regional offices about the places where the SALW and explosives were collected. Some veterans' associations were not in favour of the weapons collection. In general, the collection would have been more successful if all 334 veterans' associations in Croatia had supported it unanimously.<sup>283</sup>

A different kind of weapons awareness training is provided through the Practical Shooting Association (PSA) and its member clubs,<sup>284</sup> such as the Delta Shooting Club (DSC) in Zagreb. The 'safety exam', provided every three months at the DSC, is open to all owners of legally registered guns.<sup>285</sup> Its main goal is to teach the owners how to safely use and store a gun. Each course consists of about 20 participants.

<sup>279</sup> The program started as a complementary measure to the 'Farewell to Arms' campaign. Because it was first implemented by D Gvozdanovic a member of both the UHBDDR and the Delta Shooting Club, it was described in the SALW Monitor 2005 as an activity of the Delta Shooting Club (SALW Monitor 2005, p.82). According to Z Milan, it has been from the outset an activity of the UHBDDR.

<sup>280</sup> BICC interview with Zvonko Milan, UHBDDR, Zagreb, 20 April 2006.

<sup>281</sup> The UHBDDR was founded in 1993 and now has about 10,000 members.

<sup>282</sup> *Op cit.* Milan

<sup>283</sup> *Op cit.* Milan

<sup>284</sup> There are currently 10 shooting clubs in Croatia that are members of the PSA, three in Zagreb, two in Osijek, two in Pula and one in Split, Zadar and Slavonski Brod. There is another national association, the Croatian Shooting Association, which mostly has members practicing with air weapons and small calibre guns.

<sup>285</sup> *Op cit.* Gvozdanovic

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3. Mirko Capjak, Department for International Security, Section for Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, 19 March and 06 June 2006.
4. Brigadier Mirko Kukulj, Deputy Head of Directorate, Ministry of Defence, Division for Material Resources, Zagreb, 13 February and 06 June 2006.
5. Lieutenant Colonel Darko Spajic, Head of NATO/PfP Directorate, Defence Policy Division, Ministry of Defence, Zagreb, 16 February and 20 April 2006.
6. Colonel Zvonko Popovic, Head of Transition Office, SPECTRA Program, Ministry of Defence Zagreb, 15 February 2006.
7. Colonel Ivan Baric, SPECTRA Program, Ministry of Defence, SPECTRA Program, Ministry of Defence, Zagreb, 15 February 2006.
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9. Josip Vrbic, Criminal Police Directorate Organized Crime Department, Ministry of Interior, Zagreb, 14 February and 06 June 2006.
10. Damir Stolnik, Mol, General Police Directorate, Zagreb, 06 June 2006.
11. Filip Damjanovic, Head of the Directorate for Inspection and Administrative Affairs, Ministry of Interior, Zagreb, 19 April 2006.
12. Sinisa Fressl, Ministry of Interior, Criminal Police Directorate, Zagreb, 19 April 2006.
13. Yuri Afanasiev, Resident Representative, United Nations Development Programme, Zagreb, 13 February, 18 April and 07 June 2006.
14. Zack Taylor, EUSAC, UNDP, Zagreb, 13 February, 19 April and 06 June 2006.
15. Adrian Wilkinson, Head of SEESAC, Belgrade, 23 January 2006.
16. Diman Dimov, Deputy Head of SEESAC, Belgrade, 23 January 2006.
17. Stephan Dahlgren, Task manager Justice and Home Affairs, Delegation of the EU to the Republic of Croatia, Zagreb, 13 February 2006.
18. Alfons Peeters, Sector Manager for Minorities, Human rights, and Energy, Delegation of the EU to the Republic of Croatia, Zagreb, 13 February 2006.
19. Roy Isbister, EU and Arms Exports Controls, Saferworld, Zagreb, 06 June 2006.
20. Archana Patel, EU and Arms Exports Controls, Saferworld, Zagreb, 13 February 2006.
21. Dr Antoinette Kaic-Rak, WHO Liaison Officer in Croatia, Zagreb, 17 February 2006.
22. Dr Laurids Hölscher, Counselor and Deputy to the German Ambassador to Croatia, German Embassy, Zagreb, 15 February 2006.
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36. Professor Dragica Kozaric-Kovacic, Head of the Department for Psychiatry, University Hospital Dubrava, Zagreb, 21 March 2006.
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46. Zvonko Milan, Association of the Voluntary Defenders in the Homeland War (UHBDDR), Zagreb, 20 April 2006.

## Annex C - Household survey sample

SAMPLE TOTAL	TYPE	COUNT (N)	ROW (%)
		1000	100%
Gender	Male	468	46.8
	Female	532	53.2
Age Groups	15-24	151	15.1
	25-34	180	18.0
	35-54	344	34.4
	55 +	313	31.3
Education	Primary	261	26.1
	Secondary	582	58.2
	Tertiary	151	15.1
Income	Up to 4000 Kuna	349	34.9
	4001 to 8000 Kuna	321	32.1
	More than 8001 Kuna	136	13.6
	No answer	194	19.4
War Affection	War affected area	196	19.6
	Non war affected area	804	80.4
Nationality	Croat	960	96.0
	Other	40	4.0
Working Status	Work for somebody	353	35.3
	Owner of own business	46	4.6
	Unemployed	137	13.7
	Housewife	68	6.8
	Pupil / Student	97	9.7
	Retired	294	29.4
	Other	5	0.5
Type of Settlement	Rural	392	39.2
	Urban	608	60.8
Region	Zagreb region	248	24.8
	Northern Croatia	179	17.9
	Slavonia	176	17.6
	Lika and Banovina	87	8.7
	Hrvatsko Primorje and Istra	119	11.9
	Dalmatia	191	19.1



## Annex D - Focus group sample

### Focus Group 1, Zagreb – 13 March 2006

- Female, 60 years, one child, retired.
- Female, 33 years, two children, clerk.
- Female, 22 years, student, originally from Bosnia.
- Male, 63 years, one child, lawyer, retired.
- Male, 23 years, unemployed.
- Female, 42 years, two children.
- Female, 17 years, school of economics.
- Male, 55 years, divorced, three children, unemployed.
- Male, 54 years, married, two children.
- Male, 26 years, employed.

### Focus Group 2, Glina – 14 March 2006

- Female, 43 years, married, two children, dairy farming, housewife.
- Male, 40 years, married, two children, unemployed, former soldier.
- Male, ca. 45 years, married, three children, farming.
- Male, 20 years, trained as waiter, unemployed.
- Male, 40 years, married, two children, former soldier, unemployed.
- Female, 39 years, married, two children, agriculture.
- Female, 38 years, married, three children, agriculture and dairy farming.
- Male, 28 years, unmarried, unemployed.
- Male, 30 years, divorced, unemployed, trained conductor.
- Male, 46 years, married, three children, agriculture.

### Focus Group 3, Vukovar – 15 March 2006

- Male, 65 years, two children, four grandchildren, retired.
- Male, 49 years, two children, unemployed.
- Female, divorced, two children, unemployed.
- Female, 57 years, one child, one grandchild.
- Female, 53 years, two children, senior nurse at the emergency admission.
- Female, 36 years, one child, works at the market.
- Female, 32 years, married, unemployed.
- Male, 27 years, unemployed.
- Male, 31 years, married, unemployed.
- Male, 34 years, two children, unemployed.

### Focus Group 4, Split – 17 March 2006

- Female, 51 years, divorced, one daughter.
- Male, 64 years, married, one daughter.

Female, 64 years, three sons, three grandchildren.

Female, 50 years, one daughter, unemployed.

Male, 27 years, two children, former street child,

Male, 18 years, studying at school of economics.

Male, 44 years, married, three children, works for the navy.

Female, 34 years, unmarried.

Female, 22 years, finished her degree in economics, unemployed.

Male, 49 years, divorced, two children.

#### **Focus Group 5, Knin – 18 March 2006**

Female, 57 years, married, one son, unemployed.

Male, 49 years, married two children, works for the community.

Female, 40 years, married, one daughter, unemployed, youth work volunteer.

Female, 38 years, married, two children, unemployed, youth work volunteer.

Male, 37 years, unemployed.

Male, 57 years, married, two children, unemployed.

Female, 53 years, married, three daughters, housewife.

Female, 30 years, unmarried, unemployed, trained nurse, worked for a long time for a NGO.

Male, 26 years, no degree, unemployed.

Male, 18 years, lives with his father and brother, unemployed.



## Annex E - Rounds of ammunition under the control of the MoD

TYPE OF AMMUNITION	ROUNDS
7.62 x 25 mm TT	151,411
7.65 x 17 mm SR	129,991
9 x 17 mm	12,751
9 x 18 mm Makarov	2,000,842
9 x 19 mm Parabellum	2,487,804
5.45 x 39.5 mm	2,212,872
5.56 x 45 mm	2,522,655
5.56 mm (.22LR)	94,702
7.62 x 39 mm	108,628,346
7.62 x 52 mm	6,328,671
7.62 x 54R mm	7,345,552
7.62 x 63 mm Browning	179,277
7.9 x 57 mm	21,102,453
11.43 x 22.6 mm	133,473
12.7 x 99 mm Browning	6,809,856
12.7 x 107 mm	5,156,577
14.5 x 114 mm	3,170,083
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>169,880,316</b>

## Annex F - Ammunition stocks of the MoI

TYPE OF AMMUNITION	AMOUNT / ROUNDS
Pistol / Revolver	979,667
Gun	1,610,252
Gun (Self Loading)	14,000
Light Anti Aircraft Artillery	24,374
Hand Grenades	115
Anti Artillery Grenades	26
Anti Tank Grenades	0
Anti Aircraft Artillery	84
Detonators	40
Pirate Technology	296
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,628,854</b>



## Annex G - SALW related crimes (2005 - 1998)

### 2005

TYPE OF CRIMINAL ACT	RIFLES	HUNTING GUN	PISTOL / REVOLVER	TROPHY WEAPONS	OTHER	TOTAL
Chapter 10. Against Life	20	0	49	0	8	77
Chapter 11. Against Freedom and Rights	33	0	87	2	6	128
Chapter 12. Against State	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 13. Against Values Protected by International Law	2	0	2	4	32	40
Chapter 14. Rape at Gunpoint	0	0	1	0	0	1
Chapter 16. Against Family, Marriage and Youth	1	0	0	0	2	3
Chapter 17. Against Property	42	0	575	0	25	642
Chapter 18. Against Human Health	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 19. Against Environment	78	2	1	0	35	116
Chapter 20. Against General Safety	31	1	45	0	8	85
Chapter 21. Against Safety of Business	-0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 22. Against Judiciary	0	0	1	0	0	1
Chapter 24. Against Public Order	48	0	12	0	8	68
Chapter 25. Against State Duty	0	0	1	0	0	1
Chapter 26. Against Croatian Army	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>255</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>774</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>124</b>	<b>1,162</b>

### 2004

TYPE OF CRIMINAL ACT	RIFLES	HUNTING GUN	PISTOL / REVOLVER	TROPHY WEAPONS	OTHER	TOTAL
Chapter 10. Against Life	21	0	51	2	7	81
Chapter 11. Against Freedom and Rights	32	0	94	0	9	135
Chapter 12. Against State	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 13. Against Values Protected by International Law	5	0	1	0	9	15
Chapter 14. Rape at Gunpoint	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 16. Against Family, Marriage and Youth	1	0	0	0	0	1
Chapter 17. Against Property	61	0	624	0	26	711
Chapter 18. Against Human Health	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 19. Against Environment	78	1	1	1	37	118
Chapter 20. Against General Safety	42	0	62	2	16	122
Chapter 21. Against Safety of Business	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 22. Against Judiciary	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 24. Against Public Order	40	0	23	3	7	73
Chapter 25. Against State Duty	0	1	0	0	0	1
Chapter 26. Against Croatian Army	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>280</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>856</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>1,257</b>

## 2003

TYPE OF CRIMINAL ACT	RIFLES	HUNTING GUN	PISTOL / REVOLVER	TROPHY WEAPONS	OTHER	TOTAL
Chapter 10. Against Life	18	0	54	1	3	76
Chapter 11. Against Freedom and Rights	34	0	92	0	2	128
Chapter 12. Against State	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 13. Against Values Protected by International Law	11	0	2	0	3	16
Chapter 14. Rape at Gunpoint	2	0	2	0	0	4
Chapter 16. Against Family, Marriage and Youth	2	0	2	0	0	4
Chapter 17. Against Property	22	0	368	0	18	408
Chapter 18. Against Human Health	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 19. Against Environment	83	2	0	0	34	119
Chapter 20. Against General Safety	42	0	58	1	11	112
Chapter 21. Against Safety of Business	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 22. Against Judiciary	1	0	0	0	0	1
Chapter 24. Against Public Order	67	0	18	0	6	91
Chapter 25. Against State Duty	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 26. Against Croatian Army	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>282</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>596</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>960</b>

## 2002

TYPE OF CRIMINAL ACT	RIFLES	HUNTING GUN	PISTOL / REVOLVER	TROPHY WEAPONS	OTHER	TOTAL
Chapter 10. Against Life	19	0	57	2	7	85
Chapter 11. Against Freedom and Rights	32	0	83	2	8	125
Chapter 12. Against State	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 13. Against Values Protected by International Law	8	0	1	0	3	12
Chapter 14. Rape at Gunpoint	0	0	2	0	0	2
Chapter 16. Against Family, Marriage and Youth	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 17. Against Property	35	1	363	0	20	419
Chapter 18. Against Human Health	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 19. Against Environment	74	5	0	0	48	127
Chapter 20. Against General Safety	47	0	61	3	14	125
Chapter 21. Against Safety of Business	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 22. Against Judiciary	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 24. Against Public Order	36	1	20	0	11	68
Chapter 25. Against State Duty	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 26. Against Croatian Army	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>251</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>587</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>963</b>



## 2001

TYPE OF CRIMINAL ACT	RIFLES	HUNTING GUN	PISTOL / REVOLVER	TROPHY WEAPONS	OTHER	TOTAL
Chapter 10. Against Life	22	0	42	0	14	78
Chapter 11. Against Freedom and Rights	41	0	77	1	9	128
Chapter 12. Against State	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 13. Against Values Protected by International Law	4	0	0	0	2	6
Chapter 14. Rape at Gunpoint	0	0	6	0	0	6
Chapter 16. Against Family, Marriage and Youth	1	0	0	0	0	1
Chapter 17. Against Property	35	1	200	0	17	253
Chapter 18. Against Human Health	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 19. Against Environment	88	2	0	1	28	119
Chapter 20. Against General Safety	54	0	75	1	21	151
Chapter 21. Against Safety of Business	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 22. Against Judiciary	0	0	1	0	0	1
Chapter 24. Against Public Order	48	0	20	0	1	69
Chapter 25. Against State Duty	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 26. Against Croatian Army	1	0	0	0	0	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>294</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>421</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>813</b>

## 2000

TYPE OF CRIMINAL ACT	RIFLES	HUNTING GUN	PISTOL / REVOLVER	TROPHY WEAPONS	OTHER	TOTAL
Chapter 10. Against Life	32	0	65	1	13	111
Chapter 11. Against Freedom and Rights	33	0	60	3	7	103
Chapter 12. Against State	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 13. Against Values Protected by International Law	4	0	0	0	3	7
Chapter 14. Rape at Gunpoint	0	0	2	0	0	2
Chapter 16. Against Family, Marriage and Youth	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 17. Against Property	31	0	214	1	19	265
Chapter 18. Against Human Health	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 19. Against Environment	85	2	0	1	32	120
Chapter 20. Against General Safety	49	0	79	3	18	149
Chapter 21. Against Safety of Business	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 22. Against Judiciary	0	0	1	1	0	2
Chapter 24. Against Public Order	48	0	19	0	8	75
Chapter 25. Against State Duty	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 26. Against Croatian Army	0	0	0	0	0	0
Separate Law on Weapons	1	0	1	0	0	2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>283</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>441</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>836</b>

## 1999

TYPE OF CRIMINAL ACT	RIFLES	HUNTING GUN	PISTOL / REVOLVER	TROPHY WEAPONS	OTHER	TOTAL
Chapter 10. Against Life	42	0	92	0	12	146
Chapter 11. Against Freedom and Rights	17	0	54	0	6	77
Chapter 12. Against State	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 13. Against Values Protected by International Law	3	0	0	0	1	4
Chapter 14. Rape at Gunpoint	0	0	3	0	0	3
Chapter 16. Against Family, Marriage and Youth	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 17. Against Property	24	0	183	0	11	218
Chapter 18. Against Human Health	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 19. Against Environment	75	6	1	1	20	103
Chapter 20. Against General Safety	61	1	86	0	19	167
Chapter 21. Against Safety of Business	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 22. Against Judiciary	0	0	1	0	0	1
Chapter 24. Against Public Order	73	0	28	0	6	107
Chapter 25. Against State Duty	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 26. Against Croatian Army	0	0	0	0	0	0
Separate Law on Weapons	6	0	1	0	0	7
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>301</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>449</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>833</b>

## 1998

TYPE OF CRIMINAL ACT	RIFLES	HUNTING GUN	PISTOL / REVOLVER	TROPHY WEAPONS	OTHER	TOTAL
Chapter 10. Against Life	46	1	62	3	17	129
Chapter 11. Against Freedom and Rights	12	1	35	1	3	52
Chapter 12. Against State	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 13. Against Values Protected by International Law	5	0	0	0	0	5
Chapter 14. Rape at Gunpoint	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 16. Against Family, Marriage and Youth	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 17. Against Property	27	2	245	2	13	289
Chapter 18. Against Human Health	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 19. Against Environment	77	5	1	0	31	114
Chapter 20. Against General Safety	46	1	96	1	35	179
Chapter 21. Against Safety of Business	1	0	0	0	0	1
Chapter 22. Against Judiciary	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chapter 24. Against Public Order	80	0	36	0	6	122
Chapter 25. Against State Duty	2	0	1	0	0	3
Chapter 26. Against Croatian Army	1	0	0	0	0	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>297</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>476</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>895</b>



## Annex H - Calculation of illegal SALW in Croatia

### Question 1:

Does your household own a gun and if so how many?

1,477,377 = Number of Croatian households according to the 2001 Census.

Replies in percentage multiplied with household number.

$$5.3 \text{ percent} \times 1 \times 1,477,377 = 78,301$$

$$1.7 \text{ percent} \times 2 \times 1,477,377 = 50,231$$

$$0.8 \text{ percent} \times 3 \times 1,477,377 = 35,457$$

$$0.1 \text{ percent} \times 4 \times 1,477,377 = 5,910$$

$$0.2 \text{ percent} \times 5 \times 1,477,377 = 14,774$$

Total: 184,673

Categories Do not know/No answer (DK/NA) and more than 5 guns (only 6 was picked although respondents could have referred to a higher number):

$$0.3 \text{ percent} \times 6 \times 1,477,377 = 26,593$$

$$4.6 \text{ percent} \times 1.5 \times 1,477,377 = 101,939$$

Total of both calculations: 313,205

### Question 2:

On average, how many weapons do you think that people have in their household?

After subtracting the replies DK/NA and *possibly misleading* the following can be calculated:

$$8.5 \times 0 = 0$$

$$36 \times 1 = 36$$

$$8.4 \times 2 = 16.8$$

$$1.3 \times 3 = 3.9$$

$$0.6 \times 4 = 2.4$$

$$0.5 \times 5 = 2.5$$

$$61.6 / 55.3 = 1.1 \text{ weapons per household}$$

CONFIDENCE LEVEL	ARMS PER HOUSEHOLD	TOTAL
Low	0.85	1,255,770
Medium	1.10	1,625,115
High	1.35	1,994,458

Estimates based on the calculation of replies to Question 2

The median of the results of both questions is thus used to provide a more realistic picture.

CONFIDENCE LEVEL	ESTIMATED ARMS PER HOUSEHOLD	TOTAL	MEDIAN OF RESULTS OF BOTH QUESTIONS
Low	0.85	1,255,770	784,487
Medium	1.10	1,625,115	969,160
High	1.35	1,994,458	1,153,831

**Estimates by respondents of Household Survey on arms per household**

These estimates refer to the total number of weapons in Croatian households. In order to obtain the potential number of illegally owned weapons, one has to subtract the 371,702 registered weapons. In conclusion, the estimate is:

CONFIDENCE LEVEL	TOTAL NUMBER OF ESTIMATED ILLEGAL SALW FOR CROATIA
Low	412,785
Medium	597,458
High	782,129

**Estimate of illegal arms in Croatian households**



## Annex I - Summary of Croatia's arms transfer legislation

DATE	LEGAL REFERENCE	TITLE
N/A	Official Gazette of Croatia (OG) 46/1997	Law on arms
N/A	OG 27/1999, 12/2001, 19/2002	Law on amendments to the law on arms
N/A	OG 147/1999	Rules of procedure concerning the usage of the single administrative document in the customs clearance process
25 March 2002	OG 33/2002	Law on the production, overhaul and trade in arms and military equipment
09 May 2002	N/A	Decision on accepting the principles contained in the EU Code of Conduct for Arms Exports
29 July 2002	OG 95/2002	Rulebook on the sale of redundant arms and military equipment of the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia
January 2003	OG 5/2003	Regulation on special measures for securing and protecting the production, overhaul and trade in arms and military equipment
N/A	OG 67/2003	Regulation on special conditions for defence equipment development
10 April 2003	OG 67/2003	Decree on goods subject to import and export licensing
21 October 2003		Law on amendments and supplements to the law on manufacturing, overhaul and trade in armaments and military equipment
01 January 2005	OG 100/2004	Law on the export of dual-use goods
N/A	OG 166/2004	Regulation on form of the request for the issuance of the export license for dual-use goods
N/A	OG 166/2004	Regulation on form of the request for the issuance of import certification for the import of dual-use goods
24 December 2004	N/A	Law on international restrictive measures
01 January 2005	OG 184/2004	Decree on the list of dual-use goods

Source: SEESAC/Saferworld, Analysis of national legislation and implementation and enforcement mechanisms for arms transfer controls in the Western Balkans (Forthcoming).

## Annex J - Error margins

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The margin of error expresses the amount of the random variation underlying a survey's results. This can be thought of as a measure of the variation one would see in reported percentages if the same poll were taken multiple times. The larger the margin of error, the less confidence one has that the poll's reported percentages are close to the 'true' percentages, that is the percentages in the whole population.

A margin of error can be calculated for each figure produced from a sample survey. For results expressed as percentages, it is often possible to calculate a maximum margin of error that applies to all results from the survey (or at least all results based on the full sample). The maximum margin of error can sometimes be calculated directly from the sample size (the number of poll respondents).

A margin of error is usually prepared for one of three different levels of confidence; 99%, 95% and 90%. The 99% level is the most conservative, while the 90% level is the least conservative. The 95% level is the most commonly used. If the level of confidence is 95%, the 'true' percentage for the entire population would be within the margin of error around a poll's reported percentage 95% of the time. Equivalently, the margin of error is the radius of the 95% confidence interval.

In order to calculate the margin error one should find what the standard error is. The standard error is the standard deviation of the sampling distribution of the sample statistic (such as sample mean, sample proportion or sample correlation).

$$\text{Standard error} = \sqrt{\frac{p(1-p)}{n}}$$

Where p is proportion we would like to test, and n is number of respondents in a sample.

The standard error can be used to create a confidence interval within which the 'true' percentage should be to a certain level of confidence.

Plus or minus 1 standard error is a 68% confidence interval, plus or minus 2 standard errors is approximately a 95% confidence interval, and a 99% confidence interval is 2.58 standard errors on either side of the estimate.

The margin of error is the radius (half) of the 99% confidence interval, or 1.96 standard errors, when  $p = 50\%$ . As such, it can be calculated directly from the number of poll respondents.

$$\text{Margin of error (95\%)} = 1.96 \times \sqrt{\frac{0.5(1-0.5)}{n}} =$$

### Margin of Error for the SALW Household Survey in Croatia

In our case where n is 1000 respondents as it was in the SALW Survey the following applies:

Margin of error (95%) = 0,031 = **3,1%** (meaning that one could be 95% sure that the the real proportion in the real proportion in the population is between 46,9% and 53,1%).



To conclude, the margin of error is the 95% confidence interval for a reported percentage of 50%. If  $p$  moves away from 50%, the confidence interval around  $p$  will be smaller. Thus, the margin of error represents an upper bound to the uncertainty; one is *at least* 95% certain that the 'true' percentage is within a margin of error of a reported percentage for any reported percentage.

**Sources:**

**The ESOMAR Handbook of Market Research, Group of Authors, 2005, ESOMAR.**

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Margin\\_of\\_error](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Margin_of_error)

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
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