

2 Country assessments

This report presents progress towards the Regional Implementation Plan (RIP) by country. Each country sub-section includes two background sections: 'Small Arms Problem', which details the SALW-related problems in each country, and 'Small Arms Policy and Practice', which gives an overview of current policy and practice on SALW.

These two sections are followed by a third section, 'Small Arms Progress', which gives a detailed assessment of progress made to date. In order to facilitate analysis of the wide-ranging areas in which progress towards the RIP and combating SALW proliferation has been made, a number of sub-sections have been used to categorise and present information for each country (largely based on the functional areas defined by SEESAC). These sub-sections of SALW control activities are:

- Legislative and regulatory issues – this section details countries' current legislative and regulatory control measures and progress made in the context of other agreements on arms control, such as the 2000 OSCE Document on Small Arms, 2001 UN Programme of Action, etc. (For more detail, see Annex H). In order to ensure consistency, all analysis and referencing of legislation in the report is based on English language translations of laws obtained from SEESAC.
- SALW transfers – this section provides an overview of each country's current and recent SALW transfers (exports, imports, transit, transshipment and re-export), focusing on exports, in as far as public information is available, and also details available information on SALW trafficking.
- SALW collection programmes and capacities – this section provides an overview of SALW collection initiatives in each country.
- SALW destruction programmes and capacities – this section provides details of SALW and SALW ammunition destruction projects in each country.
- SALW stockpile management programmes and capacities – this section provides an overview of the stockpile security and management situation in each country.
- SALW awareness activities – this section presents the awareness-raising activities and public information campaigns implemented in each country. (Seminars, conferences and other meetings are not generally included in this section, which concentrates on direct SALW awareness-raising or information campaigns).
- SALW survey activities – this section presents the results of any SALW or related survey conducted in each country. (Research reports, policy reports, needs assessments, small-scale surveys, opinion polls, etc, have not been included in this section as they do not fully correspond with a 'SALW Survey' as defined by SEESAC's regional standards).
- Civil society involvement in SALW interventions – this section provides an overview of civil society and NGO activities on SALW in each country, including a brief note on overall capacity.
- Cross-border SALW control initiatives – this section provides an overview of the situation in terms of border control and cross-border co-operation on SALW trafficking in each country.

- SALW management information and exchange systems and protocols – this section provides an overview of SALW-relevant information systems, both public and confidential; it should be noted that it is not possible to make any assessment of the value and efficacy of confidential information exchange mechanisms.
- Additional SALW-related activities – this section presents any additional activities that may be relevant to a country's efforts to combat SALW, for example, community-based policing initiatives or the development of national SALW action plans.

SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO (including the internationally-administered entity of Kosovo)



Small Arms problem

Background

The surviving states of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) are now part of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (SCG). The secession of the other republics and the conflict in the Serbian province of Kosovo, and resulting NATO air strikes and international intervention, greatly affected the Republic of Serbia in particular. Although Serbia and Montenegro both largely escaped the hand-to-hand fighting, which states such as Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina suffered, the armed conflict in Kosovo resulted in thousands of lost lives and large numbers of refugees flooded into Serbia and Montenegro from the province, as well as Croatia and BiH.⁹⁶³ Prior to the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, Serbia had been the hub of the federation, with the capital Belgrade as the centre of a large and relatively prosperous state. However, instability and sanctions imposed from 1992 to 2000 hit the country's economy hard, and the vast majority of the population suffered from shortages of food and key consumables such as petrol and electricity. Compounded by the strains of refugee absorption, and to a certain extent the bomb-damage to infrastructure and industry, the Serbian economy and society suffered under the authoritarian and corrupt Milosevic administration, which perpetuated the country's isolation from the region and international community. With the popular overthrow of then President Milosevic's Socialist Party of Serbia in elections in 2000 and the coming to power of the DOS coalition,⁹⁶⁴ the country began to return to the mainstream, and, with the help of international aid, to progress toward reform and integration within wider European structures.

The greatly reduced state of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), now the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, is also threatened by further reduction, with Montenegrin moves towards full independence from the federation. During the last

⁹⁶³ The number of people killed or displaced by the Kosovo crisis is still unclear; approximate estimates of the number of lives lost during the conflict in Kosovo put the number of dead at 10,000, and the number of ethnic Albanian and ethnic Serb refugees/IDPs at 800,000 and 200,000 respectively. 'After the Wars, the Vietnam Syndrome', Vesna Peric Zimonjic, IPS News, 06 October 2003, <http://ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=20479>.

⁹⁶⁴ Democratic Opposition of Serbia.

years of the Milosevic regime, Montenegro 'followed a course of creeping secession', gaining some initial support from European powers that saw Montenegro as an ally against the blackballed authorities in Belgrade at that time.⁹⁶⁵ The tiny coastal republic of approximately 600,000 is not necessarily a great loss in terms of resources or population, but Montenegro does provide Serbia's only link to the sea and is therefore strategically valuable, and more importantly, Montenegrin secession would make the outstanding question of Kosovo's status hard to ignore.⁹⁶⁶ The internally administered entity of Kosovo,⁹⁶⁷ is currently run by the UN mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), in accordance with UN Resolution 1244, which postpones the hard question of Kosovo's independence until a later date. The situation at present remains difficult – leaders of the local ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo maintain that independence is the only acceptable outcome, while Serb leaders in Belgrade, particularly right-wing leaders, insist that the entity is and should remain a province within the Serbian state. The international community therefore intervened in discussions on Montenegro's secession in order to avoid 'premature' discussions on Kosovo. With the incentives of greater devolution of centralised responsibilities and power sharing, 'an EU initiative salvaged the union with Serbia', and convinced Montenegro to postpone a referendum on secession until 2005.⁹⁶⁸ The current arrangement, the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, was formally instituted on 14 March 2002 and seems to be working reasonably well; however, the question of Kosovo's status remains key to stability in the country and region.

The current situation

Republic of Montenegro

Montenegro managed to survive the dissolution of the former-SFRY without conflict, despite its ethnically mixed population. Despite its proximity to Albania and Kosovo, it has suffered no violence and inter-ethnic tensions are minimal. Recent alarming threats have come from the Albanian National Army (ANA), an ethnic Albanian extremist group which began activities in Macedonia in 2003, and subsequently expanded its activities into Kosovo and southern Serbia. The existence of an ANA website in Montenegro led to political debate in the sub-region: the consensus is that there is little behind vague public 'threats' of action to protect the rights of ethnic Albanians in Montenegro, but that the group does have some capacity to cause instability in the republic if the situation grows more tense.⁹⁶⁹

A more pressing concern from the perspective of public security is 'the Montenegrin administration's links to organised crime', and the fact that, according to BICC, the

965 BICC Conversion Survey2002, p 137.

966 'If Montenegro were to have left the [then] FRY, the 'federation' would have become even more anomalous, comprising one country, Serbia, its province Vojvodina, and Kosovo, under international administration and currently of unresolved status. Montenegrin independence would have also given support to Kosovo Albanians' calls for independence, and possibly also to the stirrings of discontent in Serbia's remaining 'province', Vojvodina.' 'Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia', Ian Davis, Saferworld May 2002 (hereafter 'SALW in FRY, Saferworld 2002'), www.saferworld.org.uk, p 17.

967 Hereafter referred to as 'Kosovo'.

968 SALW in FRY, Saferworld 2002, p 17.

969 The Montenegrin Interior Ministry is investigating the existence of the Albanian National Army in Montenegro after the early 2004 internet warning issued by this organisation that it would carry out actions against vital Montenegrin facilities and interests if 'the fate of the Albanians in Montenegro is experimented with'. Albanian political leaders have expressed doubts about the group's existence in the country. 'Albanian National Army of Montenegro Opens Website?', Daily Media Review, 10 - 11 January 2004; 'Montenegrin Police Has No Knowledge of the Albanian National Army', Daily Media Review, 12 January 2004; 'Ethnic Albanian Leader in Montenegro Denounces Extremist 'Propaganda'', Daily Media Review, 15 January 2004; www.seesac.org.

country has become 'an important centre for the trafficking of human beings, drugs, cigarettes and weapons'.⁹⁷⁰ The republic's serious problems with organised crime and trafficking are difficult to control given its current law enforcement capacity and problematic geography – a mountainous border and a long coastline from which smugglers can ferry goods across the Adriatic to Italy. The main threat to Montenegro's stability is therefore more likely to come from organised crime, which has a significant presence in the country and is rumoured to have connections to the top levels of government.⁹⁷¹ This problem extends from high-level crime down into Montenegrin communities, with recent research identifying crime as the greatest perceived threat to society and a deep distrust of the police by citizens.⁹⁷²

Republic of Serbia

Serbia is now largely stable, although tensions persist in the multi-ethnic areas bordering Kosovo and Macedonia in southern Serbia, and in the entity of Kosovo itself (see below). Although there is no armed conflict, questions of crime and political stability are another matter and arguably pose serious problems for the consolidation of peace and economic progress. The assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic in March 2003 was evidence of the power of the criminal cartels operating in the country. Djindjic had been leading moves to reform Serbia's economic system and integrate the republic into Euro-Atlantic structures. Under the DOS coalition lead by Djindjic as Serbian PM and Kostunica as federal President, Serbia had achieved substantial progress in political and economic terms, improving post-conflict relations with neighbours such as Croatia and BiH, relaxing travel restrictions and strengthening trade links, and participating in regional and international fora. However, there remain elements in Serbia who profited under the Milosevic regime: Djindjic's moves to crack-down on organised crime and corruption and increase transparency resulted in his murder by 'Mafiosi', including former members of an elite police special operations unit, the 'Red Berets', who are currently standing trial in Belgrade on charges of joining in 'a criminal enterprise to bring down the government... and return allies of Slobodan Milosevic to power'.⁹⁷³ The threat of criminal intervention in politics remains present as recent threats to both the Serbian Deputy Prime Minister and the state Defence Minister indicate.⁹⁷⁴

Djindjic's murder paralysed Serbian politics, and two presidential elections in late 2003 failed to engage the requisite number of voters to confirm a new president and affirmed the Serbian electorate's pessimism – the position remains unfilled. Parliamentary elections on 28 December 2003 gave the Serbian Radical Party a majority in a very divided government. Discussions on coalitions continue and to date the parliament remains closed, crippling normal governance.⁹⁷⁵ The International Crisis Group (ICG)

970 BICC notes that, 'The 'shadow economy', which flourished despite the general economic shutdown, is the result of the sanctions regime against Yugoslavia and has contributed to the creation of a 'Mafia state'. BICC Conversion Survey 2002, p 137.

971 See SALW transfers below.

972 'Republic of Montenegro SALW Survey', SEESAC APD 23, Small Arms Survey, pre-publication draft 12 January 2004 (hereafter 'Montenegro SALW Survey, SAS 2004'), p 30.

973 'Thirty-six alleged gangsters and former members of an elite police special operations unit went on trial in Belgrade for the 12 March 2003... Only 21 of the defendants are in custody. The others, including alleged ringleader Milorad 'Legija' Lukovic, will be tried in absentia.' 'Djindjic's Alleged Assassins Go on Trial in Belgrade', Daily Media Review, 22 December 2003, www.seesac.org.

974 'Two very serious' threats were sent to the Serbian Deputy PM Nebojsa Covic, warning him to 'give up Kosovo and Metohija' or he would suffer the same fate as the late PM Djindjic; also in January 2004, threats to the safety of SCG Defence Minister Tadic resulted in stepped up security for the minister. 'Covic Receives Murder Threats', Daily Media Review, 13 January 2004; 'Tadic's Security Stepped Up?', Daily Media Review, 15 January 2004; www.seesac.org.

975 As of 16 February 2004.

presented a report on 01 January 2004 stating that the political stability in Serbia has deteriorated,⁹⁷⁶ and recent assessments of Serbia's economy are equally negative, with experts commenting that current conditions for economic growth are 'worse than three years ago'.⁹⁷⁷ Serbia is now at a key point in its progress towards stabilisation, and there is real potential for a resurgence of radical politics and policy that could threaten peace processes in the region.⁹⁷⁸

Political uncertainty at the centre has not helped the situation in the troubled region of southern Serbia, which is relatively isolated from the rest of the country and where the majority of Serbia's ethnic Albanian minority live.⁹⁷⁹ Unlike the rest of Serbia, the Presevo Valley region south of the town Vranje has seen inter-ethnic tension and violence since the war in Kosovo, which is just across the administrative border the region runs alongside. Under the Kumanovo Agreement of June 1999, a buffer 'Ground Safety Zone' (GSZ) zone was established between Kosovo and Serbia proper.⁹⁸⁰ However, tensions came to a head following the emergence in January 2000 of the Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (UCPMB), an armed group of ethnic Albanian militants with close links to the formally disbanded Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which aimed to join the region with the ethnic Albanian communities in Kosovo.⁹⁸¹ As incidents continued, large numbers of Serb police and gendarmerie were transferred to the region and allegations of human rights abuses towards the local communities were made, although government actions were 'reasonably restrained'.⁹⁸² Over 30 people died and many were injured in the 'intensive fighting' between the UCPMB and Serb police from early 2000 to May 2001, when, with the assistance of NATO,⁹⁸³ fighting came to an end with the brokering of a peace agreement, the 'Covic Plan', which provided for greater ethnic Albanian involvement in local government and law enforcement and other confidence-building measures.⁹⁸⁴

Although many elements of the Covic Plan have been implemented in southern Serbia – the multi-ethnic police (MEP) force is active and generally well-accepted, ethnic Albanians hold many elected positions in local government, and economic investment continues – relations between communities and with the Serb gendarmerie in the area remain strained. The introduction of EU monitors and multi-ethnic police supported and

976 'ICG Latest Report on Political Situation in Serbia', Daily Media Review, 05 January 2004, www.seesac.org.

977 'Conditions for a Faster Increase in Standard of Living Worse than Three Years Ago', Daily Media Review, 06 January 2004, www.seesac.org.

978 Analysts attribute some of these developments to inept international policy in the region; Washington Post analyst Morton Abramovitz warned: 'If the West continues postponing solutions to political problems in the region, and if it continues making mistakes in the Serbia-Montenegro-Kosovo triangle, some kind of a black hole will be created, with extreme nationalism, crime and terrorism prevailing in it'. 'How to Avoid a 'Black Hole'?', Daily Media Review, 09 January 2004, www.seesac.org.

979 Ethnic Albanians account for between 60 and 70 percent of the population in the GSZ and adjacent areas. SALW in FRY, Saferworld 2002, p 18.

980 This 'Ground Safety Zone' was designed to end the fighting and to protect local communities in the area - only lightly armed Serb police were allowed to patrol the GSZ, a situation which was exploited by ethnic Albanian extremists who established bases in the Zone and stepped up activities with 'near impunity'. BICC Conversion Survey 2002, p 136.

981 Estimates of UCPMB strength range from 700 to 6,000 fighters, and recruits, training and weapons are said to have come from the KLA in Kosovo. SALW in FRY, Saferworld 2002, p 18.

982 Ibid

983 The situation deteriorated in early 2001 however, and further re-deployment of Yugoslav forces and the negotiations involving NATO's KFOR, were necessary before agreement was reached on the Covic Plan and 550 UCPMB rebels and their commander surrendered arms. The international community and KFOR 'saw the insurgency originating in UN-controlled Kosovo as a major embarrassment after the fall of Milosevic'; the successful solution of the Presevo Valley conflict was 'an important test of cooperation between KFOR, Western governments and the Yugoslav authorities, whose level-headedness prevented the repetition of a Kosovo-style escalation'. BICC Conversion Survey 2002, pp 136-7.

984 The 'Covic' Plan or Presevo Peace Plan developed in February 2001 'sought to address the situation by emancipating the ethnic Albanians and re-integrating them into Serbian political, social and economic life', combining 'a series of confidence-building measures, including the re-introduction of ethnic Albanians into the police force, with a gradual phased disarmament plan and economic aid for job creation'. SALW in FRY, Saferworld 2002, p 18.

trained by the OSCE has made a substantial contribution to improving the situation, with police now deployed across the former Ground Safety Zone, but the capacity of the MEP is still limited and the region is still somewhat hostage to politics in Kosovo and Macedonia. Violent incidents continue: at the end of Summer 2003, several attacks were made on public buildings and places, such as the cultural centre in Presevo, as well as individual homes.⁹⁸⁵ Demonstrations on the Albanian national holiday in December 2003 saw crowds of about a thousand rallying in Presevo, taking down the Serbian flag from the local council building and replacing it with the Albanian national flag, thankfully without violence.⁹⁸⁶ However, a few days later, an attack on a police checkpoint confirmed that threats to security are still present – unidentified gunmen opened fire with automatic weapons on a checkpoint in Konculj.⁹⁸⁷

An opinion poll on SALW in the region commissioned by SEESAC in the summer of 2003 provides a more hopeful outlook on the situation. Undertaken by the Belgrade-based SMMRI polling company, the survey's findings confirmed that the majority of citizens feel that low living standards and quality of life are the main problems they face, not security, and a majority of each ethnic group felt that the security situation was either the same or better than a year ago. Ethnic Albanian respondents, however, noted the Serbian gendarmerie as a threat, ethnic Serbs noted terrorism as a threat, and small numbers of both ethnic groups noted the other as a threat to general security.⁹⁸⁸ A report on southern Serbia produced by the ICG in January 2004 argues that although local Albanian communities do not in general support the ANA and resumption of conflict, the recent resurgence of low-level violence has been an expression of dissatisfaction with the status quo, including very difficult economic conditions, and the contradictory policies of the ethnic Albanian leaders and Serb politicians on joining or dividing Kosovo respectively, confirming that 'durable peace in the region is still far away'.⁹⁸⁹

The Entity of Kosovo

The marginalisation under Milosevic of the ethnic Albanian communities in Kosovo, and elsewhere in Serbia, resulted in the growth of originally non-violent resistance into violent insurgency in the mid to late 1990s following the 'increasingly repressive' action taken by Serb police and security forces in the face of public demonstrations, and the stationing of about 40,000 Yugoslav troops in Kosovo in 1997, when the KLA grew more and more active.⁹⁹⁰ Using northern Albania 'both as a support base and a training ground' from 1994 onwards,⁹⁹¹ the KLA launched attacks against the Serb forces in Kosovo, leading to thousands of deaths and ethnic cleansing that created hundreds of thousands of both ethnic Serb and Albanian IDPs and refugees.⁹⁹² The NATO bombing campaign in March 1999 led to the 02 June 1999 UN settlement, a full

985 On 24 August 2003, two persons were wounded in a series of explosions of the cultural centre in Presevo; a few days later an unknown assailant threw a hand grenade in the centre of Presevo; October saw more shooting, this time at individual houses. 24 August and 27 - 28 August 2003, Weekly Media Review, 01 - 08 September 2003; 06 October 2003, Weekly Media Review, 29 September - 06 October 2003; 17 October 2003, Weekly Media Review, 13 - 20 October 2003; www.seesac.org.

986 'Albanians in South Serbia Take Down Serbian and Hoist Albanian Flag', Daily Media Review, 01 December 2003, www.seesac.org.

987 'Police Checkpoint in Konculj under Attack', Daily Media Review, 09 December 2003, www.seesac.org.

988 A majority of ethnic Serb respondents, 60 percent, felt the security situation in the region was the same as it was a year ago, while 50 percent of ethnic Albanians felt it was better. Presentation by Dr Srdjan Bogosavljevic, Strategic Marketing and Media Research Institute (SMMRI), International Agency Support Office, Vranje, 05 December 2003.

989 'ICG Report on Presevo Valley: 'Hornets' Nest in Southern Serbia'', Daily Media Review 16 January 2004, www.seesac.org.

990 SALW in FRY, Saferworld 2002, p 12.

991 BICC Conversion Survey 2002, p 130.

992 For example, approximately 1.5 million ethnic Albanian refugees fled from Kosovo to Macedonia and Albania in 1999. SALW in FRY, Saferworld 2002, p 12.

withdrawal of Serb security forces, and the establishment of KFOR in the province by the end of the month.⁹⁹³ The KLA was officially disbanded in September 1999, following the withdrawal of Yugoslav security forces and administration, the intervention of international forces and the creation of a 'de facto protectorate of the UN' in the summer of 1999.⁹⁹⁴ However, 'radical groups continue to play an important role in the territory': 'Kosovo has become the hub of both criminal and radical political activity in the region, aided by the abundance of weaponry available and comparatively inefficient policing by the multinational police force'.⁹⁹⁵

In the four years since the end of the conflict, there has been an enormous investment of international aid and resources, the strengthening of law enforcement authorities and development of internal capacity, as well as that of the international agencies working in Kosovo, and much has been achieved. Despite this, and notwithstanding the continuing deployment of KFOR troops, both civilians and policemen have been killed and wounded in regular outbreaks of violence. Attacks are usually committed with SALW, often military-style weapons. Incidents involving hand grenades and bombs are also common.⁹⁹⁶ Incidents have involved the shootings of returnees,⁹⁹⁷ and both inter- and intra-ethnic violence.⁹⁹⁸ Late 2003 saw an 'alarming growth of violence against the new legal structures in Kosovo',⁹⁹⁹ and the police continue to be targets of violence, as the November 2003 killing of an ethnic Albanian policewoman and wounding of two colleagues in Pec when assailants opened fire with automatic weapons indicated.¹⁰⁰⁰ A similar attack on police near Pristina the month before resulted in more injuries and the death of a civilian.¹⁰⁰¹ Although UNMIK stresses that the number of murders has statistically fallen by 50 percent since 2000, other crimes, such as kidnapping, rape and burglary have not reduced.¹⁰⁰² Recent Small Arms Survey research concluded, 'the security and safety of civilians is a serious concern in post-war Kosovo'.¹⁰⁰³

Although often connected with criminal activity, violence in Kosovo often has political motivation, and 'political and criminal violence are becoming interlinked through increasingly well-organized crime structures';¹⁰⁰⁴ the continuing uncertainty over the final status of Kosovo fuels inter-ethnic tension. The Prime Minister of Kosovo's

993 Ibid, p 13.

994 BICC Conversion Survey 2002, p 138.

995 Ibid

996 'Security forces carry out controlled explosion of bomb in Mitrovica', Daily Media Review, 03 December 2003; 'Hand Grenade Explodes in Pristina', Daily Media Review, 08 December 2003, www.seesac.org.

997 An ethnic Albanian shot a Serbian woman, 72, when she tried to move back into her house in Kosovo. Weekly Media Report, 29 Sept - 06 October 2003, www.seesac.org.

998 28 October, Weekly Media Review, 28 October - 03 November 2003, www.seesac.org.

999 Deputy Chief of US Mission in Pristina Sorenson. 'Growing Violence Against Kosovo Legal Structures', Daily Media Review, 27 November 2003, www.seesac.org.

1000 'Kosovo Policewoman Killed, Two Policemen Wounded', Daily Media Review 25 November 2003, www.seesac.org.

1001 International staff working in Kosovo have also not been immune to violent crime: a German OSCE employee was stabbed in November, and a US KFOR soldier was killed in December 2003. 'Attack on OSCE Employee in Kosovo', Daily Media Review, 24 November 2003; 'US soldier found dead in Kosovo', Daily Media Review, 08 December 2003, 12 September 2003; Weekly Media Review, 08 - 15 September 2003; www.seesac.org.

1002 Statistics in October confirmed that 475 people were killed, 705 wounded and 183 armed robberies happened in Kosovo last year. 'Chappell: UNMIK Police Launch Operation Against Organised Crime', Daily Media Review, 20 November 2003; 17 October 2003, Weekly Media Review, 13 - 20 October 2003, www.seesac.org.

1003 'Kosovo and the Gun: A Baseline Assessment of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Kosovo', Anna Khakee and Nicholas Florquin, Small Arms Survey, June 2003 (hereafter 'Kosovo and the Gun, SAS 2003'), p viii.

1004 'Intimidation of those in key political and administrative positions is pervasive', and it has proved difficult to keep local Kosovars in senior positions within the customs service. With the demobilisation of the KLA, parts of its leadership entered politics, others went into 'business, organized crime, or continued paramilitary activities. But the split is not a neat one, as business, organized crime, and regular and extremist politics are linked in various ways... not confined to ex-KLA structures. The links are strongest in extreme nationalist organizations, which are thought to finance their activities mainly through crime, and most recently through a spate of kidnappings'. Kosovo and the Gun, SAS 2003, pp 7 and 8.

Provisional Institution of Self-Government (PISG), Bajram Rexhepi, and members of the Kosovo police force, for example, were attacked in the largely-Serb populated northern Kosovo town of Kosovska Mitrovica in December 2003 while meeting a delegation from the World Bank.¹⁰⁰⁵ In mid-November 2003, several thousand ethnic-Albanian Kosovars gathered in downtown Pristina, demanding that UNMIK leave Kosovo and the province be unified with Albania.¹⁰⁰⁶ By the end of the year the rise in ethnically-motivated violence was noted by the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, in a speech to the Security Council.¹⁰⁰⁷ As this report was going to press, on the 17 - 18 March 2004, 28 people were killed and hundreds injured^{1007a} in a wave of public unrest that also saw the burning of religious buildings and homes and the displacement of at least 3,200 people, mostly ethnic Serbs and Roma.^{1007b} Arguably the most serious breakdown of public order and level of violence since NATO first entered Kosovo, these events are clear evidence of the underlying tensions and continuing potential for conflict in the entity. Among the many challenges remaining, 'a central obstacle to the success of these efforts, however, is the continued widespread availability and misuse of small arms and light weapons'.¹⁰⁰⁸

SALW proliferation

Formed after the success of guerrilla warfare during the Second World War, Tito's SFRY maintained a large army, the Yugoslav National Army (JNA or VJ), and the concept of civil defence was an important part of Yugoslav culture and state.¹⁰⁰⁹ In addition to the substantial SALW holdings of the army and civilian reserves, an estimated 1.6 million firearms were also registered as personal weapons for use by individual citizens. The highest SFRY gun per capita ratios were in Montenegro and Serbia.¹⁰¹⁰ The conflicts and instability in the Serbia and Kosovo and the wider region contributed to a large increase in illegal proliferation, as state-held arms diffused through the population and guns were smuggled into the region to equip combatants. The majority of these illegal weapons remain uncollected, with many people continuing to retain arms for perceived needs of self-protection.

Republic of Montenegro

Recent SAS research finds that 'the widespread availability and misuse of small arms continues to threaten the safety and stability of Montenegro'.¹⁰¹¹ Montenegro has a particularly strong gun culture and even before the conflicts of the 1990s there were very high levels of civilian possession: 'a house isn't a home without a gun' is a

1005 'Kosovo PM Attacked in Mitrovica While Meeting World Bank Delegation', Daily Media Review, 06 - 07 December 2003, www.seesac.org.

1006 13 November 2003, Weekly Media Review 10 - 16 November 2003, www.seesac.org.

1007 'Annan Warns of Mounting Tension in Kosovo', Daily Media Review, 25 December 2003, www.seesac.org.

1007a "Shocked and outraged", Annan condemns killing of two UN police in Kosovo, 24 March 2004, UN News Centre, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/>.

1007b Following last week's violence, funeral held in Kosovo without incident UN, 21 March 2004, UN News Centre, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/>; 'UN mission urges calm on fifth anniversary of NATO's intervention in Kosovo', 23 March 2004, UN News Centre, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/>.

1008 Kosovo and the Gun, SAS 2003, p 41.

1009 'Macedonia: Guns, policing and ethnic division', Anna Matveeva with Duncan Hiscock, Wolf-Christian Paes and Hans Risser, Saferworld and BICC, October 2003, p 39.

1010 Statistics for 1989: Montenegro had 584,310 inhabitants and 78,928 registered weapons; Serbia, 5,694,464 inhabitants and 492,314 registered weapons; Kosovo, 1,584,441 inhabitants and 65,540 registered weapons; Vojvodina, 2,034,772 inhabitants and 143,651 registered weapons. Figure T3.1: Small Arms Ownership in the former Yugoslavia, 1989. BICC Conversion Survey 2002, pp 127-8.

1011 Montenegro SALW Survey, SAS 2004, p 43.

sentiment held dearly by many Montenegrin citizens.¹⁰¹² As noted above, despite the fact that Montenegro escaped the last decade's armed conflict in the region, it did not escape many of the negative effects of this conflict, including a rise in organised crime and smuggling, economic decline, war trauma, perceptions of political insecurity, and higher levels of SALW proliferation. Many weapons used in the fighting in neighbouring countries ended up in Montenegro, brought back as souvenirs by returning soldiers or for protection by refugees and smuggled in by criminals for trafficking purposes. The Small Arms Survey finds that the common estimate of one weapon per household is 'a realistic upper threshold' for small arms possession, and that Montenegro appears to be 'one of the most heavily armed territories in the region'.¹⁰¹³ Distinguishing between SALW controlled by the Government and weapons in civilian hands is apparently problematic, primarily because the Montenegrin Government distributed large numbers of weapons to the population in the late 1990s, and little reliable information is available on who now has direct responsibility for them.¹⁰¹⁴ In addition to government police and military forces, and civilians, other armed groups in the country include the rapidly growing private security sector, and reputedly the Serbian Orthodox Church.¹⁰¹⁵

The Small Arms Survey's conclusions are that the number of SALW in Montenegro is between 153,000 and 232,000. With the MoI holding 15,000 to 18,000 and the army between 27,000 and 54,000, SAS estimates that there are between 111,000 and 160,000 registered and unregistered SALW held by civilians in Montenegro.¹⁰¹⁶ 86,000 of these civilian-held weapons are officially registered, meaning Montenegro remains one of the countries in the region with the highest rate of registered firearms: although data on illegally-held SALW is sparse, it appears there may be between 25,000 and 74,000 unregistered guns in civilian possession.¹⁰¹⁷ Although SAS research found that the vast majority of Montenegrins – over 80 percent – believe that there are too many guns in the country and that nearly 40 percent believe guns are dangerous, another 40 percent admit that they would own a gun legally given the opportunity. The primary reason given for owning firearms was the protection of self and family.¹⁰¹⁸ With survey respondents noting the vulnerability resulting from regional conflict, other reasons given for firearms ownership were political and personal security, levels of crime, the impact of 'macho' media images, tradition and the potential profits to be gained from trade in arms.¹⁰¹⁹ The Small Arms Survey notes that, 'Although many individuals recognize the danger that firearms potentially present to Montenegrin society, far more believe that owning weapons is both a part of their cultural tradition as well as their right as citizens. As such, many Montenegrin citizens exercise their right to own and publicly carry a

1012 Ibid, p 2.

1013 Ibid, pp 3 and 8.

1014 As many as 10-12,000 of these weapons are likely to be connected with the Defence Reserve Force, whose numbers grew by thousands with recruitment in the late 1990s as a response to growing tensions with the former Yugoslav Army. 'The number of SALW distributed by the Montenegrin government to the defence reserve force remains unclear at the time of drafting this first report, as officials were unable and/or unwilling to provide details about what was distributed... What is unclear is what is happening to the weapons previously held by the 10,000 defence force reservists who are now said to have been decommissioned, reintegrated into the growing border police or in state security forces. While some officials claim that their weapons have been surrendered and are now stockpiled and secured by MUP, focus group results suggest that the process was not as systematic as one would hope, which implies that a number of SALW given by the government to civilians have not been recovered.' Ibid, pp 9, 10 and 11 and Executive Summary. BICC notes that in response to the threats from the Milosevic regime, the Montenegrin government expanded the republican police force from 10,000 to 25,000 officers, 'creating a heavily armed paramilitary force': the 'source of weapons for this force is unclear as Montenegro was subject to the same arms embargo as Serbia'. BICC Conversion Survey 2002, p 137.

1015 Montenegro SALW Survey, SAS 2004, p 9.

1016 Ibid, p 5.

1017 Ibid

1018 Ibid, p 22.

1019 Ibid, pp 23 and 27.

variety of weapons, from handguns to rifles, a fact illustrated by the multitude of public celebratory shootings and gunshot wounds that occur in the Republic each year'.¹⁰²⁰

Republic of Serbia

Official data released in 1999 estimated the number of legally armed citizens in the then FRY at 508,700. This does, however, appear to be 'a huge underestimation' as 2001 statistics on licensed civilian ownership alone are over a million.¹⁰²¹ As of May 2001, 1,005,058 weapons were registered for a population of about 9 million in Serbia. The majority of these privately-held guns, 516,000, are revolvers and pistols,¹⁰²² Most of these weapons were registered under the 'relatively lax former gun laws'; by 2001, only 1,667 new licences had been granted to private citizens since stricter legislation on gun ownership was introduced in 1998.¹⁰²³ Another separate sub-category of licensed firearms is 'small calibre weapons', of which 31,068 were registered in 2001: licences for these weapons are only granted for possession and their sole use is sporting (not hunting). Mol officials advised a Saferworld research team in 2001 that 'there is no evidence of criminal acts being committed with small calibre weapons'.¹⁰²⁴ According to a recent local news programme, people are now buying mostly hunting weapons, and that sales of pistols have dropped, although foreign weapons remain the most sought-after models.¹⁰²⁵

Apart from the statistics on registered weapons noted above, there is 'very little information' available on SALW holdings by non-state actors in Serbia, including civilians, criminals and insurgents. However, the large number of weapons seized do shed some light: 46,800 between 1992 and 2000 (minus seizures during 1994), although these figures are by nature dependent on police capacity as well as the number of illegal firearms circulating.¹⁰²⁶ Official estimates from the Mol in 2001 are that there are approximately 50,000 unregistered weapons in circulation.¹⁰²⁷ It is highly likely that the true number is far greater, as the March to April 2003 amnesty collection totals were 40,500, and it is extremely doubtful that anywhere near all the illicit SALW in the country were collected in this initiative. There are currently no up-to-date official statistics available on levels of legal and illegal weapons in Serbia; more detailed information in this area, and in related areas, will be needed for a full evaluation of the SALW problem in Serbia, necessary to inform appropriate responses.

Research conducted by the local Balkan Youth Union in schools around Belgrade indicates that there is a serious problem with SALW proliferation in the areas surrounding the capital city. 50 percent of students surveyed, aged from 13 to 19 years, think 'there is a significant quantity of weapons in Belgrade', nearly 60 percent had held a weapon



Male students in a Belgrade High-School complete a questionnaire as part of the Balkan Youth Union's research during 2003.

1020 Ibid, p 2.

1021 SALW in FRY, Saferworld 2002, p 50.

1022 Ibid, p 51.

1023 BICC Conversion Survey 2002, p 136.

1024 SALW in FRY, Saferworld 2002, p 52.

1025 'Gun Culture or Violence' news clip, VIN news programme No 284, broadcast 2130 hours B92, 09 February 2004.

1026 The greatest number of weapons seizures were during height of conflicts in the region: in 1992, 5,800 weapons were seized; 1993, 10,000 seized; 1995, 11,000; 1996, 6,700; 1997, 5,000; 1998, 3,500; 1999, 2,500; 2000, 2,300. No information was available for 1994. SALW in FRY, Saferworld 2002, p 51.

1027 BICC Conversion Survey 2002, p 136.

and over 90 percent had been in a situation where weapons were used.¹⁰²⁸ 'Respondents show great familiarity with weapons, expressed through their colloquialisms for certain types of weapons', and over 70 percent believe that weapons are owned for reasons of personal protection, and that this is a justifiable reason.¹⁰²⁹ These are obviously worrying statistics, and it is unlikely that such problems are limited to Belgrade.

There is no publicly available data on the SALW stocks of the State Army. Slightly more information is available on MoI stocks (police, special police forces, border control, etc), although no up-to-date estimates were available. During the Milosevic period, the MoI was the 'favoured' state force, and said to enjoy the best weaponry and equipment. Numbering 120,000 personnel and said to be drawing the biggest single share of the Serbian national budget, the Serbian police were equipped with weaponry including armoured vehicles, mortars, helicopters and anti-aircraft artillery.¹⁰³⁰ Although no data exists on the fate of this equipment, it is likely that much remains in MoI stocks as only limited destruction has taken place so far and re-structuring will reduce the number of active personnel.

In the SMMRI survey of public perceptions of small arms and security in southern Serbia in 2002, a very small number of respondents said they had been victims of armed thefts, vandalism, unjustified shootings, accidental and intentional injuries and weapons trafficking. Interestingly, survey results varied enormously between ethnic groups of respondents in answers to questions on weapons availability and possession. Ethnic Albanian respondents for example, 'stated they wouldn't even know where to get firearms, while Serbs stated that firearms are available even in the flea markets', and respondents from both ethnic groups 'were not willing to make any assessment of either the number or the type of illegal weapons which might be present in their region'.¹⁰³¹ However, responses to other questions, added to the recent incidents of armed violence in the region, indicate that a substantial number of weapons do exist in the region, as respondents noted the negative impact of SALW proliferation and arms possession by the other ethnic group and criminals.¹⁰³² Criminal groups were also noted as a major group possessing weapons, and the recent armed violence in the region suggest that substantial numbers of weapons may remain in the area.¹⁰³³

The Entity of Kosovo

BICC notes that even before the conflict in Kosovo began or the crisis in Albania, in 1989 the number of illegal weapons in circulation greatly exceeded the number of

1028 'Belgrade Youth Perceptions of SALW Problems', Vladimir Djumic, Clearing Guns Newsletter, Volume 1, Issue 2, October 2003. The full report of the Balkan Youth Union research is forthcoming from SEESAC.

1029 Ibid.

1030 'A Serb police source admitted that the MUP resembled 'light infantry more than policemen'. It possessed an arsenal of at least 150 armoured vehicles, 170 mortars of various calibre, unspecified numbers of light artillery and Russian-made ground attack helicopters and anti-aircraft artillery. The MUP adopted army-style ranks and command structures in 1994 and were said to be drawing the largest single share of the Serbian national budget in the period up to 1998.' SALW in FRY, Saferworld 2002, p 50.

1031 Presentation by Dr Srđjan Bogosavljević, SMMRI, International Agency Support Office, Vranje, 05 December 2003.

1032 While respondents generally avoided questions on weapons possession, responses to questions on reasons for 'hypothetical' weapons possession gave interesting results: with personal and property protection and hunting the vast majority of answers. Questions of the benefits of gun ownership for protection versus the danger this poses within families were answered with a general split - a slightly higher majority of ethnic Serb respondents felt that possession is a positive help for protecting families rather than dangerous (42% and 36%), while a majority of ethnic Albanians replied that weapons possession is dangerous (57%), with only 28% feeling that guns helped to protect families. The vast majority of respondents also confirmed that the impact of firearms on education, investments and business development, income and local infrastructure was negative, indicating that despite responses, a problem with SALW proliferation in the region does exist. This was confirmed by questions on sources of weapons, to which each ethnic group responded that the other is the main source of weapons, particularly the ethnic Serb respondents, who are 'convinced that Albanians keep tons of firearms'. Ibid.

1033 In addition to the weapons possessed by the UCPMB (largely sourced from Kosovo) as noted above, the conflict in southern Serbia was 'also fuelled by the large number of Serb-held weapons, sent to the region during the Milosevic era through secret channels, together with instructors. It seems likely that these weapons remained in southern Serbia following the Kumanovo Agreement which ended the war in June 1999'. SALW in FRY, Saferworld 2002, p 55.

registered weapons in Kosovo, 'where it was almost impossible for the ethnic Albanian minority to possess firearms legally'. Federal Yugoslav police estimated the number of illegal firearms in Kosovo in 1989 at around 400,000, including 150,000 long-barrel weapons.¹⁰³⁴ In the run up to and during the conflict, the two main sources for weapons in Kosovo were the former Yugoslav authorities and the weapons looted from stockpiles in Albania and brought across the border by criminal groups and paramilitary forces, primarily the KLA.¹⁰³⁵

Research conducted by the Small Arms Survey in 2002 estimates that there are between 350,000 and 480,000 small arms in Kosovo, excluding arms held by international forces – of these, the vast majority, 330,000 to 460,000, are civilian-held small arms, both legal (approximately 20,000) and illegal.¹⁰³⁶ In addition to civilians, Small Arms Survey estimates are that the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) hold 5,200 weapons, Weapons Authorisation Card holders over 200, Kosovo Serb militia between 240 and 400, and Kosovo Albanian militia, including the NLA, between 11,800 and 15,800 weapons.¹⁰³⁷

The KLA was officially demobilised in 1999, with many of its members now engaged in the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), a force with an active corps of 3,000 and auxiliary branch of 2,000 established to take responsibility for disaster relief, search and rescue, and humanitarian and de-mining assistance. The KPC is supposed to operate unarmed, but is allowed 200 weapons to guard facilities, while KFOR holds 1,800 former KLA arms in trust for the Corps.¹⁰³⁸ The KPC 'continues to be viewed with suspicion', and there is 'wide agreement that the KLA was not fully disarmed'.¹⁰³⁹ Although the 'murky' distinctions between combatant and civilian in the paramilitary forces in Kosovo makes estimating the extent of insurgent groups' arms stocks difficult, the Small Arms Survey believes that ex-KLA weapons are now likely to be controlled by a variety of groups and individuals, and that 'it is possible that very large weapons stocks exist in Albania, near its border with Kosovo, around places such as Bucaj and Krume, but these weapons are beyond the scope of this report. They would be an important concern, however, should armed clashes resume'.¹⁰⁴⁰ Kosovo Serb paramilitary groups were also 'quite strong in 1999', and forces such as the Black Hand, Serb Liberation Army and White Eagles, 'were well armed by the VJ (Yugoslav Army) and Yugoslav police'; Small Arms Survey estimates of their holdings are calculated at higher numbers than the actual groups recruits, 'given the VJ's 'people's war' tactics' of distributing weapons to

1034 BICC Conversion Survey 2002, pp 127-8.

1035 In the late 1990s the Yugoslav authorities distributed approximately 75,000 AK-47s to Serbian residents of Kosovo, with the aim of creating auxiliary forces: 'while many of these weapons were taken back to Serbia during the retreat of the Yugoslav Army, it seem likely that some weapons were lost to the enemy or retained by the approximately 100,000 Kosovo Serbs or other minorities for self-protection'. BICC Conversion Survey 2002, p 139.

1036 Kosovo and the Gun, SAS 2003, p 11.

1037 Ibid

1038 These weapons are now in rather poor condition as despite access rights, the KPC has undertaken little or no maintenance of the weaponry, a fact which 'could indicate that the KPC, which strives to become the national army in case Kosovo one day becomes independent, has no shortage of better quality and/or more powerful guns, or ready access to such guns'. Kosovo and the Gun, SAS 2003, p 12.

1039 The KPC 'continues to be viewed with suspicion in international circles in particular, dismissed by many as a day job for an insurgent organization with a reputation for having turned to organized crime'. SAS also argues that KLA weapons were likely to have transferred to splinter groups, such as the UCPMB and ANA, and that 'a substantial part of ex-KLA weaponry, 7,800-9,800 weapons, could have ended up in the hands of these groupings/organizations'; remaining former KLA weapons, between 8,000 and 18,000, 'are assumed now to be part of civilian weapons holdings'. Kosovo and the Gun, SAS 2003, pp 12-15. BICC research supports this, arguing that the KLA arsenal, despite the force's demobilisation in 1999, remains a 'substantial source of modern weapons'; while the KLA surrendered some 9,000 small arms, 800 machine guns, 178 mortars, 27,000 hand grenades and over five million rounds of ammunition to KFOR troops, 'it is widely assumed that this weaponry does not represent all the arms available to the KLA'. Frequent finds of weapons caches inside Kosovo seem to confirm the hypothesis that KLA weapons were hidden in preparation for a possible return to violence - some of these weapons have since been supplied to other ethnic Albanian armed groups in Macedonia and southern Serbia, but it is believed that many 'KLA weapons are now either stored by private citizens or used for criminal purposes'. BICC Conversion Survey 2002, p 139.

1040 Kosovo and the Gun, SAS 2003, p 14.

supportive civilians.¹⁰⁴¹

In addition to armed groups, small arms are owned and used by a wide variety of actors, including: international security providers such as KFOR and UNMIK, criminal actors, businessmen, ex-combatants, private security companies, a small number of politicians, hunters and recreational shooters, and civilians, who hold the 'overwhelming majority' of SALW.¹⁰⁴² Most prevalent in rural or semi-rural areas, guns in Kosovo seem to be mainly kept on family basis: 'although controlled by the adult male members of the household, they are 'family guns' rather than individually held', and the majority are stored in or nearby homes.¹⁰⁴³ The most common weapons in circulation are pistols and assault rifles, although rifles and shotguns are also present in the entity, and 'to a much lesser extent, rocket launchers, sub-machine guns, sniper rifles, and grenades'.¹⁰⁴⁴ Although 'the geographical distribution of SALW can in principle shift rapidly' across Kosovo, it appears that Mitrovica and Peje/Pec have the densest holdings of arms, although large weapons caches are regularly found throughout Kosovo, with almost daily KFOR announcements of seizures.¹⁰⁴⁵

With trust in security providers varying enormously by ethnic group, research found little difference in the primary motive for weapons possession in Kosovo – personal security and protection. Worryingly, 'both ethnic Albanian and ethnic Serb children and youth claim to rely primarily on themselves and on weapons to ensure their security' and in discussions 'youth consistently stated that approximately 25 – 50 per cent of them could personally and easily acquire a firearm within 24 hours'.¹⁰⁴⁶ SAS concludes that the 'widespread availability of guns' in the entity 'constitutes a central challenge to the reduction of insecurity and promotion of development', and has a number of consequences for Kosovo society: 'direct effects include fatal and non-fatal injuries, as well as psychological and physical disabilities due to small arms misuse... The indirect effects are more numerous – including social, economic, and human development dimensions'.¹⁰⁴⁷

SALW-related crime

Armed crime is a problem throughout Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo. Organised criminal networks are a serious problem, with mafia, corruption and armed violence reaching well into the political sphere. Also worrying is the 'growing problem of weapons possession among urban youths either as part of gangland or criminal activity', a legacy of post-conflict instability and increased crime, coupled with 'up-dated' models of traditional gun culture and easy availability of weapons.¹⁰⁴⁸ There are also substantial problems with trafficking in various illegal commodities between Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania and Macedonia. Montenegrin experts for example, recently blamed the

1041 Ibid, p 15.

1042 Ibid, p ix.

1043 Ibid, p 17.

1044 Ibid, p viii.

1045 Ibid, pp 15 and 19.

1046 Ethnic Albanians tend to have trust in the Kosovo Police Service, and to a lesser extent KFOR, while ethnic Serbs have little trust in the KPS; the majority of both groups however have trust in the international CIVPOL. 'Findings suggest that Kosovans' perception of guns greatly depends on their level of satisfaction with the current political situation. Kosovo Albanians are comfortable with the current security and political situation and therefore see tradition and protection against criminality as the main motives behind gun possession. Ethnic Serbs, on the other hand, are much less in agreement with current institutional arrangements and political insecurity much greater weight in terms of justifying gun possession.' Ibid, pp ix, 9, 33 and 39.

1047 Ibid, pp viii and 35.

1048 SALW in FRY, Saferworld 2002, p 29.

flourishing drugs traffic between Kosovo and Montenegro on 'inadequate government support' and lack of technical equipment.¹⁰⁴⁹ A serious and growing problem exists with both narcotics¹⁰⁵⁰ and people smuggling,¹⁰⁵¹ and it seems both these activities use similar routes and are linked to illicit SALW in various ways.¹⁰⁵² While the level of SALW trafficking seems to have in general decreased in recent years in SCG and Kosovo, the serious problems with organised crime and flourishing trade in other contraband serves to highlight the fact that borders are porous and should market demand increase SALW trafficking could again become a more substantial problem (see SALW transfers below).

Republic of Montenegro

Recent research in Montenegro finds that citizens lack trust in the police, that Montenegro suffers from 'relatively high levels' of small arms and violent crime compared with the rest of the region, and that small arms misuse is inflicting 'an important public health burden to the Montenegrin population': findings that personal and family protection are the primary reason for gun possession are therefore logical.¹⁰⁵³ Armed crime is a particular problem in smaller towns and handguns are the most common weapon used in assaults.¹⁰⁵⁴ Small arms are also used in petty crimes and illegal possession is a significant problem, with thousands of cases a year.¹⁰⁵⁵

Republic of Serbia

In its report on implementation of the UN PoA to the UN Biennial Meeting of States in 2003, the SCG Government notes that, 'the armed conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia accounted for an enormous increase of the quantity of arms and ammunition in the possession of citizens, which culminated in terrorism and organized crime'.¹⁰⁵⁶ Although no official figures were available, it appears that armed crime rates are fairly high in Serbia, with gangland shoot-outs a relatively common occurrence in large cities such as Belgrade.¹⁰⁵⁷ The assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic in 2003

1049 It is estimated that 100 kg of heroin enters Montenegro every day, mainly on its way to markets further afield in Western Europe. 'Large Quantities of Drugs From Kosovo Smuggled Into Montenegro', Daily Media Review, 17 December 2003, www.seesac.org.

1050 The substantial seizures of drugs indicate how serious a problem this is becoming. In October 2003 alone, local press notes: 10,246 kg heroin seized on the Serbia-Montenegro crossing; the arrest by Belgrade police of two people caught with 850 g of heroin; the apprehension by UNMIK police of three smugglers trying to bring 36 kg of heroin into Kosovo from Albania. 16 and 17 October, Weekly Media Review, 13 - 20 October 2003; www.seesac.org.

1051 The Deputy Chief of Serbia's border police stated publicly that human trafficking has become the dominant criminal activity in South Eastern Europe. The Serbian Mol has established 33 units to fight the problem and is achieving results; arrests have also been made in Montenegro, helping to cut people smuggling channels to Western Europe. 16 October 2003, 17 October 2003; Weekly Media Review 13 - 20 October 2003; 'Human Trafficking Remains a Problem in Serbia - IWPR', Daily Media Review, 25 November 2003; www.seesac.org.

1052 Belgrade police confiscated illegal weapons, in addition to substantial amounts of illegal narcotics, from criminals in October 2003. 17 October 2003, Weekly Media Review, 13 - 20 October 2003, www.seesac.org.

1053 Respondents in SAS research said the police are 'biased, behave rudely and unprofessionally, frequently use policies of nepotism, and are often used as a 'repressive instrument of the state' that strictly follow the politics of the party in power'. Montenegro SALW Survey, SAS 2004, pp 3, 20 and 30.

1054 'Handguns, and more specifically pistols, appear to be the primary weapon used in assaults, as this weapon type was involved in at least 35% of assaults which took place in 2003... Handgun makes that were used repeatedly in assaults during 2003 included Glocks and Zastavas. It is also important to note that although most assaults were carried out using unregistered weapons, in some cases registered handguns were also used. Other small arm types commonly used in assaults included explosives, automatic rifles, hunting rifles and grenades.' Ibid, pp 18-19.

1055 'With respect to illicit possession of firearms, statistics vary from source to source. Criminal justice sources claim that approximately 3,000 to 4,000 such cases go to court on an annual basis,¹⁰⁵⁵ while MUP gave a range of 1,000 - 1,800.¹⁰⁵⁵ The OSCE reported between 82 and 147 annual cases of illegal possession between 1999 and 2001.' Ibid, p 19.

1056 Report of Serbia and Montenegro on the Implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, First Biennial Meeting of States to consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, July 2003 (hereafter 'SCG UN PoA report, 2003').

1057 Author's observations from local news reporting; also, 'Shooting in the Centre of Belgrade Saturday Night', Balkan Times, 14 September 2003, www.balkanimes.com.

indicates the extensive reach and power of criminal networks in the country, which, 'having been protected from arrest and prosecution by the Milosevic regime', have now developed highly lucrative illegal business interests that they are prepared to exercise serious violence to protect.¹⁰⁵⁸ The weapons of choice for criminal activities in Serbia are said to be AK-47s, 9mm and 7.62mm pistols; according to MoI officials, about 90 percent of criminal activities involving firearms in the country are carried out using illicit firearms.¹⁰⁵⁹ Of increasing concern is the inflow of more modern weapons, such as Heckler & Koch MP5K and Glock 9mm Pistols, which are now the aspirational weapons of preferred choice for criminal elements; as the SEESAC Team Leader commented, 'fashion applies to SALW too!' ¹⁰⁶⁰

The Entity of Kosovo

'Criminality, particularly crime involving small arms, is prevalent in Kosovo': although violent crime rates are not much greater than neighbouring countries, an extremely high proportion of them are committed with small arms, and recent Small Arms Survey research indicates that the guns themselves are part of the problem, since the 'substitution effect' (when one kind of tool becomes scarce, it is replaced with another to commit a crime) does not appear to be strong.¹⁰⁶¹ 'Organised gangs appear to operate with impunity', suggesting at least endorsement by former paramilitary structures such as the KLA, and there are 'widespread reports that ethnic Albanian civilians are at risk from ethnic Albanian irregular forces engaged in criminal activities'.¹⁰⁶² This view is confirmed by statistics for murders which occur largely between ethnic-Albanian Kosovar men.¹⁰⁶³ It is clear that illegal SALW remain easy to come by and are widely diffused throughout Kosovo.

Small Arms policy and practice

Government policy and the international community

State Union of Serbia and Montenegro

The SCG Government's overall policy trends have been similar to that of many countries in the region, with high priority given to joining Euro-Atlantic structures, the EU and NATO, and it appears that this direction is likely to continue despite recent election results.¹⁰⁶⁴ The country is becoming more acceptable to the international community, it has improved relations with neighbouring countries, is participating more in international fora and mechanisms and undertaking reforms in the military as well as economic and

1058 SALW in FRY, Saferworld 2002, p 26.

1059 'Of the incidents involving legally held weapons, only one or two percent are related to armed crime, with remainder associated with personal injuries, suicides etc.' BICC Conversion Survey 2002, p 136.

1060 Correspondence with Adrian Wilkinson, SEESAC Team Leader, 16 February 2004.

1061 Kosovo and the Gun, SAS 2003, p ix.

1062 SALW in FRY, Saferworld 2002, p 27.

1063 Ibid, p 7.

1064 'Serbia-Montenegro Urges EU to Continue Assistance Towards Euro-Atlantic Integration', Daily Media Review, 15 January 2004, www.seesac.org.

1065 Visa regimes have been relaxed with Croatia and BiH in the last couple of years and in October 2002 the demilitarization of border belt with Croatia began. Ratification of international law enforcement agreements has also stepped up recently, with Serbia and Montenegro ratifying UN protocols on smuggling as well as participating in instruments such as the UN PoA. 02 October, Weekly Media Review, 29 September - 06 October 2003, and 06 November, Weekly Media Review 03 - 10 November 2003, www.seesac.org.

social spheres in order to achieve the goals of closer European integration.¹⁰⁶⁵

Part of Serbia and Montenegro's continued moves towards integration with European structures involves their upcoming membership of NATO's Partnership for Peace programme, slated for May 2004.¹⁰⁶⁶ As the SCG President stressed in December 2003, progress in the area of military reform is an important prerequisite for SCG's full integration into Euro-Atlantic structures and it is therefore 'necessary that reforms in this sphere remain the country's top priority'.¹⁰⁶⁷ Montenegro clearly shares these objectives, as Prime Minister Djukanovic emphasised that military reform is one of the 'basic requisites for creating a regional security system and quick inclusion of the Western Balkans into Euro-Atlantic security structures'.¹⁰⁶⁸

Substantial reforms of the former VJ or Yugoslav Army, much of which remained under Belgrade's control following the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, are under development and much progress has been made. The new Serbian and Montenegrin MoD and state army, VSCG, is structured according to old socialist models (oversized for the population it now serves); reform of the huge numbers of staff, out of date equipment and various facilities and bases of the VSCG is a serious challenge. According to NATO officials, the numbers of VSCG staff must be reduced to from 78,000 to 50,000, a key precondition for PFP admission, along with reform of the defence system to bring it under full civilian control.¹⁰⁶⁹ These reforms will inevitably result in substantial amounts of surplus weaponry, including SALW (see Stockpile Management below).

In a promising move towards transparency, the SCG Defence Minister Tadic has announced that a National Defence Strategy would be drafted by 15 January 2004, after which it would be put to a public debate involving all relevant groups.¹⁰⁷⁰ Progress is being rewarded – indicated by invitations to participate in NATO summits, and the possible deployment of SCG Army and Serbian gendarmerie personnel in Afghanistan.¹⁰⁷¹ Military reform is, however, dogged by broader political issues between the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro. Despite the state-level of the military, Montenegro is requesting substantial authority over military matters to be assigned to the Montenegrin Government.¹⁰⁷² A strategy for the establishment of a Montenegrin security system is under development,¹⁰⁷³ and an important aspect of this 'division of labour' is the assumption by Montenegrin state services of border control. The Montenegrin Interior Ministry took over control of the Montenegrin lengths of the state border from the VSCG in December 2003, 'part of a comprehensive reform is to create conditions for Montenegro to join the European protection system'.¹⁰⁷⁴

1066 'Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia Herzegovina to Join Partnership for Peace in May 2004', Daily Media Review, 03 December 2003, www.seesac.org.

1067 'Marovic and Krga Satisfied with Military Reforms', Daily Media Review, 24 December 2003, www.seesac.org.

1068 Increasing military co-operation and European integration processes remain clear priorities for the SCG Government: in October preparations were made for a military co-operation agreement between SCG and Turkey, and the head of the International Military Cooperation Department announced publicly that the main priorities this year were European integration processes, especially PFP. 'Djukanovic Says Stabilisation Through Demilitarisation', Daily Media Review, 17 December 2003, and 17 October 2003; Weekly Media Review, 13 - 20 October 2003, www.seesac.org.

1069 Although the state will not be able to end conscription in the next few years, efforts will be made to reduce it and civil service has recently been introduced; after phased reforms it is hoped that the objective of a fully professional army will be reached between 2005 to 2010. 15, 16 September 2003, Weekly Media Review 15 - 22 September 2003; 'Military Service Without Weapons For the First Time in SCG', Daily Media Review, 23 December 2003; 'Debate on Professional Army', Daily Media Review, 23 December 2003, www.seesac.org.

1070 'SCG Defence Strategy to Be Drafted by 15 January 2004', Daily Media Review, 26 December 2003, www.seesac.org.

1071 A training centre to prepare SCG soldiers for peacekeeping missions is also under development, a further indication of greater assimilation into Euro-Atlantic structures. 02 October, Weekly Media Review, 29 September - 06 October 2003; Weekly Media Review, 01 - 08 September 2003; 'NATO Invites Serbia-Montenegro to Summit', Daily Media Review, 02 December 2003; www.seesac.org.

1072 'Montenegro Requests Its own Ministry of Defence', Daily Media Review, 18 December 2003, www.seesac.org.

1073 'Strategy for Montenegrin Security System to be Adopted in 2004', Daily Media Review, 27 November 2003, www.seesac.org.

1074 'Montenegrin Police Take over Border Control', Daily Media Review, 26 December 2003, www.seesac.org.

Retaining previous facilities and equipment, the Montenegrin MoI department for border control is likely to need support to build its capacity to effectively take on these new responsibilities.

Republic of Montenegro

The Montenegrin Government continues to collaborate with a host of international organisations, namely the UNDP, USAID, and the OSCE, on issues of weapons control and police reform. In particular, the UNDP is working towards further SALW control activities in 2004, it is hoped a second weapons collection initiative (currently under discussion), and the establishment of a national SALW committee on SALW that will include members of the NGO community, religious and community leaders. The EU, USAID and OSCE are important international players, particularly with regard to law enforcement support, including police reform, border policing and judicial reform to help combat organised crime.¹⁰⁷⁵

Republic of Serbia

International organisations are also active in Serbia. In addition to the SEESAC office in Belgrade and direct support for legislation reform and SALW destruction, from the US and NAMSA, assistance on SALW-related activities has come from the OSCE, NATO, UNDP, EU and bi-lateral donors, such as the US, UK and German Governments. The police are undergoing reform,¹⁰⁷⁶ and have benefited from international assistance in terms of re-structuring, the multi-ethnic police project in southern Serbia, border control, organised crime and the introduction of community policing across the country. The OSCE is the main actor on police reform and, recently, border control. Support for regular and border police from the OSCE and bi-lateral donors includes training and also technical capacity-building through the provision of technical equipment.¹⁰⁷⁷ The Customs Service is also due for reform and a new law drafted with EU assistance due to take effect in 2004 will give the Serbian Customs Service much greater powers: customs working to combat smuggling will now be armed and authorised to detain suspects and undertake searches for contraband anywhere in the country, not just at border crossings.¹⁰⁷⁸

The Entity of Kosovo

The international community remains the primary actor in Kosovo's governance, and debate continues to surround the entity's future. In late 2003, KFOR issued a statement to the effect that Kosovo was growing more, rather than less, unstable,¹⁰⁷⁹ and KFOR and UNMIK raised level of alert at their facilities due to a 'still unconfirmed potential threat' in November, deploying armoured vehicles and stepping up security procedures at checkpoints.¹⁰⁸⁰ Although reduction of KFOR's troop levels was under discussion earlier in 2003, by January 2004 it was confirmed that there would be 'no significant

1075 23 September 2003, Weekly Media Review, 22 - 29 September 2003, www.seesac.org.

1076 New laws are currently being drafted on police reform to modern international standards; the Council of Europe has supported efforts in this area. 'Draft Law on Police Force', Daily Media Review, 02 December 2003, www.seesac.org.

1077 29 October 2003, Weekly Media Review, 28 October - 03 November 2003; 'Police Introduce Automatic ID System', Daily Media Review, 05 December 2003; 'Specialist Training for Border Police', Daily Media Review, 26 December 2003; www.seesac.org.

1078 Legal reform has had clear results in areas such as people trafficking, with the prosecution of a group only a few months after the activity was outlawed by revisions to the Serbian criminal code. 'Serbian Customs to Get Greater Powers in 2004', Daily Media Review, 12 December 2003; 'Human Trafficking Trial in Serbia', Daily Media Review, 12 December 2003; www.seesac.org.

1079 09 October 2003, Weekly Media Review, 06 - 13 October 2003, www.seesac.org.

1080 'KFOR, UNMIK Raise Level of Alert in Kosovo', Daily Media Review, 28 November 2003, www.seesac.org.

downsizing' of KFOR troops.¹⁰⁸¹ However, KFOR has begun rationalising its forces, and transferring some of its responsibilities to UNMIK. In November, UNMIK took charge of static security operations and the state and administrative borders of the province.¹⁰⁸²

Equally, while retaining its presence in order to oversee and support the consolidation of local institutions, UNMIK has begun to handover some responsibilities to local municipal authorities, and this process is set to advance during 2004.¹⁰⁸³ These continuing moves to build autonomous institutions in Kosovo, while perceived as progressing too slowly by the ethnic Albanian majority in the province, are not received well in Belgrade. Discussions between Belgrade authorities and UNMIK on the recent plan for 'Standards for Kosovo' have not been fruitful, and the future of Kosovo remains one of the major fault lines in the Serbian and Montenegrin state's relationship with the international community.¹⁰⁸⁴

In terms of SALW control, the UNDP is a major player, along with KFOR and UNMIK with their respective roles of security provision and policing. The UNDP's Illicit Small Arms Control (ISAC) project has helped to develop regulations on possession and to establish the UNMIK Weapons Registration Centre (donating three card printing machines), given funding for destruction, helped develop NGO and KPS capacity for SALW work, supported awareness raising on SALW as well as assistance in the facilitation of the September 2003 amnesty.¹⁰⁸⁵

The OSCE has a major role to play in the province, and much of its work focuses on building and developing the capacity of the Kosovo Police Service, a multi-ethnic service which was established to fill the law enforcement vacuum created by the withdrawal of former-Yugoslav police and military. Although much of the KPS still works with UNMIK international CIVPOL officers, substantial progress has been made in developing local capacities, and KPS officers are now undertaking more advanced levels of police work.¹⁰⁸⁶

Government SALW policy

Serbia and Montenegro's official statements on SALW are generally positive. Representatives stressed that the country 'fully supports' the UN PoA, which the Government feels 'represents an extremely important international document', and is therefore 'truly committed to the goals and tasks advanced' in the Programme.¹⁰⁸⁷

1081 'New NATO Chief Pledges Continued Commitment to Kosovo', Daily Media Review, 17 - 18 January 2004, and 03 November, 2003 Weekly Media Review, 03 - 10 November 2003, www.seesac.org.

1082 'UNMIK Takes Over Borders from KFOR', Daily Media Review, 19 November 2003, www.seesac.org.

1083 'UNMIK Transfers Powers under Constitutional Framework to Kosovo Government', Daily Media Review, 31 December 2003, and, 'UNMIK Hand Over Responsibilities to Kosovo Municipalities', Daily Media Review, 20 November 2003, www.seesac.org.

1084 Serbian Government Rejects Plan for Implementation of Standards in Kosovo', Daily Media Review, 09 December 2003; 'No Agreement Reached Between Holkeri and Covic', Daily Media Review, 16 January 2004; 'Serb Autonomy if Kosovo is Independent', Daily Media Review, 24 December 2003; www.seesac.org.

1085 Telephone conversation with Mike Dixon, ISAC Programme Co-ordinator, 12 February 2004, and, <http://www.kosovo.undp.org/Projects/ISAC/smallarms.htm>.

1086 Through the establishment of the training facilities and implementation of an accelerated training programme, to date 6,264 cadets have been trained. Initially operating in teams with UNMIK CIVPOL, who mentored the new Kosovar cadets, KPS officers are now undertaking many operations independently and are developing new capacities beyond day-to-day policing. A Department for Fighting Organised Crime has been established for example, and other specialised forces are under development, such as the special weapons and tactics (SWAT) training programme developed to train KPS officers in investigations and hostage negotiations. 'Class 27 Graduates From OSCE's Kosovo Police School', Daily Media Review, 12 December 2003; 29 October 2003, Weekly Media Review 28 October - 03 November 2003; 'SWAT to Become Part of Kosovo Police Service', Daily Media Review, 27 November 2003; www.seesac.org.

1087 Statement by HE Mr. Dejan Sahovic, Ambassador Extraordinary and plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative of Serbia and Montenegro to the United Nations, First Biennial Meeting of States to consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, July 2003 (hereafter 'SCG UN PoA statement, 2003').

At the Biennial Review Conference in July 2003, the Serbian and Montenegrin Government reported that the state has taken various measures to combat SALW trafficking, and that the Government is ready to 'continue and expand' existing regional and international co-operation to combat SALW trafficking.¹⁰⁸⁸

According to the SCG report to the UN PoA, a 'preparatory process' for the establishment of a National SALW Co-ordinating Agency has apparently begun, but this has been delayed by the adoption of the Constitutional Charter on the new federal arrangement between the two states.¹⁰⁸⁹ As discussions are already underway regarding the establishment of a republic-level commission in Montenegro, it appears that commissions may be established in both Belgrade and Podgorica, which may not necessarily be a negative development, although greater efforts will need to be made to fully co-ordinate between the 'two halves' of SCG on SALW issues. Co-ordination between the state and republic governments and the authorities in Kosovo on SALW control activities appears to be minimal, although efforts have been made in the area of border control. The PISG in Kosovo do not currently have responsibility for security or SALW issues – this lies with UNMIK and other international security providers such as KFOR.

While progress has been made on destruction and collection, no state or republic-level SALW action plans exist, and questions therefore remain over both the absence of any strategic approach, and the level of prioritisation accorded to SALW issues.

SALW production

Military production was 'a pillar of the economic and political system in the former SFRY', which was an important player in the global defence market before 1989, producing a range of products, including SALW, under both western and Soviet licences, which were exported 'in substantial quantities'.¹⁰⁹⁰ The majority of the former SFRY's military production facilities were located in Serbia, with the company Crvena Zastava in Kragujevac 'forming the backbone of small arms production'.¹⁰⁹¹ Prior to the NATO bombing in the spring of 1999, SAS notes that 15 military plants employing some 30,000 people were operational; although some facilities were damaged in the bombing, many remained operational and approximately 20,000 people are still employed by the military production industry, the bulk of which remains state-owned.¹⁰⁹² Despite the secession of former Yugoslav republics, and the UN embargoes from May 1992 to June 1996 and March 1998 to September 2001, SCG 'retained a substantial domestic arms industry' and SALW production continues, although Amnesty International ranked SCG (Yugoslavia) as a 'small' SALW producer in 2001.¹⁰⁹³ There is no known, or official, SALW production in Kosovo.

1088 Ibid

1089 Ibid

1090 Small Arms Survey 2003, p 46.

1091 'The geographic spread of production facilities - which reflected strategic thinking during the socialist period - worked to the advantage of the federal (and later the Serbian) government once war broke out, as it was able to sustain substantial small arms production, at least until the NATO bombing campaign in 1999.' BICC Conversion Survey 2002, p 128.

1092 Small Arms Survey 2003, p 46. Other sources suggest that prior to the NATO bombing, 11 military plants, employing approximately 20,000 staff, were operational, and that at present the military industry employs some 15,000 people; correspondence with Col Vlado Radic, the SCG National SALW Focal Point, 08 March 2004.

1093 BICC Conversion Survey 2002, p 135; 'Proliferation: global growth in small arms', Terror Trade Times, June 2001, <http://web.amnesty.org/web/ttt.nsf/june2001/proliferation>.

Following the secession of several republics, military production was restructured from the centre. Efforts were made to reconstruct production lines in 1993, and in place of the previous federal department of supply and procurement, a state-owned holding and trading company, Jugoimport, was established and surviving production facilities were re-grouped.¹⁰⁹⁴ For the duration of the conflicts, the country remained self-sufficient in SALW and ammunition production, although the industrial base for the production of high-tech military goods, aircraft spare parts, telecommunication equipment, etc, was substantially affected by bombing and sanctions.¹⁰⁹⁵ Since then there has been some diversification and conversion, and moves to regain former Yugoslav export markets;¹⁰⁹⁶ this has however proved difficult, and despite 'intense efforts', export markets are still much reduced.¹⁰⁹⁷ The minimal investment in the last few years mean that in general SCG factories are still producing rather out-of-date weaponry, with few export options, and the level of industrial capacity devoted to military products will be reduced, although recent announcements confirm that the country 'has no intention of stopping its arms production' and officials are still hopeful for the future.¹⁰⁹⁸ Alongside restructuring of the armed forces, recent announcements indicate that the military industry will also 'be brought down to a sensible level', with the commercialisation of about 75 percent of the industry, some of which will be privatised; current plans will see six companies, with approximately 5,000 employees, remaining state-owned.¹⁰⁹⁹

Although little official information is available, the main producers of SALW and SALW ammunition appear to be the Zastava and Prvi Partizan factories. NISAT databases record Zastava production of pistols/revolvers, rifles/carbines and sub-machine guns in 2000, and Prvi Partizan production of ammunition below 12.7mm in 1998; Jugoimport (or the Federal Directorate of Supply & Procurement) is noted by NISAT as producing pistols/revolvers, shotguns, rifles/carbines, sub-machine guns, mortars less than 100mm and ammunition both above and below 12.7mm in 1998.¹¹⁰⁰

The oldest former Yugoslav military plant, also producing some civilian goods such as cars, Zastava's weapons-producing facilities in Kragujevac survived the NATO bombing, but have been seriously affected by lack of demand. With no new investments in the last ten years, the company's financial situation is 'very fragile', and only 30 percent of production capacity is currently in use.¹¹⁰¹ The company has, however, managed to develop some new weapons in recent years, such as an advanced version of a police revolver based on a US design, and its main products are now handguns, which it is attempting to market abroad as well as domestically.¹¹⁰² Recent reports indicate the company is stepping up production of higher-tech, more marketable designs. In

1094 BICC Conversion Survey 2002, p 135.

1095 Ibid

1096 In May 2001 Jugoimport claimed to earn most of its revenue from food and alcohol sales; however, 'the Yugoslav defence industry seems interested in regaining lost ground following the lifting of sanctions, especially in the field of SALW, where - prior to the war - Yugoslavia had exported to the USA, Sweden and Germany'. BICC Conversion Survey 2002, p 135.

1097 Small Arms Survey 2003, p 46.

1098 SCG Defence Minister Tadic has admitted publicly that arms production and export is 'not regulated well', and that better regulation to prevent abuses of the system is important as SCG does not want to be 'part of the international community creating or generating problems'. 'Controlling the Arms Trade', Daily Media Review, 26 December 2003, www.seesac.org.

1099 'Tadic: Relocation of Army Bases', Daily Media Review, 11 December 2003, www.seesac.org.

1100 As Jugoimport is primarily a trading entity, the weapons NISAT notes as 'produced' by the company will presumably have been manufactured by other production companies in SCG and traded by Jugoimport. NISAT databases, www.nisat.org.

1101 'In the later 1980s, 90 per cent of the output was military-related, now the share is 40 per cent. During the 'golden age' of 1975-90, the company exported its products worldwide (including large amounts to the US market) and employed 9,000 people. Today, the number of employees has dropped to about 4,500, and of those about 40 per cent do no actual work but are paid. Both export and internal markets have shrunk dramatically, and the company's main customers are the MoD and police of Serbia and Montenegro.' Small Arms Survey 2003, p 47.

1102 Ibid

January 2004, Zastava’s General Director announced that the company will start both restructuring and the production of M21 NATO standard automatic rifles this year. He also noted that Zastava is working intensively on preparing for the production on a new product, a 12.7mm machine gun, a modernised version of a long-range rifle, popularly known as ‘Black Arrow’, and a 5.6mm rifle.¹¹⁰³ The Uzice-based Prvi Partizan factory is ‘the main producer of small arms ammunition in Serbia and Montenegro’, although its current output is ‘very low’, production utilises only 20 percent of capacity and although 70 percent of this is military-related, the ‘bulk of the company’s income derives from commercial products’.¹¹⁰⁴ The company now focuses on producing sporting and hunting ammunition, most of which is exported to Western Europe and the US. SAS notes that Prvi Partizan is still worker-owned, though management hopes it will be privatised soon, albeit with the state retaining an important proportion of shares, as the company is in ‘a very difficult financial situation’.¹¹⁰⁵ Additional factories, such as the Valjevo-based Krusik plant and Slobada in Cacak, and other ammunition plants in Lucani and Krusevac, were more seriously damaged in the 1999 air strikes and production may have been affected, although no definite information was available.¹¹⁰⁶

Defence restructuring has produced, and will continue to produce, substantial amounts of surplus military equipment. With the aim of using the profits to modernise its equipment, the SCG Army is selling some of this surplus, apparently expecting to make a profit in the region of US\$4–5 million. Press reports note that strict procedures are being followed to ensure that weapons buyers and destinations are legitimate.¹¹⁰⁷

Table 39 – Serbia and Montenegro’s commitments to arms or SALW control agreements

ARMS OR SALW CONTROL AGREEMENT	SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO’S COMMITMENTS
Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan	November 2001
UN Programme of Action	July 2001
UN Firearms Protocol	-
OSCE Document on Small Arms	November 2000
OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition	December 2003
EU Code of Conduct	-
EU Joint Action on SALW	-
Wassenaar Arrangement	-

1103 ‘Zastava Oruzje Pocijnje sa Proizvodnjom Automatske Puske po NATO standardima’, www.b92.com, referenced on 11 January 2004.

1104 Small Arms Survey 2003, p 46.

1105 Ibid

1106 Reports on the damage inflicted on military production facilities by the NATO air strikes vary. The SAS for example, reports that Krusik and Slobada were ‘destroyed’ during the bombing, and that there is unconfirmed information that Slobada in Cacak (as well as the Milan Blagojevic and Miloje Zadic plants in Lucani and Krusevac respectively) is again operational. A Saferworld research team in 2001 was however told that ‘all military-related factories were functioning’, and gathered information which suggested that sanctions and loss of key personnel and expertise had a greater impact on the industry than bomb damage. Ibid, p 46; SALW in FRY, Saferworld 2002, p 47.

1107 Weekly Media Review, 01 - 08 September 2003, www.seesac.org.

Small Arms progress

Legislative and regulatory issues

In SCG, responsibility for military production, import and export lies with the state union government and laws and regulations at that level are therefore relevant. Responsibility for civilian possession of arms lies with the respective Ministries of the Interior of the two republics, and legislation and regulation is therefore at the republic level. With regard to the internationally-administered entity of Kosovo, UNMIK is responsible for both areas of regulation. UNMIK operates a weapons licensing system for possession, as detailed below, and is currently attempting to develop legislation to cover arms export and imports; however, at present no-post Yugoslav laws or regulations exist in this area.¹¹⁰⁸

Production and transfer

Production, import and export of arms in SCG is governed by the 1996 Law on Production and Circulation of Armaments and Military Hardware.¹¹⁰⁹ While the Law on Production notes that the primary body responsible for arms imports and exports is the Federal Authority for Defence Issues, there are provisions allowing companies registered for foreign trade to apply to the Authority for licences to conduct foreign trade in arms: limited duration licences are issued for 'each and every particular delivery'.¹¹¹⁰ The Authority is also responsible for determining the foreign trade 'plan' for arms imports and exports and companies can only engage in arms trading in accordance with this plan. Transit is regulated by the MoI, and regulations exist on the security measures necessary for transport across the country's territory.¹¹¹¹ No information was available on any criteria or the procedures in place for decision-making and the issuing of export licences.

Following the Orao scandal in 2002 (see below SALW transfers) the Belgrade authorities admitted that tighter controls were needed and new legislation on arms production and trade is being drafted.¹¹¹² In a promising move towards transparency, the new legislation has benefited from some public debate, and will help to modernise the registration systems for companies and the issuing of permits and end-user certificates (EUCs) with the aim of preventing illegal sales.¹¹¹³ The Draft Law on the Trade in Arms, Military Equipment and Dual Purpose Goods will include much stronger provisions on licensing, EUCs and brokering, with the aim of reducing the possibility of illegal diversion of authorised arms shipments.¹¹¹⁴ It is to be hoped that appropriate mechanisms for parliamentary oversight and other efforts to increase transparency over export decision-making will also be introduced, in order to ensure compliance with SCG's existing international commitments.

¹¹⁰⁸ Kosovo and the Gun, SAS 2003, p 34.

¹¹⁰⁹ Official Gazette No 41, 06 September 1996.

¹¹¹⁰ 'The Arms Export Regime', SEESAC Arms Law Roundtable supporting document, www.seesac.org.

¹¹¹¹ Ibid

¹¹¹² 'Controlling the Arms Trade', Daily Media Review, 26 December 2003, www.seesac.org.

¹¹¹³ 'SCG Defence Minister Warns Against Smuggling', Daily Media Review, 02 December 2003, www.seesac.org.

¹¹¹⁴ Ibid, and, SCG UN PoA statement, 2003.

Possession

Republic of Montenegro

The 1979 Weapons Act and amendments govern civilian arms possession in Montenegro.¹¹¹⁵ The Weapons Act is based on the old Yugoslav Law and therefore not dissimilar to other legislation in the region. It is, however, more lax on a number of conditions of possession than the Serbian legislation. Civilians must obtain a permit to acquire a weapon, and then a licence to keep and carry a weapon. Other legal entities and government bodies are also permitted to possess weapons for the purposes of property protection or sport. The most serious failing of the Act is that certain provisions are extremely out of date, with penalty provisions in particular posing little deterrent to illegal actions as they specify prison terms of no longer than 60 days and fines in a now obsolete currency. It also appears that domestic trade in weapons and ammunition is not regulated, at least according to the 1979 Weapons Act, which was the only relevant piece of legislation available for analysis.

A new draft law on possession is under discussion, and should strengthen regulation on civilian possession. The draft law preserves the current system for obtaining a gun license, but 'stipulates a new ban on carrying legally owned weapons without a separate license', and licences for carrying weapons will be 'strictly monitored' and only issued to a small group of authorised official holders performing specific security-related jobs or sporting activities.¹¹¹⁶ With this new legislation, in response to international pressure and local appeal, the Government hopes to discourage citizens from carrying weapons in public, particularly as it will contain harsher and more up-to-date penalty provisions.

Republic of Serbia

With the updating of the 'relatively lax former gun laws' in 1998,¹¹¹⁷ the Serbian 1992 Weapons and Ammunition Act and its amendments now govern civilian possession in the republic. As in Montenegro, and many other former-Yugoslav states, a dual-licensing system is in place, and citizens must apply for licences to acquire weapons and then to possess them. The Serbian legislation is more restrictive than the Montenegrin in that it more clearly prohibits carrying of weapons, contains provisions governing trade in weapons and ammunition and has stronger penalties. Specific licences are required for weapons held for personal protection. A recent local news programme on weapons possession in Serbia reported that the great majority of weapons are licensed for hunting and sports, with much more limited numbers of licences issued for personal protection to specific groups of people, such as retired policemen.¹¹¹⁸ A draft amendment to the Act, which would further strengthen controls over possession, was under discussion in 2002 but has not yet been passed.

The Entity of Kosovo

Until early 2001, weapons possession in Kosovo was regulated by the old Yugoslav gun law, which was outdated and 'offered very limited legal means to combat proliferation'.¹¹¹⁹ This law has now been replaced by a stricter UNMIK regulation, No

¹¹¹⁵ Official Gazette, 1979 - 1990; 'Arms Laws on Possession', SEESAC Arms Law Roundtable supporting document, www.seesac.org.

¹¹¹⁶ Montenegro SALW Survey, SAS 2004, p 36.

¹¹¹⁷ BICC Conversion Survey 2002, pp 135-6.

¹¹¹⁸ 'Gun Culture or Violence' news clip, VIN news programme No. 284, broadcast 2130 hours B92, 09 February 2004.

¹¹¹⁹ BICC Conversion Survey 2002, p 139.

2001/7 on 'the Authorisation of Possession of Weapons in Kosovo', according to which specific individuals in need of personal protection may apply to UNMIK for a Weapons Authorisation Card (WAC), which allows them to acquire and carry a weapon at all times. Very few individuals are awarded a WAC by the UNMIK 'threat assessment committee' that assesses every application, and only about 200 WACs have been issued, to politicians, local officials, or their bodyguards.¹¹²⁰

In early 2003, regulations were also passed on the regulation of hunting and recreational weapons, which can now be registered. A three-month 'window' was created between 01 February and 01 March 2003, during which owners of hunting or sporting weapons could apply for a weapons registration card them at their local police stations without facing prosecution. Even though this deadline has now passed people can still legalise these weapons and small numbers continue to do so. Nearly 27,000 applications have been made to date, the vast majority, 25,500, during the three-month window. The UNMIK Weapons Registration Office has responsibility for issuing registration cards and the legalisation process takes some time, as all applications must be considered and background checks made; there have also been problems with printing the cards, though these have now been remedied. Weapons registration cards contain the owner's name, date of birth, photograph and the make, model, calibre and serial number of the gun. The current batch issued by the Registration Office have an expiry date of 2005, reflecting the 2-year licence period.¹¹²¹ The vast majority of the weapons registered are for hunting, although a few sporting guns have been licensed. The heaviest legal weapon is an AK-47, only possible to licence under a WAC for personal protection, and it is not possible to license military-style weapons for hunting. The sanctions for illegal weapons possession are severe, with a maximum of 8 years imprisonment and fines up to 7,500. Unregistered weapons found by UNMIK or KFOR will be seized and owners will face criminal charges.¹¹²²

1120 'UNMIK police has issued such permits very restrictively': on average, fewer than ten per cent of applications are accepted, mainly from individuals facing specific threats, including leading political figures. KFOR also has the authority to issue WACs, but only to KPC members. Kosovo and the Gun, SAS 2003, p 34.

1121 Telephone conversation with Mike Dixon, ISAC Programme Co-ordinator, 12 February 2004.

1122 Small Arms Survey notes that, 'in practice, however, prosecution for this type of crime has been relatively rare'. Kosovo and the Gun, SAS 2003, p 34.

Table 40 – Features of Serbia and Montenegro’s legislative and regulatory framework

FEATURES OF LEGISLATIVE & REGULATORY FRAMEWORK	SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO
National	
National co-ordinating agency	No
National point of contact	Yes
Laws & Procedures on Production, Export, Import and Transit	
Legislation	Yes ¹¹²³
Production	Yes ¹¹²⁴
Export	Yes ¹¹²⁵
Import	As ‘Export’ above.
Transit	Yes ¹¹²⁶
National System of Export & Import Licensing or Authorisation	
System	Yes ¹¹²⁷
Diversion risk	No
End-user certificate	No
Retransfers	There are no specific provisions in the 1996 Law on Production; it is not clear whether re-transfers are treated as ‘imports’ and ‘exports’ or are subject to reduced regulation.
Verification (pre/post)	No
Brokering controls	No ¹¹²⁸

1123 The primary law governing this area is the 1996 Law on Production and Circulation of Armaments and Military Hardware, Official Gazette No. 41, 06 September 1996. The Law on Production governs ‘production, circulation and transport of armaments and military hardware as an activity of national interest, planning of security measures, planning of production and circulation of armaments and military hardware, quality control of armament and military hardware production, as well as other issues relevant for production, circulation and transport of armaments and military hardware’; the Law does not apply to ‘sports and hunting weapons and ammunition, commercial explosives, anti-hail rockets and fireworks’ (Articles 1 and 2).

1124 Only licensed companies may engage in production of armaments and military hardware; licences are issued by the federal authority for defence, and decisions are made on various factors, including the strategic ‘defence and security needs of the country’ according to which companies must plan their production, and records are kept of all companies licensed for arms production (Articles 8, 9, 10, 12 and 13); unlicensed companies may undertake military production in times of war or similar states of emergency (Article 11).

1125 ‘Domestic circulation of armaments and military hardware is carried out by the federal authority responsible for defence and companies producing armaments and military hardware’ (Article 20). Foreign trade in arms is carried out by the federal authority responsible for defence and/or public companies ‘engaged in activities of general interest, established by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in this field’; companies registered for foreign trade may also engage in foreign arms trade (Article 20). ‘Circulation’ of arms is only permitted on the basis of a limited-duration licence for ‘each and every particular delivery’; such licences are issued by the federal authority for defence on submission of information on i) the type, quantity and price of arms, ii) the parties involved in the transaction (buyer, seller, agents and representatives), iii) the terms of the transaction, and iv) the method of payment (Article 21). Licences can be revoked by the federal authority if it determines, i) that the licence was issued on the basis of false information, ii) the company is not conducting business in accordance with the law, and iii) if supervision of relevant activities is prevented (Article 30). Records are kept on all companies engaged in arms trading and foreign payments and transactions can only be carried out through an authorised bank designated by the federal government (Articles 22 and 23). In general, only military products passing quality assurance tests can be exported and companies must plan their production and sales/exports according to government foreign trade planning (Articles 25 and 26). Penalty provisions in the law include: prison terms of six months to five years for production or ‘circulation’ of armaments and military equipment without proper licensing; fines ranging from 15,000 to 150,000 dinars (250 to 2,500) for a number of ‘commercial offences’, including the submission of false information in a licence application or transport or transit of arms or military equipment over state territory without permission (Articles 31, 32 and 33). Law on Production, 1996.

1126 Under Article 27 of the 1996 Law on Production, transit of armaments or military hardware over the territory of the country is only permitted if carried out according to statutory regulations: only appropriately registered companies may undertake transport of arms, and this must be done in accordance with statutory security measures and with an armed escort provided by the sender.

1127 Export licensing is governed by the 1996 Law on Production and Circulation of Armaments and Military Hardware.

1128 There is no specific regulation of brokering in the Law on Production; however, under Article 21, applications for licences for each arms consignment must include information on all parties to the transaction, including ‘agents and representatives’.

FEATURES OF LEGISLATIVE & REGULATORY FRAMEWORK	SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO	
Domestic Possession, Stockpiling & Trade		
Legislation	Montenegro	Yes ¹¹²⁹
	Serbia	Yes ¹¹³⁰
	Kosovo	Only possession is currently regulated. ¹¹³¹
Manufacture	Montenegro	Yes, as noted above under 'Production'; however, no legislation governing the manufacture of non-military weapons was available for analysis.
	Serbia	
Marking and tracing	Montenegro	To a limited extent, in that only 'stamped' weapons can be licensed for possession. ¹¹³²
	Serbia	No provisions in 1992 Weapons Act or amendments; however, information on usual practice suggests that marking is standard. ¹¹³³
	Kosovo	To a limited extent, in that only marked weapons can be licensed for possession.
Possession	Montenegro	Yes ¹¹³⁴
	Serbia	Yes ¹¹³⁵
	Kosovo	Yes ¹¹³⁶
Stockpiling	No legislation regulating stockpiles was available for Serbia or Montenegro; however, limited reference is made to storage of non-military weapons in the two republic's legislation governing possession. ¹¹³⁷	
Trade	Serbia	Yes ¹¹³⁸
	Montenegro	No; trade is not covered by the 1979 Weapons Act.

1129 Weapons Act, Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro, 1979 - 1990, governs 'acquisition, keeping, carrying, repair and modification of weapons, weapons parts and ammunition' (Article 1).

1130 The Weapons and Ammunition Act, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia No 6, 29 February 1992, and subsequent amendments (Official Gazette No 53, 16 July 1993, No 67, 30 August 1993, No 48, 20 July 1994, and No 44, 08 December 1998) govern 'acquisition, keeping, carrying, sale, transport, repair and modification of weapons, parts of weapons and ammunition' (Article 1).

1131 UNMIK regulation, No 2001/7 on 'the Authorisation of Possession of Weapons in Kosovo'.

1132 Interestingly, the 1979 Montenegrin Weapons Act includes the provision absent from the Serbian Act, that 'a weapon license or permit to keep a weapon shall not be issued for a weapon that has not been properly proofed or stamped' (Article 23).

1133 While there is no reference to marking in the 1992 Weapons and Ammunition Act, there may be provisions on marking contained in supporting regulations or by-laws that were not available for analysis. The SCG National Focal Point stated that unmarked weapons cannot be owned in Serbia, that 'every weapon - shooting, hunting or sports - is marked at the Institute for Marking in Kragujevac', and that SALW manufactured in Serbia are also marked as standard practice; correspondence with Col Vlado Radic, SCG National SALW Focal Point, 08 March 2004.

SALW transfers

Republic of Montenegro

The Small Arms Survey finds that the 'the volume of the legal trade in small arms in Montenegro appears to be relatively modest', with officials claiming the amount of Montenegrin exports as 'negligible', although such statements are hard to verify as reporting and transparency on exports in Montenegro is limited.¹¹³⁹ Traditionally 'a major arms smuggling point in the Balkans', Montenegro has acted as a hub for illegal weapons trafficking in the sub-region, and as an important departure point for illegal weapons shipments into Western Europe and beyond.¹¹⁴⁰ SAS note that reports of small arms trafficking include Montenegro as a transshipment point for 'weapons smuggled from Serbia to the Middle East, from Russia to Libya, from the Balkans to Western Europe, but also as a regional transit point between Bosnia and Kosovo'.¹¹⁴¹ In particular, the Orao scandal in late 2002 exposed Montenegro as the departure point

1134 Similarly to the Serbian 1992 Weapons and Ammunition Act, the Montenegrin 1979 Weapons Act in general forbids the possession of military-style weapons, and requires the application for a 10-year permit to acquire a weapon, weapons parts or ammunition, after which a person can acquire a weapon and then apply for a licence to keep and carry a weapon - the criteria for licences to acquire and permits to keep and carry are similar to Serbian legislation, and antique weapons may also be possessed without a permit, although they must be registered (Articles 12 to 16). The Montenegrin Weapons Act does include a number of other categories for possession, including licences to persons who have received a weapon as a gift from the Yugoslav Army or a marksman who has been rewarded with a weapon for achieving top sporting results (Article 20), and appears to be slightly more relaxed about the carrying and transport of weapons, although it notes that 'a weapon shall not be carried on a public place in a manner which would harass citizens or cause their disagreement', and that outside of hunting or sporting grounds, 'weapons may be carried only in special cases and unloaded' (Article 34). Government authorities and enterprises, as well as individuals, are allowed to acquire and possess firearms for the purposes of hunting, or 'self-defence', which includes the activities of businesses providing organised security services or where a weapon is necessary for the protection of private property, such as herds or crops (Article 13); weapons should not be removed from the property protected except in the case of related 'outdoor' activities, such as forestry, agriculture, when weapons may be removed and taken home (Article 29). Licence-holders must keep their licences with them, weapons may not be 'lent' to other people, and licences cannot be inherited (Articles 35 to 39). Registers must be kept of all permits and licences issued, and the MoI is responsible for supervising the application of the Act (Articles 66 to 70). Penalties are very poorly provided for, ranging from 30 to 60 days imprisonment and fines of between 1,000 to 300,000 dinars, a currency no longer in use in Montenegro (Articles 71 to 77).

1135 Possession is governed by the 1992 Weapons and Ammunition Act. Citizens are forbidden to acquire, keep or carry 'semiautomatic and combined longarms, except hunting weapons, as well as to acquire, keep and carry automatic longarms, automatic and shortbarrel weapons and special weapons' (Article 5); firearms, parts and certain ammunition may only be acquired on the basis of a permit issued by the MoI (Article 7). Firearms permits will not be issued to minors or other persons without legal competency, persons who are not medically fit, persons with a criminal record, under criminal prosecution or guilty of various misdemeanours, or a person not trained in the use of firearms (Article 8). After obtaining a permit to acquire a weapon, a weapons owner must apply for a weapon licence no later than eight days from the actual acquisition of the weapon (Article 9); state and other legal bodies or enterprises may acquire and keep weapons and ammunition, including semi-automatic and automatic weapons (except automatic pistols) for the purposes of security and protection of property (Article 17). The possession of trophy, inoperable or antique weapons is permitted by persons complying with conditions for weapons acquisition permits, although a licence for possession is not required, only 'permission' from the competent authority is required; carrying or acquisition of ammunition for such weapons is not permitted (Articles 10 and 11). Five-year permits may also be granted to carry weapons for personal safety, following the submission of a written explanation and request to the competent authority (Articles 11a and 11b). Licensed weapons may be transported under certain conditions, and unloaded and dismantled; lending weapons and use of weapons in public buildings or places where they may endanger safety is forbidden (Articles 12a, 13 and 14). Registers of all permits and licences issued must be kept by the competent authorities (Article 31). Penalties range from six months to three years' imprisonment and fines between 3,000 to 150,000 dinars (50 to 2,500) (Articles 33 to 39).

1136 UNMIK regulation, No 2001/7 on 'the Authorisation of Possession of Weapons in Kosovo', as noted above, allows licensing of weapons for personal security and hunting or sporting weapons. Weapons for personal protection, including weapons up to AK-47 calibre and type, are licensed on an extremely restrictive basis, through the issuing of a WAC. Hunting and sporting weapons can be licensed through application for a weapons registration card, valid for 2 years. Penalties for illegal weapons possession are severe, with a maximum of 8 years imprisonment and fines up to 7,500; unregistered weapons found by UNMIK or KFOR will be seized and owners will face a criminal charge.

1137 Weapons and ammunition kept and carried in accordance with the Serbian 1992 Weapons Act must be 'stored under lock and otherwise secured to prevent access by unauthorised persons' (Article 12).

1138 The 1993 Weapons Act regulates trade in weapons, parts and ammunition, which is only permitted by enterprises licensed by the competent authority. Licences to trade are only issued if storage requirements on safety and security from theft are met and if the persons responsible for the enterprise and handling the weapons met the provisions specified for a permit to acquire a weapon (Article 27). In addition, licences for 'each and every contracted quantity' of weapons or ammunition traded are required and must include the name and address of buyer, seller and manufacturer, the type and quantity of weapons, parts and ammunition (Article 28). Penalties range from six months to three years' imprisonment and fines between 3,000 to 150,000 dinars (50 to 2,500) (Articles 33 to 39).

1139 Official imports are also 'relatively small', with approximately 560,000 worth of small arms and ammunition imported in the first ten months of 2003; the majority of these were a large shipment of nearly 800 pistols by the MoI and the remainder ammunition, pistols, revolvers, and rifles imported by a handful of authorised firms for domestic resale. SAS lists small arms importing firms (operating from January to October 2003) as: Boom Company (Podgorica), Kuljaca Company (Budva), Idea (Podgorica), Una (Tivat), Bratogost SD (Niksic) and Jugimport Montenegro (Podgorica). Montenegro SALW Survey, SAS 2004, p 13.

1140 Ibid

1141 Ibid.

for substantial illegal weapons sales to embargoed countries such as Iraq, organised through former military officials and the state-owned Jugoimport firm (see below).¹¹⁴²

At present, however, it appears that 'small arms trafficking across borders is becoming negligible in Montenegro', although trafficking in other contraband is increasing; a handful of small-scale seizures at the border were reported in 2003 and there is a 'strong consensus that the market is saturated with weapons'.¹¹⁴³ However, should demand for weapons increase outside of Montenegro, it is highly likely that levels of small arms trafficking could pick up again, arguably assisted by lax border controls and widespread corruption, which appears to reach up to high levels of government. Indicative is the trial of the former Montenegrin Minister of the Interior and current SCG Deputy Defence Minister in Italy on charges brought by the Italian authorities for co-ordinating weapons smuggling,¹¹⁴⁴ and similar charges and allegations against top-level Montenegrin officials.¹¹⁴⁵

Republic of Serbia

The US appears to be the primary market for SCG military products and is also involved in efforts to support restructuring of the industry.¹¹⁴⁶ Statements made by the director of Jugoimport in January 2004, confirmed the US as an important market for military production, and noted that the company's arms contracts in the first 11 months of 2003 were worth almost US\$60 million, 16 percent higher than contracts for the previous year. The contracts apparently included light weapons, such as self-propelled artillery and howitzers.¹¹⁴⁷ In November 2003, Zastava signed an agreement with the Virginia-based KBI company on 'long-term co-operation' and the export of hunting carbines, small calibre rifles, CZ-99 and CZ-999 pistols and carbine mechanisms to the US.¹¹⁴⁸ The general manager of the Prvi Partizan facility has also been reported in local press in November 2003, announcing an arms and ammunition export contract to the US, which will he hopes will allow the company to make full use of its capacity and export 90 percent of its total ammunition production, worth approximately US\$12 million.¹¹⁴⁹ According to the same source, Prvi Partizan exports products to the EU, Australia, New Zealand, Asia and Africa.¹¹⁵⁰

Despite these reports on SALW sales abroad, the actual level of SALW export is difficult to verify. SCG submitted a report on 2002 to the UN Register of Conventional Weapons in February 2002, but no imports or exports were registered.¹¹⁵¹ The NISAT databases

1142 See section on Serbia below for more details. 'Arming Saddam: the Yugoslav Connection', ICG Balkans Report No 136, 03 December 2002 (hereafter 'The Yugoslav Connection, ICG 2002'), pp 1-2.

1143 Montenegro SALW Survey, SAS 2004, pp 3.13 and 14.

1144 Weapons were allegedly smuggled from Italy to Montenegro in violation of the UN embargo in March 1998. 09 October, Weekly Media Review, 06 October - 13 October 2003, www.seesac.org.

1145 'Djukanovic 'Could Be Charged' in Italy', Daily Media Review, 17 December 2003; 'Italy Releases Warrants on Montenegrin PM's Close Friends', Daily Media Review, 20 November 2003; 'Montenegrin Interior Minister Sought for Questioning', Daily Media Review, 01 January 2004; 'Judge Submits Evidence of Surveillance', Daily Media Review, 20 November 2003; www.seesac.org.

1146 In October 2003 for example, SCG Military industry representatives made a 2-week visit to the US, with the aim of exchanging experience on conversion from civil to military production. 17 October 2003, Weekly Media Review, 13 - 20 October 2003, www.seesac.org.

1147 'Serbian arms export company head pleased with increased exports in 2003', Beta news agency, Belgrade, in Serbian 0814GMT, 02 January 04, BBC Monitoring International Reports, 06 January 2004.

1148 14 November 2003, Weekly Media Review 10 - 16 November 2003; 'Arms and Ammunition Exports to US', Daily Media Review, 02 December 2003, www.seesac.org.

1149 'Arms and Ammunition Exports to US', Daily Media Review, 02 December 2003, www.seesac.org.

1150 Ibid

1151 The date of the report's submission is not a typing error - the UN database records the submission date of the SCG report as 27 February 2002. http://disarmament.un.org:8080/UN_REGISTER.nsf, referenced 13 February 2004.

also contain no data on exports, although some SALW imports were registered,¹¹⁵² and Serbia and Montenegro has not reported any small arms exports or imports to the United Nations COMTRADE database since 2000.¹¹⁵³

Illegal trade in SALW and other military equipment is clearly a problem. Substantial 'sanctions-busting' activities were undertaken by the Serbian Government during the early and mid 1990s in order to circumvent controls and supply Serb paramilitary groups in Croatia and the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina in violation of the UN embargo.¹¹⁵⁴ The role of various branches of the Belgrade administration is believed to have been 'extensive', and despite 'clean-up' efforts, the legacy of these activities and the accompanying corruption will be difficult to eradicate, as the arrest of the head of the Customs Service in late 2000 indicated.¹¹⁵⁵ A local opinion poll conducted in 2000 concluded that popular perceptions held that the Customs Service was thoroughly corrupt and that 'smuggling, a means of survival for many over the last decade of economic crisis, had become morally acceptable'.¹¹⁵⁶ Police and security forces have made attempts to prevent SALW proliferation since then, but BICC notes that 'the badly-equipped and underpaid officers often find themselves outgunned (or bought off) by organised crime syndicates'.¹¹⁵⁷ Other sources also comment that illicit transfers of high-quality new foreign weapons such as night surveillance equipment, 'are sophisticated enough to deter the police and security forces from attempting to stop smuggling operation'.¹¹⁵⁸

As recent arrests and seizures indicate, arms smuggling continues in Serbia, often part of chains that spread across the sub-region.¹¹⁵⁹ Little information is available, but research done in Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia, confirm that networks of traffickers are active across the sub-region, although since the end of 2001, smuggling levels have fallen due to lack of demand and market saturation. Demand for illicit arms continues abroad, however, and evidence discovered in late 2002 of substantial weapons transfers to countries under UN arms embargoes indicates that export control could be much improved.



Weapons seized in South Serbia during the crisis period of 2001.

NATO raids on the Orao military factory in Republika Srpska, BiH, in October 2002 provided evidence of illicit transfers of weapons and technology from BiH and the then FRY to Iraq. Documents discovered by NATO indicate that 'significant elements of the arms activity... were spread across borders to include not only the Serb entity in Bosnia but also the Federation', and these were traced back to the Belgrade-based state import/export company, Jugimport.¹¹⁶⁰ 'The disclosures open a window on the real

1152 SALW were imported in 1998 and 2000 from the UK and Ireland - no details were available. NISAT databases, www.nisat.org, referenced 13 February 2004.

1153 Montenegro SALW Survey, SAS 2004, p 13.

1154 BICC Conversion Survey 2002, p 135.

1155 SALW in FRY, Saferworld 2002, p 54.

1156 Ibid, p 54.

1157 BICC Conversion Survey 2002, p 135.

1158 In interviews with MOD officials in 2001, Saferworld was 'told that organised criminals and insurgents sometimes outgun the police'. SALW in FRY, Saferworld 2002, p 54.

1159 In September 2003 for example, police arrested three persons for illegal possession and sales of firearms in Kraljevo and Novi Pazar: large quantity of pistols, revolvers and ammunition were confiscated; the weapons had been moved from Belgrade and Kraljevo to Novi Pazar. 02 October 2003, Weekly Media Report, 29 September - 06 October 2003, www.seesac.org.

1160 The Yugoslav Connection, ICG 2002, Executive Summary.

power structures inside Yugoslav politics. That the special relationship with Iraq (and with Liberia) continued indicates that civilian control over the military is still absent, that connections between criminal, military and political elements are extensive'.¹¹⁶¹ According to reports, it is apparent that in contravention of UN sanctions the then FRY 'engaged in transactions respecting missile, aviation and chemical technology and equipment' to Iraq.¹¹⁶² The evidence found by SFOR, submissions by the US Government to top-level FRY officials and the seizure of a Montenegrin freighter bound for Syria by the Croatian authorities, indicate that substantial illicit weapons trafficking has been conducted by networks across the former FRY and BiH.¹¹⁶³ The then FRY government reacted quickly, removing the head of Jugoimport and the Deputy Minister of Defence. However, commentators question whether these moves have gone far enough, noting subsequent press reports and leaks that 'indicate a pattern of continuing FRY sales to Iraq', including sales of SALW.¹¹⁶⁴

Sources also suggest that Belgrade-based companies have supplied SALW to another country under a UN arms embargo – Liberia.¹¹⁶⁵ Following the investigation by the UN panel on implementation of the arms embargo on Liberia, a BBC 'Correspondent' documentary broadcast in late 2003 followed the links from weapons found in Liberia to Serbia. Authorities in Belgrade confirmed that the serial numbers and markings of the weapons found in Liberia were produced in the Zastava arms factory, and although no shipments had been authorised for Liberia, shipments had been authorised on the basis of Nigerian-issued End-User Certificates. The documentary discovered, however, that the Nigerian Government had never issued any EUC for the weapons, and concluded that the Belgrade-based Serbian firm Temex brokered the deals using falsified EUCs.¹¹⁶⁶

The Entity of Kosovo

There is no military production in Kosovo. Nevertheless, the substantial amounts of illegal weaponry in the entity, and its porous borders, mean that illicit SALW trafficking is a problem, and it is clear that illicit arms stocks in Kosovo have fuelled conflicts in neighbouring countries such as Macedonia. Recent research suggests that currently 'gun smuggling is not a major activity on the Kosovo borders, compared with other types of smuggling and with gun smuggling in the region generally', simply because the current market saturation and lack of demand mean guns are less profitable than other contraband, which can be smuggled across Kosovo's borders with ease.¹¹⁶⁷ The low-levels of trafficked small arms tend to come primarily from Serbia, a source of higher-quality Yugoslav-manufactured pistols, and Albania, from where relatively low-cost assault rifles are available.¹¹⁶⁸ The main exit for weapons is to Macedonia, where

¹¹⁶¹ Ibid

¹¹⁶² Ibid

¹¹⁶³ The 12 October 2002 SFOR raid found letter on Jugoimport-SDPR stationery signed by a Yugoslav Army Colonel and addressed to the Iraqi MoD, offering Yugoslav assistance for concealing unspecified equipment from UN weapons inspectors, and referring to Yugoslav specialists currently working in Iraq; 'it also indicated that current weapons purchases from the FRY were being routed through Syria and that a cargo for Iraq was in the Montenegrin port of Bar awaiting Syrian permission before it set sail'. Also in October 2002, the US Embassy in Belgrade directed a 'non-paper' to the FRY President and other senior Yugoslav officials; 'the non-paper asserted that the FRY had sold cruise missile technology to Libya and possibly Iraq... It also stated that the FRY had sold 200 tons of Yugoslav Army weapons stocks to Liberia, another country under a UN arms embargo'. On the 22 October 2002, Croatian authorities seized the Montenegrin-registered 'Boka Star' freighter that had sailed from the Montenegrin port of Bar to Rijeka in Croatia, carrying a 208-tonne cargo of materials for rocket fuel, falsely labelled as active coal; 'the cargo allegedly belonged to Jugoimport-SDPR and was destined for Iraq via Syria'. The Yugoslav Connection, ICG 2002, pp 1-2.

¹¹⁶⁴ The Yugoslav Connection, ICG 2002, p 2.

¹¹⁶⁵ 'Correspondent' documentary programme, broadcast on the UK BBC2 television channel, 07 December 2003; and, The Yugoslav Connection, ICG 2002, Executive Summary.

¹¹⁶⁶ 'Correspondent' documentary programme, broadcast on the UK BBC2 television channel, 07 December 2003.

weapons are 'sought after by ethnic separatists and criminal elements', to southern Serbia and further afield: 'the interdiction of transshipment notwithstanding, there is a certain illicit transit trade through Kosovo'.¹¹⁶⁹ Using much the same methods employed during the conflict, including mule trains across mountainous areas, arms smugglers tend to be organised into criminal groups, and it seems that there are links between SALW and other contraband, as trafficking tends to have a territorial, rather than commodity-specific, dimension, with certain 'networked' groups controlling the movements of various goods through 'their' area.¹¹⁷⁰ Despite the relatively small scale of arms trafficking, its existence and the weakness of border control, is 'a looming concern', as 'small arms trafficking could increase if the demand for small arms surged in either Kosovo or FYROM'.¹¹⁷¹ Although there have been efforts to tighten security measures at border crossings, 'weapons smuggled in cars and trucks can probably pass the Kosovo borders at any time'.¹¹⁷²

Suspicion that former armed factions continue to be involved in illegal activities also seems to have some basis, as evidenced by the arrest of former-KLA Commander Azreni in November 2003 for the illegal purchase and distribution of arms to members of the armed formation.¹¹⁷³ Also in late 2003, British journalists posing as Irish terrorists bought 13.5 kg of top-quality explosive in Kosovo, and during their undercover activities, which included contacts from the KLA and mafia, were apparently offered various weapons 'in quantities that would, according to this daily, be sufficient to equip small armies'.¹¹⁷⁴

SALW collection programmes and capacities

Republic of Montenegro

One SALW collection has been held in Montenegro. The two-month 'Farewell to Arms' initiative was held from 12 March to 12 May 2003, an amnesty and collection period organised through the Mol with funding from USAID/ORT and co-operation with a local NGO network. With the help of the Akcija NGO Network and USAID/ORT the Mol disseminated information on the logistical procedures of the amnesty, and engaged in supporting press-work, including weekly updates on collection totals. Based on pre-existing relationships, co-operation between the Mol and USAID/ORT and NGO representatives was in general very good, and involving NGOs in the process is believed to have assisted public confidence in the collection.¹¹⁷⁵ Citizens were encouraged to hand in weapons 'anonymously' through calling a special NGO-operated hotline

1167 The low levels of arms smuggling are 'not because such trade would be impossible or even difficult' - both international borders and the administrative boundary with Serbia and Montenegro are 'porous', despite the presence of international police and military, and 'organized and unorganised crime takes advantage of this fact, and smuggling and contraband are rife'. Kosovo and the Gun, SAS 2003, p 27.

1168 Ibid

1169 A major inflow or hub for smuggled weapons is Peje/Pec, and another key transit route is through the southernmost tip of Kosovo, from Albania via Dragash/Dragas to Tetovo in FYROM. Ibid, p 30.

1170 Ibid, pp 29-30.

1171 Ibid, p ix.

1172 The KPS border service have now upgraded weapons, including AK-47s, as 'a response to the increasingly well-armed smugglers crossing the border', and the customs officials are now offered financial incentives for discovery of illegal weapons shipments in an attempt to combat corruption. Ibid, pp 12 and 28.

1173 It is reported that Azreni was sentenced to 72 hours detention in Gnjilane over this incident. 11 November, Weekly Media Review, 10 - 16 November 2003, www.seesac.org.

1174 'Kosovo Has Become an Arms and Explosives Market, Sunday Mirror Reports', Daily Media Review, 08 December 2003, www.seesac.org.

1175 Telephone interview with Kaca Djurickovic, SALW Project Assistant, UNDP Podgorica, 12 February 2004.

number to arrange for collection of arms from homes or nearby neutral places by a team composed of one or two plain clothes police officers and an NGO representative to help provide additional reassurance.¹¹⁷⁶ A small number of weapons were also handed in to local police stations, and in a limited number of cases police also approached individuals they knew had received weapons distributed by the MoI to 'reserve' forces in the late 1990s to encourage surrender (see above, Small Arms Problem).¹¹⁷⁷

The initiative resulted in the collection of 1,600 guns and 3,000 hand grenades, mines and other explosive devices, all of which were subsequently destroyed with support from SEESAC, which also provided technical advice on SALW awareness and legislative issues.¹¹⁷⁸ Although the authorities and USAID/ORT and Akcija partners claim the initiative was a success, the public view is less enthusiastic, noting the relatively low numbers of weapons collected: Small Arms Survey respondents 'generally agreed that another amnesty period, followed by the adoption and swift implementation of the new draft law on firearms that bans public carrying of weapons, would send the appropriate message that the government is taking the threat posed by small arms to public security seriously, and is being proactive on the matter'.¹¹⁷⁹ In addition, although it is claimed that the active involvement of the MoI in the collection process increased public trust in the police, it is clear from SAS research that the public still has a 'profound mistrust in the police', and indeed this seems to be one reason why the initiative was not more successful.¹¹⁸⁰

Table 41a – Summary of SALW collection in Montenegro 1999 – 2003¹¹⁸¹

COLLECTION ACTIVITY	SALW	AMMUNITION (TONNES)	REMARKS
Mol-implemented amnesty and collection, 12 March – 12 May 2003	1,600	NA ¹¹⁸²	Support from USAID/ORT.
TOTALS	1,600		

Republic of Serbia

In addition to ongoing police and military confiscation of illegal weapons, Serbia has organised three main amnesties and collections in recent years – in 1997, 1998 and 2003.

Preceding the entry into force of stricter weapons possession legislation in 1998, citizens were allowed to hand in or 'legalise' weapons by applying for a licence. Backed by a SALW awareness-raising campaign, the initiative resulted in the 'legalisation' of approximately 60,000 weapons and the confiscation of about 7,000 automatic weapons.¹¹⁸³ This policy was repeated in 1998 for handguns and sporting rifles.¹¹⁸⁴ In

¹¹⁷⁶ Unfortunately, no training was given to NGO telephone operators or the NGO representatives that accompanied the collection 'teams' to citizens homes; thankfully, the collection proceeded without accident, but there are serious safety concerns over involving untrained civilians in SALW collection. Montenegro SALW Survey, SAS 2004, p 39, and, telephone interview with Kaca Djurickovic, SALW Project Assistant, UNDP Podgorica, 12 February 2004.

¹¹⁷⁷ Telephone interview with Kaca Djurickovic, SALW Project Assistant, UNDP Podgorica, 12 February 2004.

¹¹⁷⁸ 'Support to the Republic of Montenegro Weapons Destruction', SEESAC Activity Report AR/006, 30 May 2003, www.seesac.org.

¹¹⁷⁹ Montenegro SALW Survey, SAS 2004, p 40.

¹¹⁸⁰ Ibid

¹¹⁸¹ Statistics taken from SEESAC Press Release 23 May 2003, www.seesac.org.

¹¹⁸² Statistics on ammunition weight in tonnes was not available, however, in addition to the SALW collected, 30,000 hand grenades, mines and other types of ammunition were also surrendered. 'Destruction of Small Arms in Montenegro', Ibid.

¹¹⁸³ BICC Conversion Survey 2002, p 136.

addition to SALW voluntarily collected from citizens, a substantial number of weapons have been confiscated in the country according to Serbia and Montenegro's report to the UNDDA on implementation of the UN PoA. In 2001, 52,000 pieces of small arms were collected, and in 2002, an additional 23,223.¹¹⁸⁵ No current totals for weapons confiscations were available.

The state of emergency declared in March 2003 following the assassination of PM Djindjic resulted in substantial police crackdowns on organised crime and other factions connected to the murder. A total of 2,046 weapons, 33,478 rounds of ammunition and 198.5 kg of explosives were confiscated by law enforcement and security services during the period of martial law from 12 March to 22 April 2003.¹¹⁸⁶ At around the same time, it became apparent that the atmosphere of heightened police activity, and also public disgust at the violent death of Djindjic, was resulting in various spontaneous surrenders of weapons by civilians. A number of police discoveries of weapons abandoned in public places, such as rubbish containers, prompted the emergency government to implement an amnesty period to allow citizens to hand in weapons without fear of prosecution to their nearest police station or military facility.¹¹⁸⁷ A fifteen-day amnesty was proclaimed on 25 March 2003, but the initial success of the initiative led to its extension until 24 April 2003. Little time was available for preparation for the amnesty, but with support from SEESAC, public information and awareness-raising was organised and published lists of collection points and the procedures for the amnesty were disseminated. The initiative proved extremely successful, no doubt due to the political and social context, and in addition to over 30,000 'legalisations' of non-military, hunting and sporting weapons,¹¹⁸⁸ 40,500 SALW and 2,005,459 rounds of ammunition were voluntarily surrendered to the Serbian Mol.¹¹⁸⁹ Destruction of the collected weapons has begun (see SALW Destruction, below).

Table 41b – Summary of SALW collection in Serbia 1999 – 2004¹¹⁹⁰

COLLECTION ACTIVITY	SALW	AMMUNITION (TONNES)	REMARKS
SCG Government – 2001	52,000		
SCG Government – 2002	23,223		
SCG Government, 12 March – 22 April 2003	2,046		
Mol-implemented amnesty and voluntary surrender, 24 March – 20 April 2003	40,500	NA ¹¹⁹¹	
TOTALS	117,769		

1184 SALW in FRY, Saferworld 2002, p 66.

1185 SCG UN PoA report, 2003.

1186 136 SALW, 1,463 mines, 272 hand grenades, 10 kg of explosives and 113,095 rounds of ammunition were found and seized in the GSZ in southern Serbia, apparently during the state of emergency; these figures have not been noted in collection totals below as it is unclear whether they have already been included in the confiscation totals given for the March to April period. SCG UN PoA report, 2003.

1187 Author's observations during residence and work in Belgrade at the time, March 2003, and 'Support to Republic of Serbia National Weapons Amnesty', SEESAC Activity report AR/001, 14 April 2003, www.seesac.org.

1188 The Mol confirms that 34,917 applications to 'legalise' weapons were submitted during the amnesty; some of these applications are likely to be refused, but the processing of applications is ongoing and so the number of licences approved was not available at the time of writing. Statistics from Mol official, 13 February 2004.

1189 SEESAC SALW Collection Database, www.seesac.org, as referenced 10 February 2004.

1190 Statistics on voluntary collection totals taken from the SEESAC SALW Database, www.seesac.org, as referenced 10 February 2004, and additional data on collections from SCG UN PoA report, 2003.

1191 No information on the amount of ammunition surrendered in tonnes was available; however, 2,005,549 rounds were collected during the amnesty. SEESAC SALW Collection Databases, www.seesac.org.

The Entity of Kosovo

Since the end of the war in June 1999, both UNMIK Police and KFOR have attempted to remove illegal weapons from circulation through searches and confiscations, and also, to a limited extent, through amnesties.

KFOR searches and seizures of illicit weapons are 'a more or less constant feature of the soldiers' work', with such activities undertaken, and results gained, on an almost daily basis.¹¹⁹² UNMIK police on the other hand, in general only collect guns connected to law enforcement operation, such as house searches as part of criminal investigations.¹¹⁹³ Apparently, 'current efforts to collect military-style weapons are met calmly' by most Kosovars, while 'seizures of hunting rifles... have been met with fierce resistance'.¹¹⁹⁴

Two amnesties organised jointly by KFOR and UNMIK have been held in Kosovo, both in tandem with continued seizure operations: the first from 01 May to 03 June 2001, and the second from 15 March to 15 April 2002. The amnesties permitted people to hand in weapons anonymously to police or KFOR at special collection points. During the second amnesty, over 80 percent of the collected weapons were gathered by KFOR, 'which had better organisational means and resources to implement the amnesty'.¹¹⁹⁵ Interestingly, in addition to the weapons surrendered at collection points, there were increased 'casual findings' of weapons left in places the police were likely to search during the amnesty periods, indicating that not everyone trusted the authorities' promises of anonymity or immunity from prosecution.¹¹⁹⁶

Small Arms Survey research notes that perceived shortcomings of the 2001 and 2002 amnesties included: 'lack of information and communication on the part of the authorities before the starting date, their short time period, and overly visible collection points (which made people shy away from handing in weapons)'.¹¹⁹⁷ The amnesty efforts also suffered from limited support from Kosovar political leaders, although apparently support was more forthcoming from central authorities than the municipal level. Amnesty results were also substantially less successful among the minority Serb communities, whose political leaders gave the initiatives no support: 'one of the reasons for this is undoubtedly that Kosovo Serbs continue to feel they have to protect themselves'.¹¹⁹⁸ In general, it appears that the 2001 and 2002 amnesties were much more strongly promoted by the international authorities than by the local communities, and this may be a key reason for the limited number of weapons they returned.¹¹⁹⁹

The international community's approach towards amnesty and collection efforts changed somewhat with the implementation of the UNDP Illicit Small Arms Control project in 2002. Originally designed to pilot the 'weapons for development' approach in Kosovo, the ISAC project re-oriented its strategy in 2003, and supported a joint amnesty organised with UNMIK and KFOR in September 2003 with competitive incentives for municipalities.

1192 Kosovo and the Gun, SAS 2003, p 23.

1193 Ibid

1194 Ibid, p 24.

1195 Ibid, p 21.

1196 Ibid

1197 'In this regard, the second amnesty is considered more successful than the first. For instance, in conjunction with the 2002 amnesty, American and Russian KFOR troops worked together on publicising the measures, going from village to village with megaphones'. Ibid, p 22.

1198 Ibid

1199 Ibid

UNDP had originally planned a 'weapons in exchange for development' pilot project in Kosovo. As the project progressed, late deliveries of funding, uncertainty over amnesty timing and the tensions over the summer of 2003 combined to change the ISAC project plans.¹²⁰⁰ Although referred to as 'Weapons in Exchange for Development', the concept was in reality a 'Weapons in Competition for Development' (WCD) component.¹²⁰¹ As ISAC staff note, previously positive contacts with municipality leaders over possible development projects 'closed up' once incidents of inter-ethnic shootings raised perceptions of insecurity in the entity. The new approach involved 'weapons in competition for development', and a subsequent two-tier level of 'prizes': announcements on 01 September 2003 stated that the municipalities surrendering the top three weapons totals would win US\$250,000 worth of development funds. As the amnesty progressed the conditions were made more inclusive, and on 22 September UNDP announced that any municipality surrendering over 300 weapons would qualify for US\$25,000 worth of development funds.¹²⁰² Funds would go straight to projects to be identified by the particular communities who surrendered the weapons, or at a broader municipality level, and implemented by UNDP.

A top-level Steering Committee for the amnesty was established, comprising the Heads of UNDP, UNMIK policing and KFOR, as well as the Minister for Justice and the Prime Minister of the PISG. It was supported by a Task Force of representatives of the Committee members who were able to tackle more practical issues at monthly meetings.¹²⁰³ KFOR and UNMIK police were the main international organisations involved in the one-month amnesty, which was implemented from 01 September to 01 October 2003. The amnesty logistics were primarily implemented by KFOR, which manned collection points across Kosovo and played a major role in distributing campaign materials such as posters, the vast majority of which were posted by KFOR.¹²⁰⁴ Local police stations were also an option for weapons surrender, and CIVPOL and KPS advertised the collection in local stations and other awareness-raising activities were carried out as part of a Kosovo-wide campaign. Unfortunately, the totals of weapons surrendered in the amnesty were very disappointing: only 155 weapons were handed in.

Reasons for this very low total include the still-low levels of trust in security providers, and in the municipal authorities, which some may have believed would pocket much of the development funds awarded (even though UNDP funds would go directly to contractors), and lack of community allegiance, meaning that benefits to the community are not perceived as sufficient incentive to hand over weapons. The limited amount of time for preparation of the UNDP's 'new' WCD strategy once the project had been re-oriented also meant that public awareness of the new conditions for incentives was less than desirable, and this change in approach at a rather late stage could well have confused communities as to nature of the initiative.¹²⁰⁵ The clearest reason, however, would appear to be the continuing uncertainty over the future of the entity, and people's not unjustified fears for their safety should the situation in Kosovo change. As an ethnic Albanian interviewed by IWPR said, 'If they don't give us independence, that might

1200 Telephone conversation with Mike Dixon, ISAC Programme Co-ordinator, 12 February 2004.

1201 Correspondence with Adrian Wilkinson, SEESAC Team Leader, 16 February 2004.

1202 Correspondence with UNDP ISAC staff, 16 February 2004.

1203 Telephone conversation with Mike Dixon, ISAC Programme Co-ordinator, 12 February 2004.

1204 Ibid

1205 Ibid

mean that Serbian [security] forces are allowed to come back – and we don't want to be caught empty-handed when that happens'.¹²⁰⁶ These fears for future security were strengthened by the heightened inter-ethnic tensions and violent incidents over the summer, and UNDP staff note 'timing was a major factor – both for the project groundwork and the security situation during the groundwork and the amnesty, timing was against us'.¹²⁰⁷ It is still unclear whether the UNDP will conduct a full evaluation of the amnesty collection efforts; it is to be hoped that it will, as an evaluation of the initiative would provide a very valuable contribution to the current body of knowledge and lessons learned, and facilitate the development of best practice. Much could be learnt from the failure of the voluntary surrender component of the ISAC project, which should also be compared with the ISAC successes in terms of SALW awareness and weapons registration.

Table 41c – Summary of SALW collection in Kosovo 2001 – 2003¹²⁰⁸

COLLECTION ACTIVITY	SALW	AMMUNITION (TONNES)	REMARKS
KFOR (with UNDP support from 09 January – 30 September 2003) from 05 January 2001 – September 2003	11,711	NA	155 weapons were collected during the 2003 amnesty.
TOTALS	11,711		

Summary of SALW collection in Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo

Table 41d – Summary of SALW collection in Serbia and Montenegro, including Kosovo 1991 – 2003¹²⁰⁹

COLLECTION ACTIVITY	SALW	AMMUNITION (TONNES)	REMARKS
Montenegro	1,600	NA	
Serbia	117,769	NA	
Kosovo	11,711	NA	
TOTALS	131,080		

SALW destruction programmes and capacities

As the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro maintains an army at the state level, destruction of national arms (eg Mol surplus or seized weapons and weapons collected from civilians) is detailed below according to Republic, and entity. Information on destruction undertaken by the SCG Army is given last, and followed by a combined table of destruction totals.

¹²⁰⁶ 'Armed to the Teeth', Balkan Crisis Report, IWPR and Saferworld, 27 November 2003, www.iwpr.net.

¹²⁰⁷ Telephone conversation with Mike Dixon, ISAC Programme Co-ordinator, 12 February 2004.

¹²⁰⁸ Statistics taken from the SEESAC SALW Database, www.seesac.org, as referenced 13 February 2004.

¹²⁰⁹ Statistics taken from the SEESAC SALW Database, www.seesac.org, as referenced 15 January 2004, and additional data as noted in sub-tables above.

State Union-level destruction

Between November 2001 and January 2004, the SCG Ministry of Defence destroyed a total of 79,790 pieces of SALW, predominantly surplus stocks.¹²¹⁰ These weapons were destroyed in two main tranches. The first was a 2001 project to destroy just over 52,000 SALW with financial support from the US State Department funds at the army maintenance and service works in Cacak. The second project destroyed an additional 27,723 SALW with NAMSA funding of US\$381,425, starting in March and ending in December 2003.¹²¹¹ 'Small arms and light weapons were destroyed in the Maintenance and Supply Works by the following methods: cutting by saw and flame (acetylene and oxygen), bending and mangling by applying pressure. Fragmentised small arms and light weapons are recycled in the Smederevo Steel Works'.¹²¹² This was a very expensive destruction operation when compared to other national and regional initiatives (US\$13.75 per weapon versus US\$2 – US\$6 per weapon), but also included anti-aircraft and mortar pieces.¹²¹³ NAMSA is now exploring possibilities for supporting the destruction of the Army's anti-personnel landmine stocks in accordance with SCG's commitments under the Ottawa Convention. No information was available on ammunition destruction at the state level.

In general, Serbia and Montenegro is 'very well equipped' for SALW destruction, with facilities at Cacak, Nikisic and Smederevo. There is, however, a lack of capacity in terms of qualified manpower.¹²¹⁴ Future training projects in this area would be beneficial, particularly in light of Army of Serbia and Montenegro's recent announcements that substantial amounts of military equipment, including nearly 100,000 SALW are now scheduled for destruction.¹²¹⁵

Table 42a – Summary of SALW destruction at the state-level in Serbia and Montenegro 2000 – 2004¹²¹⁶

DESTRUCTION ACTIVITY	SALW	AMMUNITION (TONNES)	REMARKS
SCG MoD-implemented destruction, 2001	approx. 52,000		Supported by US State Department
SCG MoD-implemented destruction, March – December 2003	27,723		Supported by NAMSA
TOTAL	79,790		

1210 The weapons comprised: 515 hand guns, 277 automatic, gas and 'signal' hand guns, 7,939 rifles, shotguns, hunting carbines, hunting and small calibre rifles, 10 recoilless guns, 2,511 semi-automatic rifles, 191 semi-automatic sniper rifles, 5,328 automatic weapons, 1,564 machine guns, 60 mortars, 1,200 SAMs, 28 rocket launchers, 92 anti-aircraft artillery and 686 air rifles and pistols. In addition, over 50,000 of the weapons destroyed came from surplus stocks at the Technical Repair Institute at Cacak, which submitted 20,000 small calibre and 31,058 large calibre weapons for destruction. Data taken from the SEESAC SALW Databases, referred to on 10 February 2004.

1211 Interview with Craig Rutherford, SEESAC Deputy Team Leader, 10 February 2004.

1212 SCG UN PoA report, 2003.

1213 The final NAMSA report is awaited, and this should make clear comparable costs for small arm, light weapons, mortars and anti-aircraft guns. Correspondence with Adrian Wilkinson, SEESAC Team Leader, 16 February 2004.

1214 Interview with Craig Rutherford, SEESAC Deputy Team Leader, 10 February 2004.

1215 In line with restructuring, part of the first stage of restructuring of the Army of Serbia and Montenegro will include the dismantling of 210 T-55 main battle tanks, approximately 300 cannons and howitzers, 1,000 20m cannons and 80,000 infantry weapons, planned for 2004. Another option reported in the local press is the sale of this weaponry to markets abroad, or domestically for adaptation to civilian uses (tanks converted to heavy construction machinery for example). 'VSCG to dismantle 210 tanks and 300 cannon in 2004', VIP News - D&S, 08 January 2004; 'Tenk ode u bager', M Vuksanovic, Vecernje Novosti, 19 January 2004.

1216 Statistics taken from the SEESAC SALW Destruction Database, www.seesac.org, referred to on 10 February 2004, and consultations with Craig Rutherford, SEESAC Deputy Team Leader, 10 February 2004.

Republic of Montenegro

The first small arms destruction in Montenegro was carried out on 27 May 2003 and included weapons collected through the 'Farewell to Arms' collection initiative held from March to May 2003. Based on a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between the Montenegrin Minister of Interior and UNDP Serbia and Montenegro, the destruction took place at the Niksic Steel Industrial Complex. Organised by the Montenegrin Mol, with financial assistance and verification functions carried out by SEESAC in conjunction with UNDP, the 'seed funds' allocated by SEESAC for destruction were used to develop the capacity of the Mol's destruction agencies, and to provide the Mol with computer equipment 'necessary to enhance efficiency and operational capacity in their small arms control initiatives'.¹²¹⁷ The cost per weapon destroyed, including transport and security costs, was US\$5 per weapon, but future destruction costs are predicted to be lower as capacity development has now taken place, and economies of scale will begin to apply.¹²¹⁸ The weapons were destroyed in the Zeljezara-Niksic smelter, producing approximately 16 tonnes of molten steel. SEESAC databases contain listings for a total of 5,028 weapons destroyed on 27 May 2003, including: 89 revolvers, 872 pistols, 147 shotguns, 1,704 rifles, 1,021 assault rifles, 90 sub-machine guns, 397 light machine guns, 450 medium machine guns, 257 heavy machine guns and one anti-aircraft gun.¹²¹⁹ The collected weapons, 1,600, were only part of the weaponry destroyed, 'the other 3,400 presumably coming from state owned surplus stockpiles or weapons seized by the police from criminals'.¹²²⁰



May 2003, 5,028 weapons await destruction in Montenegro's Zeljezara-Niksic smelter.

An assortment of over 3,000 hand grenades, mines, and approximately 63,777 rounds of small arms ammunition, and over two tonnes of assorted ammunition natures collected either prior to or during the amnesty were also destroyed on 27 May 2003 by either firing or detonation at the Niksic military polygon; the destruction operation was also monitored by SEESAC technical staff.¹²²¹

SEESAC notes that, with the UNDP Liaison Office in Podgorica, it intends to support further arms destruction with both equipment and training, and it is to be hoped that further destruction will continue, particularly as the downsizing of Montenegrin Mol forces is likely to result in a larger number of surplus SALW. While destruction costs are now likely to be lower than US\$5 per weapon, destruction capacity for ammunition is limited.¹²²² A capacity-building equip and train activity, sponsored by SEESAC and conducted by the International School of Search and Explosive Engineering (ISSEE), will take place from 19 - 30 April 2004. This will provide basic equipment, training in alternative techniques and then opportunity for the EOD organisation to accredit themselves to UK City & Guild and IMAS standards.¹²²³

1217 'Destruction of Small Arms in Montenegro', Press Release 27 May 2003, www.seesac.org.

1218 'Support to the Republic of Montenegro Weapons Destruction', SEESAC Activity Report AR/006, 30 May 2003, www.seesac.org.

1219 SEESAC SALW Databases, www.seesac.org.

1220 Montenegro SALW Survey, SAS 2004, p 41.

1221 'Support to the Republic of Montenegro Weapons Destruction', SEESAC Activity Report AR/006, 30 May 2003, www.seesac.org.

1222 SAS notes that 'future destruction costs are predicted to be lower now that the capacity development for weapons destruction has already taken place and economies of scale begin to apply'. Montenegro SALW Survey, SAS 2004, p 41.

1223 Correspondence with Adrian Wilkinson, SEESAC Team Leader, 16 February 2004.

Table 42b – Summary of SALW destruction in Montenegro 2003¹²²⁴

DESTRUCTION ACTIVITY	SALW	AMMUNITION (TONNES)	REMARKS
Montenegrin Mol-implemented, 27 May 2003	5,028	2.0 + ¹²²⁵	Financial assistance and verification functions provided by SEESAC.
TOTAL	5,028	2	

Republic of Serbia

A substantial amount of destruction has taken place in Serbia, all linked to the amnesty held in March and April 2003.

The March to April 2003 weapons amnesty in Serbia, combined with police confiscations at the time, resulted in the collection of almost 55,000 SALW. SEESAC, and the UNDP and the Stability Pact, gave substantial support to the Serbian Government during the amnesty, and, with the end of the initiative, 'provided significant project advice and support for the destruction of SALW in support of the process'.¹²²⁶

The Mol decided to destroy nearly 4,000 previously confiscated weapons in order to contribute to awareness-raising around the amnesty and collection initiative, and this first phase of the destruction took place at the Smederevo Steel Works on the 12 April 2003 with SEESAC support. Before an audience of government officials, international representatives and media, the Minister of Interior initiated the destruction of almost 4,000 SALW by loading weapons into the smelter in a 'hands on' gesture, followed by other dignitaries present. The 3,859 weapons destroyed included AK-47s, rocket propelled grenade launchers and pistols, and were smelted to produce an estimated 12 tonnes of steel, at a cost of approximately US\$6 per weapon.¹²²⁷ Further to the weapons destroyed, the Mol also destroyed 40,000 rounds of small arms ammunition with SEESAC support on 16 April 2003. The ammunition was destroyed by burning in a small rotary kiln furnace at the Prvi Partizan ammunition facility in Uzice; SEESAC technical staff monitored the destruction. The destruction system at Prvi Partizan is only designed to destroy between 20–40,000 rounds per working day, (approximately 0.4 – 0.8 tonnes), and does not have a logistic disposal capability.¹²²⁸

'Phase 2' of the post-amnesty destruction took place on 04 October 2003 at the Smederevo facility, following limited disassembly at the Institute of State Security in Belgrade. The 7,335 weapons destroyed comprised weapons collected during the March – April 2003 amnesty and Mol surplus.¹²²⁹ The smelting process converted the weapons into approximately 20 tonnes of molten steel, which will be recycled by the US Steel Sartid facility. The operational costs of destruction, approximately US\$5

¹²²⁴ Statistics taken from the SEESAC SALW Databases.

¹²²⁵ No statistics on the total amount of ammunition destroyed by tonnes was available, however approximately 63,777 rounds of small arms ammunition, and over two tonnes of assorted ammunition natures collected either prior to or during the amnesty were also destroyed on 27 May 2003. 'Support to the Republic of Montenegro Weapons Destruction', SEESAC Activity Report AR/006, 30 May 2003, www.seesac.org.

¹²²⁶ 'Republic of Serbia - Destruction of SALW (Phase 2)', SEESAC Activity Report AR/019, 06 October 2003, www.seesac.org.

¹²²⁷ 'Arms Destruction in Serbia', Press Release 12 April 2003, www.seesac.org.

¹²²⁸ 'Serbia National Weapons Amnesty Ammunition Destruction', SEESAC Activity Report AR/002, 16 April 2003, www.seesac.org.

¹²²⁹ 04 October 2003, Weekly Media Review 29 September - 06 October 2003, www.seesac.org.

per weapon, were covered by the US State Department.¹²³⁰ SEESAC and diplomatic representatives from OSCE and the US provided monitoring and verification assistance, and SEESAC also used the destruction to field test a simple computer based destruction accounting system.¹²³¹ In addition, SEESAC notes that this process of weapons destruction, 'has continued to draw valuable public attention to the process due to the extensive media coverage', and has also contributed towards maintaining the political momentum of the destruction initiative.¹²³² The remaining 10,000 weapons were destroyed in a similar fashion on 21 February 2004.

SEESAC is now moving on to Phase 3 of the process, which will be to encourage further destruction operations for the remaining 18,000 weapons collected during the amnesty initiative, and then move on to the destruction of surplus stockpiled weapons.¹²³³



Conversion of weapons into molten steel, Smederevo, October 2003.

Table 42c – Summary of SALW destruction in Serbia 2000 – 2004¹²³⁴

DESTRUCTION ACTIVITY	SALW	AMMUNITION (TONNES)	REMARKS
Mol-implemented destruction, 12 April 2003	3,859		Confiscated weapons, destroyed with SEESAC funding.
Mol-implemented destruction, 16 April 2003		0.4 – 0.8 ¹²³⁵	Destroyed with SEESAC funding.
Mol-implemented destruction, 04 October 2003	7,335		Amnesty-collected weapons, destroyed with US State Department funding and SEESAC technical support.
Mol-implemented destruction, 21 February 2004	10,000		Amnesty-collected weapons, destroyed with US State Department funding and SEESAC technical support.
TOTAL	21,194	0.4 – 0.8	

¹²³⁰ 'Future destruction costs are predicted to again be lower as capacity development continues and economies of scale start to apply'. 'Republic of Serbia - Destruction of SALW (Phase 2)', SEESAC Activity Report AR/019, 06 October 2003, www.seesac.org.

¹²³¹ This accounting system will shortly be available to all future SALW destruction agencies within South Eastern Europe. The Institute of State Security Firearms Team is conducting this trial in close cooperation with SEESAC. 'Republic of Serbia - Destruction of SALW (Phase 2)', SEESAC Activity Report AR/019, 06 October 2003, www.seesac.org.

¹²³² 'Republic of Serbia - Destruction of SALW (Phase 2)', SEESAC Activity Report AR/019, 06 October 2003, www.seesac.org.

¹²³³ The Mol weapons currently earmarked for destruction with SEESAC support include: 4,618 pistols, 740 shotguns, 6,538 rifles, 4,810 assault rifles, 88 sub-machine guns, 32 light machine guns, 4 light mortars, and 170 hunting weapons. 'Republic of Serbia - Destruction of SALW (Phase 2)', SEESAC Activity Report AR/019, 06 October 2003, www.seesac.org.

¹²³⁴ Statistics taken from the SEESAC SALW Destruction Database, www.seesac.org, referred to on 10 February 2004, and consultations with Craig Rutherford, SEESAC Deputy Team Leader, 10 February 2004.

¹²³⁵ Approximate estimation of the weight of the 40,000 rounds of ammunition destroyed. 'Serbia National Weapons Amnesty Ammunition Destruction', SEESAC Activity Report AR/002, 16 April 2003, www.seesac.org.

The Entity of Kosovo

KFOR first started destruction of confiscated and collected SALW in a Norwegian-funded facility in Obelac. This facility was discarded as upgrading was not deemed to be cost effective, and a new weapons and ammunition destruction facility at Janjevo is now operational thanks to a Dutch grant of US\$56,000.¹²³⁶ Methods used are cutting, followed by melting in a furnace, and items such as manhole covers and metal trays are produced with the recycled steel. As part of the ISAC project, the UNDP has provided US\$40,000 of funding to KSFOR for SALW destruction at Janjevo, approximately 3,500 weapons have been destroyed with these funds so far, at an estimated cost of under US\$3 per weapon.¹²³⁷

Unfortunately, little information on destruction totals is available, but in mid-2003 a total of 18,000 SALW had been destroyed by KFOR.¹²³⁸



The 155 weapons collected during Kosovo's autumn 2003 amnesty are cut before melting.

Table 42d – Summary of SALW destruction in Kosovo 1999 – 2003

DESTRUCTION ACTIVITY	SALW	AMMUNITION (TONNES)	REMARKS
KFOR-implemented destruction, 1999 to mid-2003	18,000 ¹²³⁹	NA ¹²⁴⁰	
TOTAL	18,000		

Summary of SALW Destruction in Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo

Table 42e – Summary of SALW destruction in Serbia and Montenegro, including Kosovo 1991 – 2003¹²⁴¹

COLLECTION ACTIVITY	SALW	AMMUNITION (TONNES)	REMARKS
Montenegro	5,028	2.0	
Serbia	21,194	0.4 – 0.8	
SCG	79,790		
Kosovo	11,711	NA	
TOTALS	117,723	2.4 – 2.8	

1236 'Short Mission Report - Clearinghouse Consultation in Kosovo, 14 - 17 May 2002', www.seesac.org.

1237 Telephone conversation with Mike Dixon, ISAC Programme Co-ordinator, 12 February 2004.

1238 Kosovo and the Gun, SAS 2003, p 24.

1239 Statistics were taken from 2003 Small Arms Survey research as no statistics were available from the SEESAC Database. Ibid.

1240 KFOR is also undertaking ammunition destruction at Janjevo, as noted above, however no up-to-date destruction totals were available. 'Short Mission Report - Clearinghouse Consultation in Kosovo, 14 - 17 May 2002', www.seesac.org.

1241 Statistics taken from the SEESAC SALW Database, www.seesac.org, as referenced 15 January 2004, and additional data as noted in sub-tables above.

SALW stockpile management programmes and capacities

State Union of Serbia and Montenegro

The SCG report for the UN PoA in 2003 states that SALW in possession of MoD and armed forces staff are stored in 'magazines, warehouses and facilities for safekeeping'.¹²⁴² According to the Government report, the security of these arms storage facilities is 'very high': 'every facility is provided sentry, sealed and specially secured with padlocks, locks, electric energy-light, and wire. By and large, the facilities are customized, and all security measures are very strict (fire and lightning protection and anti-explosion system). Up-to-date warehouse records are kept and the facility risk level is constantly reviewed. In that connection, a plan of emergency measures and procedures is in place in every facility'.¹²⁴³ SALW held by the Ministries of the Interior of Serbia and Montenegro are also kept in 'customized facilities', where the standards and responsibilities for safe storage are also very high. The report notes that so far there have been no incidents of theft or other security incidents.¹²⁴⁴

In line with military re-structuring, the assessment of current stocks and identification of surplus is ongoing; when surplus is identified, the UN 2003 report notes that unnecessary SALW stocks 'will be treated as any marketable goods or will be earmarked for destruction depending on their condition, technical performance and utility'.¹²⁴⁵ Until 'pure' military surplus is identified, the Government notes that 'surplus stocks of small arms and light weapons are created by arms-and-weapons seizures in incidents of illegal crossings of the State border, illegal transport or sale and by seizures from organized criminal groups and individuals'.¹²⁴⁶ No information was available on the current size or number of SCG SALW stockpiles.

Republic of Montenegro

The restructuring of both the Montenegrin MoI and state SCG army means that the size of SALW stockpiles in Montenegro are difficult to assess. However, Small Arms Survey research concluded that there are '42,000 to 72,000 small arms are in the hands of the MUP and the State Union Army in Montenegro'.¹²⁴⁷ Other than the general note on high standards provided in the UN 2003 report detailed above, no information is currently available on MoI stockpile management practices.

Republic of Serbia

MoI stocks are equally hard to assess in Serbia, and no official information is available, although these are likely to be substantial (see above, Small Arms Problem). Other than the general note on high standards provided in the UN 2003 report detailed above, no information is currently available on MoI stockpile management practices.

¹²⁴² SCG UN PoA report, 2003.

¹²⁴³ Ibid

¹²⁴⁴ Ibid

¹²⁴⁵ Ibid

¹²⁴⁶ Ibid

¹²⁴⁷ Montenegro SALW Survey, SAS 2004, pp 9-10.

The Entity of Kosovo

The NATO KFOR troops and international police officers in Kosovo are armed, though no information was available at the time of writing as to the size of these holdings. KFOR-held SALW, and the 1,800 KPC weapons 'held in trust', are stored in the Force's facilities, presumably according to NATO standards. Similarly, the new KPS has been established with international assistance and firearms carried by police are stored in accordance with international standards. As noted above, the KPC has 200 SALW for the purposes of guarding its facilities; no information was available on storage or security measures for these weapons.

In terms of illegally-held SALW possessed by civilians, Small Arms Survey research finds that, 'small arms tend to be stored indoors in purpose-built caches, or buried outdoors relatively close to households'.¹²⁴⁸ The increasing sophistication of purpose-built concealment in homes is 'a direct response to KFOR search operations' and 'more and more weapons are stored outside homes, buried in gardens, or cached further afield. Consequently, there are fewer weapons in apartment blocks in the cities than in individual homes in the countryside'.¹²⁴⁹ Caches of weapons belonging to armed groups in Kosovo, estimated by Small Arms Survey to be between 12,000 and 16,000 SALW, are likely to be buried or stored in unused buildings, and are sometimes mined.¹²⁵⁰

In general, very little information is available on the size of stockpiles or management practices in SCG, and more research and transparency is needed.

SALW awareness activities

Although there has been relatively little co-ordinated awareness raising in SCG, with time-limited efforts mainly centering on the brief amnesty campaigns in Serbia and Montenegro in 2003, there is potential to do more work in this area, and on a promising note, the SCG report to the UN PoA in 2003 stated that the Government would welcome more assistance for public awareness-raising campaigns, particularly those aimed at educating children and young people.¹²⁵¹

Republic of Montenegro

The only co-ordinated SALW awareness-raising in Montenegro was the campaign accompanying the 'Farewell to Arms' amnesty and collection initiative in Spring 2003. In the run-up to the amnesty, the Akcija NGO Network conducted a campaign, also entitled 'Farewell to Arms', using radio and TV to spread the slogan 'respect life, return the weapons' to the authorities. Primarily aimed at family safety, Akcija messages encouraged pro-active participation in the initiative and return of illegal weapons to the police in order to prevent accidental deaths or injury by firearm misuse. The Mol also worked closely with Akcija and USAID/ORT on publicising the initiative, holding press conferences and broadcasting weekly updates, as well as information on the procedures for weapons surrender.¹²⁵²

1248 Kosovo and the Gun, SAS 2003, p viii.

1249 Ibid, p 20.

1250 As noted above, SAS estimates are that Kosovo Serb militia hold between 240 and 400 SALW, and Kosovo Albanian militia, including the NLA, between 11,800 and 15,800 weapons. Ibid, p 11.

1251 SCG UN PoA statement, 2003.

1252 Montenegro SALW Survey, SAS 2004, p 39.

SAS research confirmed that the Akcija SALW awareness campaign did achieve its goals (to inform the public about the amnesty and collection procedures, to appeal to citizens to participate for the safety of their families, and to outline the penalties for illegal possession at the end of the amnesty). 'The dream-sequence commercial that warned parents of the potential harm that could befall their child from unsecured guns and explosives was the most effective element of the campaign, while billboards that advertised the initiative had the least effect, as no one in the groups even remembered their content'.¹²⁵³ The campaign was overall felt to be quite 'powerful' and 'high intensity', although the value of informal channels of word-by-mouth advertisement among communities was 'equally important to the SALW awareness campaign's success'.¹²⁵⁴ One of the failings of the campaign, however, was the minimal attention given to legalisation, as its main focus was on collection of military-style weapons, possession of which is banned by law.¹²⁵⁵

Republic of Serbia

Two main awareness-raising campaigns have been conducted in Serbia, the first by the Red Cross and the second by government, international actors and local NGOs in support of the amnesty in early 2003.

In September 2001, the then Yugoslav Red Cross launched an awareness-raising campaign, 'For Life – Without Weapons'. Funded by the Norwegian Red Cross, the national campaign aimed to raise awareness among the public about the dangers of SALW and to work with the government to tackle their availability. Running until late spring 2002, primarily in Serbia but also with some activities in Montenegro, the campaign 'stimulated public discussion on SALW issues across the country and generated significant national media coverage'.¹²⁵⁶ In addition to the distribution of T-shirts, posters, drink mats and other campaign materials, the Red Cross produced and dissemination three leaflets, designed for children, youth and adults, and two TV 'clips' were produced and broadcast, one on the dangers for children of weapons in the home and another featuring the Yugoslav volleyball team encouraging young people to leave weapons behind. One of the main activities undertaken by the Red Cross was education in schools, designed both to raise consciousness of safety issues among children and parents, and to change attitudes towards weapons. Activities in over 1,500 schools in Serbia included sessions with teachers, drawing and painting exercises, and also special 'presentations' by local and national personalities and celebrities, such as the national Olympic-medal shooting champion, who visited schools to spread the message that guns are dangerous, not 'cool' and should be used responsibly. The Red Cross also organised various activities through its substantial network of volunteers, many of them young people, and also organised a youth training event on SALW with Saferworld in June 2002.



An image from the 2001-2 Yugoslav Red Cross 'For Life Without Weapons' campaign targets teenagers.

¹²⁵³ Ibid, p 35.

¹²⁵⁴ Ibid, p 35.

¹²⁵⁵ Telephone interview with Kaca Djurickovic, SALW Project Assistant, UNDP Podgorica, 12 February 2004.

¹²⁵⁶ 'Implementing the Programme of Action - Action by States and Civil Society', *Biting the Bullet* 2003, IANSA, p 100.

The second major awareness-raising campaign also involved the Red Cross, and in fact utilised some of their materials in a nation-wide effort to publicise the March to April 2003 government amnesty and collection initiative. As the amnesty was announced during the state of emergency following Djindjic's assassination, there was limited preparation time available for logistics, and minimal time for awareness-raising. The majority of the SALW awareness support was undertaken with support from SEESAC, which helped to design and printed amnesty literature, at a cost of approximately US\$50,000, and also supported the public information campaign through the medium of local NGOs and media.¹²⁵⁷



A variety of materials and activities were used during the awareness campaign that followed the Serbian Prime Minister's assassination, including posters by the then-NGO OTPOR, and a public destruction of toy weapons led by Balkan Youth Union.

The main campaign information material was a leaflet designed and printed with SEESAC support, which detailed which weapons could be legalised and how and where weapons could be legalised or surrendered. 2.3 million copies were distributed through the national postal service at no charge to households across the country. 60,000 Red Cross leaflets used in their previous campaign were also re-printed and distributed through Red Cross centres in major towns across Serbia. The Red Cross television advertisements were also re-broadcast on national TV stations. The student resistance movement OTPOR was also involved, and distributed 100,000 posters and 750,000 leaflets based on designs from previous campaigns updated specially for the March 2003 amnesty. SEESAC also co-ordinated SALW awareness action across Serbia with the help of several NGOs, mainly using amnesty literature. In addition, during a weekend towards the end of the amnesty, the Belgrade-based Balkan Youth Union staged an event for children in the centre of Belgrade, during which safety messages were conveyed through puppet shows and 'hundreds of toy weapons were destroyed by passing children who received T-shirts and balloons carrying anti-weapon slogans'; the event raised awareness among families passing by and media coverage of the event helped to spread the messages across the country.¹²⁵⁸ SEESAC co-operated on more general AR in the media, alerting media outlets and journalists, offering background information on SALW.¹²⁵⁹ SEESAC also supported and funded the Mol in the public destruction of about 4,000 previously confiscated weapons on 12 April 2003; attended by top-level government officials and representatives of the international community, the event drew valuable public attention to the process and 'contributed towards maintaining the political momentum of the amnesty initiative'.¹²⁶⁰

The Entity of Kosovo

Although small-scale awareness-raising had been conducted by local NGOs (see Civil society involvement in SALW interventions below), the campaign supporting the September 2003 amnesty and collection represents the main awareness-raising on SALW undertaken in Kosovo. The campaign was conducted by the UNDP's ISAC

¹²⁵⁷ 'Arms Destruction in Serbia', Press Release 12 April 2003, www.seesac.org.

¹²⁵⁸ 'Support to Republic of Serbia National Weapons Amnesty', SEESAC Activity report AR/001, 14 April 2003, www.seesac.org.

¹²⁵⁹ Op cit, 'Arms Destruction in Serbia'.

¹²⁶⁰ 'Support to Republic of Serbia National Weapons Amnesty', SEESAC Activity report AR/001, 14 April 2003, www.seesac.org.

project, but involved other actors from both the international and Kosovar communities. Campaign materials funded at a cost of US\$75,000 by UNDP ISAC, included posters, billboards, leaflets, and a set of eight fact-sheets on the different aspects of SALW problems and regulations. KFOR was particularly active in putting up posters, and was responsible for posting 45,000 of the 54,000 disseminated during the campaign. Local NGOs were also involved and distributed leaflets and 200,000 fact sheets in public places in cities, and on market days in smaller



One of the ISAC project's powerful advocacy posters used to support SALW collection in late 2003.

towns – volunteers distributed information to approximately 34,000 people on 94 market days in Kosovo between August and September 2003.¹²⁶¹ Over 30 different TV and radio public announcements were broadcast during the initiative, as well as press conferences and debates involving key public figures, and the print media in Kosovo carried over 130 feature articles on SALW and the amnesty initiative between mid-August and 30 September 2003.¹²⁶² Roundtables and discussions were held with townspeople at the municipal level and with women in rural areas; sporting and recreational events were also held, including a children's parade; and a concert in support of the initiative was held on the first day of the amnesty.¹²⁶³ In addition to personal visits and discussions with municipal leaders, UNDP letters about the competition 'rules' in appropriate languages were sent to every municipal president and UN representative on 01 September 2003.¹²⁶⁴

¹²⁶¹ Telephone conversation with Mike Dixon, ISAC Programme Co-ordinator, 12 February 2004.

¹²⁶² Correspondence with UNDP ISAC staff, 16 February 2004.

¹²⁶³ Ibid

¹²⁶⁴ Telephone conversation with Mike Dixon, ISAC Programme Co-ordinator, 12 February 2004.

¹²⁶⁵ Montenegro SALW Survey, SAS 2004, p 35.

¹²⁶⁶ Telephone interview with Kaca Djurickovic, SALW Project Assistant, UNDP Podgorica, 12 February 2004.

¹²⁶⁷ Author's discussions with Red Cross staff, January and Spring 2002.

Table 43 – SALW awareness activities

CAMPAIGN AND IMPLEMENTER	DURATION	TARGET GROUP	METHODS	INDICATORS OF SUCCESS	DONOR
Akcija NGO Network 'Farewell to Arms' AR campaign	February – March 2003	General public	Radio and TV advertisements, media coverage.	Small Arms Survey research into public opinion: the campaign was quite 'powerful' and 'high intensity'. ¹²⁶⁵	USAID/ORT (US\$70,000 was spent on the AR campaign, hotline, assoc. activities). ¹²⁶⁶
Yugoslav Red Cross 'For Life – Without Weapons' campaign,	September 2001 – March 2002	Children, youth and general public.	TV advertisements, leaflets, posters and other materials.	Red Cross internal assessments are that the campaign generated a lot of interest, and may have contributed to reduced levels of celebratory firing over New Year 2001/2002. ¹²⁶⁷	Norwegian Red Cross.
SEESAC AR in support of Serbian March – April 2003 amnesty	March – April 2003	General public	Posters, TV spots and discussions, leaflets and billboards.	The substantial number of weapons surrendered and legalised during the amnesty.	SEESAC, US\$50,000 (Serbian national broadcasting and postal services provided free of charge).
UNDP Kosovo AR in support of September 2003 amnesty	August – September 2003	General public	Distribution of posters, billboards, leaflets, fact-sheets and TV/radio announcements and discussion; public sporting and children's events and concert; personal discussion and informing of municipal authorities.	NA	UNDP funds of US\$75,000 for production of campaign materials; Canadian Government funds of US\$66,000 for NGO activities and events.

SALW survey activities

Republic of Montenegro

A SALW survey was conducted in Montenegro in late 2003 by a team of researchers from the Small Arms Survey NGO.¹²⁶⁸ Funded and recently published by SEESAC, the survey included four main components – a small arms distribution survey, a small arms impact survey, a small arms perception survey and a small arms capacity survey – and is thus the first survey undertaken in the region in accordance with the recently-drafted SALW Survey Protocols and SEESAC Regional Micro-Disarmament Standard (RMDS) 05.80. Conducted with the aim of establishing the extent of the problem in Montenegro to inform the design of future SALW control interventions in the republic, survey sources included key informant interviews, a household survey and focus groups, a media review and public health data.

Republic of Serbia

No thorough survey on SALW has been undertaken in Serbia, and the quality and quantity of information available on SALW issues is therefore in general quite low. Two opinion polls were conducted in 2003, among the general population in southern Serbia and youth in Belgrade by the SMMRI and Balkan Youth Union respectively. The reports of both surveys are available from SEESAC.

The Entity of Kosovo

A SALW survey was conducted in Kosovo by the Small Arms Survey in 2003.¹²⁶⁹ 'Kosovo and the Gun: a Baseline Assessment of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Kosovo', was undertaken to more clearly identify SALW-related problems in the entity and to gain more information on possible methods of collecting SALW for the UNDP office in Pristina. Incorporating the results of a small arms baseline assessment household survey, and based on desk and field research, the survey includes information on: perceptions of security and security providers; the number of weapons in the entity; weapons trafficking across Kosovo's borders; gun culture and weapons regulations, and the direct and indirect effects of guns in Kosovo. One area that should have been addressed in more detail during this survey was the question of what incentives would be potentially most effective in the community with individuals in encouraging voluntary surrender during an amnesty.¹²⁷⁰

Civil Society involvement in SALW interventions

Although in general civil society capacity in the SCG and Kosovo remains poor, there are a number of NGOs which have undertaken work on SALW and which have capacity for further work, given funding and opportunity. Until recently, NGO work on SALW or security issues was very limited, mostly consisting of local think tank or academic input into military reform and legislation development,¹²⁷¹ or research conducted

¹²⁶⁸ Montenegro SALW Survey, SAS 2004, Executive Summary.

¹²⁶⁹ Kosovo and the Gun, SAS 2003.

¹²⁷⁰ Correspondence with Adrian Wilkinson, SEESAC Team Leader, 16 February 2004.

¹²⁷¹ For example, the Belgrade-based Centre for Civil-Military Relations has worked with the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces and the SCG Government on advising on military restructuring.

by international NGOs.¹²⁷² In the last few years this has changed, and more grass roots NGOs are now active on SALW-related issues. The SCG report on the UN PoA admits that government co-operation with civil society has in general been ad hoc, but notes that 'efforts have been made... to increase participation of all segments of the population in the education and information in this field' and that 'a new quality will be given to co-operation with a civil society, in particular with NGOs'.¹²⁷³

A similar situation exists in relation to media capacity, which in general is fairly low when it comes to reporting SALW issues. However media outlets, both local and national, have been extremely active in support of the amnesty and collection campaigns in Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo, giving the initiatives much-needed publicity. A media training event was held in Serbia in December 2002, a regional seminar organised by SEESAC, and sub-regional events in Skopje in May 2003 (organised by Saferworld, SEESAC and IWPR) and in Sarajevo in September 2003 (organised by Saferworld and IWPR) involved journalists from Kosovo and southern Serbia, and Montenegro and Serbia respectively.

Republic of Montenegro

In Montenegro, NGO action on SALW has mainly been limited to the fairly successful campaign to support the March to May 2003 government amnesty and collection. The main vehicle for NGO involvement was the Akcija Network, a coalition of about 50 NGOs committed to social, legal and political reform in Montenegro, which used its substantial media contacts and capacities to disseminate and broadcast campaign messages and information, overseeing the majority of the public media-covered activities during the amnesty. The Centre for Democratic Transition NGO was also involved in operating the surrender 'hotline', through which citizens could request police collection of their weapons, and NGO representatives accompanied the police collection 'teams' to ensure procedures were respected and build confidence in the initiative. In addition to Akcija NGOs, there is relatively little civil society capacity to work on SALW, though some will exist and the UNDP conducted a training seminar for local NGOs on SALW from 17 – 19 May 2003.¹²⁷⁴ Montenegrin NGOs have been involved in regional NGO SALW activities and trainings,¹²⁷⁵ and representatives of Montenegrin media have participated in sub-regional trainings to improve reporting on SALW.¹²⁷⁶

Republic of Serbia

NGO activities on SALW in Serbia began rather sooner than in many SEE countries, with the then Yugoslav Red Cross, now SCG Red Cross Society, 'For Life – Without Weapons' awareness-raising campaign in Autumn 2001. The campaign is detailed above, but was a significant step forward, both in terms of regional NGOs tackling a 'new' area and NGO–Government co-operation. SCG Red Cross follow-up activities also supported the March – April 2003 government amnesty. Since the 2001 Red Cross campaign,

1272 Such as Saferworld, BICC, Small Arms Survey, etc.

1273 SCG UN PoA report, 2003.

1274 Funded from SEESAC core funding, the UNDP Podgorica seminar 'Small Arms and Light Weapons - NGO Training' gave over 20 individuals from ten NGOs based in Albania, BiH, Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro, two regional and one international NGOs, a chance to learn more about the problem of SALW proliferation. 'UNDP Podgorica/SEESAC SALW NGO Training', SEESAC Activity Report AR/005, 19 May 2003, www.seesac.org.

1275 Meetings organised by Saferworld in Szeged, in November 2002, and Sarajevo, in September 2003, included representatives of Montenegrin NGOs.

1276 Montenegrin journalists participated in a SEESAC media training held in October 2002, and a Saferworld training in Sarajevo September 2003.

however, activities have been more limited, with the notable exception of the Balkan Youth Union (BYU), a Belgrade-based youth group, which has undertaken research into youth perceptions of SALW and awareness-raising in schools with SEESAC funding in 2003. Both the SCG Red Cross and the BYU have been active in regional NGO networks, and have participated in regional network meetings and trainings.¹²⁷⁷

International NGOs such as Saferworld (which has two staff based in Belgrade) and BICC have also been active in Serbia, holding seminars with government ministries and implementing research projects.

The Entity of Kosovo

NGO activities on SALW in Kosovo were originally linked to youth work funded by UNDP, through the Kosovar Youth Network NGO, which identified SALW as a major concern of Kosovar youth. Following these activities, the issue was picked up by the US Balkan Sunflowers NGO, which runs operations with local members in Kosovo, and who produced a video documentary on SALW filmed and produced by local youth. The video, 'In the Hands of Youth', highlighted the serious proliferation of SALW among young people in Kosovo, and the 'taboo' on discussing the issue of weapons. This work was built on by local NGOs such as the Forum for Civic Initiatives (FIQ), which worked to disseminate information and anti-gun messages among youth in the entity.

The UNDP ISAC project and September 2003 amnesty in Kosovo provided an opportunity for more action on SALW, and a training of Kosovar NGOs was held with Saferworld in April 2003. Various NGOs and civil society organisations were active in August and September 2003. The NGOs War Child and Lipjan Youth Centre were active, organising a parade and poetry and drawing competition for children respectively. Sporting events were organised by the Kosovo Centre for International Co-operation and the Pristina Youth Centre, which also organised film nights, produced a TV documentary on SALW, disseminated information at market days and to youth, and organised a concert to launch the amnesty. The Kosovo Action for Civic Initiatives organised public discussions in town halls and four TV debates on SALW. The Gender Research and Training Centre organised roundtables with women and others in rural areas, and the magazine Srpsko Slovo undertook small-scale research and carried feature articles on SALW.¹²⁷⁸

International NGOs have also been active in Kosovo, particularly given the large international presence. In addition to the work noted above undertaken by Balkan Sunflowers and Saferworld, international NGOs have also been involved in research, with reports produced by the Small Arms Survey, Saferworld and BICC.

¹²⁷⁷ Meetings organised by Saferworld in Szeged, in November 2002, Ohrid, in April 2003, Sarajevo, in September 2003, and Skopje in December 2003, included representatives of Montenegrin NGOs.

¹²⁷⁸ Correspondence with UNDP ISAC staff, 16 February 2004.

Cross-border SALW control initiatives

The SCG Government states that there is 'a high level of co-operation on SALW-related issues among the countries in the region, particularly in the field of trans-border customs cooperation', noting that 'the relevant authorities exchange information in this connection with a view to preventing illegal trade in small arms'.¹²⁷⁹ It appears, however, that there are problems with co-operation across the administrative border with Kosovo and SCG statements noting that co-operation with international authorities in Kosovo needs to be strengthened, and that additional international resources should be devoted to SALW control in Kosovo.¹²⁸⁰ The Government admits there have been cases of illicit trafficking in SALW across SCG borders, and highlights the Kosovo borders, particularly in southern Serbia, as being problem areas,¹²⁸¹ claims which do have some basis.¹²⁸²

There has however been progress on co-operation with the authorities in Kosovo, and in addition to police co-operation,¹²⁸³ meetings concerning border control have been held between SCG officials and military and representatives of the European Union, OSCE and KFOR: 'the required co-operation was established and the problems that have to be solved in the future were identified. Furthermore, the need to train border guards and to modernize communication equipment was underlined'.¹²⁸⁴ The Montenegrin Ministry of the Interior also signed an agreement on fighting organised crime with UNMIK and Albania in November 2003,¹²⁸⁵ following the agreement reached two months earlier with the Albanian Ministry of Public Order on the exchange of security information and organisation of joint operations to combat various forms of trafficking and border-related crime.¹²⁸⁶ Serbia is also stepping up co-operation with neighbouring countries, and signed an inter-governmental memorandum on co-operation to combat organised crime and trafficking with Bulgaria in September 2003.¹²⁸⁷

SCG also participates in various regional co-operation fora and mechanisms for law enforcement: Serbia recently signed the Council of Europe Convention on the Fight Against Organised Crime, and participated in the meeting of the Southeast Europe Police Chiefs Association in December 2003, where the heads of police from across the region discussed ways to improve regional co-operation in organised crime fighting, among other topics.¹²⁸⁸ SCG, as one of the countries committed to the Ohrid Border Security and Management Common Platform, has outlined a number of short-term objectives under this framework, including drafting of a new law on state borders and

1279 SCG UN PoA statement, 2003.

1280 Ibid

1281 The Kosovo border was also a concern highlighted in the FRY statement at the UN 2001 SALW conference. SCG UN PoA report, 2003, and, Statement by Mr Stevan Nikcevic, Assistant Federal Minister for Internal Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Head of the Yugoslav Delegation, UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, New York, 12 July 2001.

1282 Such claims do have a basis in the current system operated by UNMIK. While UNMIK customs has been operating since 1999 for the purposes of revenue collection, until 2002 the service had no 'protection of society mandate' to interdict shipments of drugs, arms etc, and this was the task of the border police, who do not generally check vehicles, only people, at border crossings: 'as a result, there is at present no concerted and effective effort to stem small arms trafficking at the border crossings'. This will however soon change with the introduction of EU-compliant Customs Law, a new customs computer system and mobile anti-smuggling units. Kosovo and the Gun, SAS 2003, p 28.

1283 In a joint action in late 2003, co-operation between Serbian and UNMIK police resulted in the freeing of two Albanians kidnapped during their stay in Serbia. 'UN, Serbian police arrest kidnappers of two Kosovo Albanian businessmen', Daily Media Review, 03 December, www.seesac.org.

1284 SCG UN PoA report, 2003.

1285 03 November 2003, Weekly Media Review 28 October - 03 November 2003, www.seesac.org.

1286 26 September 2003, Weekly Media Review 22 - 29 September 2003, www.seesac.org.

1287 29 September 2003, Weekly Media Review 22 - 29 September 2003, www.seesac.org.

1288 'Regional Conferences on Co-operation in Interior, Judicial Sectors Held', Daily Media Review 10 December 2003, and, 10 October 2003, Weekly Media Review 06 - 13 October 2003, www.seesac.org.

transfer of authority for border security and establishing an efficient, complete and integrated border control system and border security based on Schengen principles. SCG reports that 'intense co-operation has been established with border services (police) in neighbouring and other countries... co-operation with foreign liaison officers is especially significant for exchange of information', and that the Border Police are taking various action on trafficking, including forming a special police team, participating in training courses and appointing a national anti-trafficking co-ordinator.¹²⁸⁹ A new department within the MoI has been established in Montenegro, and a border security projects for the republic has been developed.¹²⁹⁰ International co-operation is also increasing, with links to the law enforcement agencies of countries such as the US and Australia deepening in the last year.¹²⁹¹

In terms of future action in this area, the SCG Government states that 'regional co-operation will be promoted in all its aspects related to SALW',¹²⁹² although it 'would welcome more assistance in areas of training and capacity building of our border control and customs service and for upgrading their communication and other equipment'.¹²⁹³

SALW management information and exchange systems and protocols

In terms of regional and international information exchange, SCG is a member of the SECI Regional Centre for Combating Transborder Crime, and exchanges information with other SECI states through the Centre and its law enforcement officer secondment there. SCG is also a member of Interpol and through this mechanism engages in 'appropriate co-operation and information exchange with a view to suppressing illicit trafficking in SALW'.¹²⁹⁴ The country has also begun negotiation on a co-operation agreement with Europol.¹²⁹⁵ UNMIK international police also exchange information with Interpol, mainly on a case-by-case basis, within the framework of an MoU signed with the Interpol general secretariat.¹²⁹⁶

SCG complies with OSCE obligations in terms of information exchange submissions on SALW, and submitted a report to the 2003 Biennial Meeting of States in accordance with the UN PoA, although the detail in the report was relatively vague. The report did note however that, in addition to OSCE submissions, SCG also exchanges information on SALW 'with the countries of the region and beyond'.¹²⁹⁷

Unfortunately, little transparency exists on SALW issues in SCG. Researchers working in Montenegro note that, although officials at the Ministry of Internal Affairs are very forthcoming on the details of the recent amnesty, 'they are, for the most part, reluctant to discuss other subjects that pertain to the illegal possession of weapons within

1289 'Way Forward Document', Ohrid Regional Conference on Border Security and Management, 22 - 23 May 2003.

1290 Ibid

1291 For example, in October 2003, the Australian Federal Police Bureau opened regional headquarters in Belgrade, with the aim of increasing co-operation in the fight against organised crime. 09 October 2003, Weekly Media Review 06 - 13 October 2003, www.seesac.org.

1292 SCG UN PoA report, 2003.

1293 SCG UN PoA statement, 2003.

1294 SCG UN PoA report, 2003.

1295 'Europol annual report and work programme for 2004', News article May 2003, www.statewatch.org, referenced 22 January 2004.

1296 www.interpol.int.

1297 SCG UN PoA report, 2003.

Montenegro, and the lack of transparency is an issue that hinders progress on the issue'.¹²⁹⁸ A similar situation exists in Serbia: although there has been a positive level of transparency and discussion on destruction events and the 2003 amnesty, sparse information on SALW, such as stocks and estimates of legally and illegally held weapons is publicly available. Nevertheless, the Republic of Serbia has allowed full monitoring and verification of its SALW and ammunition destruction in 2003/4, primarily by SEESAC, but also in part by a local NGO, the European Movement (Zrenjanin chapter).

On a positive note, it seems that transparency on SALW may improve, as the SCG Government has stated that in the future, 'particular attention will be paid to informing the public and to information exchange with countries in the region. Interest in such co-operation is huge'.¹²⁹⁹

As host to SEESAC the SCG Government has been very supportive of SEESAC activities, and has never interfered in, or tried to influence, SEESAC's work. This is a clear indicator of their political will in this area.¹³⁰⁰

Table 44 – Information and exchange progress

INFORMATION AND EXCHANGE SYSTEMS AND PROTOCOLS	SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO
International	
Reporting to the UN DDA on the Programme of Action	Yes ¹³⁰¹
Reporting to the UN Register of Conventional Arms	Yes
Reporting to other international regimes, if appropriate (eg Wassenaar Arrangement)	-
Interpol/Europol	Yes ¹³⁰²
Regional	
Information exchange with OSCE	Yes
Annual reporting to EU (if relevant)	-
SECI Regional Center intelligence exchange	Yes
National	
Transparency – on SALW imports, exports and decision-making	No
Publication of national reports on arms/SALW transfers	No
Publication of SALW national strategy	No

1298 The Small Arms Survey finds that currently, 'the greatest obstacle to improved regulation of weapons as well as a clear picture of official gun holding in Montenegro is the government's lack of transparency surrounding the SALW issue'; Montenegro SALW Survey, SAS 2004, pp 38 and 43. BICC also observe that there is limited information available and transparency in Montenegro; BICC Conversion Survey 2002, p 137.

1299 SCG UN PoA report, 2003.

1300 Correspondence with Adrian Wilkinson, SEESAC Team Leader, 16 February 2004.

1301 SCG submitted a report to the Biennial Meeting of States on the UN PoA in 2003; the level of detail in the report was, however, relatively vague.

1302 SCG is a member of Interpol and, as noted above, it is also negotiating a co-operation agreement with Europol. UNMIK has also signed an MoU with Interpol.