



# **1 Introduction**

## **1 SALW problem in South Eastern Europe**

The proliferation and illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) is a serious problem in many parts of the world, fuelling crime, generating insecurity and undermining conflict prevention and peace building efforts. The countries of South Eastern Europe (SEE), some of which have experienced violent conflict, and all of which remain in transition, have been faced with many of these problems in recent years.

To date, all SEE countries, whether for reasons associated with the outbreak of violent conflict, or because of the challenges associated with state-building and the transition from Communist to liberal-democratic systems of governance, have struggled to maintain adequate controls over SALW. In many countries, factors such as poor police performance, corruption and the growth of organised crime have contributed to the illicit possession and trafficking of SALW as well as to their misuse. Inadequate state regulation of international arms transfers has posed an additional concern, with weapons leaving the region for sensitive destinations, including to conflict zones without adequate safeguards on several occasions. Additional difficulties with co-operation and information exchange that continue to hamper progress both within countries at the departmental and ministerial level, as well as across the region, have also been evident.

## **2 SALW policy and practice in South Eastern Europe**

Over the last five years, commitments made by SEE governments to a range of SALW-related initiatives have encouraged action to better control the availability, use and trade in such weapons by providing policy frameworks and guidance for practical measures at the national level. These include, variously, the OSCE Documents on SALW and on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition; the UN Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials ('Firearms Protocol'); the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALW in All Its Aspects; the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports; and an agreement specifically tailored for the states of the region, the Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan 'Combating the Proliferation of SALW'.

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT OR INSTRUMENT	ALBANIA	BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	BULGARIA <sup>1</sup>	CROATIA <sup>2</sup>	FYR MACEDONIA	MOLDOVA	MONTENEGRO <sup>3</sup>	ROMANIA <sup>4</sup>	SERBIA
EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports <sup>5</sup>	2003	2002	1998	2001	2004	2005	2005	1998	2005
OSCE Document on SALW <sup>6</sup>	2000	2000	2000	2000	2000	2000	NO	2000	2000
OSCE Document on Conventional Ammunition <sup>7</sup>	2003	2003	2003	2003	2003	2003	NO	2003	2003
OSCE Decision on MANPADS <sup>8</sup>	2003	2003	2003	2003	2003	2003	NO	2003	2003
OSCE Decision on EUC <sup>9</sup>	2004	2004	2004	2004	2004	2004	NO	2004	2004
OSCE Decision on Brokering <sup>10</sup>	2004	2004	2004	2004	2004	2004	NO	2004	2004
SCSP Regional Implementation Plan <sup>11</sup>	2001	2001	2001	2001	2001	2001	2001	2001	2001
UN Firearms Protocol <sup>12</sup>	NO	NO	2002	2004	(2005) <sup>13</sup>	2006	NO	2004	2006
UN Programme of Action on SALW <sup>14</sup>	2001	2001	2001	2001	2001	2001	NO	2001	2001
Wassenaar Arrangement (MANPADS) <sup>15</sup>	NO	NO	2000	2005	NO <sup>16</sup>	NO	NO	2000	NO

<sup>1</sup> Entered the Wassenaar Arrangement in 1996.

<sup>2</sup> Entered the Wassenaar Arrangement in 2005.

<sup>3</sup> Serbia is the successor state to the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro in terms of international agreements and treaties entered into. Montenegro has still to apply for membership of the UN and OSCE; when their membership is accepted they will then be able to accept their commitments under the various regional agreements. Montenegro will also have to formally ratify the UN Firearms Protocol as an independent member state, although it is bound by the SCSP Regional Implementation Plan, having played a role in Stability Pact regional meetings.

<sup>4</sup> Entered the Wassenaar Arrangement in 1996.

<sup>5</sup> EU Code of Conduct for Arms Exports, 08 June 1998.

<sup>6</sup> OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, FSC.JOUR/314, 24 November 2000.

<sup>7</sup> OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition, FSC.DOC/1/03, 19 November 2003.

<sup>8</sup> OSCE Decision on Man-Portable Air Defence Systems, Decision No. 7/03, FSC.DEC/07/03, 23 July 2003.

<sup>9</sup> OSCE Decision on Standard Elements of End User Certificates and Verification procedures for SALW Exports, Decision No. 5/04, FSC.DEC/5/04, 17 November 2004.

<sup>10</sup> OSCE Decision on Principles on the Control of Brokering in SALW, Decision No. 8/04, FSC.DEC/8/04, 24 November 2004.

<sup>11</sup> Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan – Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons, 28 November 2001, (Revised 15 May 2006).

<sup>12</sup> Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (the Firearms Protocol), entered into Force on 03 July 2005.

<sup>13</sup> FYR Macedonia expressed an 'Intent to Ratify', but this has not yet happened.

<sup>14</sup> United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, UN Document A/CONF.192/15, July 2001.

<sup>15</sup> Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, Elements for Export Controls of Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS). Agreed at the WA Plenary, 01 December 2000.

<sup>16</sup> FYR Macedonia expressed an 'Interest' in being invited to join the Wassenaar Arrangement, but have not yet been invited to join by the members.

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT OR INSTRUMENT	ALBANIA	BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	BULGARIA <sup>1</sup>	CROATIA <sup>2</sup>	FYR MACEDONIA	MOLDOVA	MONTENEGRO <sup>3</sup>	ROMANIA <sup>4</sup>	SERBIA
Wassenaar Arrangement (Brokering) <sup>17</sup>	NO	NO	2003	2005	NO	NO	NO	2003	NO
Wassenaar Arrangement (Exports) <sup>18</sup>	NO	NO	2003	2005	NO	NO	NO	2003	NO

**Table 1: SEE Countries' commitments to arms or SALW control agreements**

Agreed by the South Eastern European Stability Pact states in November 2001, and subsequently revised in May 2006, the Regional Implementation Plan provides concrete mechanisms for assisting countries' implementation of commitments and involving those governments in priority setting and decision-making on region-wide efforts. Eight South Eastern European countries have declared their support for the plan – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Romania and Serbia and Montenegro. The newly independent Montenegro now makes this nine participating states. A Regional Steering Group (RSG) composed of representatives from all governments involved (National Focal Points), and observers from key organisations or agencies provides guidance on the Plan's implementation and oversees the work of the 'Clearinghouse' that was set up to provide additional practical assistance for governments. The South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for SALW Control (SEESAC) was established in May 2002 in order to facilitate and inform activities under the framework of the Plan. SEESAC, a joint project of the Stability Pact and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), is based in Belgrade and has the mandate to provide technical support, strategic guidance, develop best practice on the various areas of SALW control, and mobilise resources for projects in the region. The mandate of SEESAC was revised at the SCSP SALW Regional Steering Group meeting of 15 May 2006 to allow it to engage wider geographically and also in support of the demilitarisation and disposal of heavy weapons system within the region; it was re-titled the *South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for SALW Control* to reflect this, although the abbreviation SEESAC remains for administrative reasons.

As further described below, during 2005 - 2006, some states of the region (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) have belatedly begun to go beyond their declared alignment to international instruments such as the Regional Implementation Plan and have established national commissions for SALW control, or national strategies to guide such work. These steps have by and large been taken only after strong input from international actors, and the sustainability of structures and plans created at their behest remains in each case to be proven. Nevertheless, the prospect of enhanced co-ordination and planning on SALW control in those countries that have taken such steps is certainly to be welcomed.

<sup>17</sup> Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, Elements for Effective Legislation on Arms Brokering. Agreed at the WA Plenary, 2003.

<sup>18</sup> Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, Best Practice Guidelines for Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). Adopted at the WA Plenary of 11-12 December 2002.

### 3 Monitoring progress on combating SALW: SEE SALW Monitor 2006

The purpose of this report is to provide an overview of how the countries of South Eastern Europe have progressed towards fulfilling their commitments on SALW control, with particular reference to those made under the Regional Implementation Plan. The report does not represent a technical verification system or a formal inspection report – its purpose is to collect relevant information and to present it in an organised way in order to facilitate monitoring, discussion and assessment of progress on SALW control. As the region moves gradually closer towards full integration into European structures and the outstanding territorial and constitutional dilemmas in territories such as FYR Macedonia and the UN Administered Territory of Kosovo<sup>19</sup> have come to be addressed, it becomes increasingly important to monitor states' progress towards those regional and international norms on SALW control to which they are committed. In this context, wherever the declared policy of states diverges from practice, the difference becomes ever more stark, and the need for remedial action more urgent.

Funded by SEESAC, the research and writing of the report was undertaken by Saferworld, an independent non-governmental organisation based in London, together with a number of research partners from SEE. The contents therefore reflect an independent and objective presentation of factual information on SEE countries' responses to SALW problems within the Regional Implementation Plan framework. The steps taken by the governments of the region to address these are described both below, and in the country-specific chapters that follow in more detail. Areas of progress as well as inaction are clearly highlighted. This third edition of the report builds on previous research carried out in 2003/4 and 2004/5, but has been compiled using information collected during fresh research from February to May 2006. Given that previous editions have sufficiently explored the existing regulatory arrangements of states in the region, this year's report concentrates more heavily on identifying the unresolved problems facing SEE countries, and detailing any concrete SALW control measures taken since the 2004/5 edition. As in previous years, a variety of primary and secondary sources have been used, including those individual government officials designated as 'National Focal Points' by their governments. Saferworld and SEESAC acknowledge that this report will have inevitable shortcomings due to constraints such as inaccessible information and limited time for research and production.

### 4 Progress to date – a regional overview

Given the varied nature of the SALW problems facing individual SEE countries, implementation of the Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan must ultimately be judged on a country-by-country basis. Accordingly, Section two of this report covers the progress made by each SEE government in the region. A summary of progress across the region by thematic area is also however, provided below.

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<sup>19</sup> Referred to as Kosovo in the remainder of this Chapter.

## 4.1 Legislative and Regulatory Issues

### Transfer controls

Given the EU's progressive role in international arms transfer control (the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports was agreed in 1998, while support for an international Arms Transfer Treaty (ATT) was declared in mid-2005) the introduction of robust regulation in this area should be one of the highest priorities for SEE states, most of whom aspire to join the organisation in the coming years. Yet, little or no progress has occurred in this area during 2005/6, despite the support of international actors.<sup>20</sup> Previous National SALW Surveys, coupled with ongoing research into the arms transfer regulations of Western Balkans states, highlight remaining gaps in policy, (e.g. no government has followed the EU lead to declare support for an ATT), administration and practice in all countries of the region despite the introduction of new legislation on transfers in previous years. Common challenges across the region include a lack of provision for end-use monitoring and verification of transfers; a failure to control brokers; a poor institutional basis for case-by-case risk assessment of arms transfer licence applications; and a failure to properly reference the EU Code of Conduct, or similar language, in national legislation. More sophisticated considerations, such as the licensed production of weapons, their transit, retransfer or transshipment are not taken into account in many cases. It also remains difficult to assess how well policy and practice match in this area since no SEE state has thus far produced public reports on its arms transfers on a regular basis, despite technical support having already been provided in this area.<sup>21</sup>

### Domestic possession and use

Legislation governing civilian weapons possession is now similar in all SEE countries with civilian possession of sporting, hunting and self-defence weapons being regulated using licences. The enforcement of civilian possession laws is too often poor however, and self-defence licences appear in many cases to be issued without the application of strict and objective assessments of the threats facing applicants. The countries of the Western Balkans are particularly troubled by high levels of illicit SALW possession, while poor licensing controls feature more widely in the region. During 2005/6, only Bulgaria and Kosovo have reported amendments to their legislation and supporting their regulations in this area, though the Government of FYR Macedonia has begun preparations for the introduction of new legislation in early January 2007.

## 4.2 SALW Collection programmes and capacities

With the exception of a two-week amnesty held within only one municipality in Kosovo, no voluntary SALW Collection programmes have been run in SEE during 2005/6. Instead, most states have relied on the seizure of unregistered weapons during policing operations.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> For example, 'South Eastern Europe Regional Seminar: Towards NATO and EU Accession: Effective Export Control Legislation - Lessons Learned', a SEESAC-sponsored seminar, 08 June 2005.

<sup>21</sup> A regional seminar in Belgrade on 08 - 09 February 2006 brought governmental representatives from across the region together to examine EU standards in this area, 'Arms Exports Reporting Seminar', SEESAC Activity Report 064, 08 February 2006.

<sup>22</sup> A partial exception to this is the Republic of Moldova, where a rolling amnesty arrangement allows those holding unregistered weapons to surrender them to police at any time without charge.

### 4.3 SALW Destruction programmes and capacities

According to available information, destruction of weapons and ammunition has been most rapid during 2005/6 in Albania and BiH, both of which have sizeable surplus stocks and are reliant on outside support. Lesser, but still significant numbers of weapons and ammunition (mainly items seized from civilians) have also been reported destroyed in Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Moldova and Serbia. However, although all countries in the region are committed under the UN PoA and OSCE Document on SALW to dispose of surplus weapons by destruction, it appears that in many cases large surplus stocks remain stockpiled or are being sold to foreign buyers (BiH, Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia). Due to poor transparency, the situation as regards SALW Destruction in Kosovo remains unknown.

### 4.4 SALW Stockpile Management programmes and practices

Only FYR Macedonia has reported upgrades to stockpile management practices or standards during the previous year. Nevertheless, an accidental detonation at an ammunition storage depot in Albania during the year served to highlight once again the need for continued improvements in this area.

### 4.5 SALW Awareness activities

2005/6 has seen a drop-off in traditional forms of SALW Awareness initiatives, since those typically carried out to support SALW Collection initiatives have not occurred. Project and one-off activities have however taken place in Albania, BiH, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. For the most part, NGO activists associated with the South East European Network on Arms Control (SEENCA) have conducted these activities, working variously in schools (BiH) and through the media (Albania, BiH, FYR Macedonia, Kosovo and Serbia). Additional activities during the year include a SEESAC-supported regional campaign against the use of weapons during celebrations in four countries,<sup>23</sup> and a one-day film festival, also organised by SEESAC in Belgrade. Further, an educational specialist has been hired by SEESAC to work with Ministries of Education across the region and examine the feasibility of including SALW Risk Education in national school curricula. In Kosovo, with the support of UNDP, SALW Awareness work is already underway in a number of schools.

### 4.6 SALW Survey activities

With the exception of Romania, SALW Surveys have now been carried out in all SEE states. During 2005/6, SALW Surveys were completed in Albania (Saferworld), Bulgaria (Centre for the Study of Democracy / Saferworld), Moldova (Institute for Public Policy / Saferworld) and Serbia (Saferworld). Similar research is now being conducted in Croatia by the Bonn International Center for Conversion, and Kosovo, by Saferworld. In addition, the past year has seen a renewed focus on related problem areas such as the phenomena of gun culture (examined by the Bulgaria-based Centre for the Study of Democracy); the privatisation of security (the subject of a SEESAC-commissioned study by International Alert and Saferworld 'SALW and Private Security Companies (PSC) in SEE: 'A Cause or Effect of Insecurity?'); and

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<sup>23</sup> 'SALW Film Festival, Republic of Serbia', SEESAC Activity Report 067, 03 - 05 April 2006. This included the screening of a documentary produced in summer 2005 covering issues of illicit SALW possession and misuse in the Western Balkans 'A Lethal Legacy'.

the administrative and legislative readiness of five Western Balkan states to comply with EU norms and standards on arms transfer control (Saferworld).

#### **4.7 Civil society involvement in SALW interventions**

In many respects 2005/6 has been the year of SEE civil society with respect to SALW control. While progress in so many other areas has been slight, the NGO sector in the region in particular has flourished. SEENCA members in particular, though few in number, have been active at the regional, national and community level on SALW issues. In contrast to previous years, substantial research and advocacy work has also been carried out by organisations based in the region, as well as the monitoring of SALW Destructions. All such work however, remains dependent on a narrow funding base, and appears to have no roots in broader civil society, with journalists and academics not having taken an active interest in SALW issues.

#### **4.8 Cross-border SALW control initiatives**

Most countries in the region continue to experience border management problems, and regional trafficking of SALW is known to have taken place on several occasions during the year. The challenge of cross-border co-ordination against trafficking continues to be made more difficult by a lack of internal co-ordination between different ministries and departments responsible for border control and security. However, ongoing support by governments and international donors for the establishment and operation of integrated border management systems in line with EU practice clearly points the way ahead.

#### **4.9 SALW Management Information and exchange systems and protocols**

Within established international fora such as the UN (UNDDA) and OSCE, information exchange by SEE states has been regular during 2005/6 (see Table 2 below) though as always, the quality and detail of information provided has varied. Outside these established channels, the situation differs markedly. For example, Saferworld's analysis of the reports submitted by states participating in the SECI Centre's Operation Safe Place, in which national law enforcement agencies from the region exchanged information on SALW seizures, showed significant variance in the depth and regularity of national reports.<sup>24</sup> As previously noted, no states have provided public reports on arms transfers during the last year and little additional public information has been provided. Moreover, as yet no governments have full parliamentary oversight on SALW policy development and export licence decision-making, and there is an ongoing need for NGO and parliamentary lobbying for increased transparency on SALW issues.

With notable exceptions such as Albania, BiH and Bulgaria, whether for reasons of low capacity or political will, the designated National Focal Points of only a few countries provided information in a full and timely manner for the 2006 SALW Monitor report, clearly demonstrating that problems remain with the NFP system established under the Regional Implementation Plan. Despite the revision of the plan in May 2006, the poor attendance of countries such as Bulgaria and Romania at Regional Steering Group meetings as compared

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<sup>24</sup> The Southeast Europe Cooperative Initiative (SECI) Regional Centre for Combating Transborder Crime ran its second information exchange on SALW seizures, 'Operation SafePlace' from March until September 2005.

with their neighbours underlines a growing divergence of approach between those states hopeful of integration into the EU within the near future, and those who are still keen to operate within a regional framework. It seems increasingly clear that tailored approaches are needed by international actors who deal with all states in the region, to more fully take account of the particular needs and conditions of each state.

COUNTRY	UN PoA REPORT	OSCE REPORT	ATTENDANCE AT RSG MEETINGS <sup>25</sup>	
			NFP <sup>26</sup>	REP <sup>27</sup>
<b>Albania</b>	NO	YES	0/5	3/5
<b>BiH</b>	YES	YES	1/5	4/5
<b>Bulgaria</b>	YES	YES	0/5	3/5
<b>Croatia</b>	YES	YES	2/5	3/5
<b>FYRoM</b>	YES	YES	3/5	2/5
<b>Kosovo</b> <sup>28</sup>	-	-	0/5	1/5
<b>Moldova</b>	YES	YES	1/5	1/5
<b>Romania</b>	YES	YES	0/5	3/5
<b>SCG</b>	YES	YES	3/5	1/5

**Table 2: Information exchange during 2005/6<sup>29</sup>**

## 5 Future priorities

This third assessment of SALW control activities undertaken in SEE suggests that during 2005/6, far too little has been done by the states of the region to meet the full range of commitments made under the original 2001 Stability Pact RIP. Certainly the capacity of SEE governments and civil society organisations to work on SALW has improved over the five-year period, but progress has if anything slowed over the last year, with fewer practical measures having been implemented. Although the resources available to fund SALW control initiatives could always be greater, with the ongoing presence of SEESAC within the region, and donor funding for SALW control initiatives having been offered bilaterally, and through the EU, OSCE and UNDP, a failure of political will is the most obvious explanation for states' inertia. Given the outstanding challenges facing the governments of the region, it is imperative that they collectively refocus their attention on these immediate priorities:


<sup>25</sup> From May 2003.

<sup>26</sup> Nominated National Focal Point attended personally.

<sup>27</sup> Representative attended.

<sup>28</sup> The UN Administered Territory of Kosovo is shown separately for illustrative purposes in terms of the SALW situation within the territory.

<sup>29</sup> Information obtained via correspondence with Anton Martynyuk, OSCE Secretariat, 31 May 2006.

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- Destruction of surplus weapons and ammunition at the earliest opportunity, in accordance with commitments made under the OSCE and UN PoA documents;
  - The establishment and adoption of mechanisms such as national commissions, strategies and action plans that enhance intra-governmental work on SALW control and provide a means to improve information exchange nationally and internationally;
  - Full participation in international fora and processes related to SALW control, such as the UN PoA review process;
  - Enhancements to governmental transparency in line with EU standards, in particular the publication of regular reports on arms surpluses and transfers; and
  - Development of the legislative and administrative bases necessary for upholding the highest regional and international standards with respect to arms transfer controls.

Considerable support and encouragement will clearly be needed from civil society and international actors such as the EU and UNDP if the momentum needed to see through the required changes to national SALW control policy and practice is to be achieved in the near future. For their part, international actors should work collectively to convey to the governments of the region the message that they will be held to the commitments they have made to enhance SALW controls, and that with adequate technical and financial support now on hand from donors, significant criticism will follow inaction where it can be attributed to failures of political will. Action by civil society groups to encourage governmental action may also prove vital in moving the SALW agenda forward in the region. While the continued development of the skill and interest of non-governmental actors in this sphere is therefore greatly welcome, future support for the still fragile civil society constituency working on SALW issues in SEE is still necessary to allow the small number of active organisations to consolidate their position and reach out to a broader range of actors.

The international community should clearly continue to support SALW control programmes in the region, but should require that any such programmes meet with international best practices, represent a well targeted response to problems, and are supported by a national SALW control strategy that has been prepared with substantial input from national governments. A commitment by all agencies that implement SALW control projects in the region to use existing best practice guidelines and build provisions for baseline research, monitoring and evaluation would provide a welcome boost to programme effectiveness and transparency. Given that the newly revised Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan, like its predecessor, does not include specific targets and benchmarks for success, these considerations are all the more important.

The increasing support of the EU for SALW control initiatives in the region during 2005/6 is one of the most important developments of the last year. Following the agreement by the Council of the EU of a '*Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition*' in December 2005, the EU has taken a number of useful steps to support enhanced SALW control. This includes the commitment of nearly three million Euros to fund practical initiatives on the ground, including the assignment of three full-time Chief Technical Advisers to support the work of national governments in Albania, Croatia and Kosovo. Further, both from Brussels and in-country Delegation offices, EU/EC representatives have begun to reference SALW-related questions in their Justice and

Home Affairs programmes and in political dialogues that occur within the framework of Stabilisation and Association Agreements.

The EU should continue, and wherever possible, increase its attention on SALW issues in the future. However, the experience of previous years suggests that a one-size fits all approach will not succeed in encouraging the governments of the region to take action. In both its political and programmatic work in the region on SALW therefore, the EU should look to provide support that is specifically tailored to the circumstances on the ground. Lessons should be drawn from the results of previous work in related areas, such as security, safety and access to justice programmes in designing these interventions, with a particular view to providing communities with adequate safety and security over the long-term, thereby reducing the underlying demand for SALW.

International donors and implementing agencies should also give additional consideration to questions of sustainability and local capacity building, which have not featured prominently enough in the work of international actors to date. Fresh approaches to this challenge should be considered, such as basing international Chief Technical Advisers in the offices of governmental NFPs, or hiring indigenous 'shadow' Technical Advisers until sufficient capacity has been built. This will be particularly important given that one of the main agents for past action in the region, SEESAC, has now acquired the mandate to work beyond the SEE region. As new countries come to draw on SEESAC's necessarily limited resources, the financial and technical support that the SEE region has been able to draw on in previous years may not now be available as consistently.

It is also critical that the approach adopted by governments and international actors supporting SALW control in the region keeps pace with the process of transition, changing over time to match the challenges presented at any given point in time. Accordingly, in order to achieve greater future policy coherence and impact in SEE, it is critical that SALW control as a theme is effectively integrated into broader security and justice sector reform and development planning. This is the responsibility of governments but also of international agencies that provide support in these areas. The inclusion of SALW control into EU dialogue in Albania, Croatia, FYR Macedonia and Kosovo are good examples that should be replicated across the region.

## 2 Country assessments

This report presents progress towards the Regional Implementation Plan by country. Each country sub-section includes two background sections: 'SALW problem', which details the SALW-related problems in each country, and 'SALW policy and practice', which gives an overview of current policy and practice on SALW.

These two sections are followed by a third section 'SALW progress', which gives a detailed assessment of progress made to date. In order to facilitate analysis of the wide-ranging areas in which progress towards the RIP and combating SALW proliferation has been made, a number of sub-sections have been used to categorise and present information on each country's progress so far (largely based on the functional areas defined by SEESAC). These sub-sections of SALW control activities are as follows:

- **Legislative and Regulatory Issues** – this section details countries' current legislative and regulatory control measures and progress made in the context of other agreements on arms control, such as the 2000 OSCE Document on Small Arms, 2001 UN Programme of Action, etc. (For more detail, please see Annex 4.3).
- **SALW Collection programmes and capacities** – this section provides an overview of SALW Collection initiatives in each country.
- **SALW Destruction programmes and capacities** – this section provides details of SALW and SALW ammunition destruction projects in each country.
- **SALW Stockpile Management programmes and capacities** – this section provides an overview of the stockpile security and management situation in each country.
- **SALW Awareness activities** – this section presents the awareness raising activities and public information campaigns implemented in each country. (Seminars, conferences and other meetings are not generally included in this section, which focuses more on direct SALW Awareness raising or information campaigns).
- **SALW Survey activities** – this section presents the results of any SALW or related survey conducted in each country. (Research reports, policy reports, needs assessments, small-scale surveys, opinion polls, etc., have not been included in this section as they do not fully correspond with a 'SALW Survey' as defined by SEESAC's regional standards).
- **Civil society involvement in SALW interventions** – this section provides an overview of civil society and NGO activities on SALW in each country, including a brief note on overall capacity.
- **Cross-border SALW control initiatives** – this section provides an overview of the situation in terms of border control and cross-border co-operation on SALW trafficking in each country.
- **SALW Management Information and exchange systems and protocols** – this section provides an overview of SALW-relevant information systems, both public and confidential; it should be noted that it is not possible to make any assessment of the value and efficacy of confidential information exchange mechanisms.