

1 Introduction

1.1 Small Arms problem in South Eastern Europe

The proliferation and illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) is a serious problem in many parts of the world, fuelling crime, generating insecurity and undermining conflict prevention and peace building efforts. The countries of South Eastern Europe, some of which have experienced violent conflict, and all of which remain in transition, have grappled with the challenges posed by SALW in recent years.

In most countries a combination of past conflict and weak state institutions, or both, has resulted in varying degrees of control over the possession, use and trade in weapons. Accompanying factors, such as limited police performance, corruption and the growth of organised crime and trafficking networks, have served to both justify illicit weapons possession in the minds of many and permitted the continued transfer and possession of illegal SALW. The activities of established criminal networks coupled with porous borders and weak arms export controls has in the past resulted in weapons being trafficked to Western Europe and beyond, including in some cases to conflict zones. Problems with co-operation and exchange of information, either at a national level between the different relevant departments or agencies, or internationally between governments, have also been evident. Lastly, governments in the region are also dealing with the challenge of restructuring military and police forces, and the consequent disposal of substantial stockpiles of now outdated weaponry and ammunition, which continue to grow as downsizing progresses.


2.2 Small Arms policy and practice in South Eastern Europe

In the context of peace support operations by the international community in Kosovo, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (hereafter referred to as 'Macedonia) and Bosnia, and the drive towards Euro-Atlantic integration by SEE governments, significant reforms have been undertaken by SEE governments and valuable changes to policy and practice have been introduced. Commitments made by SEE governments to a range of initiatives on SALW have helped to encourage and facilitate action on SALW by providing policy frameworks and guidance.

The Stability Pact *Regional Implementation Plan (RIP)*, 'Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons' was agreed by the South Eastern Europe Stability Pact states in November 2001,¹ with the broad aim of reducing the flow and availability of SALW in the region and thereby supporting the socio-economic conditions for peace and development in South Eastern Europe. In contrast to many other arms control agreements, the RIP provides concrete mechanisms for assisting countries' implementation of commitments and involving those governments in priority setting and decision-making on region-wide efforts. Eight South Eastern Europe countries have declared their support for the RIP - Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Romania and Serbia and Montenegro.

The participation of countries is organised through a Regional Steering Group (RSG) composed of representatives from all governments involved (National Focal Points), and observers from key organisations or agencies (such as NATO, OSCE etc.). Meeting twice a year, the RSG acts as a regional governmental forum for progress on the Plan and oversees

¹ The full text of the Regional Implementation Plan is included in Annex 5.1 of this report.



the work of the 'Clearinghouse' that was set up to provide additional practical assistance for governments. The South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) was established in May 2002 in order to facilitate and inform activities under the framework of the Plan. SEESAC, a joint project of the Stability Pact and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), is based in Belgrade and has the mandate to provide technical support, strategic guidance, develop best practice on the various areas of SALW control, and support resource mobilization to implementers in the region.

In November 2000, OSCE states, including the countries of SEE, adopted the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, which outlines strategic measures aimed at fostering responsible behaviour with regard to the transfer of small arms, including provisions on regional co-operation and commitments to combat illicit trafficking and confidential information exchange.² In December 2003 OSCE states agreed a second document, the OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition, which deals with the risks arising from surplus stockpiles of conventional ammunition, explosive material and detonating devices and offers practical mechanisms for national capacities and assistance to address them.

A supplement to the Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, the *Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials* (also known as the 'Firearms Protocol') was adopted by the UN General Assembly in March 2001 and entered into force on 25 April 2005 after Zambia became the fortieth nation to ratify it.³ The Firearms Protocol contains practical, tools-based measures such as agreements on marking, record-keeping and tracing firearms and on the import, export and transit of firearms designed to assist law enforcement communities, enhancing international co-operation and promoting greater transparency in legal transfers of firearms.

The *Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects* resulted from the UN July 2001 Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects and is now seen as the major international framework for tackling SALW proliferation and misuse. The UN Programme of Action (PoA) includes a range of voluntary national, regional and global measures to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. National measures include the introduction of legislation to: control the production, storage, export and transit of SALW; ensure marking and tracing of SALW; licensing of manufacturers; and the criminalisation of illicit SALW-related activities. Regional measures include establishing regional information-sharing mechanisms and co-operation between law enforcement agencies. Global measures include the effective implementation of UN arms embargoes, encouragement of disarmament, the strengthening of global tracing and policing mechanisms and co-operation with civil society. All SEE states attended the Conference and have reported on PoA implementation both in writing and at subsequent review meetings such as the 2003 Biennial Meeting of States.

² The subsequent OSCE Handbook of Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons, launched in December 2003, provided states with additional guidance on implementation - see 'Decision No. 5/03 Best Practice Guides on Small Arms and Light Weapons', Forum for Security and Co-operation, <<http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/handbook.pdf>>

³ Announcement during 11th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Bangkok, Thailand, 25 April 2005 <www.un.org/events/11thcongress/docs/bkkcp26e.pdf>

The *Wassenaar Arrangement On Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies* (WA) is an international regime established in 1995. It seeks to prevent destabilising accumulations of weaponry through its formal process of transparency and consultation, and its participants have agreed to use their national policies to control the items and technologies contained in the WA lists of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions.⁴

The *European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports*, agreed in 1998, lists a set of criteria to guide decisions on whether to grant or refuse export licence applications and includes the agreement of a groundbreaking denial notification system. EU member states are directly bound by this political undertaking, which also applies to SALW, and are full members of its operational mechanisms. In the five years since its agreement, the code has come to be seen as the most progressive and effective regional arms transfer control regime. The December 1998 *Joint Action on the EU's Contribution to Combating the Destabilising Accumulation and Spread of Small Arms and Light Weapons* builds on the Code of Conduct and takes a regional and incremental approach to dealing with the problems posed by proliferation.

⁴ At a meeting 11 - 12 December 2003, the WA adopted 'Best Practice Guidelines for Exports of SALW', which include non-binding criteria for exports of SALW. <http://www.wassenaar.org/docs/best_practice_salw.htm>

Table 1: SEE countries' commitments to Arms or SALW Control Agreements

COUNTRY ARMS OR SALW CONTROL AGREEMENT	ALBANIA	BiH	BULGARIA	CROATIA	MACEDONIA	MOLDOVA	ROMANIA	SCG
	Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan	November 2001	November 2001	November 2001	November 2001	November 2001	November 2001	November 2001
UN Programme of Action	July 2001	July 2001	July 2001	July 2001	July 2001	July 2001	July 2001	July 2001
UN Firearms Protocol	-	-	February 2002	Acceded November 2004	-	-	February 2004	-
OSCE Document on SALW	November 2000	November 2000	November 2000	November 2000	November 2000	November 2000	November 2000	November 2000
OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition	December 2003	December 2003	December 2003	December 2003	December 2003	December 2003	December 2003	December 2003
EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports	August 2003	January 2003 ⁵	August 1998	2002 ⁶	November 2004	-	July 1998	-
EU Joint Action on SALW	-	-	December 1998	-	-	-	December 1998	-
Wassenaar Arrangement	No, but submitted application to join	-	July 1996	No, but submitted application to join	N/A	-	April 1996	-

⁵ The Code was incorporated into domestic legislation in 2003, see Section 2 – Bosnia and Herzegovina below.

⁶ Croatian representatives to the UN announced in July 2001 and October 2002 that the government has taken the decision to apply the EU Code's Criteria in advance of its EU accession; see Section 2 - Croatia below.

1.3 Monitoring progress on combating SALW: SEE SALW Monitor

Three and a half years on from the creation of the Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan on SALW, it is appropriate to examine the progress made to date by countries in the region on combating SALW problems, in order to initiate further discussion about future needs and priorities.

The purpose of the present report - the South Eastern Europe Small Arms and Light Weapons Monitor - is to provide an overview of how the countries of South Eastern Europe have progressed towards fulfilling their commitments on SALW control. This second edition of the report builds on the findings of a first edition published in early 2004. Since the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe's Regional Implementation Plan is the most inclusive and regionally relevant document, representing governments' commitments in the area of SALW control, it is the main benchmark used in this report. Other commitments, such as those detailed above, are however given consideration. This report does not, however, represent a technical verification system or a formal inspection report. Its role is to collect relevant information and to present it in an organised way in order to facilitate monitoring, discussion and assessment of progress on SALW control, particularly under the RIP.

Funded by SEESAC,⁷ the research and writing of the report was undertaken by Saferworld, an independent non-governmental organisation based in London, together with a number of research partners from SEE. The contents therefore reflect an independent and objective presentation of factual information on SEE countries' responses to SALW problems within the RIP Framework. The report consists of four main sections: this introductory section; analysis of each country's progress in each of the areas of activity covered by the RIP; an overview section of donor support for SALW projects in the region; a concluding section; and annexes containing relevant documents and additional information. Saferworld and SEESAC acknowledge that this report will have inevitable shortcomings due to constraints, such as inaccessible information and limited time for research and production. It is anticipated that the Monitor report will be updated, corrected where necessary and improved on an annual basis and comments and input from all actors and stakeholders are welcomed.

1.4 Progress to date – a regional overview

Given the varied nature of the SALW problems facing individual SEE countries, implementation of the Stability Pact RIP must ultimately be judged on a country by country basis. Accordingly, Section 2 of this report covers the progress made by each SEE government in the region. A summary of progress across the region by thematic area is, however, also provided below and should prove valuable.

1.4.1 Legislative and regulatory issues

Legislation governing civilian weapons possession is similar in all SEE countries as a licence is required for the possession of active firearms and, in most countries, a two-tier system of application for a permit to purchase a weapon and a subsequent licence to possess and/or carry a weapon is needed. Since 2001, new laws and regulations related to the possession

⁷ The research, writing and production of this report has been funded by SEESAC under its operational objective to develop a framework to collect, collate, analyse and disseminate (or support dissemination of) operational data and public information relating to SALW issues within the region in order to generate knowledge and support SALW initiatives.

of SALW have been introduced in Croatia, Macedonia, Romania and SCG (Montenegro but not Serbia). Draft laws are being prepared in BiH (both in RS and FBiH). However, despite reforms, problems are still apparent in areas, including the issuing of licenses to civilians and the enforcement of possession laws.

New legislation and regulations in the area of arms transfer controls have been introduced since 2000 in Albania, BiH, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania and Serbia and Montenegro. In most cases the new legislation appears to have had a positive impact on the level of control exercised over SALW exports from the region. In most cases however it is difficult to assess precisely how policy progress has contributed to changes in practice since that there exists very little publicly accessible information published by states on arms exports and very little parliamentary or civilian oversight of decision-making in this area.

It is also encouraging that a number of states have incorporated EU standards and directives into domestic legislation, and it is to be hoped that these commitments are effectively implemented in practice with regard to both domestically produced SALW and also surplus SALW that may be slated for sale and export abroad.

SEE governments have received assistance to jointly review their arms laws by the SEESAC Arms Law Process, which brought representatives from all SEE countries together to discuss ways of improving legislation on domestic possession and arms transfer in 2002 and 2004. In addition, foreign governments (particularly Canada, US and UK) have provided trilateral support on request to a number of states that wished to review outmoded legislation.

Gaps remain, however, and although some countries have introduced more comprehensive legislation regarding the production and transfer of arms, which provides for criteria such as human rights and conflict to be taken into account when issuing licences, the administrative systems required to properly implement such laws often fall short. More sophisticated considerations, such as the licensed production of weapons, their transit, retransfer or transshipment and post-shipment verification are not taken into account in many cases.

1.4.2 SALW transfers

Past examples of trafficking from the region, or of officially sanctioned SALW transfers to sensitive destinations, show that in some cases control over exports was previously weak. As noted above, there is still scope to further improve legislation and implementation in this area. However, government departments responsible for administration and implementation, in the complex area of export licensing and compliance with international standards, often lack adequate institutional capacity. Continued support is required to overcome these shortcomings. Given the widespread presence of organised criminal networks, it is not surprising that SALW smuggling continues to occur in SEE, albeit on a much reduced scale in comparison with previous years. Alongside the need for more effective control of arms exports, continued improvements in the capacity and co-ordination of border control agencies and police is needed in the medium to long term. Many states have already taken important steps in this area. Several countries have established anti-trafficking units and regional co-operation is increasing through valuable initiatives such as the SECI Center SALW Task Force.

1.4.3 SALW collection programmes and capacities

Much has been done in this area by national governments, regional and international organisations and NGOs. Albania, BiH, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo have all run voluntary weapons collection programmes in recent years, which with the exceptions of Kosovo and Montenegro, have proved successful in numerical terms. Novel variations have also been introduced in the course of these initiatives, such as UNDP Macedonia's 'Weapons in Exchange for Incentives' scheme (see Section 3.3 'SALW collection programmes and capacities of the Macedonia country chapter'). The results in terms of collected weapons totals are not, however, the real indicators of success. Bringing illicit weapons under legal control, an increased awareness of the dangers of SALW and reinforcing post-conflict confidence are other important areas addressed by weapons collections. It is to be hoped that any future weapons collections will be undertaken following detailed needs assessments of the kind that national SALW surveys provide. With the exception of the collection efforts in Macedonia, this has not hitherto been the case.

In addition to voluntary weapons collections, seizures by security forces continue to make inroads into the societal supply of illicit SALW, albeit with varying degrees of commitment and effectiveness.

1.4.4 SALW destruction programmes and capacities

All countries in the region now have at least some capacity to destroy surplus weapons and ammunition, and substantial progress has been made in disposing of stocks since 2001. Destruction is vitally important both in terms of stockpile safety and in preventing further proliferation through theft from storage sites. It is also a crucial aspect of weapons collection, reinforcing confidence in collection initiatives by permanently removing weapons from circulation. Although substantial amounts of SALW and ammunition have now been destroyed by the governments of the region, often with the support of international donors, further destruction continues to be a priority, whether for reasons of public safety as in Albania, BiH and Moldova, or simply because existing levels of surplus are unduly large. In other countries where less of an immediate threat is posed by existing stocks, such as Croatia, Bulgaria and Serbia, substantial surpluses remain and efforts should continue, particularly in the light of SEE countries' existing international commitments to destroy surpluses under the OSCE Document on SALW of 2000. These commitments have not been met in several cases. External support is likely to be required in this area over the medium term as SEE military forces restructure and downsize to meet NATO accession requirements.

1.4.5 SALW stockpile management programmes and capacities

Overall, there is very limited information available on this area across the region and a definite lack of transparency. There are, however, some indications that stockpile management practices are not in accordance with either international security or safety standards in many countries and that weaponry is stored in potentially unsafe and insecure conditions in several countries. Once again, continued attention by governments, international organisations, such as NATO, donors and civil society is necessary in this area in order to minimise safety and security threats over time.

1.4.6 SALW awareness activities

To date, awareness raising on SALW has been undertaken in all SEE countries, though only on a limited basis in Moldova, Romania and Bulgaria. Campaign goals have included raising awareness of the dangers of SALW and encouraging the public to voluntarily surrender illicit SALW. While most awareness campaigns have been rated as successful by their organisers, it is impossible to make any objective judgement of the impact of most campaigns, as 'baseline' research on the knowledge, attitudes, perceptions and behaviours of target groups has generally not been conducted in the early stages.⁸ In addition, most SALW awareness raising projects undertaken in the region have been short-lived exercises designed to support weapons collection programmes. Lasting behavioural change is more likely to be yielded by longer-term programmes.

1.4.7 SALW survey activities

An ever greater amount of management information is now being provided to practitioners in SEE in the form of national SALW surveys and, to date, it is only in Croatia, Moldova and Romania where the SALW situation has not been comprehensively analysed by operational researchers. The quality, depth and degree of local ownership over these studies has improved with each SALW survey, and the introduction of a standardised methodology by UNDP-SEESAC and the Geneva-based organisation Small Arms Survey now allows research to be conducted to an internationally recognised model, allowing comparisons across countries.⁹ In addition, smaller-scale, localised surveys, opinion polls, needs assessments, evaluations and policy-oriented research have also been undertaken, primarily by NGOs.

1.4.8 Civil Society involvement in SALW interventions

Since 2000, when NGOs and media activities on SALW control initiatives was primarily restricted to Albania, there has been a substantial increase in civil society activity on SALW in SEE, to the point where some form of activity has now been undertaken either by local media or NGOs in all SEE countries. Training events run by actors such as Pax Christi, Saferworld, SEESAC and the Institute of War and Peace Reporting have begun to address the skills gap which hitherto existed among local civil society in areas such as monitoring SALW destruction, advocating for policy change and reporting on the arms trade. Weapons amnesties in several countries have provided opportunities for civil society to carry out supporting awareness raising actions. In addition, a number of local NGOs or think tanks have now undertaken research on SALW, either during stand-alone projects or as part of national SALW surveys commissioned in the region.

Regional co-operation between NGOs has continued to develop, particularly through the South East European Network for the Control of Arms (SEENCA), originally borne out of a meeting of the Szeged Small Arms Process in 2002. However, competition between NGOs for funding and the lingering attitude that civil society should not meddle in security issues continue to hamper efforts to increase cross-border cooperation between NGOs and with governments. An understanding of the valuable role that civil society can play as a vital

⁸ In 2003, SEESAC developed a standardised approach to SALW awareness raising, the SALW Awareness Support Pack (SASP), a handbook setting out the principles and procedures for conducting safe and effective SALW awareness campaigns, which is available for use by all actors undertaking awareness raising, from local NGOs to international organisations and peace-keeping forces.

⁹ The methodology is outlined in 'Regional Micro-Disarmament Standard/Guideline 05.80 2nd Edition 2004-03-01, SALW Survey', and accompanying 'SALW Survey Protocols'. Accessible from <http://www.seesac.org/resources/current_eng.htm> and <<http://www.seesac.org/resources/surveyprotocols.htm>> respectively.

bridge between the state and communities and as a legitimate driver for change continues to develop slowly.

1.4.9 Cross-border SALW control initiatives

All SEE governments have established protocols and systems for cross-border co-operation, either on a bi-lateral or at the regional level. The participation of all Western Balkans countries in the Ohrid Border Management Conference in May 2003 and the adoption of a 'Common Platform' and 'Way Forward Document' marked a key step forward in improving border control and combating trafficking activities, including SALW smuggling.¹⁰ Through the Ohrid conference, countries made specific commitments to share information and increase the capacity and co-ordination of border personnel, with the longer-term objective of full implementation of integrated border management in accordance with European standards.

However, much remains to be done and in many countries the challenges of cross-border co-ordination are made more difficult by a lack of internal co-ordination between different ministries and departments responsible for border control and security. More attention needs to be paid to this issue and genuine political will to co-operate will be needed from governments, both at central government and field levels. Ongoing support is also required from international donors. Hitherto, donor funding has tended to focus on hot issues, such as the trafficking of drugs, people or WMD. If the impact of capacity-building projects is to be maximised, it is crucial that they include elements relevant to all trafficked commodities, including SALW.

1.4.10 SALW management information and exchange systems and protocols

Despite progress in this area, a great deal remains to be done. All countries co-operate to a certain extent through law enforcement related mechanisms; all have seconded officers to the SECI Regional Centre in Bucharest, whose anti-trafficking task forces include an information exchange on illicit arms seizures; all are members of INTERPOL; and all have at least begun negotiations on co-operation agreements with EUROPOL. SEE governments are also participating in the information exchanges on SALW required under agreements such as the UN PoA and OSCE Document on SALW. However, the quality of information exchange in all of the above fora and processes varies considerably from state to state. For example, SEE countries' reports to the UNDDA within the UN PoA framework have ranged from detailed and timely implementation reports of many pages, to short statements or letters.

Although the Stability Pact Working Table III, the Regional Steering Group and SEESAC itself have provided new avenues for regional co-ordination between governments and the numerous SALW actors in the international community, weaknesses still remain in this area. The system of National SALW Focal Points (NFPs) established by the Stability Pact has been described as a "weak point" in the RIP framework¹¹ and has proved problematic, with many focal points changing or comprising whole departments rather than individuals. The result is inconsistent attendance at Regional Steering Group meetings, inconsistent

¹⁰ See Annexes 5.4 and 5.5 for the Ohrid Common Platform and Way Forward Document.

¹¹ Interview with Jiri Kalashnikov, Expert - Working Table III, Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, 13 February 2004.

provision of information by NFPs from different countries and lack of coordination between government departments within states.

In terms of public transparency, progress to date has been slow and substantial problems still exist. In many cases official information on SALW is still difficult to find, though governments have become progressively better at providing web pages on arms control policies and legislation. In 2003, Romania was the first SEE country to publish an annual report on arms exports and this has since been followed by BiH. As yet no governments have full parliamentary oversight on SALW policy development and export licence decision-making, and there is an ongoing need for NGO and parliamentary lobbying for increased transparency on SALW issues from governments, as such activities have been only minimal so far.

In general, more official information on SALW should be made public. There is, for example, a strong case for publication of the OSCE information-exchange submissions and for increased transparency on SALW production and transfer. That said, the challenges government officials face in collecting, collating and publishing information on this topic should not be underestimated. International support to train officials and build effective administrative systems and capacity is certainly required.

1.5 Future priorities

This second assessment of SALW control activities undertaken in SEE confirms that there has been some good progress in many of the areas detailed in the Stability Pact RIP since its adoption in November 2001. Clearly the agreement of the RIP and the establishment of SEESAC, alongside other developments and actors in the region, have had a positive impact. Having started from a very low base, the capacity of SEE governments and civil society organisations to work on SALW has consistently improved as a result of local actors' efforts to work collaboratively on practical projects and the efforts of donors and international organisations to provide training and resources.


However, although all SEE governments have made important progress in terms of SALW control and many have given increased prioritisation to the issue, SALW must compete with numerous other priorities on the agendas of donors, governments, NGOs and international organisations alike. Maintaining enough momentum to see through the required changes to SALW policy and practice is an ongoing challenge for which non-governmental actors and key international organisations should shoulder much responsibility. The EU in particular should devote more attention to SALW in the accession and stabilisation processes which apply to SEE states. In this light and in order to avoid government and donor fatigue on the issue of SALW control in SEE, it may prove wise for the Stability Pact to either review the RIP or provide supplementary guidelines, which contain specific timelines and benchmarks for implementation.

Priorities for action on the part of governments include: the destruction of remaining SALW surpluses in accordance with commitments made under the OSCE Document on SALW of 2000, rather than the sale or indefinite storage of such stocks; the establishment and adoption of mechanisms, such as national commissions, strategies and actions, plans that enhance intra-governmental work on SALW control and provide a means to improve information exchange nationally and internationally; the strict adherence to those international agreements, which they are bound by or aligned with; and full participation in processes such as the UN PoA review and the Biennial Meeting of States in July 2005, information exchanges via INTERPOL and the SECI Centre Task Force. SEE governments

should also work to further enhance transparency in line with EU standards through detailed annual reporting by governments of their arms transfer practices, supplementing this where possible by the publication of existing report formats such as OSCE submissions.

In this regard, undertakings by civil society aimed at encouraging government action on SALW and holding governments to account, can prove vital in moving the SALW agenda forward in the region. Although SEE civil society has made extremely valuable contributions by conducting awareness raising among the public and research to aid implementation, policy level work and advocacy remains an underdeveloped area which will be key to creating longer-term indigenous commitment to combating SALW problems.

Despite the fact that international donors and institutions have invested significant resources into stabilising the security situation in South Eastern Europe, remaining problems related to SALW continue to pose a threat to economic and social development, and in some cases to peace building. The international community should therefore continue to support SALW control programmes in the region, provided such programmes meet with the best international practices, represent a well targeted response to problems, are based on sound operational research and support a national SALW control strategy. A commitment by all agencies that implement SALW control projects in the region to use existing best practice guidelines and build provisions for baseline research, monitoring and evaluation would provide a welcome boost to programme effectiveness and transparency. For their part, international donors and implementing agencies should also give ongoing consideration to questions of sustainability and local capacity building, whilst continuing the regionalization of operational resources such as the UNDP SALW projects and SEESAC. International technical support is still required, although this should be scaled down as local capacity is developed.




2 Country assessments

This report presents progress towards the Regional Implementation Plan by country. Each country sub-section includes two background sections: 'Small Arms problem', which details the SALW-related problems in each country, and 'Small Arms policy and practice', which gives an overview of current policy and practice on SALW.

These two sections are followed by a third section 'Small Arms progress', which gives a detailed assessment of progress made to date. In order to facilitate analysis of the wide-ranging areas in which progress towards the RIP and combating SALW proliferation has been made, a number of sub-sections have been used to categorise and present information on each country's progress so far (largely based on the functional areas defined by SEESAC). These sub-sections of SALW control activities are as follows:

- **Legislative and regulatory issues** – this section details countries' current legislative and regulatory control measures and progress made in the context of other agreements on arms control, such as the 2000 OSCE Document on Small Arms, 2001 UN Programme of Action, etc. (For more detail, please see Annex 4.3).
- **SALW transfers** – this section provides an overview of each country's current and recent SALW transfers (exports, imports, transit, transshipment and re-export), focussing on exports, in as far as public information is available, and also details available information on SALW trafficking.
- **SALW collection programmes and capacities** – this section provides an overview of SALW collection initiatives in each country.
- **SALW destruction programmes and capacities** – this section provides details of SALW and SALW ammunition destruction projects in each country.
- **SALW stockpile management programmes and capacities** – this section provides an overview of the stockpile security and management situation in each country.
- **SALW awareness activities** – this section presents the awareness raising activities and public information campaigns implemented in each country. (Seminars, conferences and other meetings are not generally included in this section, which focuses more on direct SALW awareness raising or information campaigns).
- **SALW survey activities** – this section presents the results of any SALW or related survey conducted in each country. (Research reports, policy reports, needs assessments, small-scale surveys, opinion polls, etc., have not been included in this section as they do not fully correspond with a 'SALW Survey' as defined by SEESAC's regional standards).
- **Civil society involvement in SALW interventions** – this section provides an overview of civil society and NGO activities on SALW in each country, including a brief note on overall capacity.

- 
- **Cross-border SALW control initiatives** – this section provides an overview of the situation in terms of border control and cross-border co-operation on SALW trafficking in each country.
 - **SALW management information and exchange systems and protocols** –this section provides an overview of SALW-relevant information systems, both public and confidential; it should be noted that it is not possible to make any assessment of the value and efficacy of confidential information exchange mechanisms.
 - **Additional SALW-related activities** – this section presents any additional activities that may be relevant to countries' efforts to combat SALW, for example, community-based policing initiatives or the development of national SALW action plans.