Note: This document was adopted at the 407th Plenary Meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation on 19 November 2003 (see FSC.JOUR/413).
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Annex I: Model questionnaire for a requesting State
Annex II: Model questionnaire for an assisting/donor State
Annex III: Illustration of the procedure for dealing with a request for assistance
OSCE DOCUMENT ON
STOCKPILES OF CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION

Security risks arising from Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition, Explosive Material, and Detonating Devices in surplus and/or awaiting destruction in the OSCE area

Preamble


2. Reaffirming their will to build upon the Framework for Arms Control contained in Decision No. 8/96 by the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC), and, in particular, their determination to continue to respond to security needs in the OSCE area through arms control, including disarmament and confidence- and security-building,

3. Recognizing that the issue of norms, principles and measures regarding stockpile management of small arms and light weapons is duly covered by the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons,

4. Recognizing the risks and challenges caused by the presence in the OSCE area of stockpiles of conventional ammunition, explosive material and detonating devices in surplus and/or awaiting destruction,

5. Recalling FSC Decision No. 18/02 of 27 November 2002 and the Porto Ministerial Declaration paragraph 13 regarding security risks arising from such stockpiles,

6. Mindful of the discussions that took place during the FSC Workshop on this issue which was held in Vienna on 27 and 28 May 2003,

7. Underlining the need for the OSCE, as part of its comprehensive approach to security, to constructively contribute, while not duplicating already existing international tools or initiatives in this field,

8. Willing to enhance transparency through a voluntary exchange of information on surplus stocks of conventional ammunition, explosive material and detonating devices,

9. Recognizing the benefit of providing participating States, upon their request, with a procedure that is designed to facilitate the assessment of situations created by conventional ammunition, explosive material and/or detonating devices presenting risks on their territory and to establish a framework for international assistance (technical, personnel and/or financial) to address these risks,

10. Also recognizing the possible role of OSCE field operations in assisting host and assisting/donor States’ efforts to deal with stockpile management, stockpile security, and risk assessment of conventional ammunition, explosive material and detonating devices in surplus and/or awaiting destruction,
11. Have decided to adopt and implement the general principles and procedure set out in the following sections.

Section I: General principles

12. The participating States recognize the security and safety risks posed by the presence of stockpiles of conventional ammunition, explosive material and detonating devices in surplus and/or awaiting destruction in some States in the OSCE area. These risks may adversely affect the local population and the environment and, through the possibility of illicit trafficking and uncontrolled spread, especially to terrorists and other criminal groups, the security of the OSCE participating States.

13. Reflecting the OSCE concept of co-operative security and working in concert with other international fora, the participating States decide to establish a practical procedure, requiring minimal administrative burden, to address these risks by providing assistance for the destruction of these stockpiles and/or upgrading stockpile management and security practices. Such a procedure will contribute to reinforcing confidence, security and transparency in the OSCE area.

14. The participating States recognize their primary responsibility for their own stockpiles of conventional ammunition, explosive material and detonating devices, as well as identification and reduction of corresponding surpluses. One of the aims of this initiative is to strengthen national capacity in order to enable participating States, in the long run, to deal with such specific problems on their own. This principle, however, will not diminish their will to promptly consider assistance for States that request it.

15. The participating States agree that the request for and the provision of assistance will take place on a voluntary basis. The OSCE can only take action in response to a specific request for assistance from a participating State when the request addresses stockpiles on its territory. The participating States recognize that the responsibility to sustainably safeguard and/or eliminate the surplus in question lies with the requesting State. The substance and scope of assistance will be determined on a case-by-case basis for each concrete request by a participating State after appropriate consultations with assisting/donor and requesting States.

Section II: Categories of conventional ammunition, explosive material and detonating devices

16. The participating States agree that the scope for addressing stockpiles of conventional ammunition, explosive material and detonating devices in surplus and/or awaiting destruction has to be as broad as possible. This Document includes conventional ammunition, explosive material and detonating devices of land-, air- and sea-based weapons systems. Ammunition used for weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological) is excluded.

17. The following broad categories serve as an indicator, bearing in mind the wide range of categories and components of conventional ammunition, explosive material and detonating devices in surplus and/or awaiting destruction (not listed in order of priority):
(i) Ammunition for small arms and light weapons (SALW);

(ii) Ammunition for major weapon and equipment systems, including missiles;

(iii) Rockets;

(iv) Landmines and other types of mines;

(v) Other conventional ammunition, explosive material and detonating devices.

Section III: Indicators of a surplus

18. It is for each participating State to assess in accordance with its legitimate security needs whether parts of its stockpiles are to be identified as surplus. When assessing whether it has a surplus of conventional ammunition, explosive material and detonating devices, a participating State could take into account the following indicators:

(i) The size, structure, equipment and operational concept of the military, paramilitary and security forces and the police; the geopolitical and geostrategic context including the size of the State’s territory and population;

(ii) The internal and external security situation;

(iii) International commitments including international peacekeeping operations;

(iv) Conventional ammunition, explosive material and detonating devices for weapons no longer used for military purposes in accordance with national regulations and practices.

19. The OSCE Handbook of Best Practices on SALW offers additional indicators that may be useful.

Section IV: Stockpile management and security

20. The participating States recognize that the risks posed by surplus stockpiles of conventional ammunition, explosive material and detonating devices are often created by precarious and unsatisfactory conditions of storage. Therefore, they agree that the stockpile security should be taken into account and that proper national security and safety control over stockpiles of conventional ammunition, explosive material and detonating devices is essential in order to prevent risks of explosion and pollution, as well as loss through theft, corruption and neglect.

21. When assessing whether a surplus should be considered a risk, a participating State can use the following indicators:

(i) The characteristics for stockpile locations;

(ii) The characteristics of infrastructure of storage sites;
(iii) The robustness and capacity of stockpile buildings;
(iv) The condition of conventional ammunition, explosive material and detonating devices;
(v) Access control measures;
(vi) The preparedness to provide adequate protection in emergency situations;
(vii) Lock-and-key and other physical security measures;
(viii) Inventory management and accounting control procedures;
(ix) The sanctions to be applied in the event of loss or theft;
(x) The procedures for the immediate reporting and recovery of any loss;
(xi) The procedures to maximize the security of conventional ammunition, explosive material and detonating devices in transport;
(xii) The training of staff in effective stockpile management and security procedures;
(xiii) The system for application of supervisory and auditing responsibilities.

22. The degree of implementation of these relevant measures might give an indication of the risk caused by conventional ammunition, explosive material and detonating devices in surplus and/or awaiting destruction.

Section V: Transparency about needs and assistance

23. It is the participating State’s own responsibility to determine, taking account of the criteria mentioned in Sections III and IV above, the size of any surplus stockpiles of conventional ammunition, explosive material or detonating devices, whether the stockpiles pose a security risk, and whether external assistance is needed to address this risk.

24. In dealing with the issue of surplus stockpiles of conventional ammunition, explosive material and detonating devices within the OSCE area, information gathering is of prime importance. In order for participating States to be provided with adequate assistance, a standard format questionnaire should be used by the requesting State.

25. To get an overview of available funds and/or expertise, information gathering is of equal significance. For this reason potential assisting/donor participating States are also invited to provide information, when deemed appropriate, in response to a standard format questionnaire.

26. Requests for assistance as well as information provided by potential assisting/donor States using these questionnaires will be provided to all participating States and to the
Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC). Any additional related information may also be provided by requesting and assisting/donor participating States.

(A) **Information to be provided by a requesting State**

27. The information provided by a requesting State will contain the following elements (see model questionnaire in Annex I):

(i) Nature, amount, technical characteristics of each type of conventional ammunition, explosive material or detonating device;

(ii) Location of stockpile;

(iii) Security of stockpile (management and condition);

(iv) Nature and level of risk (to the population/environment, vulnerability to intrusion/theft, etc…);

(v) Incidents; nature and level of danger for the local population/environment; measures taken;

(vi) Plans for destruction/enhancing stockpile management;

(vii) Availability of own assets;

(viii) Assistance requested;

(ix) Details of bilateral/multilateral assistance already requested and/or granted;

(x) Name, address, function, of the point of contact;

(xi) List of annexed documents.

(B) **Information to be provided by an assisting/donor State**

28. The information provided by an assisting/donor State will contain the following elements (see model questionnaire in Annex II):

(i) Volume of available funds;

(ii) Priorities;

(iii) Conditions or restrictions on use of funds;

(iv) Available experts/expertise;

(v) Other available assets.
Section VI: Scope of assistance and procedure

29. Any participating State that has identified a security risk linked to the presence of surplus stockpiles of conventional ammunition, explosive material and detonating devices, and needs assistance, may request the assistance of the international community through the OSCE.

30. The participating States consider it appropriate that technical, financial, consultative and other assistance be provided to requesting participating States on a voluntary basis, in order to address the risk posed by the presence of stockpiles of conventional ammunition, explosive material and/or detonating devices as defined in Sections II, III and IV above.

(A) Scope of assistance

31. Financial assistance is a key element in addressing the needs expressed by requesting States. It will always be of a voluntary nature. By compiling the information gathered through the exchange of information described in Section V (A) and through the expert assessment conducted under Section VI (B), a clear picture could be formed on the financial feasibility of the proposed projects. The funding mechanism for any concrete project should be developed through consultations among assisting/donor States, the requesting State and other participating States that may be involved. If appropriate, the funding mechanism may include the resources of other international organizations, especially those with pre-existing programmes.

32. The assistance may also comprise:

(i) Collecting information on the needs expressed by the participating States in the OSCE area as well as on resources for assistance through the questionnaires mentioned in Section V above;

(ii) Providing risk assessment, as well as advice on stockpile management and on destruction;

(iii) Providing help in elaborating a programme for the destruction of surplus stockpiles or enhancement of their management. This will involve the evaluation of the volume and the nature of the operations that should be engaged, the necessary technical means, the applicable security dispositions and other necessary resources;

(iv) Assisting the requesting State in the definition of projects (pre-feasibility stage) by setting up multinational assistance teams of experts designed to make a preliminary assessment of a given situation. This activity may also be carried out in co-operation with other international actors;

(iv) Assisting the requesting State in the training of personnel involved in the destruction of conventional ammunition, explosive material or detonating devices, as well as in stockpile management and security.

33. The OSCE should have a clearinghouse function, which consists of:
(i) Giving a participating State the possibility to signal the presence of conventional ammunition, explosive material and detonating devices in surplus and/or awaiting destruction on its territory, which present a risk and for which it needs assistance;

(ii) Sending, if requested, assistance and evaluation missions. These actions will be developed in close co-ordination with the requesting State and can be co-ordinated as appropriate with other (international) organizations or institutions;

(iii) Centralizing the data collected by the creation of an archive;

(iv) Monitoring the process where assistance has been requested in co-ordination with the requesting State;

(v) Bringing together and ensuring liaison and exchanging information with requesting States, potential assisting/donor States and other (international) actors in this field.

34. The OSCE field operations may, depending on their mandate, play a role in assisting in the implementation of activities, drawing from the experience of some field operations that have previously dealt with related issues.

(B) Procedure

35. The procedure for dealing with a request for assistance by a participating State will be as follows (see illustration in Annex III):

(i) In initiating the OSCE response to the request, the Chairperson of the FSC, in close co-operation with the FSC Troika and the Chairmanship-in-Office (CiO), will begin consultations, informing the FSC as appropriate, and may seek additional information and/or clarification from the participating State making the request. This may include organizing an initial visit, if invited to do so by the requesting State, which may include a pre-feasibility study. Consultations will be undertaken to identify and contact potential assisting/donor States, as well as initiating contacts with appropriate OSCE bodies and institutions. The CPC will assist in liaison with other relevant international organizations (IO’s) and relevant non-governmental organizations (NGO’s). The CPC will provide technical assistance to the FSC Chairman and the CiO as necessary in responding to the request;

(ii) One or more expert assessment visits may be deemed advisable in order to respond to the request for assistance. Follow-up technical assessment visits will be carried out by expert teams consisting of personnel provided by interested States. Representatives of other international organizations and non-governmental organizations could be included in the expert teams. Assessment visits, which will be funded in accordance with established OSCE procedures, will be carried out with the agreement of, and in close co-operation with, the requesting State. If an OSCE field operation is present in the requesting State, the OSCE field operation can also be involved in the process of consultation and assessment, if appropriate. A final report will be prepared upon the conclusion of the assessment process;

(a) The expert team will assess the situation regarding:
(1) The composition of the stockpiles (nature and type of conventional ammunition, explosive material or detonating devices, volume);

(2) Safety and security conditions, including stockpile management aspects;

(3) Assessment of the risks posed by these stockpiles;

(b) The report of the assessment, which will be conveyed to the State requesting assistance as well as the FSC and the Permanent Council (PC), will include recommendations for action to be taken regarding:

(1) The parts of the stockpiles that should be destroyed;

(2) The processes to be used and the security requirements;

(3) The assessment of the costs and other implications;

(4) The storage and the safety conditions;

(5) The most urgent steps to be taken;

(iii) After the consultations and assessment, the operational and financial implications of responding to the request for assistance will be addressed by the FSC. If implementation of the anticipated assistance requires amendment of the current mandate of an existing OSCE field operation or entails financial consequences for the OSCE, the FSC will prepare, in consultation with the PC, a draft decision for approval by the PC;

(iv) On the basis of information gathered through the steps above, the assisting/donor States and the requesting State will establish a project team to produce a detailed project plan, which will include details of the project’s financial requirements, with co-ordination assistance from the CPC as appropriate. Once the assisting/donor and requesting States agree on the project plan, it will be submitted for information to the FSC and, if appropriate, for endorsement, in close co-operation with the CiO and, where necessary, the PC;

(v) The project team will implement the project plan, providing information periodically over the life of the project to the assisting/donor and requesting States, as well as to the FSC, the PC and the OSCE field operation, if involved;

(vi) On completion of the project, the head of the project team will provide a final report of the results to the FSC and the PC. Lessons learned and possible follow-up actions will be emphasized in this report;

(vii) After initial consultations, it may be determined that no direct OSCE involvement will be pursued. This could be the result of the requesting State and a donor agreeing on a separate arrangement. In cases where there will be no direct OSCE involvement, the Chairperson of the FSC, in co-ordination with the CiO and with assistance from the CPC, will facilitate, in the clearinghouse function, contacts between the requesting
State and potential donors, other States, regional or international organizations, or non-governmental organizations. A report on actions taken will be provided to the FSC and the PC.

Section VII: Final provisions

36. The CPC will act as the point of contact on conventional ammunition, explosive material and detonating devices between the OSCE and other international organizations and institutions. The participating States can provide the names of Points of Contact on conventional ammunition, explosive material and detonating devices, in delegations to the OSCE and in capitals, on a voluntary basis. The list of Points of Contact will be held and maintained by the CPC.

37. The participating States agree to keep the scope, content and implementation of this document under regular review.

38. The Forum for Security Co-operation will consider developing a “best practice” guide of techniques and procedures for the destruction of conventional ammunition, explosive material and detonating devices, and the management and control of stockpiles. This document would cover, inter alia, indicators of surplus and risk, standards and procedures for the proper management of stockpiles, norms to be used in determining which stockpiles should be destroyed, as well as standards and technical procedures of destruction.

39. The text of the present document will be published in the six official languages of the Organization and disseminated by each participating State. It will also be distributed to the field operations of the OSCE.

40. The Secretary General of the OSCE is requested to transmit the present document to the Governments of the Partners for Co-operation (Japan, the Republic of Korea, Thailand and Afghanistan) and of the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia).

41. The Secretary General of the OSCE is requested to transmit the present document to the United Nations.

42. The principles and procedure in this document are politically binding and will take effect on the adoption of the document.
MODEL QUESTIONNAIRE FOR A REQUESTING STATE

1. What conventional ammunition, explosive material or detonating devices in surplus are concerned?

Requesting States will specify in this paragraph, for each category, such indications as:

— The nature of the surplus (cartridges, shells, etc...);
— The amount;
— The condition of the surplus (overdue, damaged, corroded, etc...);
— A geographic description of location.

2. What are the nature and level of risk and danger caused by these surpluses?

A general assessment of the nature and level of risk and danger caused by these surpluses should cover the following items:

— The situation of the relevant stockpiles including environmental issues (especially the effect on the local population) and physical measures against sabotage, theft, trespass, terrorism or any other criminal acts;
— The safety situation of the relevant stockpiles including conditions of stocks, technical factors (e.g., degradation or deterioration rates of conventional ammunition, explosive material or detonating devices) and the maintenance condition of storage buildings;
— Storage management and conditions;
— Details of any recent incidents/accidents and appropriate measures taken.

3. What is the intention of the requesting State in regard to the surplus?

Requesting States have to mention here if their aim, in regard of these surpluses, is basically:

— To destroy them; or
— To enhance their storage conditions in order to avoid the assessed risks and dangers.

4. What assets are available?

The purpose of this paragraph is for requesting States to specify the nature, amount, and capability of the assets and the ways they could be:

— Used in order to solve themselves a part of the current identified problems;
— Put at disposal of the foreign assistance teams.

For example:

— Technical assets directly linked with the destruction or storage of conventional ammunition, explosive material and detonating devices;

— All other logistic means to support the different necessary actions (transportation, accommodation, etc…);

— Possible financial contribution.

5. What type of assistance is requested?

Taking into account the different risks and dangers and regarding the above-mentioned available assets, requesting States have to specify in this paragraph the type of assistance required. It can be assistance, for instance, to:

— Make a detailed risk assessment;

— Develop a destruction programme for the concerned stockpiles;

— Destroy these surpluses;

— Enhance the stockpile management and security;

— Train the personnel involved in the destruction or in the stockpile management and security;

— Realize an awareness programme.

6. Details of bilateral/multilateral assistance already requested and/or granted.

7. Who is the point of contact (POC)?

Name, function and address, telephone and telefax numbers of the POC and, if relevant, email address, are to be mentioned.

8. Any further information.
MODEL QUESTIONNAIRE FOR AN ASSISTING/DONOR STATE

1. What funds are available?

Assisting/donor States are basically expected to indicate the volume of available funds for assistance programs, as well as priorities and conditions or restrictions for the use of these funds.

2. What expertise is available?

Assisting/donor States will mention here, as precisely as possible, what expertise they could supply in order to provide assistance in the following fields linked to stockpiles of conventional ammunition, explosive material or detonating devices:

   — Risk assessment;
   — Development of destruction programmes and monitoring of these programmes;
   — Management of stockpiles;
   — Security of stockpiles with regard to the local population and the environment;
   — Training of personnel involved in the destruction of conventional ammunition, explosive material or detonating devices, or in the stockpile management.

   They will give indications about priorities and conditions or restrictions for the use of this expertise and the participation of their experts.

3. What are the other available assets?

In the same way as in the paragraph above, assisting/donor States mention here the different assets available and specify the priorities, conditions and restrictions for their use.

4. Who is the point of contact (POC)?

Name, function and address, telephone and telefax numbers of the POC and, if relevant, email address, are to be mentioned.

5. Any further information.
ILLUSTRATION OF THE PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH A REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE

Request for assistance (Form of request is flexible)
— Questionnaire provides details; should accompany request

Consultations about request – FSC Chair (Troika) in close co-operation with CiO pursue as necessary.
— May seek additional information/clarification from requesting State; possible initial visit offered by requesting State
— Identify and contact potential assisting/donor States
— CPC assist with liaison with other IO’s and NGO’s
— Contact with other OSCE bodies and institutions as appropriate
CPC provides technical assistance throughout.

Conduct expert assessment visit
— Personnel from interested States.
Personnel from IO’s and NGO’s may be included.
— Co-operation with requesting State

Provide assessment report

Identify operational/financial implications
— FSC address operational/financial implications
— Possible PC decision (field operation mandate, if necessary; supplemental budget; establish voluntary fund; etc)

Produce detailed project plan
— Donors and requesting State establish project team, CPC assist
— Donors and requesting State agree
— Project plan submitted to the FSC, CiO

Implement project plan
— Provide information on status (ongoing) to donors, requesting State, FSC, PC

Final Report to FSC, PC
— Concludes official OSCE action
— Lessons learned and possible follow-up actions

No direct OSCE involvement
— Requesting State and donor may reach separate arrangement
— OSCE should facilitate contact with potential donors (States, other IO’s and NGO’s)