

Performance Indicators for the Monitoring and Evaluation of SALW Control Programmes -Discussion Paper



SEESAC

South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the
Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons



The **South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons** (SEESAC) has a mandate from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Stability Pact for South East Europe (SPSEE) to provide operational assistance, technical assistance and management information in support of the formulation and implementation of SALW co-ordination, control and reduction measures, projects and activities in order to support the Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan, thereby contributing to enhanced regional stability and further long-term development in South Eastern Europe.

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


Introduction

The trend is for SALW control (and DDR) programmes to become more integrated into national socio-economic development, therefore programme evaluation and the use of performance indicators are important to; 1) monitor the impact of a programme during its implementation; 2) provide management information during the implementation of a project; 3) verify that the programme is making progress towards achieving its objectives; and 4) to satisfy donors, governments and other stakeholders.

There is growing acceptance within the donor community that the evaluation of all development projects, irrespective of activity group, should be conducted, (whenever possible), using objective, quantitative analysis based on the internationally recognised principles of the development community. Yet, little formal work on PI for SALW control interventions has been done to date and they are rarely included in SALW project documents.¹ Evaluation, in the absence of PI, tends by its nature to be subjective; objective, quantitative evaluation requires the development of specific PI. Conversely, most statistics will need subjective interpretation to come alive and take on meaning, especially for donors whose home-based analysts sometimes have no personal knowledge of the country. The art of judging, assessing or explaining programme performance should also combine relevant and appropriate PI with subjective and illustrative anecdotes.

Data capture for some PI will of course remain a challenge, but it is one that must be addressed if the information provided by the PI is to be useful to programme managers, programme directors and donors. The decision as to which PI to use, and how much external dissemination to allow, will of course be up to the judgement of the programme manager, and must be agreed with the national authorities. Many elements of SALW programmes are considered integral to issues of national security by the government. Even the exact nature of police policy in relation to security is closely guarded and often beyond the access of an external programme.² Information received, like all statistics, can be misused or misdirected to the detriment, or even the covert benefit, of a programme, but that does not negate the very real need to capture and analyse the data required for the PI. This information should be obtained throughout a programme life as it can also be used to support informed management decisions necessary to respond to a changing situation on the ground. Some of the PI will inevitably produce controversial statistics, and it is important that close cooperation with the national SALW authority is maintained and that the national policy on external dissemination is adhered to.³ The capacity of the national SALW authority will be key to the collection and analysis of data and hence the effectiveness of PI, and where such an authority is weak or non-existent, capacity development in this particular area may be necessary at both the local and national levels, involving a wide range of stakeholders.



Picture 1: Qualitative SALW Control Programme Evaluation, Albania 2003

This paper examines the concept of performance indicators, their applicability to SALW control programmes and the impact they can have on the successful management of such programmes. Recommendations are also made for the development of an objective and analytically based evaluation methodology for SALW control programmes.

¹ The only referenced work identified is:

- Safe and Efficient SALW Collection and Destruction Programmes - Proposal for Practical Technical Measures, **Hughes-Wilson J** and **Wilkinson A E A**, UNDP, July 2001.
- Development Held Hostage - Assessing the Effects of Small Arms on Human Development, **Batchelor P** and **Muggah R**, UNDP and Small Arms Survey, April 2002.

² EU ASAC input of October 2004. (David de Beer).

³ This policy should form part of the national SALW control strategy, and arrangements made for the use of PI to support the SALW awareness campaign where appropriate. The 'old barriers of secrecy' must be broken down.



Primary versus Secondary Indicators

The work of **Muggah** and **Batchelor** proposes that 'primary' and 'secondary' indicators could measure the impact of SALW on development. 'Primary' indicators being normally short-term and quantitative, relating to the availability and misuse of SALW, whilst 'secondary' indicators are usually longer term and more qualitative. The immediate requirement of SALW control interventions is to obtain management information to support programme planning and then illustrate success and impact to donors on an annual funding cycle; therefore 'primary' indicators are generally the more immediate concern to programme managers. This paper therefore concentrates on primary quantitative PI, but accepts the importance of the longer-term qualitative secondary PI. Secondary PI should be designed and developed to link into the wider Security Sector Reform (SSR) agenda.

Caution must be the key word though in any use of primary PI as reliance on them alone will not have any value unless the relationship between the primary PI themselves, and their impact on secondary PI is examined at some stage during the process. For example, the collection of SALW in Mozambique would have been considered a success if a collection PI had been solely used to indicate success or failure, yet the weapons were not destroyed and subsequently appeared in the South African underworld. In this case the use of a collection PI, without a complementary destruction PI would have indicated a 'success', when in reality it was arguably an ineffective intervention when other related factors are considered.⁴



Source: UNDP Afghanistan, ANBP, 2003

Primary PI are important for monitoring during the implementation of a programme in terms of identifying trends, and suggesting areas for corrective managerial action. They must, however, be linked to longer term secondary PI that are relevant to the political, economic, security and social impact that a SALW intervention has on local, national and even regional communities. SALW intervention programmes can be both a conflict prevention and post-conflict activity, and it is important that their final impact on the peace building objectives are assessed. Primary PI can, and should, be used to support such an assessment, but they should not be the only information used in such an assessment, as it is likely that the wrong lessons will be learned.

Picture 2: SALW Collection during the Afghan New Beginnings Programme (ANBP) 2003

There will be a temptation to report to donors using primary PI, in order to access funding and resources for the next years' phase of the project. This is unfortunately a reality of project management when resource mobilization is reliant on annual donor funding cycles. Should single PI be used as a donor reporting mechanism, then the inherent dangers of reliance on such a system for assessing programme progress should be clearly identified to the donor, and reference made to the longer term use of secondary PI importance in terms of assessing the full impact of a SALW control intervention on a community or society.

⁴ Robin Poulton, E Mail to author, 04 October 2004.

Key Factors

- Initial data must be collected during SALW Survey, or soon after, so that progress can be as accurately identified as possible.⁵
- Operational objectives for SALW control interventions must be SMART; 1) Stated; 2) Measurable; 3) Achievable; 4) Realistic; and 5) Time constrained.
- The widest possible range of PI should be agreed and adopted.
- Monitoring and evaluation techniques, and the financial resources to support them, must be included as a component of the project document.
- The PI must be included as a component of the Project Document.
- Part of the project may be to enhance the capacity of national data collection and analysis systems in order that information is available to feed into the various PI mathematical models.
- The ground security environment and literacy levels of the population will be key factors in determining the most appropriate PI to consider. *'Statistical western style marketing surveys cannot be done with reasonable accuracy in disparate, illiterate communities under war conditions'*.⁶ Notwithstanding these problems, it is possible to use appropriate PI in such conditions, although a caveat should again be used when such data is released.
- All stakeholders should agree on the appropriate PI before the commencement of a programme. This means that they have all then agreed on their objectives for the programme, increases their motivation for participation and strengthens stakeholder ownership of the process. Different stakeholder aspirations may well mean using different PI for what appear to be very similar programmes.

⁵ This is critical to the effectiveness of PI, as baseline data is so important. It would be difficult to inject a PI system into a project at the half way stage, as comparisons would be extremely difficult. At this stage perceptions of an improved security environment are perhaps more relevant than 'pure' PI systems. (Input from EU ASAC, October 2004).

⁶ David de Beer, E Mail to author, October 2004.



Matrix of Performance Indicators versus Programme Operational Objectives

The following matrix identifies potential operational objectives for SALW control interventions, and proposes Performance Indicators that would be appropriate for each objective. Some of them refer to 'cost effectiveness' or are indicative of 'cost benefit analysis', which although very financial based, do provide useful information to donors. This matrix is not exhaustive, and should be amended as further field experience is gained. **It is again emphasised that these are only potential PI, and SALW control interventions should ONLY use those that are appropriate, achievable and provide some linkage to the wider and more subjective secondary PI. It is not proposed that these are solely used as an evaluation methodology:**

OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE	SALW CONTROL PROGRAMME COMPONENT	PERFORMANCE INDICATOR ^{7 8}	REMARKS / RMDSG #
	Formation of a national commission.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ National Commission established and effective. ■ Developed as part of an ALL stakeholder consultative process. 	RMDS/G 03.10
	Development of a national SALW control strategy.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Dissemination of a national SALW Control Strategy to ALL stakeholders. 	RMDS/G 03.10 This will also require capacity development in order to educate the stakeholders of the requirements of such a strategy.
Assessment of the risk of SALW and their impact on the community.	SALW Survey ⁹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Completion of a comprehensive SALW Survey. ■ Completion of a 'confirmatory', comparative mini-SALW Survey looking specifically at KAP changes. (SALW Awareness effectiveness). 	Contributes to Cost Benefit Analysis. ¹⁰ RMDS/G 05.80

⁷ The operational objectives are examples of the possible outputs or outcomes of a SALW Control programme. An alternative method of presentation would be to represent the PI as part of a logical framework. This was not done as UNDP does not now use this methodology in project documents.

⁸ Measurement systems and methodology follow in next section.

⁹ Throughout this document SALW Survey refers to a distinct operation task conducted in accordance with the Small Arms Survey Protocols, which can be found at www.seesac.org. This is one recommended methodology for data collection on distribution of SALW, impact on communities, perceptions of individuals and the capacity of national authorities. Other methodologies could be used, so long as comparable and statistically valid results can be obtained.

¹⁰ The whole concept of Cost Benefit Analysis and Cost Effectiveness is a highly emotive area. Some donors and practitioners are totally against the use of such concepts, whereas others consider their use to be important, but within appropriate parameters. The identification of PI to support such concepts is included for academic accuracy, although no judgement has yet been made by the author within this paper as the merits or otherwise of use of these specific concepts.

OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE	SALW CONTROL PROGRAMME COMPONENT	PERFORMANCE INDICATOR ^{7 8}	REMARKS / RMDSG #
Reduction in the number of weapons available to criminals.	SALW Collection SALW Destruction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Statistics on the 'Street Price' of SALW. ■ SALW Recovery statistics. ■ SALW Destruction statistics. ■ SALW Disposal ¹¹ statistics. ■ Security survey of SALW storage locations. 	Contributes to Cost Benefit Analysis and Cost Effectiveness. RMDSG 05.10 RMDSG 05.20
Reduction in the number of weapon and ammunition accidents.	SALW Stockpile Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Military statistics for weapons and ammunition accidents. ■ Police statistics for weapons and ammunition accidents. ■ Safety survey of SALW storage and range facilities. 	Contributes to Cost benefit Analysis. RMDSG 05.40
Reduction in armed violence (criminal and domestic).	SALW Collection SALW Stockpile Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Statistics on civilian victims of armed violence. 	Contributes to Cost Benefit Analysis. RMDSG 05.40
Building community awareness of the SALW problem.	SALW Awareness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Effective and specifically targeted SALW Awareness campaign. ■ Survey of effectiveness of the SALW Awareness campaign. 	Contributes to Cost Benefit Analysis. RMDSG 06.10
Need to make public connection between availability of weapons and amount of violence in society.	SALW Awareness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Effective and specifically targeted SALW Awareness campaign. ■ Survey of effectiveness of the SALW Awareness campaign. 	Contributes to Cost Benefit Analysis. RMDSG 06.10
Reduction and disruption of the transfer and illicit trade in SALW.	Cross Border Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Statistics on weapons seizures by police and border control agencies. ■ Statistics on the 'Street Price' of SALW. 	Contributes to Cost Benefit Analysis. RMDSG 05.70
Control of weapons transfers through legislation.	Legislation and Regulatory Issues.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Export legislation developed and implemented. ■ Transfers legislation developed and implemented. ■ Statistics on violation prosecutions. 	Contributes to Cost Benefit Analysis. RMDSG 03.20 RMDSG 03.30

¹¹ Disposal of SALW includes: 1) Sale; 2) Gift; 3) Increased use at training; 4) Deep sea dumping; and 5) Destruction. See RMDSG 05.50 for more details.



OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE	SALW CONTROL PROGRAMME COMPONENT	PERFORMANCE INDICATOR ^{7 8}	REMARKS / RMDSG #
Control of legal weapons through registration.	Legislation and Regulatory Issues.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Law on civilian possession and use. ■ Law on Private Security Company use of SALW. ■ Effective Weapons Registration system developed and implemented. ■ Registration statistics. ■ Statistics on violation prosecutions. (Indicates impact of legislation implementation) 	Contributes to Cost Benefit Analysis and Cost Effectiveness. RMDS/G 03.20 RMDS/G 03.30
Recovery of illegal weapons from the community.	SALW Collection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ SALW Recovery statistics. 	Contributes to Cost Benefit Analysis and Cost Effectiveness. RMDS/G 05.10
Reduction of the open visibility of weapons in the community. ¹²	SALW Collection SALW Awareness Legislative and Regulatory Issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ SALW Recovery statistics. ■ Law on civilian possession and use. ■ Law on PSC use of SALW. ■ Statistics on violation prosecutions. 	Contributes to Cost Benefit Analysis and Cost Effectiveness. RMDS/G 05/10 RMDS/G 06.10 RMDS/G 03.20 RMDS/G 03.30
Development of norms against the illegal use of weapons.	SALW Awareness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Effective SALW Awareness campaign. ■ Survey of effectiveness of the SALW Awareness campaign. ■ Statistics on internal economic investment. (FDI). ■ Statistics on foreign direct investment (FDI). ■ Reduction in economic and humanitarian aid requirements.¹³ 	Contributes to Cost Benefit Analysis. RMDS/G 06.10
Improved perceptions of human security.	All	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ 'Confirmatory SALW Perception Survey (SASPS). 	
Improved social and economic development and a reduction in economic and humanitarian aid requirements.	All		

¹² There is a danger that assault rifles are replaced by pistols as they are more easily concealable, therefore any PI system must consider this before claims can be made of a reduction in weapons carriage.

¹³ The information on internal investment, FDI and reduction in aid requirements can not be directly attributed to the SALW control intervention as so many other variables all contribute to these areas. Undoubtedly an effective SALW control intervention can improve the perception and reality of human security to a situation whereby there is an improvement in the confidence of the investment communities. Therefore it is legitimate to look at these sort of PI, although great caution must be exercised in assessing the actual impact that the SALW control intervention may have had on improvements in these areas.

Quantitative Performance Indicators

Although quantitative PI should not be the only measure of programme performance, they do provide important indicators as to success or failure. This part of the paper provides more detail on the proposed PI, and provides examples from recent SALW control interventions within SEE.¹⁴ Performance Indicators need to be adapted to the special circumstances of each case. A single, best, generic PI methodology does not exist, but it is possible to provide a range of PI for consideration. Credible evaluations intermix quantitative and qualitative data from a variety of sources in order to reach final conclusions; quantitative PI are a significant part of this process.

SALW Recovery Statistics

■ Collection Statistics

The number of weapons recovered (by type) is compared against the estimated number of weapons present in the local community, based on SALW Survey results:

$$\text{Weapons Recovered (\%)} = \frac{\text{Quantity of Weapons Recovered}}{\text{Estimated Weapons in Community}} \times 100$$

This PI considers the least number of variables, but is only as accurate as the estimate of the physical number of weapons present in the target community from the SALW Survey. Other factors, such as the illegal inflow or outflow of weapons in the target community during the collection phase will also impact on the accuracy of this approach. It is very difficult, although not impossible to monitor illegal activities within communities, and there will be a significant margin of error in this PI. Yet it can look at the effectiveness of an intervention in terms of 'order of magnitude'; for example it is useful to know whether the distribution of weapons is in the 10,000s, 100,000s or 1,000,000s.

NOTE *It is important that the number of collected weapons is NOT used solely as the measure of success or failure of a SALW control intervention. It MUST always be emphasised that the number of weapons collected are only one component of a series of coordinated and integrated activities, which together aim to reduce the proliferation and IMPACT of weapons within a community. SALW control is NOT just about weapons collection; improved perceptions of human security, improved social and economic conditions and the registration and management of weapons are all highly desirable outcomes. These do not necessarily require weapons collection!*

CASE STUDY

During the 2003 Macedonia SALW amnesty a total of 7,551 weapons were recovered in response to the SACIM Weapons in Exchange for Incentives (WEI) incentive component. The 2003 SALW Survey estimated that a total of between 100,000 and 450,000 illegal weapons in circulation. This PI, (using a mid point estimate), therefore indicates that the **amnesty collected 2.7% of the illegal weapons** in circulation. Although low as percentages, this amnesty collected more weapons than the previous national amnesty and the 2001 NATO intervention combined; judged against that it was a more successful intervention. In this example the PI could be used to demonstrate that the intervention had collected approximately 151% more weapons (7551 v 3000) than the 2001 NATO SALW control intervention at a fraction of the costs. The improved, but difficult to measure, attitudes of society towards weapons ownership and the fact that illegal weapons were driven deeper underground are all important successful results of this particular intervention.



Source: UNDP SACIM Project, 2003

Picture 3: SALW Collection in Macedonia during 2003 produces some surprises. A Main Battle Tank (T-55) was surrendered by one community.

¹⁴ The majority of Case Studies are from the 2003 SACIM project as this is the only one where the appropriate data was collected to enable the use of PI.



■ SALW Registration Statistics

The increase in weapon registration during the period of the SALW control intervention can be used as a PI:

$$\% \text{ Increase in Weapon Registration} = \frac{\text{Total Registrations} - \text{Registrations (Prior)}}{\text{Registration (Prior)}} \times 100$$

CASE STUDY

During the Kosovo ISAC Project in 2003 a total of approximately 23,000 illegal weapons were registered, in addition to the approximate 9,000 weapons already registered. Using this PI shows that the ISAC project achieved a **% Increase of Weapons Registration of 255%**.

■ Cost per Recovered Weapon

A more complicated approach is to compare the “cost” of recovering a weapon to the programme against the street price. The total costs of the **collection component of the programme** (operating costs and incentive options¹⁵ costs), divided by the number of weapons recovered gives an initial crude indicator of what it has cost to recover each individual weapon. This is still a highly emotive issue within the SALW community. Regardless of the pros and cons of the overall argument, it is a harsh reality that the media, and other international organizations still look at the ‘cost’ of recovering a weapon as THEIR indicator of success or failure. This is mainly because it is easy to do, easy to understand and allows for sensational media coverage. If the cost per weapon recovered is less than the ‘street price’ then that provides one means of defending against such coverage, and certainly proves that a more effective approach than just ‘buy back’ has been achieved.

$$\text{Cost per Recovered Weapon (\$)} = \frac{\text{Total Cost of Programme (\$)}}{\text{Total Weapons Recovered}}$$

This PI will only be of value once the collection phase has reached a degree of maturity, as the first weapon collected will of course be very expensive. The Cost per Recovered Weapon will begin to fall as more are recovered, but will increase as more finance is committed to funding the incentive option selected. The cost per recovered weapon will also begin to increase as it becomes more difficult to maintain voluntary surrender levels during the collection process. Therefore this PI should not be used as a management decision making tool until programme maturity, but the data should be loaded into the financial model throughout the programme. It will soon become apparent when this PI becomes an effective measure of success.

The approach can be made more sophisticated by comparing individual weapons against total costs. The mathematical model for this is complex with a number of variables and involves the management team in the continual substitution of figures in a spreadsheet model. The street price for a pistol will be different to that for an assault rifle, therefore the PI model should also reflect this. If the difference is 40%, then the cost per recovered weapon should also vary by an equivalent percentage. The figures in the spreadsheet model should be continually altered to reflect this equivalent percentage. There can also be significant differences in prices between urban, rural, remote or border areas and they are also dependent on political and social factors. In conclusion, this seemingly simple PI is in fact very complex and great care should be taken if it is selected.

CASE STUDY

During the 2003 Macedonia SALW amnesty a total of 7,551 weapons were recovered in response to a Weapons in Exchange for Incentives (WEI) incentive component. The costs to the UNDP SACIM project of this phase of the SACIM project, (including the SALW Awareness component) were approximately USD 400,000, which resulted in a **Cost per Recovered Weapon of USD \$53**. The street price for an AK variant assault rifle at the time was in the order of USD \$150.

The danger with both the simple and more sophisticated approaches, is that it could give the impression that the programme is in essence a “buy back” programme by another aim, and that there is a direct linkage between the costs of the incentive option component selected and the number of weapons that have been voluntarily surrendered.

¹⁵ Weapons in Exchange for Development (WED), Weapons in Exchange for Incentives (WEI), Weapons in Competition for Development (WCD), Weapons Linked to Development (WLD), ‘Search and Seize’ etc.



The technical limitations of this approach are that it doesn't reflect the intent of individuals in the target community to use any weapons they may have or take account of the "value" of recovered ammunition. In terms of ammunition value, this is not a major failing. Most recovered ammunition would be useless without the weapons; and if ammunition that can be regarded as a "self contained" weapon (such as hand grenades and certain Rocket Launchers) is included in the model, then the validity of the approach will be enhanced.

Crime and Suicide Statistics

■ Fatalities, Injuries and Armed Robbery

One indication of the impact of a SALW control programme on a target community is a comparison of the crime statistics in the area prior to, during and after completion of the weapons collection phase. Statistics should be kept for; 1) fatalities using weapons; 2) woundings as a result of weapons; 3) aggravated assault; and 4) armed robbery. These can again be reported in percentage terms:

$$\text{Percentage Change (\%)} = \frac{(1 - \text{Current Crime Figures})}{\text{Previous Crime Figures}} \times 100$$

This PI provides a realistic indication of the impact of a collection programme on the target community, but is limited in that it does not give an indication of any intent of individuals in the community to use any weapons they may have in the future. It does not, however, provide an indicator as to the root causes of armed violence and crime. A SALW control intervention programme cannot begin to address the root causes of violence in isolation, and will form part of a much larger process. This is a developing area outside the scope of this paper.

CASE STUDY

The SALW Survey of Montenegro identified that the homicide rate using small arms was 3 per 100,000 population. This compares to a rate of 1.28 per 100,000 population for Macedonia. (Rate for Hungary¹⁶ is 0.45 per 100,000 population).

CASE STUDY

The SALW Survey of Montenegro identified that 33% of suicides in one region were committed with small arms. This compares to rates of 59% for Albania and 10% for Macedonia. (Rate for Hungary is 3%).



SEESAC, 2004.

■ Risk Rating

Picture 4: SALW Survey of Montenegro 2004

This PI allocates a risk rating to each individual weapon type based on previous and current weapon usage in the area:

$$\text{Risk Rating (Fatality)} = \frac{\text{Total Number of Fatalities}}{\text{Total Weapons used in Attacks}}$$

$$\text{Risk Rating (Injury)} = \frac{\text{Total Number of Injuries}}{\text{Total Weapons used in Attacks}}$$

These Risk Ratings can be established for both the target community and the country as a whole. They should also be monitored for any rise or fall in the Risk Rating as this will provide a general indication of intentions of the weapon user, and to a degree, the level of competence of illegal users. The usefulness of a Risk Rating is that it can suggest to the programme management team whether or not there is a need to 'target' specific weapon types because the use of such weapons would inevitably produce many more casualties than other weapons types. This is one major argument behind the current US policy of 'buy back' for Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS), due to the devastation than a successful illegal MANPAD attack against a civil aircraft would have.

¹⁶ Hungary is used as a comparator as it is close to SEE, but has a more stringent national SALW control policy and is further towards euro-atlantic integration.



CASE STUDY

This PI was covertly used during the 1999 Gramsh Pilot Project in Albania. During that period, for an AK variant assault rifle there were 21 fatalities for every 100 times that particular type of weapon was used. Hence a **Risk Rating of 0.21** evolved. In the case of an **RPG 7 the Risk Rating was as high as 0.80**. Unfortunately the programme did not maintain these statistics post-1999 and it is not possible to assess whether the follow-on SALW project in Albania had a positive impact on the Risk Rating.



Source: UNDP Albania, SSSR Project, 2002

Picture 5: SALW collection process in Albania 2002.

■ Violation Prosecutions

Statistics should be maintained on the number of unsuccessful and successful legal prosecutions¹⁷ for the **illegal use, carriage and possession of weapons** within a target community. The % increase or decrease should be calculated.

Economic Statistics

■ Street Price

Simple supply and demand laws would suggest that the success of a SALW control programme could be measured by an analysis of the street price¹⁸ of weapons in the target community and the adjoining regions.

$$\text{Percentage Change (\%)}^{19} = \frac{(1 - \text{Current Street Price})}{\text{Previous Street Price}} \times 100$$

An increase in the street price would indicate an increasing scarcity of available weapons. This increasing scarcity or an increase in demand is either being caused by the impact of the collection phase or by an outflow of weapons from the community into adjoining regions, (where a better price can be obtained for the dealer). Either way, it is an indicator that weapons are being removed from the target community, although it is difficult to know whether or not the problem is just been shifted elsewhere. Conversely a fall in the street price can also reflect a drop in the demand for weapons because of improved legislation, implementation of legislation or an improvement in perceptions of human security; all of which could have been impacted by the SALW control intervention. Again, like in other PI areas, care must be taken to make sure that the correct conclusions are drawn from this particular PI.

CASE STUDY

In Albania during 1997/1998 the street price for an AK variant assault rifle was in the region of USD\$ 40, after the UNDP supported interventions from 1998 to 2002 the street price rose to approximately USD\$ 120, an increase of 200%. This was due to a number of supply related factors including 1) the outflow of 200,000 weapons to neighbouring countries; 2) market saturation meaning individuals didn't bother to try and sell; and 3) impact of police and legislation driving weapons underground. The UNDP intervention cannot claim all of the credit for the impact on the street price, although it certainly made a significant contribution. Increased street prices means weapons become more unaffordable, and therefore more difficult to obtain for random acts of armed violence.



Source: UNDP Albania, SALWC Project, 2002

Picture 6: SALW collected in Albania during 2002.

■ Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALY) ²⁰

The DALY has emerged as a measure of the burden of disease, (or in this case injury), and it reflects the total amount of healthy life lost to all causes during a period of time. Further information is available from the WHO

¹⁷ Statistics on unsuccessful prosecutions should also be kept as these may also prove to be one indicator as to the effectiveness of the judicial system.

¹⁸ Within SEE a range of organizations have been used to try and maintain an overview of the street price of weapons within communities. This is a highly sensitive area, which must be treated with the strictest confidentiality. It would not be desirable for illegal weapons traders to be able to easily find out where the prices are most advantageous to them as this could trigger illegal movement of weapons.

¹⁹ If this percentage change is negative, it indicates an INCREASE in the Street Price

²⁰ Source - Development Held Hostage - Assessing the Effects of Small Arms on Human Development, **Batchelor P** and **Muggah R**, UNDP and Small Arms Survey, April 2002.



on the mechanisms for this particular PI. A DALY would provide the most comprehensive description of the costs associated with armed violence in terms of human capital, but it is also impacted by significant improvements in the health system during the SALW programme life. A relationship in economic terms can then be drawn by applying a median income.

$$(DALY \text{ by Armed Violence}) \times (\text{Median Income Wage})$$

This figure represents the wages lost as a result of armed violence. The effects of armed violence prematurely rob the economy of productive workers. This equation highlights the economic loss caused to society by the use of small arms.

CASE STUDY

In Colombia, between 1989 and the late 1990s, 20% of all DALY were attributed to SALW. In 1995 a total of 1,450, 845 years of potential life were lost - over 60% of which were directly attributable to small arms.

CASE STUDY

It has been identified that in the USA during 1998 the cost per firearms injury was over USD \$14,000. (Sources: Batchelor and Muggah, from May and Rice, 1993).

■ Years of Potential Life Lost (YPLL) ²¹

The YPLL has emerged as a measure of premature mortality and is derived by summing years of life lost over all age groups. Further information is available from the WHO on the mechanisms for this particular PI.

■ Storage Costs v Destruction Costs for Surplus SALW

SEESAC is soon to start a project to provide a model to assess the costs of security and storage compared to the costs of destruction for weapons. Although not a 'true' PI, this information is useful in terms of advocacy to persuade governments to destroy surplus stocks of weapons and ammunition.

■ % Funding against Functional Area

This PI requires further work in terms of trying to assess as to what proportion of project funding should be allocated to each functional area of a SALW control intervention. For example, would an increase in 20% to 40% of project funding to SALW awareness result in a proportional increase in risk and impact awareness within communities.

CASE STUDY

In the 2003 SACIM project in Macedonia, USD\$290,000 of a USD \$600,000 budget (48%), was specifically committed to SALW awareness. The campaign was objectively assessed as being highly successful, with an increase of risk and impact awareness of 80% after the campaign. Yet, for future projects it would be useful to know whether this is the sort of percentage that should be committed to awareness, and whether there is an optimum percentage funding range, (25 - 40% for example).



Picture 7: SALW Awareness in Macedonia, 2003.

Source: UNDP Macedonia, SACIM Project, 2003.

■ Trends in local investment, foreign direct investment (FDI) and economic/humanitarian aid requirements

These statistics are usually available from the World Bank or Ministry of Finance. Any improvement in internal investment, FDI or reduction in aid requirements can not be directly attributed to the SALW control intervention

²¹ Source - Development Held Hostage - Assessing the Effects of Small Arms on Human Development, **Batchelor P** and **Muggah R**, UNDP and Small Arms Survey, April 2002.



as so many other variables all contribute to these areas. Yet it is possible to argue that without an intervention then the environment necessary for investment may not have been stimulated. Undoubtedly an effective SALW control intervention can improve the perception and reality of human security to a situation whereby there is an improvement in the confidence of the investment communities. Therefore it is legitimate to look at this sort of PI, although great caution must be exercised in assessing the actual impact that the SALW control intervention may have had on improvements in these areas.

CASE STUDY

In Albania, following the collapse of the pyramid schemes in 1997 and the outbreaks of related violence, net inflows of **Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) declined almost 36% in 3 years**; (from USD \$70M in 1995 to USD \$45 in 1998). Yet the **External Aid per capita increased by 29% over the same period**; (from USD \$56 to USD \$72).

CASE STUDY

The EU ASAC project in Cambodia had a significant success in Snoul where there was extensive armed violence throughout the district prior to their intervention. The EU ASAC intervention mobilised, among others, the political and economic communities to a stage whereby there violence reduced and investment was stimulated.



Source: EU ASAC, 2004.

Picture 8: SALW recovered from a weapons cache in Cambodia.

NOTE *The government's approach to poverty alleviation has a direct effect on levels of violence in communities. Poor communities are likely to be more violent.* ²²

Legal Use Statistics

■ Military and Police weapons and ammunition accidents

This statistic indicates the level of competence and training received by security agencies in the storage, transport and use of weapons and ammunition. Improved training levels, and an increased ethos in the minimal use of force, should result in this figure declining. Should it increase, then reasons should be identified and corrective measure implemented.

■ Number of time used by security agencies – incidents, rounds fired, casualties

Statistics could be maintained on the operational usage of weapons by national security agencies. A decrease in usage could be compared against the statistics for crime using weapons to try and identify any correlation. In many countries it may be difficult to access the data for this PI.

SALW Awareness

One of the primary aims of a SALW Awareness campaign is to change the knowledge, attitudes and behaviour of the target audience, which can also include the security forces themselves.²³ Whilst behaviour change can be measured, to a degree, from the crime and armed violence statistics, it is still important that changing attitudes and knowledge is assessed. A confirmatory 'survey' should be conducted during and at the end of a SALW awareness campaign to provide indicators of such changes.

■ Improvement in Risk and Impact Awareness

CASE STUDY

The UNDP SALW Control in Macedonia (SACIM) conducted a 'mini-survey' on the conclusion of the national weapons amnesty in late 2003. This indicated that their SALW Awareness campaign had reached over 90% of households within the country, and produced an estimated increase in awareness of the SALW issue within Macedonia by over 80%.

²² Comment by David de Beer, EU ASAC, October 2004.

²³ The EU ASAC project specifically tries to positively impact on the SALW awareness of the police and army.



Programme Evaluation ²⁴

Introduction

SALW control programmes are often highly visible, and can also be controversial. As such, there will be demands from a variety of quarters for an assessment of the programme value in economic, social and security terms. In addition, many lessons can be learnt from the formal evaluation of SALW control programmes. Such programmes are invariably complicated and each individual programme is to a greater or lesser extent different to others in terms of the political, social and security impacts on the community; yet there are also many commonalities in terms of programme management, technical procedures and the types of incentive options. Evaluation can be done at many points - shortly after commencement of the collection process, in mid-term and at the end. There are also times when programmes seem to be making little progress, or are delayed for a complex series of reasons. It is at such times that an independent external evaluation can clarify the situation, and assistance can be provided to the programme management team.

An evaluation of programme process must be undertaken to document the results, provide information to the host nation, donors and interested international organisations. It should, as a minimum, provide a description of the process, account for funds dispersed, assess to what extent the programme objectives have been met and identify lessons learned for the future. Ideally the evaluation criteria should be determined at the programme planning stage, but it must also take into account any unexpected programme impacts.

Evaluation should be an asset for those being evaluated. It is an opportunity for them to learn and to reconcile different perspectives. This very positive quality of evaluation is something that should be explained clearly to all participants in order to create a sense of ownership and commitment. Fundamentally, evaluation is intended to improve project planning and delivery; it contributes to decision-making and strategy formulation. Too often the evaluator sees their role as a critic rather than as a programme support tool. The UN and donors should demand the 'support and reorientation' function rather than the critical and negative aspect of evaluation.²⁵

In other humanitarian aid sectors evaluation support is often provided by consultants on an ad-hoc basis. Understandably different consultants have approached the process of evaluation from different standpoints, based on their previous experience. The problem in the SALW field is that it is so new that there are not many consultants with any practical operational experience. In addition to this, there is no formal evaluation process specifically tailored for SALW control programmes. There is a danger that evaluations will be purely subjective and contain individual bias. The development and use of the performance indicators proposed earlier would greatly assist in quantitative, objective evaluations, but they cannot cover all aspects of a programme. Evaluations should aim to provide high quality, objectively based information in order to improve programme efficiency and cost-effectiveness.

Evaluation planning should be incorporated into the original project design documents. Not only will such an approach anticipate the key issues to be examined in future monitoring and evaluation work, it will also enhance the project's design, and encourage an analysis of assumptions and risks involved in project delivery.


Whilst it would be ideal to establish a single body to carry out all evaluations of SALW programme evaluations, this is clearly impracticable. However, it should be possible to evolve principles and a standard format and structure for evaluation, including guidelines on the areas to be evaluated and some advice on the evaluation methods to be used. Since every evaluation will be different, such standard formats, structures and guidelines would have to be flexible, but it is considered that a basic structure could probably be applied to bring a discipline and consistency to evaluation reports. If approved by agencies calling for evaluations, these basic structures could be used for the tasking and de-briefing of evaluation personnel, and as a guide for the formal evaluation reports. Comparison

²⁴ An evaluation is defined by ISO as "a process that attempts to determine as systematically and objectively as possible the merit or value of an intervention". The word "objectively" indicates the need to achieve a balanced analysis, recognising bias and reconciling perspectives of different stakeholders through use of different sources and methods. Evaluation must be considered to be a strategic exercise. ISO 11011 - Auditing of Quality Management Systems

²⁵ Robin Poulton, E Mail to author, 04 October 2004.



between lessons learned during programmes, and their potential impact on the development of SALW control theory and practice, would be significantly improved if the international community adopted similar evaluation methodology and report structures. The development of programme evaluation is a complex issue²⁶ requiring expert advice in the formulation of an appropriate methodology; therefore it will not be covered in detail in this discussion paper. What will be covered are the issues and areas to be examined. In addition the objectives for a study to develop programme evaluation will be proposed.



What is Evaluation?

The term refers basically to:

*“...an assessment, as systematic and objective as possible, of an on-going or completed project, programme or policy, its design, implementation and results. The aim is to determine the relevance and fulfilment of objectives, developmental efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. An evaluation should provide information that is credible and useful, enabling the incorporation of lessons learned into the decision-making process of both recipients and donors”.*²⁷

The definition of evaluation stresses the need for objectivity, the possibility of assessing a project/programme/policy during implementation or after implementation, and the need to look at all stages of a project cycle from design - to implementation - to final results, in order to capture a complete set of lessons learned.²⁸

Evaluation is an indispensable ingredient of the overall project cycle. Whether it takes place mid-way through a project, at the end of a project, or years after the project has been completed, evaluation provides information that can enhance future planning, or indicate adjustments to implementation that need to be made. The relationship is depicted in the following graph.

Programme Evaluation Study

If it is agreed that the SALW community desires consistency in programme evaluation, then the following objectives should be addressed:

- Investigate the need for the evaluation of SALW control programmes.
- Examine current evaluation techniques²⁹, both in relation to SALW and other disciplines.
- Investigate and develop an objective and quantitative SALW control programme evaluation structure based on statistical analysis and internationally recognised audit procedures.³⁰
- Derive from the above an optimised evaluation technique and series of evaluation methods to provide consistent and comparable evaluation reports.
- Field-test the new technique on a suitable small-scale programme.
- If approved, disseminate the new evaluation technique to the widest range of stakeholders.

²⁶ Indeed, after 12 years the international mine action community is only just addressing this issue, and they are more developed in operational methodology, international standards and programme comparison than the SALW community.

²⁷ Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance, OECD, DAC, 1991, Para 5

²⁸ Evaluation does not take place before a project, but only after a project has commenced. The term “appraisal” is normally reserved for the investigative activities involved in the planning process before the start of a project.

²⁹ See UNDP Handbook - Results Orientated Monitoring and Evaluation, New York, 1999.

³⁰ ISO 11011 - Auditing of Quality Management Systems would be a good place to start.



Programme Evaluation Areas

The detailed requirements for programme evaluation should be considered by the recommended study, however the following areas should be addressed:

- An audit of donor funds is essential in line with the principles of control and transparency.
- An examination of the accuracy and effectiveness of the weapon and ammunition accounting procedures.
- A detailed description of the programme background and the implementation of all aspects of the programme. This should include SALW survey, SALW awareness, collection, destruction and the progress of any related projects.³¹
- Verification of the final disposal route for recovered weapons and ammunition.
- An analysis of the programme's progress towards meeting the pre-determined programme output objectives.
- An indication of the motives of the affected community in surrendering their weapons and ammunition.
- The impact of the programme on the political, social and economic environments.
- Lessons learned.

EVALUATION IN ALBANIA

A traditional qualitative evaluation approach was used by the Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC) to evaluate the impact of the UNDP SALW Control (SALWC) project in Albania during 2003. This was a comprehensive evaluation of all factors and is useful reading to illustrate the degree of work necessary for a useful evaluation.

CASE STUDY

The UNIDIR 'Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation (PME) of Weapons in Exchange for Development Programmes' study (www.unidir.ch) has been ongoing from 2002 - 2004 and examined individual and community reactions to the interventions in Mali, Albania and Cambodia. Although it identified few 'lessons learned' that are not now been regularly applied at the operational level, it does provide valuable evidence to support the requirement for a consistent evaluation methodology within the SALW and DDR community. PME is but one evaluation methodology that could be considered, but it must be used in tandem with other methods if a balanced view of the impact of a SALW control intervention is to be obtained.

³¹ For example any projects taking place under the auspices of a Weapons in Exchange for Development programme.



Conclusions

The proposed Performance Indicators could provide the primary stakeholders and the donor community with an ongoing estimate of the success of a SALW control intervention. It will give them visibility and allow them an opportunity to more specifically target funding. The management team would have access to quantitative evidence as to the progress of their programme, thereby assisting their management decision-making process.

It is not proposed that SALW control programmes should be compared against one another using these PIs. There are so many influencing variables that such a comparative approach would be invalid in terms of comparing success and learning lessons. These proposed PIs are only meant to be used as an indicative quantitative tool for measuring success. It must be remembered that they do not take into account the intent of the population who possess weapons, the political situation or the overall economic situation. They are only indicators and should not be used as the definitive tool for the measurement of success; qualitative judgement is also important.

In terms of programme evaluation, it is highly desirable that a consistent approach should be adopted, based on objective, quantifiable analysis, to enable the best possible use of lessons learned for adoption in the management of subsequent programmes. However, it is important that a degree of subjective assessment is also retained within the evaluation methodology, as it is only this that can account for the widely differing scenarios in which SALW control programmes take place.

Annex A – Glossary and Definitions

A.1

awareness

see SALW awareness

A.2

conflict prevention

measures taken to try and prevent violent confrontation.

A.3

conflict reduction

strategies employed by states with the aim of diffusing tensions and building sustainable peace.

A.4

conflict resolution

efforts designed to increase cooperation among the parties to a conflict and strengthen their relationships by building or deepening the institutions and processes through which the parties interact.

A.5

DDR

(Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration)

a three-pronged programme of reducing or abolishing weapons of former government or opposition forces, shedding their excess personnel and integrating their former fighters back to normal civil life, after a period of (usually internal) conflict.

A.6

evaluation

a process that attempts to determine as systematically and objectively as possible the merit or value of an intervention.

NOTE

The word “objectively” indicates the need to achieve a balanced analysis, recognising bias and reconciling perspectives of different stakeholders (all those interested in, and affected by programmes, including beneficiaries as primary stakeholders) through use of different sources and methods.

NOTE

Evaluation is considered to be a strategic exercise.

NOTE

Definition when used in relation to programmes. (UNICEF Policy and Programming Manual).

A.7

indicator

quantitative or qualitative factor or variable that provides a simple and reliable means to measure achievement, to reflect changes connected to an intervention, or to help assess the performance of a given development or aid factor.

A.8

intervention

a wide variety of situations in which an actor enters into the area of another, with or without the consent of the other.

A.9

lessons learned

generalisations based on evaluation experiences with projects, programmes or policies that abstract from the specific situations to broader circumstances. Lessons often highlight strengths and weaknesses in preparation, design and implementation that affect performance, outcome and impact.



**A.10
monitoring**

in the context of SALW Control the term refers to the authorised observation by qualified personnel of sites, activities or processes without taking responsibility for that being observed . This is usually carried out to check conformity with undertakings, procedures or standard practice and often includes recording and reporting elements.

**A.11
quality**

degree to which a set of inherent characteristics fulfils requirements. [ISO 9000:2000]

**A.12
quality management**

coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with regard to quality. [ISO 9000:2000]

**A.13
quality control (QC)**

part of quality management focused on fulfilling quality requirements. [ISO 9000:2000]

NOTE *QC relates to the inspection of a finished product. In the case of collection and destruction, the 'product' is destroyed weapons.*

**A.14
quality assurance (QA)**

part of quality management focused on providing confidence that quality requirements will be met. [ISO 9000:2000]

NOTE *The purpose of QA in SALW is to confirm that management practices and operational procedures for collection and destruction operations are appropriate, and will achieve the stated requirement in a safe, effective and efficient manner. Internal QA will be conducted by SALW organizations themselves, but external inspections by an external monitor should also be conducted.*

**A.15
SALW awareness**

A programme of activities undertaken with the overall goal of minimising, and where possible eliminating, the negative consequences of inadequate SALW Control by undertaking an appropriate combination of SALW advocacy, SALW risk education and media operations/public information campaigns which together work to change behaviours and facilitate appropriate alternative solutions over the long term.

NOTE *Wherever it exists, the operational objectives of a national SALW Control initiative will dictate the appropriate type of SALW Awareness activities.*

NOTE *SALW awareness is a mass mobilisation approach that delivers information on the SALW threat. It may take the form of formal or non-formal education and may use mass media techniques.*

NOTE *In an emergency situation, due to time constraints and the lack of available data, it is the most practical means of communicating safety information. In other situations it can support community liaison.*

**A.16
SALW control**

those activities, which, together, aim to reduce the social, economic and environmental impact of uncontrolled SALW proliferation and possession.

**A.17
Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)**

all lethal conventional munitions that can be carried by an individual combatant or a light vehicle, that also do not require a substantial logistic and maintenance capability.

A.18

survey (SALW Survey)

a systematic and logical process to determine the nature and extent of SALW proliferation and impact within a region, nation or community in order to provide accurate data and information for a safe, effective and efficient intervention by an appropriate organisation.

A.19

verification

confirmation, through the provision of objective evidence that specified requirements have been fulfilled. [ISO 9000:2000]

A.20

violence

the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community that either results in, or has a high likelihood of resulting in, injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development or deprivation. [WHO, 2003].

A.21

weapon

any thing used, designed or used or intended for use:³²

- a) in causing death or injury to any person; or
- b) for the purposes of threatening or intimidating any person and without restricting the generality of the foregoing, includes a firearm.

³² Criminal Code of Canada (CCofC) Section (S) 2 "Interpretation" Paragraph 2.

Annex B – Example of Reporting using PI

The following matrix is the reporting summary used by the EU ASAC project in Cambodia. Although it does not directly utilize primary PI as discussed in the main text of this paper, it does clearly illustrate the degree of detail required for effective reporting, and also contains a lot of the detail necessary for the effective use of PI.

SER	OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY	DATE	RESULTS / REMARKS
1	Safe Storage and Registration of Weapons for MOD		Consultant: Lt Col (Ret'd) Alain Perigaud
1.1	Placing of lockable weapons racks in barracks and offices of Military Region 4	Feb 2004	Siem Reap: 2,034 weapons on 145 racks Banteay Srey: 2,016 weapons on 142 racks Preah Vihear: 1,782 weapons on 136 racks Kampong Thom: 774 weapons on 47 racks Oddor Meanchey: 3,132 weapons on 205 racks
1.2	Final Official Handover Ceremony of depots in Military Region 4 to Ministry of National Defence: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Military Region 4 Headquarters (Siem Reap) ■ Division 2 (Banteay Srey) ■ Brigade 12 z (Preah Vihear) ■ Sub-Military Region Kampong Thom 	30 Mar 2004 31 Mar 2004 28 Apr 2004 29 Apr 2004	Capacity = 4200 weapons Capacity = 3024 weapons Capacity = 1092 weapons Capacity = 1092 weapons
1.3	Agreement signed with Ministry of National Defence for project in Military Region 1 Agreement signed with Ministry of National Defence for project in Military Region 3	30 Jan 2004 10 May 2003	
1.4	Construction of depots in MR1: Stung Treng, Rattanakiri, Mondulakiri	Completed in August 2004	Stung Treng capacity: 7,560 weapons on racks Mondulakiri capacity: 1,260 weapons on racks Rattanakiri capacity: 1,260 weapons on racks
1.5	Construction of lockable weapons racks for Military Region 1	Completed in August 2004	Total capacity of weapons racks = 5,670 Weapons

SER	OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY	DATE	RESULTS / REMARKS
1.6	Construction of depots in Military Region 3:	Completed in September 2004	Depot K290 capacity: 7,560 weapons on racks Sub-MR Kg. Speu: capacity: 756 weapons on racks Sub-MR Koh Kong: capacity: 756 weapons on racks Sub-MR Sihanoukville capacity: 672 weapons on racks Sub-MR Kep capacity: 336 weapons on racks Brigade 11 capacity: 1,092 weapons on racks Sub-MR Kampot capacity: 1,512 weapons on racks Sub-MR Takeo: capacity: 756 weapons on racks
1.7	Construction of lockable weapons racks for Military Region 3	Completed in September 2004	Total capacity of weapons racks = 5,592 Weapons
1.8	Training sessions for military personnel tasked with management and registration of weapons	2-4 March 2004 1-10 April 2004 11-20 May 2004 11-20 May 2004 25 May-3 Jun 2004 22-24 Jun 2004 7-21 Sep 2004	50 MR1 unit commanders on scope of project in Stung Treng 20 persons Manual Registration training in Brigade 14, Pursat 100 High Level Officers Training in Phnom Penh Computer operators' training course in Phnom Penh 100 persons Manual Registration course for MR1, Stung Treng 100 MR3 unit commanders on scope of project in Kg Speu 100 persons Manual Registration course for MR3, Kg. Speu
2	Activities concerning Weapons Caches		Consultant: Lt Col (Ret'd) Adrian Sprangemeijer
2.1	Agreement with National Commission on Weapons Management and Reform for EU ASAC to search for weapons caches in 2004	Renewed 18 Dec 2003	
2.2	Expedition to Pursat	17-18 Feb 2004	58 weapons recovered
2.3	Expedition to Pursat	9-11 Mar 2004	48 weapons recovered
2.4	Expedition to Pursat	15-17 Mar 2004	55 weapons recovered
2.5	Expedition to Preah Vihear	21-31 Aug 2004	No weapons recovered, some ammunition and spare parts
2.6	Expedition to Kampong Speu	7-21 Sep 2004	271 weapons recovered
			Total weapons recovered by EU ASAC in 2004 = 432

SER	OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY	DATE	RESULTS / REMARKS
3	Destruction of weapons stored in the provinces		Consultant: Lt Col. (Ret'd) Adrian Sprangemeijer
3.1	Kampong Cham Province (3,707 weapons)	27 Feb 2004	Weapons collected from population
3.2	Siem Reap Province (5,000 weapons)	30 Mar 2004	Surplus weapons from Ministry of Defence
3.3	Kampong Thom Province (4,426 weapons)	13 Jul 2004	Surplus weapons from Ministry of Defence
3.4	Svay Rieng Province (4,000 weapons)	28 Sep 2004	Surplus weapons from Ministry of Defence
			Total weapons destroyed by EU ASAC in 2004 = 17,133
4	Weapons Collection and Weapons Security Programme		Project Officers: Marc Vanhemelryck and Neil Wilford
4.1	WfD projects using local NGO 's 87 water wells were built in 2003 as part of small-scale WfD projects: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Quality control of wells with Seila staff ■ Entering location of wells into GPS system 	Jan 2004 Jan 2004	
4.2	Additional WfD Public Awareness activities Co-operation on public awareness for weapons collection with CWS in Kampong Thom province: <input type="checkbox"/> 78 villages trained	Jan-Sep 2004	
4.3	Community Council Training Programme in Weapons Security		
a	Provincial Orientation Meetings	Mar 2004 Sep 2004	Pailin, Battambang and Pursat provinces Kampong Thom province
b	Production of training materials with Police, SEILA and CMAC	Mar-Apr 2004	
c	Training of Trainers	7-9 Apr 2004 20-22 Apr 2004 19-21 May 2004 18-20 Aug 2004	Battambang Pursat Pailin Kampong Thom
d	District Training Sessions	21-25 Aug 2004 23-28 Aug 2004 21 Aug-15 Sep 2004	Pailin Pursat Battambang
e	Commune Council training Sessions	29-30 Sep 2004 9 Aug-30 Sep 2004	Kampong Thom Pursat: 31 Commune Councils trained

SER		OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY	DATE	RESULTS / REMARKS
f	Commune Council training in Phnom Penh		27 Aug 2004 8 Sep 2004	Discussions with Governor of Phnom Penh Meeting of working group to plan target communes
4.4	Preah Vihear assistance programme (continued from 2003)			
a	Police Family Assistance Nutrition and homestead gardening programmes for police families in Preah Vihear province implemented by Helen Keller International (HKI)		Jan-Sep 2004	10 police families have Village Model Gardens (VMG) 5 police families have Village Model Poultry Farms (VMPPF) Each VMG and VMPPF trains approx. 50 other families. Total families trained = approx. 750
b	Police Support Extra weapons racks supplied to Preah Vihear police		Apr-May 2004	28 racks for storing a total of 468 weapons supplied
5	Public Awareness activities			
5.1	Peace Art Project, Cambodia (PAPC)		Jan-Sep 2004 Feb 2004 May-Aug 2004 12-27 Sep 2004	Training 22 art students to produce welded works of art from collected and/or destroyed SALW, UXO etc. First public exhibition in Phnom Penh Exhibition in Siem Reap 3 students visit Australia to publicise SALW work in Cambodia
5.2	Working Group for Weapons Reduction (WGWR)		23 Aug 2004	Agreement to support comprehensive SALW public education campaign including radio and TV broadcasts, theatre, youth forums and students activities
5.3	FIT Media		Feb 2004 Aug 2004	Production of video on Flames of Peace ceremonies Production of DVD on Weapons Safe Storage project



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