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Management of SALW Programmes

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Foreword

On 08 May 2003 the development of regional micro-disarmament standards and guidelines was discussed during the RACVIAC sponsored seminar on ‘SALW - A year after Implementation of the Stability Pact Plan’. The consensus was that such standards and guidelines were desirable, and SEESAC agreed to develop a framework and then take responsibility for the future development of regional standards. It was agreed RMDS/G would be designed to support the work at the operational level, and would go further than the more generic ‘best practice’ documents currently available. After a wide-ranging discussion between stakeholders as to the status of RMDS/G it has been agreed that the term ‘standards’ will refer to the technical issues, whilst ‘guidelines’ will apply to ‘programme’ issues.

This RMDS/G reflects the development of operational procedures, practices and norms, which have occurred over the past four years in the area of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) control. Best operational practices have been identified and reviewed from within the region and beyond, and included as appropriate within this RMDS/G.

SEESAC has a mandate under the Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan to fulfil, among others, operational objectives of 1) sharing information on and enhancing co-operation in the establishment and implementation of SALW control and reduction programmes and approaches among regional actors; and 2) providing linkage and co-ordination with the other relevant regional initiatives. The development of RMDS/G is one means of fulfilling that mandate.

The work of preparing, reviewing and revising these standards and guidelines is conducted by SEESAC, with the support of international, governmental and non-governmental organisations and consultants. The latest version of each standard, together with background information on the development work, can be found at www.seesac.org. RMDS/G will be reviewed at least every three years to reflect developing SALW control norms and practices, and to incorporate changes to international regulations and requirements. The latest review was conducted on 01 March 2006, which has reflected the development of the UN Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) www.unhhr.org, which include RMDS/G as a normative reference in the Disarmament and the SALW Control modules.

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1 Defined as: ‘The monitoring, collection, control and final disposal of small arms, related ammunition and explosives and light weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. It includes the development of responsible weapons and ammunition management programmes’. Often used interchangeably with SALW control in the past, but SALW Control is now the recognised terminology. The term Micro-Disarmament has only been used here to ensure consistency of the RMDS/G concept, rather than renaming the standards.

2 The layout and format of RMDS/G are based on the highly successful International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). The cooperation of the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) is acknowledged by SEESAC during the development of RMDS/G.

3 There is no agreed international definition of SALW. For the purposes of RMDS/G the following definition will apply: ‘All lethal conventional munitions that can be carried by an individual combatant or a light vehicle, that also do not require a substantial logistic and maintenance capability’
Introduction

The term ‘SALW control’ refers to those activities, which, together, aim to reduce the social, economic and environmental impact of uncontrolled SALW proliferation and possession. These activities comprise Cross Border Control Issues, Legislative and Regulatory Measures, SALW Awareness and Communications Strategies, SALW Collection and Destruction operations, the Management of Information and SALW Stockpile Management.

However, ‘SALW control’ and its constituent activities cannot be addressed in isolation, as there is significant overlap with complementary humanitarian and developmental programmes, and in some cases with peacekeeping and peace support operations. SALW control requires management planning at global, national and local levels, and involves international, national, commercial, NGO and military stakeholders operating under a variety of conditions. Thus it is not possible, nor is it desirable, to establish a unique set of criteria which alone define regional micro-disarmament standards and guidelines. Instead, it is necessary to identify a framework of standards and guidelines which, together, harmonise the manner in which activities and tasks are managed and conducted by the different organisations and agencies involved. Regional Micro-Disarmament Standards (RMDS/G) provide this framework of international standards and guidelines within the South Eastern Europe region. This particular RMDS/G provides guidance on the establishment of national SALW control programmes.
Guide to the management of SALW programmes

1 Scope

This Guide defines the guiding principles for the management, planning and implementation of Small Arms and Light Weapon (SALW) control activities at headquarters and field level. It seeks to examine the key components of a SALW control process, from initial assessment of the problem caused by the SALW, through the creation of the necessary legal structure, to the SALW collection and destruction. These key components have been found by experience to be vital to the generation of high quality SALW control process.

This guide assumes that all components of SALW control must be considered when setting up a national SALW reduction programme, which will include national or international impact surveys and assessments, programme planning, SALW awareness projects and weapon/ammunition destruction procedures. Equally important is the way in which all the programme components interact with each other, and the importance of timing for the implementation of reduction measures.

This guide concentrates on the establishment of national programmes, and the word programme is used throughout the document. The principles and guidelines laid down are in many cases equally applicable to a full-scale national programme set up with the assistance of an international agency such as the SALW Control in Macedonia (SACIM) project, a government programme assisted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), or a smaller programme set up by the government of a country affected by an SALW problem.

2 References

A list of normative references is given in Annex A. Normative references are important documents to which reference is made in this standard and which form part of the provisions of this standard.

3 Terms and definitions

A list of terms and definitions is attached at Annex B, and a complete glossary of all the terms and definitions used in the RMDS/G series of standards is given in RMDS/G 02.10. In such a potentially complex arena, particularly when combined with the potential problems of an exact technical translation, it is important that the correct terminology is used. All participants in the SALW Control process from the international organisations, through the national authorities to the local population must have a clear understanding of what each term represents. Any confusion will only lead to mistrust, which is probably the major problem that any SALW Control programme seeks to dispel.

The term ‘Policy’ defines the purpose and goals of an organisation, and it articulates the rules, standards and principles of action that govern the way in which the organisation aims to achieve these goals. Policy evolves in response to strategic direction and field experience. In turn, it influences the way in which plans are developed, and how resources are mobilised and applied. Policy is prescriptive and compliance is assumed, or at least is encouraged.

In the term ‘Standard’, RMDS/G follow the ISO definition: ‘A standard is a documented agreement containing technical specifications or other precise criteria to be used consistently as rules, guidelines, or definitions of characteristics to ensure that materials, products, processes and services are fit for their purpose’.

Note: RMDS/G aim to improve safety and efficiency in SALW control by promoting the preferred procedures and practices at both headquarters and field level. To be effective, the standards should be definable, measurable, achievable and verifiable.

In the RMDS/G series of standards, the words 'shall', 'should' and 'may' are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance. This use is consistent with the language used in ISO standards and guidelines.
a) 'shall' is used to indicate requirements, methods or specifications that are to be adopted in order to satisfy the standard in full.

b) 'should' is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications.

c) 'may' is used to indicate a possible method or course of action.

The term 'Standing Operating Procedures' (SOPs) refers to instructions that define the preferred or currently established method of conducting an operational task or activity. Their purpose is to establish recognisable and measurable degrees of discipline, uniformity, consistency and commonality within an organisation, with the aim of improving operational effectiveness and safety. SOPs should reflect local requirements and circumstances.

4 The components of an SALW control programme

SALW control is a complex process, in which there are many components, all of which must interact correctly with each other. The components of this process include:

a) the formation of a national commission to develop and implement a national SALW control programme;

b) assessment of the risk of SALW, and their impact on the community;

c) operational planning of a national control programme;

d) development of a SALW awareness campaign;

e) development of an amnesty plan for those illegally holding SALW;

f) development of national legislation to support the collection and destruction of weapons, and to develop policies for the period following the amnesty programme;

g) development of a collection and destruction plan;

h) seeking/securing international funding and technical assistance for the SALW control programme;

i) implementation of the collection phase of the control programme;

j) selection and establishment of the destruction capability, and implementation of the weapons and ammunition destruction phase;

k) development of a cross-border weapons movement prevention programme; and

l) carrying out an evaluation to assess the degree of SALW control achieved.

The components above also require continuous monitoring, to assess the progress being achieved, inform the government, population and donors to the programme, and to eliminate as far as possible any difficulties of implementation.

A schematic diagram of an SALW intervention process is attached at Annex C.
4.1 Formation of a National Commission

The primary responsibility for SALW control lies with the Government of the affected state. This responsibility should normally be vested in a national SALW authority or commission, which should act as a national point of contact for all matters concerning SALW control. It should be charged with the planning, regulation, management and coordination of a national SALW control programme. The national SALW authority is responsible for establishing the national and local conditions that enable the effective management of SALW. It is ultimately responsible for all phases and all facets of a SALW programme within its national boundaries, including the development and implementation of national SOPs and instructions.

In certain situations and at certain times it may be necessary and appropriate for the United Nations, or some other recognised international body, to assume some or all of the responsibilities, and to fulfil some or all the functions, of a national SALW authority. In such cases, reference to a 'national SALW authority' throughout RMDS/G shall be understood as applying to the United Nations or other recognised international body.

In countries with long SALW control action needs, the development of an indigenous capacity should be addressed from the very outset of a SALW programme. Capacity development is the process by which individuals, institutions and societies (individually and collectively) perform functions, solve problems and set and achieve objectives. More information on capacity development is available in RMDS/G 01.10.

4.2 Acceptability of weapons

In many societies, the ownership of SALW is commonplace, and accepted by the community, as is the ownership of guns for hunting and sport. The situation changes in conditions following a civil war, regional conflict or proxy war, when large numbers of SALW of many types are introduced into the country. It must also be understood why members of the civilian population feel it necessary to protect themselves, and feel that possession of a weapon is necessary. Law and order may have broken down, leading to a situation that the police or national army cannot control, or where communities do not feel they can trust or rely on the national security infrastructure for protection. The level of crime or internal warfare resulting from large quantities of illegal SALW may become intolerable, and a nation, faced with such a situation, may decide to introduce control of weapons, by a form of SALW Control. This national decision will need to be taken by the national commission, or any agency such as the United Nations acting on its behalf.

4.3 Assessment of the SALW threat

Following the decision to implement a SALW control programme, the first stage shall be to discover the nature and scope of the weapon threat. This should be done by conducting a SALW survey in order to gain information on the threat to the local community and national authorities. The aim of the survey is to determine the nature and extent of SALW proliferation and impact within a region, nation or community, in order to provide accurate data and information for a safe, effective and efficient intervention by an appropriate organisation.

There are four major components of a comprehensive SALW survey:

a) Small Arms Distribution Assessment (SADA). This collects data on the type, quantity, ownership, distribution and movement of SALW within the country or region, together with an analysis of indigenous resources available to respond to the problem;

b) Small Arms Impact Survey (SAIS). This collects data on the impact of SALW on the community and social and economic development;

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4 RMDS/G 03.10 provides guidance on the establishment of national SALW commissions, and the distinction between an authority and a commission.
5 Taken from UNDP Definition at http://www.magent.undp.org/cdrb/techpap2.htm.
6 See 'The tradition of Bearing Arms in Albania (Managing the Remnants of War p 162)
c) **Small Arms Perception Survey (SAPS).** This collects qualitative information on the attitudes of the local community to SALW ownership and possible interventions; and

d) **Small Arms Capacity Survey (SACS).** This collects information on the indigenous capacity to conduct an appropriate, safe, efficient and effective SALW intervention.

Each national problem is different, and the methods for carrying out the surveys will also have to be different. The data will vary in quantity and quality, but sufficient data must be gained to establish a picture of the threat that will allow a national programme of SALW to be established.

More information on SALW Survey is contained in RMDS/G 05.80, and information can also be found in an article on national assessment or ‘Mapping’ carried out by Saferworld.\\footnote{Resolving Small Arms Proliferation: The Development and Implementation of National Action Plans on Arms Management and Disarmament, ISBN 0-620-30761-7.}

### 4.4 Planning of a national SALW control programme

The planning of a national programme requires that the national commission, (or its equivalent), is in place, and can take the necessary planning action. The national control programme will have to cover all aspects of the programme, many of which are covered below. Four of the main priority topics are the provision of funds, the alerting of the public and Government, effective border controls and the creation of a framework of national legislation, which is highly necessary not only during the actual SALW control programme, but after the programme is over, to prevent a rapid return of illegal weapons into the country.

As part of the planning process, the National Commission will have to start the political and diplomatic moves to gain consensus and get agreement to the disarmament process, and to establish an independent authority to monitor the fairness of the programme.

Above all, the National Commission will have to ensure that all parts of the programme are integrated with each other, and that the whole process can run without interruption. If there is public perception that the programme has stalled, the programme will be hard to re-start, political initiative will be lost and public goodwill and support will be jeopardized.

### 4.5 Planning of a national SALW awareness programme

No SALW programme can run without the backing of both the people and the Government. Where ownership of weapons has been a way of life, and there is a history of armed factional strife in regions of the country, some communities will need convincing that the removal of weapons will not leave them defenceless against aggressors. A SALW Awareness component is therefore a major part of any SALW programme. It will often be difficult to gain the trust of isolated ethnic communities or factions who may have no confidence in the military or police, and the organisation running this component must have a sufficient number of independent and trusted organisations, such as local and international NGOs or churches, who have many links with the people at local and regional level. All must understand that the aim is ‘to secure a safer environment and control SALW within society in order to promote the conditions that will encourage the continued return of the region to normalisation’.

The SALW awareness programme must be put in place early, to get firm indications of the low level support needed to ensure acceptance of the programme. The gathering of such low-level support is relatively inexpensive, and probably within the financial and material resources of the country. It could help to attract external donors to fund the SALW programme.

The SALW awareness programme will also need the full support of government. This might be more difficult to achieve, as political power processes may not always think in humanitarian terms. Without full support from government, the SALW programme is unlikely to succeed.
The more people that are aware of the SALW collection programme, the better. Weapons and ammunition may be held unlawfully, but with no criminal intent. They may in fact be dangerous, especially if they are munition items rather than guns. They may also be badly stored, and poorly secured. The SALW programme must be used as the opportunity to educate the local population of the risks of holding such weapons, as well as provide risk reduction advice.

More information on the development and implementation of national SALW awareness campaigns can be found in RMDS/G 06.10 and 06.20.

4.6 Funding of an SALW programme

SALW control programmes can be costly, depending on the scale of the weapons problem and the incentives offered to encourage the voluntary surrender of weapons. Many governments believe that the bulk of the funding should come from external donors, but in reality, the in-country communities that benefit from the programme should also pay. Local and national government, and businesses should be encouraged to contribute money or resources to ensure the success of the programme. That said, few nations who have recently suffered debilitating internal conflict can afford to run an SALW programme without external aid, and the UN, especially UNDP, has been active in a number of SALW intervention programmes.

Funding is always a difficult issue, because estimating the ultimate cost of a programme is highly complex, and not many past successful programmes are available from which to gain experience. The offering of cash, food or goods in exchange for weapons can raise the costs significantly, and the numbers and types of weapons being surrendered may not be known until well into the programme. The main lessons that have so far emerged from past programmes are that sponsors, especially international donors, must be must be identified before the programme strategy is fully developed in order that a programme is sustainable. For operational reasons it is necessary to start the collection or surrender process at some point in the community and then expand into other areas, but sufficient financial and logistic resources must be made available to sustain the surrender process until the whole community has been covered. No one element of the community will be persuaded to surrender weapons unless it can be convinced that the process will be applied throughout the entire community, or surrender its weapons if rivals in the region will not have to surrender theirs. The argument that it is better to get some weapons out of the community than none is spurious and divisive, especially if it leaves one element of the community at a tactical disadvantage to another. A partial programme based on insufficient funding will therefore probably fail, because it will not be possible to implement it in a way that ensures that equal or proportional numbers of weapons are removed from all factions, or that effective control of the illegal weapon situation can be gained.

4.7 Development of an amnesty plan

To achieve the surrender of illegal weapons, it will be necessary to declare an amnesty for those who are returning them. In many countries, this will require a change in the law. If the open carrying of weapons is prohibited, the law also may need to be changed or suspended for the amnesty period. It will also be necessary to get the amnesty publicly declared, and information on the terms of the amnesty made known to all former warring factions, ethnic groups and communities. It also must be made clear to the armies and police forces, which may have been authorised to detain or shoot anyone openly carrying weapons. The amnesty must also have a fixed time limit, to allow the declaration of penalties for owning or carrying illegal weapons after the amnesty period.

Extensive consultation and advice should be taken when determining the period of the amnesty. It will take time to change the attitudes and perceptions of SALW holders, and they need to be convinced that the security situation has improved to such a degree that they will consider voluntary surrender of SALW. Previous experience has shown that short amnesties of a month are rarely successful, whilst longer ones are more effective in terms of numbers of weapons surrendered. The success of the amnesty will be mainly influenced by:

8 ‘Managing the Remnants of War’, pp 226-227
a) active participation and support of the widest range of stakeholders, (government, international organisations, NGOs and CSOs);

b) the effectiveness of the sensitisation phase of the SALW awareness component;

c) improvements in community perceptions of the security situation;

d) well-targeted incentives for voluntary surrender;

e) timely delivery of incentives;

f) a well-planned and non-confrontational collection operation; and

g) concurrent destruction of SALW in support of the SALW awareness component.

4.8 Development of national legislation

Other national legislation may also be required as well as the amnesty. The collection of numbers of weapons in a single collection point may also be illegal, and will require legal authorisation. Even the destruction of SALW may have legal implications, and the inspections and monitoring of weapons holdings, including those of national organisations such as the armed forces or police may itself require an enabling legal framework. This framework should also make clear the areas of responsibility of all the agencies involved. The re-imposition of new and possibly harsher penalties for illegal weapons after the amnesty period may also be an important legal step. National legislation may need to be extended to cover the import and export of weapons, to ensure that new weapons cannot lawfully be imported to replace those surrendered during the SALW programme.

More information on arms control legislation can be found in RMDS/G 03.20 and 03.30.

4.9 Development of the collection and destruction plan

The core of any SALW programme will be the collection and destruction of the SALW, and this must be carefully planned. The sites for collection must reflect the fact that many civilians may not wish to visit police posts or military barracks, and some ‘neutral ground’ may be needed to be planned, such as community centres or business premises. The collection plan must include details of how SALW are going to be accounted for, stored and guarded prior to being moved to the destruction area. Above all, the programme must be sufficiently transparent to gain and maintain the support of the local population or factions. They should be allowed complete visibility of the process of collection and destruction, within the bounds of operational security. They must be confident that the weapons that they surrender are not going to be used against them by a rival faction or by the government.

The planning of the methods for collection and destruction must allow for both collection and destruction to be repeated as often as is necessary. Replicability ensures that a consistent methodology can be used throughout the programme. This confers advantages in terms of training, use of resources, complete visibility of weapon and ammunition accounting and easily understood operating procedures. As such, it also helps to ensure the sustainability of the programme.

If some incentive is being provided for weapon surrender such as development aid, food or goods, some method of handling and accounting for the incentives must also be planned9. Depending on the geographical scope of the problem, it may well be necessary to plan for a number of SALW collection points. Of particular importance is the manning of SALW collection points; active participation of NGOs and civil society will improve transparency and reduce the ‘confrontational’ aspects of security force participation.

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9 For information on incentives, see RMDS/G 01.10
Information on SALW collection is found in RMDS/G 05.10, and weapon storage and security in RMDS/G 05.30 and 05.40.

Plans will also be needed for the destruction of the collected weapons. There are many different methods of destruction, such as crushing, cutting or burning\textsuperscript{10}. Different types of small arms may need different forms of destruction\textsuperscript{11}, and ammunition will also have to be destroyed. Some forms of destruction are portable, but some are more efficient at fixed locations, which will in turn require planning of the movement of the weapons and ammunition from the collection point to the destruction area. Weapons are probably most vulnerable to theft when being moved, so some form of escorted transport may have to be planned. Initial dismantling of the weapon (i.e. removal of the breech blocks) prior to movement may reduce the security risks. There may also be a move by the government to take the higher quality surrendered weapons and ammunition back into the national police or army, or sell them, but this kind of action could undermine the whole SALW programme.\textsuperscript{12}

\subsection{4.10 Accounting for weapons}

The successful management of a SALW programme will require a high standard of accounting, which at the same time should be as transparent as possible. Receipts may have to be considered for weapons surrendered, and certificates will certainly have to be prepared at the moment of destruction. Plans must be made to publicise the numbers of surrendered weapons, although publicising detailed locations and community statistics may not be an appropriate measure, and the risks of such a move shall be considered. The accountancy process during a pure DDR, rather than wider SALW control intervention, must be transparent enough for all factions to see that equal or proportional numbers of weapons are being surrendered by all parties. It also needs to be accurate enough to ensure that every weapon registered as handed in must also be registered as destroyed. Information on SALW accounting is given in RMDS/G 04.20.

\subsection{4.11 Implementation of the collection plan}

When the actual collection process starts, the programme managers will need to ensure that it is witnessed by national and international media, and the results will need to be publicised, to urge other members of the communities to participate in the surrender process. This means that collection points will need to be correctly staffed and accommodated, with adequate security for recovered weapons and ammunition. There will also need to be adequate space for the storage of different kinds of weapons and ammunition. Programmes often receive large amounts of ammunition, grenades and even landmines. Some of these can be actively dangerous if stored incorrectly, and the assistance of EOD-qualified staff will be necessary to advise on correct methods of short-term storage. Collection sites will need to have secure storage facilities, possibly in steel shipping containers, which may have to be double-locked, with appropriate stakeholders holding the keys to ensure transparency of the process. This will ensure that all stakeholders accept that the weapons are not removed and transferred to armies, police or other factions.

The collection sites will also need suitable facilities for the loading of weapons and ammunition into secure transport for movement to the destruction area, or a site near the collection point where mobile weapon destruction equipment can be used.

\subsection{4.12 Implementation of the destruction plan}

Where possible, the destruction of the weapons and ammunition should be public and symbolic. Where the weapons are to be destroyed by burning, the actual burning can be observed by independent and local NGOs, politicians and the media. Explosive items such as grenades, ammunition, anti-tank rockets and landmines can also be destroyed in symbolic explosions, in the same way as landmine stockpiles are currently publicly destroyed under the Mine Ban Convention, but this must be done under carefully controlled conditions, which will certainly require specialist

\textsuperscript{10} See BICC ‘Tackling Small Arms and Light Weapons - A practical guide for Collection and Destruction’ Feb 2000.

\textsuperscript{11} See OSCE ‘Best Practice Guide on National Procedures for Destruction of Small Arms and Light Weapons’.

\textsuperscript{12} UNDP assistance to SALW interventions will normally be conditional on the physical destruction of all weapons destroyed.
EOD advice, and destruction certificates must be available to show what weapons have been destroyed.

Following the destruction of the weapons, they need to be inspected to ensure that they cannot be repaired, or that parts of them cannot be re-built into complete weapons, or used again as spare parts. This again will initially require specialist expertise. More information on SALW is obtained in RMDS/G 05.20.

The end result of the destruction process will be large amounts of scrap metal and possibly wood, if burning is not used. Metal scrap can be sold\textsuperscript{13}, or recycled into useful tools. This could also have a symbolic effect - in both the Republic of Serbia and Kosovo, steel from destroyed weapons is turned into manhole covers, and this sort of activity can be used to support community awareness programmes.

4.13 Monitoring and verification of the SALW programme

A programme as politically sensitive as SALW control will require active independent monitoring to ensure that the programme is running satisfactorily, and above all is being applied in an even-handed way. For the programme to be successful there should be continuous feedback to the government, the community, the donors and sponsors stating how many weapons have been collected and destroyed. This assessment must be made by independent verification and monitoring teams. Where possible these teams need to be able to give some estimates of the proportion of weapons held illegally that have been surrendered. The verifying agencies will need to have the technical expertise to assess the completeness of destruction, not only of weapons but also of explosive items. More information on the verification and monitoring of SALW programmes is found in RMDS/G 04.30 and 04.40.

4.14 Development of a cross-border SALW movement prevention programme

A SALW intervention programme should not be carried out in isolation, but be seen as part of a broader disarmament strategy in support of security sector reform; in particular in the areas of cross border controls and stockpile destruction. The SALW intervention programme may be needed as part of a peace-keeping or peace-making strategy, it may assist in creating stability following the demobilisation of young soldiers, or it may be elevated to become a regional peace initiative. In any of the cases above, the good effects of the SALW programme can only be sustained if active measures are taken to prevent weapons moving back into the country to replace those surrendered. Prevention of cross-border weapon movement can only be done by mutual cooperation between the nations on either sides of the border, but it is generally in the interests of both nations to work together. Conflicts can quickly flow across borders unless checked, and the supply of weapons follows the conflicts. To build a sustainable disarmament programme, groups of nations need to be persuaded that mutual support in the establishment of SALW control or other disarmament programmes is one of the keys to success of such programmes.

Information on cross-border controls is available in RMDS/G 05.70

4.15 Evaluation of the SALW programme

At the end of the SALW programme, it will be necessary to carry out an evaluation of the results, and the number of weapons handed in compared with the estimated numbers in circulation before the programme started. More importantly, it will be necessary to evaluate as far as possible what effect the reduction of weapons, and the associated SALW awareness programme, has had on the attitudes and way of life of the local people. An SALW programme is not merely a matter of weapons, but the creation of an environment where the government can govern, where the police and armed forces can be trusted, where different communities can live alongside each other and community development can take place in a secure environment. The socio-economic aspects of an SALW programme are equally as important as the number of weapons recovered.

\textsuperscript{13} See OSCE Best Practice Guide on National Procedures for Destruction of Small Arms and Light Weapons
It is also important to evaluate what further steps in disarmament and cross-border co-operation have been taken following the SALW programme. An SALW programme is merely one step on the road to disarmament and the creation of national and regional stability.

5 Areas of responsibility

5.1 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

UNDP has a general responsibility for enabling, assisting and encouraging the effective management of SALW control programmes by continuously maintaining an overview of RMDS/G to reflect developing SALW control norms and practices, and by informing stakeholders of any changes to international regulations and requirements.

UNDP should apply RMDS/G to its SALW control programmes, activities and contracts within South Eastern and Eastern Europe unless the local situation precludes their effective application. In such circumstances, when one or more RMDS/G is not appropriate, UNDP will provide alternative specifications, requirements and guidance.

In the preliminary phases of a SALW control programme UNDP should perform a pivotal role of SALW awareness raising and co-ordination with the key regional, national and/or local stakeholders.

5.2 Regional organizations

In certain areas of the world, regional organizations have been given a mandate by their member states to coordinate and support SALW control programmes within a states' national boundaries. (For example EUFOR within Bosnia and Herzegovina).

In these circumstances the regional organization should assume many of the responsibilities and roles of the national SALW authority, and could also act as a conduit for donor resources. The responsibilities and roles of regional organizations for SALW control programmes will vary from state to state and may be subject to specific Memoranda of Understanding, or similar agreements.

5.3 SEESAC

SEESAC shall provide operational assistance, technical assistance and management information, within resources and on request, to all SALW control programmes within South Eastern and Eastern Europe.

5.4 National SALW Authority

The national SALW authority should be responsible for ensuring the national conditions that enable the effective management of national SALW control programmes. The national SALW authority is ultimately responsible for developing and managing the SALW control programme within its national boundaries.

The national SALW authority shall be responsible for establishing and maintaining national regulations and procedures for the management of SALW control programmes. These national regulations and procedures should be consistent with RMDS/G, and other relevant national and international standards, regulations and requirements.

5.5 Intra-national authorities

Authorities that exist within nations introducing SALW Control operations and legislation are responsible for ensuring that their members recognise, respect and comply with such legislation, and support the national government in its introduction and implementation.
5.6 SALW Control organizations

NGOs, commercial companies and other organizations involved in SALW control projects shall establish SOPs, instructions and procedures which enable SALW control projects to be conducted effectively, efficiently and safely. These SOPs should be based on the appropriate national regulations, or in their absence RMDS/G.

5.7 Donors

Most SALW Control operations are funded by donors – mainly governments and regional organisations. Donor agencies are part of the management process, and as such have a responsibility for ensuring that the projects they are funding are managed effectively, and in accordance with national and/or international standards. This involves attention to the writing of contract documents, and ensuring that SALW Control organisations chosen to carry out such contracts are competent. This responsibility and accountability is even greater when the national SALW authority is in the process of formation, and has not had the opportunity to gain experience
Annex A
(Normative)
References

The following documents when referred to in the text of this standard, form part of the provisions of this standard.

a) RMDS/G 01.10 - Introduction to RMDS/G and SALW control measures;

b) RMDS/G 02.10 - Glossary and definitions;

c) RMDS/G 03.10 - National SALW commissions;

d) RMDS/G 03.20 - SALW control and transfer legislation

e) RMDS/G 03.30 - Export documentation;

f) RMDS/G 03.40 - Marking and tracing of SALW;

g) RMDS/G 04.10 - Management of SALW programmes;

h) RMDS/G 04.20 - SALW accounting;

i) RMDS/G 04.30 - Monitoring of SALW programmes;

j) RMDS/G 04.40 - Verification of SALW programmes;

k) RMDS/G 05.10 - SALW collection;

l) RMDS/G 05.20 - SALW destruction;

m) RMDS/G 05.30 - Weapons storage and security;

n) RMDS/G 05.40 - Ammunition and explosives storage and safety;

o) RMDS/G 05.50 - Ammunition stockpile management;

p) RMDS/G 05.60 - EOD support to SALW programmes;

q) RMDS/G 05.70 - Cross-border controls;

r) RMDS/G 05.80 - SALW survey; and

s) RMDS/G 06.10 - Development and implementation of SALW awareness campaigns.

The latest version/edition of these references should be used. The latest version, together with background information on the development work, can be found at www.seesac.org. RMDS/G will be reviewed at least every three years to reflect developing SALW control norms and practices, and to incorporate changes to international regulations and requirements.
Annex B  
(Informative)  
Terms and Definitions

A.1.1  
**buy back**  
the direct linkage between the surrender of weapons, ammunition and explosives in return for cash.

Note: Buy Back schemes have been practised in the past, but the concept is often unacceptable to international donors. There is a perception that such schemes reward irresponsible armed personnel who may have already harmed society and the innocent civilian population. They also provide the opportunity for an individual to conduct low level trading in SALW.

A.1.2  
**demobilisation**  
the process by which armed forces (government and/or opposition or factional forces) either downsize or completely disband, as part of a broader transformation from war to peace.

Note: Typically, demobilisation involves the assembly, quartering, disarmament, administration and discharge of former combatants, who may receive some form of compensation to encourage their transition to civilian life.

A.1.3  
**demilitarisation**  
the complete range of processes that render weapons, ammunition and explosives unfit for their originally intended purpose.

Note: Demilitarisation not only involves the final destruction process, but also includes all of the other transport, storage, accounting and pre-processing operations that are equally as critical to achieving the final result.

A.1.4  
**destruction**  
the process of final conversion of weapons, ammunition and explosives into an inert state that can no longer function as designed.

A.1.5  
**disposal (logistic)**  
the removal of ammunition and explosives from a stockpile by the utilisation of a variety of methods, (that may not necessarily involve destruction). Logistic disposal may or may not require the use of Render Safe Procedures.

Note: There are five traditional methods of disposal used by armed forces around the world, some of which are obviously not suitable for SALW Control programmes. These are; 1) sale; 2) gift; 3) increased use at training; 4) deep sea dumping; and 5) destruction or demilitarisation.

A.1.6  
**Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)**  
the detection, identification, evaluation, render safe, recovery and final disposal of unexploded ordnance. It may also include the rendering-safe and/or disposal of such explosive ordnance, which have become hazardous by damage or deterioration, when the disposal of such

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14 As of March 2002, UNDP-BCPR will no longer support such schemes.
16 IMAS 11.10.
17 This is an obvious area where confusion can be caused due to the use of incorrect terminology or translation. One party may assume that when the other mentions disposal they are really talking about destruction. This may not be the case!
explosive ordnance is beyond the capabilities of those personnel normally assigned the responsibility for routine disposal.  

Note: The presence of ammunition and explosives during SALW Control operations will inevitably require some degree of EOD response. The level of this response will be dictated by the condition of the ammunition, its level of deterioration and the way that it is handled by the local community.

A.1.7 micro-disarmament
the collection, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives, light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. It includes the development of responsible arms management programmes.

A.1.8 munition
a complete device charged with explosives, propellants, pyrotechnics, initiating composition, or nuclear, biological or chemical material for use in military operations, including demolitions. [AAP-6].

Note: In common usage, ‘munitions’ (plural) can be military weapons, ammunition and equipment.

A.1.9 national authority
the government department(s), organisation(s) or institution(s) in a country charged with the regulation, management and coordination of SALW activities.

A.1.10 reintegration
assistance measures provided to former combatants that would increase the potential for their and their families' economic and social reintegration into civil society.  

Note: Reintegration programmes could include cash assistance, or compensation in kind, as well as vocational training, income generating activities and participation in sustainable development programmes. In some UNDP SALW programme, reintegration could include individuals who return munitions.

A.1.11 residual risk
in the context of SALW control, the term refers to..... the risk remaining following the application of all reasonable efforts to remove the risks inherent in all collection and destruction activities, and SALW stockpile management. [Modified from ISO Guide 51:1999]

A.1.12 risk
combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm. [ISO Guide 51: 1999(E)]

A.1.13 risk analysis
systematic use of available information to identify hazards and to estimate the risk. [ISO Guide 51: 1999(E)]

A.1.14 risk assessment
overall process comprising a risk analysis and a risk evaluation. [ISO Guide 51: 1999(E)]

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A.1.15  
**risk evaluation**  
process based on **risk analysis** to determine whether the **tolerable risk** has been achieved. [ISO Guide 51: 1999(E)]

A.1.16  
**risk reduction**  
actions taken to lessen the probability, negative consequences or both, associated with a particular event or series of events.

A.1.17  
**tolerable risk**  
risk which is accepted in a given context based on the current values of society. [ISO Guide 51: 1999 (E)]

A.1.18  
**safety**  
freedom from unacceptable **risk**. [ISO Guide 51: 1999(E)]

A.1.19  
**Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)**  
al all lethal conventional munitions that can be carried by an individual combatant or a light vehicle, that do not require a substantial logistic and maintenance capability.

Note: There are a variety of definitions for SALW circulating and international consensus on a ‘correct’ definition has yet to be agreed. For the purposes of RMDS/G the above definition will be used.

A.1.20  
**SALW awareness**  
A programme of activities undertaken with the overall goal of minimising, and where possible eliminating, the negative consequences of inadequate SALW Control by undertaking an appropriate combination of SALW advocacy, SALW risk education and media operations/public information campaigns which together work to change behaviours and facilitate appropriate alternative solutions over the long term.

Note: Wherever it exists, the operational objectives of a national SALW Control initiative will dictate the appropriate type of SALW Awareness activities.

Note: SALW awareness is a mass mobilisation approach that delivers information on the SALW threat. It may take the form of formal or non-formal education and may use mass media techniques.

Note: In an emergency situation, due to time constraints and the lack of available data, it is the most practical means of communicating safety information. In other situations it can support community liaison.

A.1.21  
**SALW advocacy**  
a programme of activities that aim to raise SALW problems and issues with the general public, the authorities, the media, Governments and their institutions to achieve changes at both institutional and/or individual levels.

Note: These types of activities also include campaigns highlighting the SALW problems and issues with the aim of encouraging people to surrender weapons. This is generally conducted as a support to weapons collection programmes.

A.1.22  
**SALW Risk Education**  
a process that promotes the adoption of safer behaviours by at-risk groups and by SALW holders, and which provides the links between affected communities, other SALW components and other sectors.
Note: SALW Risk Education can be implemented as a stand-alone activity, in contexts where no weapons collection is taking place. If an amnesty is to be set up at a later stage, risk education activities will permit an information campaign to take place efficiently, using the networks, systems and methods in place as part of the risk education programme and adapting the content accordingly.

Note: SALW Risk Education is an essential component of SALW Control. There are two related and mutually reinforcing components: a) Community Involvement; and b) Public Education.

Note: Generally, SALW Risk Education programmes can use both approaches, as they are mutually reinforcing. They are not however alternative to each other, nor are they alternative to eradicating the SALW threat by weapons collection and destruction. The use of those approaches will also depend on whether a weapon collection programme is taking place or not.

A.1.23 Small Arms Capacity Assessment (SACA)

the component of SALW survey that collects data on the indigenous resources available to respond to the SALW problem.

A.1.24 Small Arms Distribution Assessment (SADA)

the component of SALW survey that collects data on the type, quantity, ownership, distribution and movement of SALW within the country or region.

A.1.25 Small Arms Impact Survey (SAIS)

the component of SALW survey that collects data on the impact of SALW on the community and social and economic development.

A.1.26 Small Arms Perception Survey (SAPS)

the component of SALW survey that collects qualitative and quantitative information, via focus groups, interviews, and household surveys, on the attitudes of the local community to SALW and possible interventions.

A.1.27 standard

a standard is a documented agreement containing technical specifications or other precise criteria to be used consistently as rules, guidelines, or definitions of characteristics to ensure that materials, products, processes and services are fit for their purpose.

Note: RMDS/G aim to improve safety and efficiency in SALW Control by promoting the preferred procedures and practices at both headquarters and field level. To be effective, the standards should be definable, measurable, achievable and verifiable.

A.1.28 standing operating procedures (SOPs)

standard operating procedures

instructions which define the preferred or currently established method of conducting an operational task or activity.

Note: Their purpose is to promote recognisable and measurable degrees of discipline, uniformity, consistency and commonality within an organization, with the aim of improving operational effectiveness and safety. SOPs should reflect local requirements and circumstances.

A.1.29 stockpile management

those procedures and activities regarding SALW safety and security in accounting, storage, transportation and handling.
A.1.30
survey (SALW Survey)
a systematic and logical process to determine the nature and extent of SALW proliferation and impact within a region, nation or community in order to provide accurate data and information for a safe, effective and efficient intervention by an appropriate organisation.

A.1.31
Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)
explosive ordnance which has been primed, fuzed, armed or otherwise prepared for action, and which has been dropped, fired, launched, projected, or placed in such a manner as to constitute a hazard to operations, installations, personnel or material and remains unexploded either by malfunction or design or for any other cause. 20

A.1.32
Voluntary Surrender
the physical return by an individual(s) or community of small arms and light weapons to the legal government or an international organisation with no further penalty.

A.1.33
Weapons in Competition for Development (WCD)
the direct linkage between the voluntary surrender of small arms and light weapons by competing communities in exchange for an agreed proportion of small-scale infrastructure development by the legal government, an international organisation or NGO.

A.1.34
Weapons in Exchange for Development (WED) (WFD)
the indirect linkage between the voluntary surrender of small arms and light weapons by the community as a whole in exchange for the provision of sustainable infrastructure development by the legal government, an international organisation or NGO.

A.1.35
Weapons in Exchange for Incentives (WEI)
the direct linkage between the voluntary surrender of small arms and light weapons by individuals in exchange for the provision of appropriate materials by the legal government, an international organisation or NGO.

A.1.36
Weapons Linked to Development (WLD)
the direct linkage between the voluntary surrender of small arms and light weapons by the community as a whole in return for an increase in ongoing development assistance by the legal government, an international organisation or NGO.

20 NATO Definition.
Annex C
(Informative)
SALW Intervention Process Flow