What about the Bullets?

by Aleksandrina Mavrodieva, SEESAC intern

 

According to SEESAC’s 2005 report Biting the Bullet, there are around 600 million small arms and light weapons (SALW) worldwide. At the same time, SIPRI has estimated that between 2005 and 2011, to a large extend due to the “war on terror”, the production of weapons has been on the rise and has stopped increasing only in 2011 when spending reached $1738 billion.

 

In order for those weapons to operate, ammunition is needed. Even though it is impossible to assess the quantity of ammunition produced, it is clear that the number is at least several times higher than the one of SALW.

 

While most of these weapons and ammunition start as legally produced and sold, a large amount are later diverted, smuggled or re-sold, ending up on the black market and used as tools in crimes against humanity.

 

Ammunition is particularly problematic as it is the least traceable peace of armory. And it is the cheapest one, making it easy to refill old AK47s or other cheaper rifles that have proliferated through the African continent, South East Asia, South America and the Balkans.

 

The international community acknowledged the pressing need to address the issue of illicit arms transfers and began developing a legally binding global treaty regulating the arms trade. One of the much disputed topics during the negotiations process was the inclusion of ammunition as a part of the regulatory system. Finally, ammunition was recognized as an integral part of the arms trade and included in the final text of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) under the Article 3.

 

Article 3 states that each signatory country shall maintain a system to regulate the export of ammunition and according to the provisions of the Articles 6 and 7, countries should assess the probability that such exports would be used to conduct human rights abuses, commit genocide or support organized crime.

 

However, the rest of the Treaty, most notably articles on import, transit and trans-shipment, brokering, diversion, record keeping and reporting, clearly exclude regulation of ammunition and instead are only limited to the list of conventional weapons in Article 2 (1).

 

This omission in the text weakenes the control systems that the ATT aims to establish as it represents a loophole that can be used by brokers to circumvent the Treaty and keep transferring munitions to conflict-torn places. 

 

Trafficking is a complex business with many interests that have not ceased to prevail over international ones. When fifty countries ratify the ATT and it comes into force, the regulations on ammunition might need to be reconsidered or reinforced at national level so that traffickers get a clear message of the importance of the Treaty and the commitment of member states to stop the illicit trade.

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